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ABSTRACT 
Derek John Holmgren: “Gateway to Freedom”: The Friedland Refugee Transit Camp as 
Regulating Humanitarianism, 1945-1960 
(Under the direction of Konrad H. Jarausch) 
 Using the refugee transit camp located in Friedland, Lower Saxony as a case study, this 
dissertation examines the efforts in West Germany to aid and resettle millions of persons 
displaced during and after World War II. These uprooted populations included foreign victims of 
the Nazi regime (forced laborers, prisoners of war, and concentration camp survivors), Germans 
evacuated from bombed-out cities, Germans fleeing or expelled from from Eastern Europe, and 
German soldiers who were demobilized and released from prisoner of war camps. Established by 
order of the British military government in September 1945, the camp at Friedland functioned as 
the lynchpin for a system designed to collect, aid, register, and resettle displaced populations as 
quickly as possible. As such, this study describes the operation of the camp as a regulating form 
of humanitarianism that not only aided refugees with food, shelter, and medical services, but also 
turned unmanageable masses into settled individuals with claims on the postwar welfare state. 
Between 1945 and 1960, the camp processed over 2.1 million individuals. Given the scope of the 
crisis, this intervention to ameliorate suffering and restore social order depended on the work of 
German civil authorities, the British military government, and German, British, and international 
charities. 
 This study of the Friedland camp makes three major contributions to scholarship on 
postwar displacement in Central and Eastern Europe. First, it demonstrates how improvisational 
efforts at Friedland became formalized into a comprehensive system of regulation in which the 
iv 
camp played a crucial role. Second, examination of groups processed at Friedland shows that the 
postwar unsettling of populations was both broader in scope and longer lasting than previously 
recognized. Groups whose dislocation was tied to the war included evacuees, released military 
and civilian prisoners of war, young refugees from the Soviet zone, and “resettlers” who left 
Poland. Third, this dissertation deconstructs the mythology of Friedland as the “Gateway to 
Freedom” by analyzing credible elements of myth, counter-examples to it, and officials’ 
cultivation of the camp’s public image. 
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PREFACE 
Over the past seven years, when my conversations with Germans have turned toward 
research, typically there has been some form of the question, “Why are you, an American, 
interested in this topic of Friedland?” This question is natural, and it is one I admit to having 
asked myself often while researching and writing this dissertation. Many Germans have heard of 
the “Gateway to Freedom,” especially those of older age cohorts or from the Göttingen area, but 
it is not self-evident that a foreigner would know of the camp, much less spend years of his life 
on the topic. 
 Oddly enough, my path to Friedland began in the former Yugoslavia. I had long been 
interested in that region and the wars during the 1990s. I was fortunate to have the opportunity to 
participate in a University of Denver “service-learning” course in Sarajevo and Vareš after my 
freshman year at DU in 2005. While I was teaching English in Vareš, some of the older students 
shared their experiences of the war. I was intrigued by the issues of flight and resettlement in the 
city as well as the good interethnic relationships between Croatian and Bosniak teenagers 
compared to rumored animosity between the adults there. Years later, when I was choosing a 
topic for my senior thesis, I had wanted to address those issues with respect to Yugoslavia after 
World War II. My advisor, Carol Helstosky, wisely suggested that given my knowledge of 
German and lack of knowledge of Serbo-Croatian, it might make more sense to write about 
Germans expelled after World War II. The topic was a fascinating for me, particularly because it 
was so unknown in America despite widespread interest in World War II. 
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 When I first met with Konrad Jarausch as a prospective student for UNC-Chapel Hill, he 
encouraged me to continue research in the area of expulsions if I still found it interesting. He also 
helpfully suggested that before leaving Germany for North Carolina, I might look into the history 
of the Friedland camp near Göttingen where I was working as an English teaching assistant. 
Representatives of the camp administration kindly give me a short tour of the facility and sat me 
down with the two-volume camp Chronik, a collection of newspaper articles, memoranda, and 
photographs saved over the years. It quickly became evident that the Friedland camp was 
interesting as more than just a facility for expellees. The diversity of people aided at Friedland 
along with the contentious relationship between German and British administrations seemed to 
offer a wider perspective on the questions that most interested me: How do societies return to 
normal after the devastation of war? How can refugee crises be resolved quickly without leading 
to lasting irredentist political conflict?  
 Politics are often an unspoken aspect of the question about my research on Friedland and 
the displacement of Germans. Indeed, much of the early research done on expulsions served the 
purposes of documenting German claims against eastern neighbors, demonstrating communist 
repression, and creating exculpatory narratives of the war through focus on German victimhood. 
The displacement of Germans during and after the war is still a politically charged issue. That 
much was clearly apparent when I attended a conference at Friedland sponsored by the Bund der 
Vertriebenen (Federation of Expellees). When the topic of expellee “integration” arose, audience 
members angrily proclaimed that there had been no need for integration, because they had 
always been German. My only interest in these sorts of politics is to document and analyze 
instances in which they intersected with operation at Friedland. I have no desire to perpetuate the 
xi 
political projects involved in the early forms of research on German displacement, but the 
unsettlement did produce problems that, along with the solutions to them, are worth study. 
 As numerous studies of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe have reminded their 
readers, the naming of cities, regions, and the like is also a political matter. Refugee officials in 
the federal and Lower Saxon ministries were well aware of that fact. For example, archival 
records include directions on how to refer to Poland. In the effort to avoid antagonizing Polish 
authorities, officials were to refer to “Poland and the Polish-administered eastern territories,” as 
opposed to “Poland and the Polish-occupied eastern territories” (in both cases leaving aside the 
fact that those eastern territories were internationally recognized as parts of the existing Polish 
state). 
For sake of clarity, I have referred to towns and cities by their official names in their 
country after 1945. In some cases, they are followed by the German name. When there was a 
common English name, I used that (hence, Poznań followed by Posen, but Warsaw instead of 
Warszawa). That is not to imply any ongoing German claim to any of the cities but rather to 
avoid confusion, because the German sources rarely used Polish, Czech, or other languages’ 
names for towns and cities. Indeed, for small towns in rural Eastern Europe, some guesswork 
was required to translate the German name into a present-day location. For German cities, I have 
maintained German spelling unless the city is particularly well known by its English equivalent 
(hence, Göttingen, Braunschweig, Hannover rather than Gottingen, Brunswick, and Hanover; but 
Cologne and Munich rather than Köln and München). 
 The names of states and regions present other difficulties. In the German case, many of 
the states did not actually exist throughout the period of this study. Lower Saxony did not 
become a political entity until November 1946, and Thuringia was dissolved along with other 
xii 
East German states in favor of districts in 1952. To avoid awkwardness throughout, I simply 
refer to the state names regardless of the date. I have chosen the states’ English names because of 
the need to use them adjectivally (e.g. Lower Saxon instead of niedersächsisch). At the country 
level, I refer to West Germany and East Germany to include the occupation periods, while the 
Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic refer specifically to the states 
from 1949 onward. 
Finally, the changing political structures in West Germany can also potentially create 
awkwardness and confusion. The refugee ministry in Lower Saxony, for example, used a variety 
of names. People referred to it in many other ways as well. In the interest of simplicity, I refer to 
it as the Lower Saxon Ministry for Refugees or state refugee ministry rather than longer variants, 
such as the Lower Saxon Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and the War-Damaged. 
xiii 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES .....................................................................................................................xvi 
INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................................1 
Historiography .................................................................................................................... 6 
Theory, Methods, and Sources.......................................................................................... 18 
Chapter Organization ........................................................................................................ 30 
CHAPTER 1: NATIONALIZATION AND POPULATION DISPLACEMENT  ...................... 35 
The Nationalization of Eastern European Populations ..................................................... 38 
Minority Protection and Population Transfers .................................................................. 45 
World War II and the Unsettling of Peoples ..................................................................... 53 
Evacuees and DPs ............................................................................................................. 62 
Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 64 
CHAPTER 2: OUT OF THE EAST AND INTO CAMPS .......................................................... 67 
Refugee Crises and the Development of Camp Operation ............................................... 71 
Camp Populations ............................................................................................................. 85 
The Camp Personnel ......................................................................................................... 96 
British and German Volunteers, Fraternization, and Reconstructing Civil Society ........108 
Conclusions ......................................................................................................................121 
CHAPTER 3: PROVISIONAL TO PERMANENT: BRITISH AND 
GERMAN ADMINISTRATION, 1946-1952 .............................................................................124 
British Oversight ..............................................................................................................126 
xiv 
Reformation of the German Administration ....................................................................136 
Camp Staff, Gendered Divisions of Labor, and Charities ...............................................147 
End of an Era ...................................................................................................................161 
CHAPTER 4: FROM PROVISIONAL TO PERMANENT II: CAMP  
POPULATIONS, 1946-1952 .......................................................................................................170 
Prisoners of War ..............................................................................................................172 
“Resettlers” from Poland .................................................................................................202 
Foreign Nationals .............................................................................................................221 
Conclusions ......................................................................................................................243 
CHAPTER 5: “POOR GERMAN YOUTH”: EFFORTS TO RESTORE ORDER 
THROUGH THE FRIEDLAND YOUTH RECEPTION CAMP ...............................................246 
Establishment of the Youth Reception Camp ...................................................................248 
Operation of the Youth Camp and Daily Life ...................................................................253 
Vocational Training and Work Placements .......................................................................259 
Problem Cases, Punishment, and Trauma .........................................................................266 
Youth Camp Demographics ..............................................................................................272 
Female Residents and Gender in the Youth Problematic ..................................................277 
Conclusions .......................................................................................................................285 
CHAPTER 6: GATEWAY TO FREEDOM: REFUGEES, RETURNEES, 
AND MYTH-MAKING ..............................................................................................................288 
Refugees in Residence and Operation Vermin ................................................................291 
The Last Homecomings ...................................................................................................303 
Hungarian Refugees .........................................................................................................325 
Conclusions ......................................................................................................................333 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................336 
xv 
APPENDIX A: OVERVIEW OF PERSONS REGISTERED BETWEEN 
1945 AND 1960 ...............................................................................................................349 
APPENDIX B: MAJOR POPULATION TYPES, 1945-1960 ....................................................350 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................351
xvi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Overview of Persons Registered during the First Year of Operation 
(20 September 1945 to 19 September 1946)..................................................................... 89 
Figure 2: Size and Direction of Returnee Traffic, 1945-1960 .....................................................177 
Figure 3: Overview of Returnees Registered in 1949 ..................................................................179 
Figure 4: Distribution of the Returnees Registered in 1949 ........................................................183 
Figure 5: Changes in Refugee and Resettler Traffic, 1945-1960 ................................................211 
Figure 6: Distribution of Youths from the JAL ...........................................................................266 
Figure 7: Vocational Training of JAL Residents .........................................................................275 
 
   
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On a snowy morning in late November 1945, a young British volunteer named David 
Sainty made his first trip into Soviet-occupied Thuringia to bring elderly and infirm refugees to 
the newly opened refugee camp in Friedland, a small town in British-occupied Lower Saxony. In 
addition to collecting an ambulance-load of paralyzed and elderly individuals, Sainty and his 
colleagues gathered vital information about displaced populations in the Soviet zone. The British 
Army of the Rhine unit administering the Friedland camp had become increasingly disconcerted 
by the piecemeal reports from the individuals who crossed at border checkpoints and along the 
so-called “Green Frontier” (grüne Grenze). The military government was most alarmed about 
rumors of a “queue on the other side of the barrier stretching for anything up to 20 kilometres.” 
They also feared that there was “no provision whatever for [those] people on the Russian side” 
and that the Russians had “disbanded the Red Cross in their zone.” To the officials of the British 
military government, such masses of underfed and under-provisioned refugees threatened both 
order and the general state of health in their zone. Across the border in Arenshausen, Sainty 
observed that the Russians, in fact, were running their own transit camps and that the Red Cross 
was functioning along the frontier. As to the masses, Sainty could at least provide reassurance in 
the form of the approximate figure of 6,000 people and some stragglers nearer to Heiligenstadt 
on the morning of November 26. Of course, he had to admit, “beyond that we don’t know.”1 
 Although the Friedland camp has long enjoyed characterizations as a center of 
humanitarian aid and a “Gateway to Freedom,” concerns about insecurity posed by the inter-
                                                 
1 “Report 31,” November 26, 1945, B 45 11 26 – 1 01. Archives of the Service Civil International. 
   
2 
zonal traffic of unsettled populations led to the camp’s construction in September 1945. Myriad 
reasons accounted for this two-way, cross-border flow. Wartime evacuees journeyed home, 
while expellees from Eastern Europe sought new a start. Still others searched for missing family 
members or tried to retrieve property from former homes. Outright smuggling accounted for yet 
another segment of the regular border traffic. In addition to the humanitarian concern for these 
masses, uncontrolled movement between zones also presented dangers, both real and perceived. 
These unsettled populations threatened to overrun overcrowded cities. Supposed criminal 
elements among them profited from chaos and scarcity while exacerbating both problems. 
Government administrators also recognized that uncontrolled movement of exhausted refugees 
presented a major epidemiological risk. The refugee and transit camp at Friedland thus was much 
more than the humanitarian Gateway to Freedom of popular memory. Rather, the Friedland 
camp played a crucial role in the maintenance of a border regime and the implementation refugee 
policies of western occupied Germany and, later, the West German government. 
 The twentieth century was the century of the camp.2 Despite Zygmunt Bauman’s 
evocative phrasing that “the shadows cast by Auschwitz and the Gulag seem by far the longest,” 
his discussion of the camp ignores the related development of refugee camps.3 The modern camp 
structure contributed to an increased scope and speed of killing in concentration and 
extermination camps, but the institution of the refugee camp has likewise allowed for greater, 
faster, and more effective responses to humanitarian disasters. Compared to the literature on 
Nazi and Soviet camps, refugee camps have received relatively little scholarly and public 
                                                 
2 Succeeding the Ages of Reason, Enlightenment, and Revolutions respectively in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and 
nineteenth centuries, Zygmunt Bauman suggests that the twentieth century will be known as the “Age of the 
Camps.” See Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1995), 192. 
3 Ibid., 193. 
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attention. Yet, if one takes seriously the notion of the century of the camp, the role played by 
refugee camps in providing for stability in the second half of Europe’s twentieth century requires 
critical attention in much the way scholars have examined the camp in the history of the 
murderous first half-century. Indeed, unsettlement in the form of millions of non-German 
Displaced Persons and millions more Germans expelled from Eastern Europe was a major 
consequence of World War II. Solving that problem profoundly affected the formation of the 
postwar order, such that the refugee camp should be taken as a starting point for analyzing 
Europe’s recovery from war.4 
 The refugee transit camp at Friedland is therefore the point of departure for this study of 
the postwar project of resettling and reordering displaced populations after the disruptions of 
dictatorship and war. A case study of the Friedland camp is an especially useful method for 
examining solutions to the postwar problem of unsettlement, because the camp functioned as a 
lynchpin in the process of resettling displaced populations. This study addresses key issues at 
each step in the process of unsettlement, registration, and resettlement. Moreover, the 
periodization from 1945 to 1960 reveals crucial information about changes to the groups housed 
at Friedland and how those groups were treated. At its most basic level, the Friedland facility 
functioned as a containment system for holding and eventually distributing displaced individuals, 
including: civilian evacuees and expellees, released prisoners of war, refugees from the Soviet 
Zone/German Democratic Republic, orphaned or otherwise unsupervised children, foreigners 
who lost Displaced Person status or who entered Germany illegally after the war, and so-called 
German “resettlers” who left Eastern Europe after the official end to expulsions in 1949. As 
                                                 
4 Tony Judt includes Europe’s displaced populations as one of the crucial legacies of the war to be overcome in the 
postwar recovery, though his discussion of the camp system for surmounting the problem focuses on the charges of 
UNRRA and the IRO. See Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 21-32. 
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such, the many shifts in the camp populations speak to a wide range of problems and attempted 
solutions regarding the reestablishment of social order during the foundational years of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
At the Friedland camp, the German and Allied response to this near overwhelming 
displacement problem consisted of what this study identifies as a “regulating humanitarianism.” 
One of the camp’s primary purposes was to provide humanitarian aid to persons crossing into the 
western zones, but the size of the postwar population displacement necessitated an orderly 
acceptance in these areas. Regulating humanitarianism offers an analytical framework for 
examining the attempts to order refugees’ acceptance and resettlement. The concept derives from 
a critical engagement with Michel Foucault’s discussions of security and the application of 
Foucauldian theory in social sciences studies of refugee camps.5 Camp regulations helped to 
restore discipline, ensure hygiene, and reestablish authorities’ knowledge of the populace 
through the reconfirmation of the individual identities. Yet, while the Foucauldian, discipline-
oriented approach is useful for understanding camp regulation, it also exhibits a tendency to 
overemphasize the state’s coercive powers while undervaluing charitable impulses among 
administrators and the society at large. By approaching the camp’s operation as having exhibited 
a regulating humanitarianism, this dissertation suggests that Allied and German authorities 
created the disciplining environment as a necessary and humane means to collect and identify the 
uprooted masses, to deliver aid to them, and finally to distribute them to the areas most capable 
of absorbing them amidst material scarcity and social upheaval. 
                                                 
5 On security and the threat of unknown populations, see Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures 
at the College de France, 1977-1978, ed. Michel Senellart and trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 
17-18. Social science literature on refugee management is deeply indebted to Foucauldian notions of biopower. See 
Bülent Diken and Carsten Laustsen The Culture of Exception: Sociology Facing the Camp (New York: Routledge, 
2005) and Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
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Analysis of the Friedland camp as an example of a regulating, humanitarian approach to 
displacement rests upon four questions about the camp’s relationship to political, social, and 
cultural issues beyond its confines. First, what do administrative records reveal about Allied and 
German authorities’ views of the displacement problem and their attempts to enact policy at a 
practical level? At Friedland, refugee policy and practicable methods intersected and informed 
each other in the attempt to quickly resolve displacement. Second, who worked in the camp, and 
how might their individual histories have informed the camp’s operation? Examination of the 
personnel records and camp regulations demonstrates the significant influence of staffers with 
military and Red Cross backgrounds. Third, who were the camp’s residents, particularly in 
regard to gender, age, occupation, place of origin, and official classification upon arrival? 
Demographic information about camp populations throws into relief the contours of postwar 
displacements and contextualizes operation at Friedland. Fourth, what were the residents’ 
experiences of the camp and what role did a stay at Friedland play in the longer process of 
resettlement for the different resident populations? The every-day history of life at Friedland 
recaptures individual perspectives on camp life, and this individual-oriented approach clarifies 
how Friedland specifically helped in their resettlement. In the case of each question, this study 
also investigates continuities and ruptures over the course of the camp’s first fifteen years of 
operation. 
By addressing the larger question of Friedland’s contribution to restoration of social order 
and the above questions, one necessarily speaks to crucial issues in postwar German history. 
These areas of study that are distinct from the displacement problematic but nonetheless related 
to it include the relationship between the military government and German authorities, the 
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uneven process and results of de-Nazification, and the redefinition of German citizenship to 
account for new social groups with special claims to the welfare state. 
Historiography 
This dissertation contributes new scholarship to three interrelated historiographies. First 
and most directly, the project addresses the relatively small group of histories of the camp itself. 
Second, the history of the Friedland camp speaks to the growing body of scholarship on the 
displacement and resettlement of Germans and other national or ethnic groups during and after 
World War II. Finally and most broadly, this project engages with the scholarship concerning the 
successful establishment of a stable, prosperous democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
By addressing all three of these historiographies, this dissertation contributes to scholarly 
understanding of how the Friedland camp created the preconditions necessary for 
reestablishment of an orderly, cohesive West German society. That contribution in turns sheds 
further light on narratives of the Federal Republic’s successful material and political 
reconstruction after World War II. 
Histories of the Friedland transit camp can be divided into two separate categories: 
commemorative and scholarly works. Celebratory volumes coinciding with major anniversaries 
were the first major publications about the camp.6 These publications are rich in information, but 
they offer little in the way of analysis or argumentation with which to engage. Aside from their 
useful descriptions of early camp operation no longer available in archives, commemorative 
camp histories are perhaps most important for understanding the creation of a popular 
                                                 
6 See Walter Müller-Bringmann, Das Buch von Friedland (Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1956). The 
anniversary publications include 20 Jahre Lager Friedland (Heidelberg: Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 
Flüchtlinge, und Kriegsgeschädigte, 1965); and Jürgen Gückel, 60 Jahre Lager Friedland: Zeitzeugen berichten 
(Göttingen: Göttinger Tageblatt GmbH & Co. KG, 2005). For commemorations of charities, see Wilhelm Tomm, 
Bewegte Jahre, erzählte Geschichte (Friedland: Innere Mission, 1992) and Karoline Grothe, Ein Stück Leben 
(Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2007). 
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imagination of the Friedland camp. Indeed, later chapters of this study rely on the 
commemorative works to analyze the developing mythologization of Friedland in the 1950s, as 
well as for the histories’ reporting of daily life and routines in the camp. Nevertheless, this 
dissertation engages more with the second, later-emerging category of scholarship. Such 
analyses initially focused on institutional and policy histories but have also begun to include 
cultural and memory studies. 
Academic scholarship on Friedland began with Dagmar Kleineke’s 1992 dissertation on 
the camp from 1945 to 1955.7 Best described as a focused institutional history, the study 
concentrated on issues such as funding, the establishment of a sub-camp for vagrant youths, and 
the religious charities operating in the camp. Indeed, Kleineke’s dissertation is representative of 
the movement in German historical scholarship toward rediscovering local histories that began in 
the 1980s. Lacking explicit argumentation or discussion of broader issues in the postwar period, 
her study discusses the camp in isolation from the problems it was meant to resolve. The result is 
a carefully researched, valuable overview of the camp’s history but one that leaves scholarly 
space for an analysis of how the camp operated within the shifting political, social, and material 
circumstances of Germany in the decades after World War II.8  
Since the publication of Kleineke’s dissertation, academic interest in the Friedland camp 
has grown. Andrea Riecken’s discussion of the camp within the context of health policy and 
                                                 
7 Dagmar Kleineke, “Entstehung und Entwicklung des Lagers Friedland 1945-1955” (Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Göttingen, 1992). She has also authored “Das Grenzdurchgangslager Friedland,” in Zuwanderung und Integration 
in Niedersachsen seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Klaus J. Bade and Joachen Oltmer (Osnabrück: Universitätsverlag 
Rasch, 2002), and “Das Lager Friedland und die konfessionellen Verbände,” in Vertreibung und Ankunft in 
Niedersachsen, ed. Ellen Ueberschar (Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 2007). 
8 For instance, she is dismissive of analyzing relationships between the German and British authorities over the 
camp, which she characterizes as “obviously follow[ing] the ‘climate’ of high politics and in most instances can be 
seen as a reflection of the ‘normalizing’ relationships between victors and vanquished.” Kleineke, “Entstehung und 
Entwicklung,” 3. 
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refugee reintegration in the British zone offers a compelling account of Friedland’s history 
because it links the camp to German attempts to address the general problem of public health 
through the Friedland facility.9 In an investigation of the social and moral burdens represented in 
the homecomings of German POWs, Frank Biess has likewise located the Friedland facility 
within a network of transit camps for returning POWs who had been released from Soviet 
prisons without the necessary documentation.10 Finally, Friedland has featured in postwar 
cultural and memory studies, such as Robert Moeller’s discussion of returning prisoners of war 
and Birgit Schwelling’s article on public memory and the construction of the Friedland 
memorial.11 Sasha Schießl has likewise contributed scholarship on the development of the 
“Gateway to Freedom” mythos within the context of Cold War West German politics.12 
None of these studies has examined the camp’s role in the restoration of social order in 
postwar Germany. Kleineke’s dissertation offered little reference to the stability and security 
problems addressed through Friedland, while Riecken and Biess respectively treated the camp 
one-dimensionally as a site for dealing with the single issues of health policy and POWs. By 
examining Friedland’s history in terms of both the institution and populations processed there, 
this dissertation offers a more systematic accounting of the camp’s role in addressing the re-
                                                 
9 Andrea Riecken, Migration und Gesundheitspolitik: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in Niedersachsen 1945-1953 
(Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2006). 
10 Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 45-46, 155, 204. 
11 Respectively, Robert Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Birgit Schwelling, "Gedenken im Nachkrieg. Die "Friedland-
Gedächtnisstätte," Zeithistorische Forschungen Online-Ausgabe 5, no. 2 (2008). 
12 Sascha Schießl, “Das Lager Friedland als Tor zur Freiheit: Vom Erinnerungsort zum Symbol bundesdeutscher 
Humanität,” in Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Geschichte 84 (2012): 99-124. See also Schießl, “‘Ein Versprechen 
der Liebe, das draußen nicht erfüllt wird’: Die Wohlfahrtsverbände, die Lagerleitung und die symbolische 
Aufladung des Lagers Friedland 1945-1970” in Flüchtlingslager im Nachkriegsdeutschland: Migration, Politik, 
Erinnerung, ed. Henrik Bispinck and Katharina Hochmuth (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2014), 217-232. 
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creation of social stability. In doing so, the study examines how the camp contributed to the 
resettling of the various uprooted populations with whom the camp was charged, thereby 
engaging with a growing historiography on that subject. 
Much like the historiography on Friedland, scholarship on the related issues of wartime 
and postwar population displacements has received increasing attention since the 1980s. This 
body of works falls into two general categories. The first category consists of studies focusing on 
non-German populations, such as groups affected by other postwar population transfers and 
myriad groups of displaced persons in Germany after the war. Historians have tended to treat 
these groups, often officially recognized by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency 
as “Displaced Persons” (DPs), separately from the second category: the Germans displaced 
through the war, flight, and the expulsions agreed to at Potsdam.13 Although there was some 
early acknowledgement of direct links between the displacements of different national or ethnic 
groups during and after the war, only recently have historians begun treat these displacements as 
part of a broader phenomenon of massive social engineering projects in modern Eastern Europe. 
As such, after a brief summary of works recognizing the interconnectedness of postwar 
displacements, the discussion of the displacement historiography must necessarily be split 
between scholarship on the dislocations of non-German and German populations. 
Population displacements in the form of expulsions or exchanges have a long historical 
record, but historians have noted the phenomenon’s peak in Europe following World War II. 
Joseph Schechtman’s 1962 account of population transfers between 1945 and 1955 was one of 
the first scholarly examinations of displacements as a postwar phenomenon affecting nearly all 
of Eastern Europe. To Schechtman, such “redistribution” was “unprecedented in scope,” and 
                                                 
13 Officially recognized Displaced Persons are capitalized, while “displaced persons” refers to them generally. 
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while the expulsion of German minorities was the most prominent of the transfers, persistent and 
otherwise irreconcilable national conflicts were at the root of each of the many cases.14  
More recent histories of population displacements in postwar Europe have likewise 
emphasized the interconnectedness of the forcible resettlement of various nationalities. They 
have also begun to develop the link between postwar displacements and those dislocations begun 
as part of wartime efforts to reengineer Europe’s national and social composition. In his 1985 
study, Michael Marrus argues, “the emergence of a new variety of collective alienation” 
constitutes a crucial element of modern European refugee crises.15 In addition to his measured 
discussion of the Nazi uprooting of both German and non-German populations for their racial 
remaking of the East, Marrus identifies key continuities in interwar, wartime, and postwar 
European governments’ distaste for refugee masses and their desire to keep them at arm’s length. 
Gustavo Corni and Tamás Stark have argued that mass population transfers are a modern 
phenomenon “connected to the emergence of a strong idea of nation during the 1800s, which 
played an essential role in legitimizing political systems on the way to democratization.”16 
Whereas states had earlier imposed a dominant nationality through legal codes and language, 
population transfers gained favor as a solution to the problem of multinational states (however 
artificial or constructed the problem may have been) in the twentieth century. The national 
remaking of Eastern Europe during World War II extended the underlying logic of physically 
removing undesired groups through ethnic cleansing. The Nazis’ Heim ins Reich program and 
                                                 
14 Joseph B. Schechtman, Postwar Population Transfers in Europe 1945-1955 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1962), vii, ix. Schechtman concentrates on the following cases: Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Germany. 
15 Michael Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 13. 
16 Perrti Ahonen et al., People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and 
its Aftermath (New York: Berg, 2008), 1.  
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Generalplan Ost were not the only examples of such thinking; it was also evident in Italian 
attempts to colonize Slovenia and exchanges involving Hungary and Rumania.17 
Millions of non-German persons separated from their homes and homelands by war and 
Nazi persecution posed significant problems for the administration of Germany. At the end of the 
war, as many as eight to eleven million non-Germans found themselves in occupied Germany, 
whether as former forced laborers, POWs, or other victims (and some former allies) of the Nazi 
regime.18 Excepting the official histories of UNRRA and other relief organizations, scholarship 
on DPs has emerged only since the 1980s. Mark Wyman’s 1989 study was one of the first 
attempts to address the administrative, cultural, and every-day aspects of DP history, but most 
studies have focused on either institutions or nationalities.19 Atina Grossman’s examination of 
interactions between Jewish DPs, Allies, and Germans gave little attention to other national 
groups, while histories of relief organizations and camps treated the subject in a top-down 
manner.20 Gerard D. Cohen’s recent book offers an excellent synthesis of institutional and 
national histories in his case study of the International Relief Organization. He argus that the DP 
problematic affected the beginning Cold War, the emergent international human rights 
                                                 
17 Ibid., Chapters 2-3. 
18 Unsurprisingly in light of chaotic postwar conditions, figures for the number of DPs in Germany vary greatly. 
William Hitchcock puts the figure at 11 million, while Gerard D. Cohen suggests that 8 million is more accurate and 
enjoys a greater consensus. See, respectively, William Hitchcock, The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the 
Liberation of Europe (New York: Free Press, 2008), 250; and Gerard D. Cohen, In War’s Wake: Europe’s 
Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 7. 
19 Mark Wyman, DPs: Europe’s Displaced Persons, 1945-1951 (London: Associated University Presses, 1989). 
20 On Jewish DPs, see Atina Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); and Angelika Königseder and Juliane Wetzel, John Broadwine trans., 
Waiting for Hope: Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-World War II Germany (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 2001). On various organizations, see Kim Saloman, Refugees in the Cold War: Toward a New International 
Refugee Regime in the Early Postwar Period (Lund: Lund University Press), Hitchcock, Bitter Road, chapters 6 and 
7; and Ulrich Möller, Fremde in der Nachkriegszeit: Displaced Persons -- Zwangsverschleppte Personen-- in 
Stuttgart und Württemberg-Baden 1945-1951 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cota, 1990). 
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movement, and the governance of international migration.21 According to Cohen, IRO 
resettlement was “an unprecedented instance of planned population redistribution,” though DP 
populations were hardly the only instances of such redistributive efforts in postwar Germany.22  
The first scholarship on German displacement developed in the 1950s and concentrated 
on the process and trauma of expulsion. Such studies had the political goal of establishing a 
narrative of German victimization at the hands of Eastern European nationalities and 
documenting lost lands and property for remunerative claims. Through its focus on the horrors of 
expulsion, this scholarship also implicitly fed into an uncritical and taken-for-granted narrative 
of the expellees’ easy integration into Germany society after their arrival. In the past quarter 
century, however, a second strand of research on expellees has turned to the issue of integration. 
More critically minded than their earlier counterparts, these researchers have increasingly 
questioned how unproblematic the integration really was and, more provocatively, if one should 
even speak of a successful integration at all.23 
The first significant historical account of the expulsion of Eastern Europe’s German 
populations emerged in the 1950s with the publication of Documentation of the Expulsion of 
Germans from East-Central Europe by the Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and the War-
Damaged.24 Like much of the scholarship on expellees that followed in the next twenty years, the 
                                                 
21 Cohen, In War’s Wake, 8. 
22 Ibid., 11. 
23 Expellee scholarship does not constitute the sole subject of German-centered studies of displacement, given that 
there is a smaller but related field of studies on the return of German prisoners of war after the war. Important works 
on the release and reintegration of POWs into civil society include Biess, Homecomings; Benjamin Bieber, Wie 
Kriege Enden: Die Reintegration von Soldaten in Nachkriegsgesellschaften (Hamburg: Kovač, 2002); Birgit 
Schwelling, Heimkehr, Erinnerung, Integration: der Verband der Heimkehrer, die ehemaligen Kriegsgefangenen 
und die westdeutsche Nachkriegsgesellschaft (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010). 
24 Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mittel Europa, ed. Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 
volumes 1-5, and Beihefte 1-3 (Leer, Göttingen, Munich, Wolfenbüttel, Kassel, and Düsseldorf, 1954-1961). 
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Schieder project narrowly focused on German suffering during the expulsion with little 
discussion of their integration.25 The Schieder volumes thus contrasted notably with the 
Schechtman example of early American scholarship, given Schechtman’s argument that the 
German example was one among many transfer programs, though also “the most spectacular 
result of this momentous population movement.”26   
 The scholarship on the expulsion of Germans was also highly politicized within the 
context of competing victimhood narratives and the Cold War. It was a federal ministry that 
commissioned the Schieder volumes, after all, with the purpose of documenting German claims 
to lost property and homelands. Yet, the most polemical account of the expulsions can be found 
in Alfred Maurice de Zayas’s highly controversial work. He excoriated Eastern European and 
particularly Russian brutality during the expulsions, while also decrying Anglo-American 
complicity at the Potsdam Conference.27 Schieder and de Zayas’s works thus serve as important 
reminders of how scholarship on the expulsions could be highly politicized within the Cold War 
context. Filled with anti-Communist tropes, these books painted Germans as victims. Moreover, 
they elided Germans’ wartime roles as perpetrators and Nazi resettlement initiatives that 
accounted for the first uprooting of ethnic German communities.28 
                                                 
25 The fact that these volumes are now considered a major part in creating German memory culture of the expulsion, 
however, testifies to their importance. See in particular, Robert Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past 
in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 51-87. 
26 Schechtman, Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955, vii. 
27 Alfred Maurice de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Expulsion of Germans from the East (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1977). 
28 Nazi policies and population transfer agreements with various Eastern European states were responsible for many 
ethnic Germans’ initial displacement, even if the subsequent mass expulsions proceeded through a much more 
drastic uprooting of historic German communities in Eastern Europe. See, Valdis O. Lumans, Himmler's 
Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1993), and Doris Bergen, "Tenuousness and Tenacity: The Volksdeutschen of 
Eastern Europe, World War II, and the Holocaust," in The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness, ed. 
Krista O'Donnell, Renate Bridenthal, and Nancy Reagin (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005). A more 
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 With a few exceptions early scholarship focused strongly on the process of the expulsion, 
while the focus in the past twenty years has shifted to the issue of integration.29 Paul Lüttinger’s 
1989 quantitative analysis of expellee integration can therefore be seen as a landmark text. 
Questioning what he called “the myth of a speedy and successful integration,” Lüttinger studied 
micro-census information from 1971 and concluded that the first generations to experience full 
integration were actually the children of refugees and expellees.30 Whereas earlier scholarship on 
the expulsion had assumed that difficulties in integration were overcome through Germany’s 
economic revitalization in the 1950s, Lüttinger’s work challenges the foundational mythology 
that expellees’ hard-work and clear belonging to the German national community meant a 
speedy, problem-free integration. 
 Following in Lüttinger’s path, new scholarship on expellee issues shares a basic 
skepticism about the ease of integration. Reinhard Rohde examines social strife between 
expellees and native residents of small agricultural communities, where, he argued, village elites 
played a crucial role in “othering” the newcomers.31 Based on interviews with expellees in small 
communities, Rainer Schuzle further argues that no matter the expellees’ personal or 
professional successes, the experience of expulsion and loss “continues to have an important 
                                                                                                                                                             
recent and less polemical (though still highly critical) English account can be found in R. M. Douglas, Orderly and 
Humane: the Expulsion of Germans after World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). 
  The highly politicized nature of scholarship on the expulsions has also led to major disputes outside the historical 
profession, such as the German-Polish arguments over a Berlin museum dedicated to documenting the expulsion. 
29 Aside from Schechtman’s discussion of integration, the Ministry for Expellees produced one other early report. 
See Die Eingliederung der Flüchtlinge in die deutsche Gemeinschaft (Bonn: Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 
1951). 
30 Paul Lüttinger, Die Integration der Vertriebenen: eine empirische Analyse (Frankfurt: Campus, 1989), 35. 
31 Rainhard Rohde, "'Der Hejder ist eben ein anderer Menschenschlag als der ostelbische Mensch'" in Zwischen 
Heimat und Zuhause: Deutsche Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in (West-) Deutschland 1945-200, ed. Rainer Schulze, 
Rainhard Rohde, and Rainer Voss (Osnabrück: Secolo Verlag, 2001). 
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bearing on their lives and keep them different from the natives.”32 Finally, Andreas Kossert 
claimed that refugees and expellees faced a cold reception based upon racial and religious 
prejudices against them, though he overstated the novelty of his argument.33 
A variety of social factors have also driven the new critical interest in expellee 
integration. The difficulties of integrating guest workers and their families into German society 
after it became clear many would not return to their countries of origin contributes to the interest 
in the example of expellee integration. An even more important subtext can also be seen in the 
consequences of the collapse of Eastern European communism in 1989: the difficult integration 
of the former GDR into the Federal Republic and the problem represented by waves of “late 
resettlers” (Spätaussiedler) from the former Eastern Bloc who immigrated to Germany based 
upon a right of return for ethnic Germans.34 
Although recent expellee scholarship offers a much-needed critical approach, the narrow 
focus on the process’s faults obscures significant successes. The difficulties that these studies 
have documented, though not insubstantial, reveal much more about expellees’ expectations and 
disappointments than a truly failed integration. Complaints, for instance, also functioned as 
claims on political parties and the state. In many ways, the disappointments speak to the overall 
success of the integrative project. While the shortcomings of the integrative process might have 
resulted in bitterness, there is little evidence of outright failure, such as through radicalization or 
                                                 
32 Rainer Schulze, "The Struggle of Past and Present in Individual Identities" in Coming Home to Germany?, ed. 
David Rock and Stefan Wolff (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 41. 
33 Andreas Kossert, Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945 (München: Siedler, 2008), 
esp. 74-84, 229, and 325. 
34 On the issue of citizenship, see Dieter Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschliessen: Die Nationalisierung der 
Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2001); and Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, "The Decline of Privilege," in Coming Home to 
Germany, ed. David Rock and Stefan Wolff (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 102-06. 
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a widespread social paralysis preventing individuals from building new lives.35 Also problematic 
in these histories of expulsion and integration is the overlooking of crucial intermediary steps in 
redistributing expellees (or other dislocated German populations) and establishing their claims to 
the subsequent welfare programs that aided their integration. In that sense, a case study of 
Friedland reveals much about how German and Allied authorities were able to solve problems 
posed by mass displacement and create the preconditions for integrative successes that naturally 
and necessarily happened within communities rather than within the camp itself.36 
 The question of the expellees’ successful integration into the Federal Republic in turn 
raises the broader issue of accounting for the successes of the postwar West German state. 
Indeed, a fundamental issue in writing the history of postwar Germany is accounting for how 
Germany, which was responsible for two World Wars and the Holocaust, emerged from the 
material, political, and social rubble left by National Socialism and World War II to create a 
prosperous model democracy. Histories concentrating on Germany post-1945 further complicate 
this issue of continuities and ruptures as well as the related question of accounting for the 
establishment of democracy in the Federal Republic. By presenting 1945 as a defining caesura in 
Germany history, the so-called “zero hour” of occupation, this approach denies any major 
positive or negative continuity with Germany’s past. Edgar Wolfrum, for example, argued that 
Germany’s successful democracy “proved and [continues to prove] itself after all catastrophes of 
                                                 
35 On the non-development of radicalization, see Helmut Grieser, Die ausgebliebene Radikaliesierung: zur 
Sozialgeschichte der Kieler Flüchtlingslager im Spannungsfeld von sozialdemokratischer Landespolitik und 
Stadtverwaltung, 1945-1950 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980). 
36 Meryn McClaren may go too far in using the term integration within the camp setting, but she is right to suggest 
that refugee communities within longer-term residential camps (as opposed to a transit camp like Friedland) assisted 
the process by jumpstarting new social networks and helping refugees realize that return was not an option. See 
Meryn McClaren, “‘Out of Huts Emerged a Settled People: Community Building in West German Refugee Camps,” 
German History 28 (2010), 21-43. 
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the German history as a stroke of luck.”37 In a different interpretive paradigm, Heinrich August 
Winkler explained Germany’s postwar success as product of its social and political 
Westernization.38 Criticizing the notion of Westernization and its implicit association with a 
German Sonderweg, Konrad Jarausch instead drew upon the postwar discourse of civilization 
and historian Dan Diner’s concept of a “rupture of civilization at Auschwitz” to describe a 
process of German “recivilization” through a renewed commitment to human rights and the 
reemergence of civil society.39 Thus, while major surveys of postwar Germany recognize the 
significant success of Germany’s postwar reconstruction and social rehabilitation, there is little 
consensus on how to describe the achievement and its roots. 
 This study of the Friedland transit camp thus speaks to three interconnected levels of 
postwar German historiography. Most directly, there must be a reorientation of scholarship on 
Friedland toward locating camp operation within postwar efforts to reestablish social order 
amidst difficult material and political conditions. A case study of Friedland therefore necessarily 
speaks to the issues of mass displacement, German and otherwise, in the wake of World War II 
and how to account for the successes of redistributing and ultimately integrating the uprooted 
masses. Integration did not and could not occur during an individual’s brief stay at the Friedland 
camp, and this dissertation makes no such claims. Nevertheless, the vast majority of scholarship 
on the problem of displaced German populations has dealt with integration issue, meaning that 
                                                 
37 Edgar Wolfrum, Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik von ihren Anfang bis zur Gegenwart 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006), 18. 
38 On German Westernization, see Heinrich August Winkler. Der lange Weg nach Westen (Munich: Beck, 2000); 
and Ronald J. Granieri has reinforced this notion of Westernization through his discussion of the FRG’s 
commitment to the “Abendland” and the western political sphere in The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the 
CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003). 
39 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1955, Brandon Hunziker trans. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). On Winkler, Westernization, and the Sonderweg, see p. 11; on civilization and Diner, vii, 
11-14. 
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this project must in turn account for that scholarship and how the Friedland facility contributed 
to the larger process of resettling uprooted Germans, whether expellees, refugees, or returning 
POWs, as well as the other non-German populations also processed at the camp. Expellee 
integration has long served as a hallmark accomplishment in narratives of the Federal Republic’s 
overall successes, and by clarifying issues of resettlement, Friedland’s history has a bearing on 
this third, broadest level of German historiography. By examining the aid and resettlement 
operations at Friedland, my dissertation explains the crucial intermediary step between 
displacement and reintegration, a signal success of Germany’s postwar return to order. 
Theory, Methods, and Sources 
This study situates the history of Friedland camp within the framework of a regulating 
humanitarianism that can be seen in rise of refugee camps as a systematic response to 
displacement since World War II. In the case of Friedland, the concept of regulating 
humanitarianism offers an analytical approach to understanding camp operation within the 
broader context of postwar German society, particularly given the level of material scarcity and 
social upheaval. Indeed, after Germany’s defeat in 1945 both the occupational authorities and the 
German population faced a grim society of rationing. “Normal consumers” received a ration of 
860 calories.40 Aside from foodstuffs and myriad other consumer goods, housing was subject to 
ration regimes, because the 4 million housing units destroyed during the war amounted to 25 
percent of Germany’s 1939 capacity.41 By the time the Friedland camp opened in September 
1945, the military government in nearby Göttingen was allotting the city’s residents a mere 3.25 
                                                 
40 Judt, Postwar, 21. 
41 Jeffry Diefendorf, “America and the Rebuilding of Germany” in American Policy and the Reconstruction of 
Germany, 1945-1955, ed. Jeffry Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, and Hermann-Josef Rupierer (Washington DC: German 
Historical Institute, 1993), 348. 
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square meters of living space per person and demanding that anyone with additional room 
register for the assignment of another homeless person.42 
In this context, the Friedland camp played a critical role in collecting and redistributing 
displaced persons, thereby organizing need away from cities already stretched beyond capacity. 
This dissertation therefore introduces the notion of regulating humanitarianism to capture the 
overriding concern with restoring social order while also acknowledging that the camp provided 
significant humanitarian services, if necessarily in a strictly controlled manner. Such an 
understanding of a regulating humanitarianism represents a conceptual response to Michel 
Foucault’s discussions of security and to a social sciences literature that has applied Foucauldian 
theory to refugee camps. 
 Foulcauldian theory provides a foundation for examining how the state uses social 
categorization of refugees along with refugee camps as instruments of government for social 
control. In his lectures to the College de France, Foucault called for a discussion of how 
“artificial multiplicities are to be constructed and organized according to the triple principle of 
hierarchy, precise communication of relations of power, and functional effects specific to this 
distribution, for example, ensuring trade, housing, and so on.”43 The lectures demonstrate a need 
to critically assess how social categories as well as spaces such as camps are constructed with 
clear social goals in mind. As Foucault later noted, the security concerns of space are also closely 
tied to surveillance of the population, particularly when social order is threatened by the influx of 
unknown populations, such as “beggars, vagrants, delinquents, criminals, thieves, murderers, and 
                                                 
42 Hans-Georg Schmelling, “Die überfüllte Stadt” in Göttingen 1945: Kriegsende und Neubeginn, ed. Hans-Georg 
Schmelling (Göttingen: Erich Goltze KG, 1985), 117. 
43 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 17. 
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so on, who might come […] from the country.”44 This fear of the potential disruption caused by 
unknown populations speaks to processes at the heart of Friedland’s operation: the collection and 
registration of the incoming masses in order to establish their identities before admittance and 
redistribution to West German society. 
 Sociologists Bülent Diken and Carsten Laustsen have further developed ideas on how 
these Foucauldian concerns with space and security affect the position of refugees in host 
societies. Based upon their survey of contemporary refugee policies and debates in Europe, they 
argue that refugees occupy a necessarily ambivalent position in society’s eyes: “Our society 
seems unable to decide whether the asylum seeker is the true subject of human rights […] or 
simply a criminal, a thief, who threatens ‘us’ with abusing ‘our’ welfare system.”45 The refugee 
seems particularly dangerous to order because of his or her social ambivalence. In the eyes of the 
state, “the refugee represents the nomadic excess that the state seeks to capture and normalize 
through panoptic confinement, e.g. in refugee camps.”46 By confining refugees to the camp 
rather than allowing them to move freely within the host society, the state is able to impose the 
order of a sedentary existence on refugees while simultaneously excluding them from the 
broader community and thereby avoiding social disruption. 
Jennifer Hyndman’s analysis of population tracking in refugee camps demonstrates how 
concerns for order affect the practical level of camp operation. In her discussion of situation 
reports and headcounts, she defines the refugee camp in Foulcauldian terms as “a standardized, 
generalizable technology of power in the management of displacement […] entailing the 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 18. 
45 Bülent Diken and Carsten Laustsen, The Culture of Exception: Sociology Facing the Camp (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 79. 
46 Ibid. 
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management of space and movement for ‘peoples out of place.’”47 The refugee camp imposes 
order, which is particularly important for the distribution of aid. Feeding refugees is a crucial 
part of displacement management, and camp authorities and aid agencies work to ensure the 
most cost-effective implementation of this sort of welfare program. Hyndman notes, “accurate 
refugee numbers are important for procuring funds and food rations […] but refugees have not 
willingly subjected themselves to the methods these counts employ.”48 Authorities engage in a 
“coercive exercise” by forcing refugees into enclosures to ensure an accurate count, while 
refugees seek to “maximize [rations] by resisting counting procedures that might reduce the 
number of extra ration cards circulating in the camps.”49 One thus observes camp regimes 
engaging in a Foucauldian process of turning individuals into “instruments of government” both 
to assure order and to maximize the efficiency of aid distribution.50 
Hyndman’s description of coercive camp regimes also raises the fundamental issue of the 
individual refugee’s agency. Foucauldian analysis has the potential to turn the refugee into the 
subject or conduit of governmental control while ignoring the extent to which refugees contest 
the camp regime. To borrow terminology from historians of everyday life, does the victim of 
displacement not exert his or her own obstinacy known as “Eigensinn” to maximize benefits at 
the camp?51 In fact, administrative records at Friedland are replete with examples of that 
                                                 
47 Lisa Malkki quoted in Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of 
Humanitarianism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 120. 
48 Ibid., 127. 
49 Ibid.,130, 141. 
50 Michel Foucault quoted in ibid., 124. 
51 On Eigensinn see particularly Alf Lüdtke, “Cash, Coffee-Breaks, Horseplay: Eigensinn and Politics among 
Factory Workers in Germany circa 1900” in Confrontation, Class Consciousness, and the Labor Process: Studies in 
Proletarian Class Formation, Michael Hanagan and Charles Stephenson, eds., (Westport: Greenword Press, 1986). 
See also Alf Lüdtke, ed., Alltagsgeschichte. Zur Rekonstruktion historischer Erfahrungen und Lebensweisen 
(Frankfurt: Campus Verlag 1989). 
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obstinate form of agency. Although outright physical confrontation between staff and residents 
was rare, refugees lied to, cajoled, and even bribed camp staff for more rations and desired 
transit permits. As this dissertation demonstrates, camp residents also deceived administrators in 
the effort to prevent the state from accurately identifying them. In some cases, residents lied in 
order to escape criminal charges and arrest. In other instances, they made false statements to 
obtain a more favorable classification and the accompanying access to specific welfare 
provisions, because official recognition at camps such as Friedland was the first step in the 
creation of large classes with special claims on the postwar German welfare state. The response 
from the Foucauldian perspective may well be to reemphasize that camp residents are 
nonetheless forced into situations of panoptic confinement and that they become enmeshed in 
systems of governmentality by dint of engaging with the camp regime. Nevertheless, this study 
demonstrates that such a constraining formulation of camp residents as mere subjects misses the 
complexities of the relationships between residents and camp authorities. 
In addition to the question of agency, there are other compelling reasons to take 
Foulcauldian theory as a starting point rather than to adopt it wholesale as the theoretical 
backbone for the concept of regulating humanitarianism. The preceding social sciences 
approaches relying on an uncritical use of Foucault’s work suffer from the crucial drawback of 
ignoring or otherwise obscuring the humanitarian side of camp operation in favor of focusing on 
the coercive aspects. Still, an approach to the camp that uncritically focused on its operations as a 
product of a non-contextualized humanitarianism would nevertheless prove shortsighted as well. 
After all, Lynne Hunt and Samuel Moyn have demonstrated that the concept of human rights 
from which humanitarianism stems needs to be historicized, or understood as a product of certain 
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historical contexts with specific meanings rather than as a timeless given.52 Granting the cultural 
and temporal contingencies of the meanings of humanitarianism, this dissertation generally 
understands it to consist of improving welfare and ameliorating suffering. 
The language of humanitarianism was quite common in postwar discussions of displaced 
populations, and a major concern of this study is what was humanitarian about Friedland.53 The 
humanitarian nature of services such as the providing of food, shelter, and clothing are easy 
enough to recognize, even if pragmatic considerations coexisted with the readily apparent 
altruistic ones in these cases. Search services for missing relatives at Friedland likewise provide 
a clear example of enmeshed humanitarianism and pragmatism. Families could be reunited with 
longed-for relatives, thereby shifting the burden of primary care from the state. Confirmation of 
death through search services may have provided emotional closure, but the information also had 
significant implications for the disposition of property and civil status. 
Other elements of camp operation and decisions taken by camp authorities were less 
obviously humanitarian. Delousing with DDT powder and invasive medical exams, both of 
which were mandatory, certainly speak to a Foucauldian sense of the state’s coercive powers. 
The camp administration also regularly returned vagrant adolescents to the Soviet sector where 
they faced the compulsory work in the uranium mines of the Wismut SAG (Sowjetische 
Aktiensgesellschaft).54 The stranding of resettlers in the GDR due to the British High 
                                                 
52 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), suggests that 
human rights are primarily a product of the Enlightenment. Samuel Moyn rejects ancient, Enlightenment, and even 
the post-WWII UN Declaration of Universal Human Rights in favor of events in the 1970s as the source of the 
present-day international conception of human rights. See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
53 Examples include Potsdam Agreement’s “humane” transfers and German references to iterations of “menschlich,” 
“würdig,” and “humanitär” in government documents and the press. 
54 On youths who arrived at Friedland in their attempt to escape forced labor in the mines, see “Wandernde 
Jugendliche” Nds. 386 Acc 16/83 Nr. 39 (141-46), NHStA; and Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
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Commissioner’s refusal of transports in 1950 raised questions about what humanitarianism 
meant in the context of Friedland.55 The highly regimented and bureaucratized camp space, 
including all sorts of questioning, paperwork, and transit permits did not always seem 
particularly humanitarian to contemporary observers. In fact, the camp’s bureaucratic nature 
produced many complaints and even became subject of a parliamentary investigation in 1955.56  
Grievances or present-day objections should not be dismissed out of hand, but one may 
nevertheless note that a humanitarian logic drove these seemingly hard-hearted decisions as well. 
Medical intervention at Friedland allowed for the discovery and treatment of threatening medical 
conditions that might have led to epidemics elsewhere. Strict controls of movement and 
resettlement assignments prevented overcrowding in areas unable to house more refugees. The 
Friedland bureaucracy legalized claims and pre-entitled residents as members of special 
categories deserving compensation and welfare benefits. Naturally, one should maintain a critical 
perspective on the camp involving the identification and investigation of problems or perverse 
outcomes. Nevertheless, the resettlement of displaced populations with the promise of further 
state assistance was a humanitarian process, particularly given the alternative of a vagrant 
underclass spurned by the reflexively self-defensive communities that Foucault and subsequent 
scholars recognized. As such, analysis of Friedland further historicizes the notion of 
humanitarianism by demonstrating what was considered humane in specific moments of 
Germany’s postwar history and within the context of mass destruction and mass population 
displacement. Discussion of regulations locates humanitarianism within a specific historical 
                                                 
55 See “German Refugees from Poland,” Times, 4 March 1950; and “Attempts to upset German economy,” 
Manchester Guardian, 7 March 1950; and Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
56 On the investigation by the Parliamentary Committee for War-Victim and Returnee Issues (Bundestagausschuss 
für Kriegsopfer- und Heimkehrerfragen), see Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
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problematic, while the notion of humanitarianism contextualizes regulation and coercion as tools 
for providing aid and allowing the absorption of displaced populations rather than as ends unto 
themselves. 
 A variety of methods support this regulating-humanitarianism methodology in analysis of 
the Friedland camp. First, an administrative historical approach helps to address the Foucauldian 
aspects of control and observation inherent to refugee camp operation. Because administrative 
history is concerned with goals along with the methods for achieving them, this first method is 
also intertwined with policy discussions in postwar Germany. A prosopography of the camp’s 
staff comprises the second method for examining the institution, because the issue of who ran the 
camp helps to explain how and why it operated in a particular manner. Such a focus on 
administrative matters, however, is limited in what it reveals about the populations at Friedland. 
Discussion of camp residents relies on statistical analysis to uncover key information about their 
size and characteristics. Despite their effects on the camp, the different populations cannot be 
systematically addressed through administrative documentation alone. As in the case of the 
camp’s staff, this study explores various subgroups of the Friedland populations through 
prosopographical analysis to determine common features that affecting their displacement, 
treatment at Friedland, and ultimate resettlement. Lastly, examination of everyday life in the 
camp sheds light on how camp residents experienced the humanitarian regulation at the camp 
and the various ways in which they pursued self-interest in their interactions with the camp 
bureaucracy. 
At the level of sources, the administrative history of the camp relies on documents 
produced by the camp administration, state and federal agencies, and the various charities active 
in Friedland. Examination of a wide variety of internal memoranda, administrative directives 
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(Verwaltungsvorschriften and Lageranordnungen), and interagency correspondence reveals that 
lines of authority often proved confusing to camp and military government officials as well as to 
administrators within German agencies. Disentangling power relations between different levels 
of German civil government, the British military government, and nongovernmental 
organizations constitutes a significant portion of the administrative history. 
The administrative records largely come from the Friedland camp collections, the 
collections of the Hildesheim Regierungspräsident and Flüchtlingsdezernat, and the Lower 
Saxon Ministries of Refugee Affairs and Interior as well as State Chancellery, all located at the 
Lower Saxon State Archive in Hannover. Other such sources were located in the British National 
Archive’s holdings of British Army of the Rhine military government reports and Civilian 
Control Council for Germany records. Likewise, an examination of administrative and legal 
documents (particularly Verwaltungsstreitsachen—administrative litigation—heard in 
Hildesheim courts) at the State Archive in Hannover demonstrate the involvement of the 
Friedland camp administration in translating legal codes into practicable methods for classifying 
and redistributing populations. Discussion of charitable organizations’ involvement in the camp 
also relies upon records held by the County Church Archives of the Evangelical Church in 
Göttingen and the Friedland office of the Catholic Caritas organization. 
 The second question of what camp staffing reveals about postwar conditions and the 
priorities of the various authorities is answered by combining a prosopography of camp staff 
with analysis of various regulations governing the camp’s staff. Personnel lists for permanent 
and wage-earning employees are an important starting point for quantifying Friedland’s work 
force and, in some cases, determining demographic markers such as age and sex. Also valuable 
are the nearly 40 files on key camp personnel from the Göttingen de-Nazification committee, 
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which reveal information about past employment, political associations, and war records.57 These 
de-Nazification files for the camp’s departmental heads and labor council representatives allow 
for an even more detailed quantification and qualitative description of common traits and an 
analysis of how personal histories affected the camp’s operation. Other crucial sources include 
personnel files from the records of the Lower Saxon State Chancellery and the Ministries of 
Refugees, Finance, and Interior. Further analysis relies on records from the camp personnel 
council, articles and other publications about specific individuals, and first-person accounts by 
some staffers. Because of German privacy laws and contingent access to many of these records 
(particularly the de-Nazification proceedings), some individuals are referred to by pseudonym in 
this study. When that it is the case, it is made explicit at the first mention of such individuals.   
 Quantitative analysis to answer the third question regarding the composition of camp 
populations relies on three major sources. First, this study makes use of a systematic sampling of 
300 case files each from the refugee and POW registration files at the Friedland branch office of 
the German Federal Administrative Agency.58 Although such a sample excludes resettlers after 
1958 and a few other groups, it nevertheless enables an analysis of the camp’s populations in 
                                                 
57 De-Nazification files present several challenges as a source, particularly because the record collections are so 
fragmentary. Although most camp personnel were de-Nazified in Göttingen, the proceedings were conducted 
wherever an individual lived at the time of his or her first application for work after the war, meaning that it can be 
impossible to know where some individuals’ files may be located today. In other cases, individuals may have never 
undergone de-Nazification (or at least not in the regions whose files are held by the State Archive), because they 
either stopped working at the camp before they underwent the process in Göttingen or because they first sought 
work after de-Nazification requirements had passed. As such, the de-Nazification files used in this study were those 
located by Ms. Hoffmann and her colleagues at the Lower Saxon State Archive (for which the author is deeply 
grateful) or those files from other regions that were copied and included in personnel records of Lower Saxon 
government agencies. A final concern with these documents is that it can be difficult to determine their veracity; 
some verifiable cases of falsified identities and/or past activities underscore this point. Discussion of the files must 
therefore proceed with the caveat that the analysis relies on a critical reading of who individuals claimed to be or 
what they claimed have done earlier in life. 
58 For each sample, a random registration file was selected at the start of the letters B, M, S, and Z. Every fiftieth file 
thereafter was included until 75 files were collected for each letter. The Kartei database lent itself to such systematic 
sampling, while the selection of the different letters and random starting points was done in the hope of avoiding 
biases that might emerge from the family names. 
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terms of age, sex, place of origin, destinations, occupation, and how these categories shifted over 
time and between categories of displaced individuals (e.g. women constituted a majority of 
refugees, men a majority of POWs). Second, the study makes use of registration files located in 
Hannover for a similar systematic sampling of other camp populations, such as unaccompanied 
minors and non-Germans classified as “infiltrees” and “former DPs.” Records from the camp’s 
medical office and its reports to local and state health authorities provide further information on 
the size of transports and the condition of the arriving individuals. Third, collections of statistical 
information in the Hannover archives that were gathered and analyzed by the camp staff and 
state and federal agencies offer both a point of comparison to the preceding two sources and 
further descriptive data on the camp’s residents. 
 Addressing the issue of the residents’ experience of the camp and how a stay in the camp 
fit into the process of dislocation and resettlement requires a discussion of everyday life in the 
camp and also an examination of records pertaining to exemplary individuals from the various 
categories of camp residents. Camp directives, letters written by residents, complaints about 
personnel and conditions along with official investigations of those complaints, and newspaper 
articles about life in the camp combine with memoires and interviews to provide the source base 
for capturing the Alltag (everyday) at Friedland. Examination of individual trajectories leading to 
and from Friedland relies not just upon the expected sources of memoires, interviews, and letters, 
but also less obvious sources, such as camp protocols, interrogations, and even lawsuits over the 
categorization and official recognition of individuals at the camp. One of the challenges of 
studying populations within a transit camp such as Friedland is that many individuals spent only 
a few nights there and most had left the camp within a week of their arrival.59 Taken as a whole, 
                                                 
59 “Grenzdurchgangslager Friedland 1945-2005," ed. Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Inneres und Sport 
(Hannover: Landesvermessung und Geobasisinformationen Niedersachsen, 2005), 8. 
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a careful reading of these diverse sources helps to reveal aspects of camp life, from the grim to 
the uplifting, how they relate to memory and mythologization of the camp, and what the camp’s 
role and the longer process of unsettlement and resettlement was. 
 A final methodological note concerns the periodization of this project. The establishment 
of the Friedland camp in September 1945 provides a convenient starting point in 1945. 
Discussions of the history of the expulsion, personal histories of people at Friedland, and points 
of continuity to wartime and prewar issues do, however, push elements of the dissertation further 
back than the camp’s opening. Arriving at a satisfactory ending date proves more difficult. 
Unlike other major camps, such as at Uelzen, Gießen, Warburg, Furth, or Piding, the camp at 
Friedland has no closure date marking a natural endpoint for a study. Indeed, for the foreseeable 
future, the camp will continue to operate in its capacity as the sole federal transit facility for 
asylum seekers from conflict zones around the world as well as for Jews and ethnic Germans 
from the former Soviet bloc. 
Although some parts of the project address developments after 1960 (particularly those 
relating to memory and myth-making), the year 1960 offers a reasonable end date for the 
questions investigated here. The periodization is appropriate because the research questions are 
decidedly focused on the surmounting of postwar challenges, a process in which Friedland’s 
importance dwindled along with the crisis’s extent around 1960.60 The period of 15 years 
captures the first, most critical half of the postwar generation. When the crisis receded as 
displacement diminished and material wellbeing increased across West Germany, camp 
operation had already standardized to the point that there is little of interest in archival 
                                                 
60 The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 had little effect on the camp at Friedland. The camp did 
process some GDR refugees flown from Berlin to Hannover and then taken to Friedland, but their relatively small 
number means that 1961 does not constitute a defining year in the camp’s history. 
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documents pertaining to resettlement post-1960. Even in a span as short as the fifteen years 
examined here, the diversity of camp populations with the attendant efforts by camp staff to meet 
the residents’ and governments’ needs in their processing provide for ample discussion material. 
Another reason to end major research for the project with 1960 was that documentation 
from new personnel groups after 1960 reveals little new information about problems or camp 
operation. Already in the early 1950s, Friedland was becoming a fairly well oiled machine for 
implementing policies made at the federal level. Indeed, Friedland did not face truly challenging 
inflow levels again until the softening and ultimate fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. These challenges associated with receiving new waves of “late resettlers” from the 
Soviet bloc (Spätaussiedler) are discussed in the concluding sections of the dissertation but do 
not warrant extensive research of the intervening decades. 
Chapter Organization 
 The six chapters of this dissertation are organized in a thematic and roughly 
chronological manner. Chapter 1 examines the long, medium, and short-term factors that led to 
mass population displacement at the end of World War II. The war and its immediate aftermath 
saw the culmination of two interrelated processes: the increasing salience of the national identity 
and the use of population displacement as a tool of statecraft. Central and Eastern Europe had 
long been home to ethnically diverse populations subject to competing communities of 
belonging. The nationalization of these populations begun in the nineteenth century contributed 
to conflict as statesmen and activists believed in a necessity for nationally homogenous states. 
Moreover, the mass expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe cannot be understood without 
examining the causative context of World War II. Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime and its allies tried 
to remake Eastern Europe along national and racial lines. German atrocities hardened Allied 
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resolve for expulsion as both a punishment and tool to finally bring an end of conflicts over 
German minority populations. These expellees along with millions of wartime evacuees and non-
German Displaced Persons presented the occupying powers in Germany with the staggering task 
of resettling some 30 million persons (excluding demobilized soldiers) between 1945 and 1949. 
 Chapter 2 discusses the founding of the refugee camp at Friedland in September 1945 as 
well as its early operations through the spring of 1946. The chapter reconstructs the 
establishment of the camp and its procedures for processing the interzonal traffic as well as the 
characteristics of three camp populations: wartime evacuees, refugees, and Displaced Persons. A 
large staff was responsible for aiding these groups and constructing the camp. In addition to paid 
German staffers, the camp’s administration relied upon labor from prisoners of war, Displaced 
Persons, and German and British volunteers. The interactions between the German staff and 
German and British volunteers also provide insight into the reemergence of civil society and 
reconciliation between wartime enemies in the Göttingen region. 
The third chapter examines the camp’s administration between 1946 and 1952 and 
addresses the question of why the facility at Friedland continued to operate after the initial waves 
of displacement had passed. One reason for the camp’s continued operation was growing 
efficiency of its staff. The promotion of Richard Krause to camp director in the spring of 1946 
marked the beginning of an era in the camp’s administration that ended with the departures of 
Krause and the camp’s British military unit in 1952. Although the relationship between German 
civil authorities and the British military government at the camp was friendly during the early 
years, a string of new British commandants and structural changes combined to sour the 
cooperation between the two parties. In particular, German and British administrators clashed 
over questions of supply, financing, and who held authority over the camp. In 1946 and 1947, 
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Richard Krause led an effort to remake the camp’s staff so that it behaved more professionally in 
processing the populations passing through Friedland. Krause also worked assiduously to defend 
and improve the camp’s reputation in local press. During these six years, the camp’s staff was 
overwhelmingly comprised of men and former refugees, though women found paths to 
leadership through charity work in the camp. The chapter ends with Krause’s departure from the 
camp and the transfer of a new director, Franz Freßen, to Friedland.  
Chapter 4 examines the populations passing through Friedland between 1946 and 1952, 
which are the second aspect of answering why camp operation continued during those years. The 
chapter begins with an analysis of prisoners of war released to their homes across the zonal 
boundaries. During this period, the Friedland facility was the location of debates over the 
definition of returnee categories, benefit and resource allocation, and distribution mechanisms 
for these released military and civilian prisoners. The case of Friedland also lays bare difficulties 
in categorizing these individuals, such that the camp’s problems with categorization ultimately 
worked their way up to the Federal Refugee Ministry and its interpretations of the landmark 
Returnee Law (Heimkehrergesetz) of 1950. 
The fourth chapter also juxtaposes the arrival and treatment of two other groups. First, the 
camp was responsible for accepting and redistributing ethnic German resettlers from Poland 
beginning in 1950. Initially planned as a program for family reunification, the influx of these 
resettlers became a point of conflict between German and British authorities in the spring of 
1950. Second, between 1947 and 1952 the camp was home to a variety of foreign nationals who 
had either lost their DP status or entered West Germany illegally. Accommodating these 
individuals became a further point of dispute between German and British authorities. These 
conflicts complicate the issue of German-British relations post-1949 while also offering a 
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corrective to narratives that assume a greater level of German sovereignty after the establishment 
of the Federal Republic than was actually the case. 
 Chapter 5 examines the development and operation of the sub-camp for transient or 
“wandernde” male youths from 1947 to 1951. War and displacement were powerful solvents 
against familial bonds. Fathers died at the front or languished in prisoner of war camps, while the 
chaos of flight and expulsion sometimes separated mothers from their children.61 Even in cases 
when the family unit remained intact or children could rely on family networks of uncles, aunts, 
and grandparents, material scarcity and uncertain employment strained familial ties. Flight from 
the Soviet zone over the Thuringian-Lower Saxon border was typically motivated by work 
conscription or domestic conflicts. This flight of Soviet-zone youths exacerbated the extant 
problem of transient youths in the British zone and particularly brought it to the attention of 
camp administrators dealing with these young illegal border crossers. Thus, the establishment of 
Friedland’s “Youth Reception Camp” (Jugendauffanglager) encapsulates the larger humanitarian 
and regulatory goals of the camp. Administrators used the regulating camp space to capture these 
youths whose unsettlement seemed so dangerous to social order. Through education, work 
placements, and family reunification the camp administrators hoped to redirect youthful energy 
from criminality to social and economic productivity. 
 Chapter 6 discusses camp operations between 1952 and 1960, when Friedland was 
responsible for “late returnees” (Spätheimkehrer) from imprisonment in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. Refugees from East Germany’s border region in 1952 and Hungarian refugees 
fleeing due to the revolution in 1956 were two other groups that helped to solidify the camp’s 
                                                 
61 Of course, postwar internment was not limited to men, despite depictions focusing on the masculinity of the 
affected populations. Particularly in the cases of the former eastern German provinces and among ethnic Germans, 
mothers were also separated from their families by imprisonment in labor camps. 
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reputation as the Gateway to Freedom. This reputation played a crucial role in decisions taken in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s to keep the Friedland facility open while the West German 
government began shutting down similar refugee camps. Although this period was crucial to the 
formation of the Friedland mythos, the camp issues surrounding the returnees proved quite 
contentious. More so than in the case of earlier returnees, late returnees raised thorny questions 
about complicity in Nazi crimes, whether as individual returnees or as members of the “non-
amnestied” group released by the Soviet Union in 1955. Indeed, examination of press reports and 
investigations at the camp, state, and federal levels suggests that the camp became a site of 
accusations and counter-accusations over dealing with Nazi crimes. More broadly, the “Great 
Homecoming” (Große Heimkehr) of 1955 was an event with bitter contestation over what 
constituted a proper reception for the final remaining POWs of Germany’s last war while as the 
process of rearmament to defend against communism had begun. 
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CHAPTER 1 
NATIONALIZATION AND POPULATION DISCPLACEMENT 
On September 7, 1945, the mayor of Göttingen, Erich Schmidt, wrote a plaintive letter to 
the governor (Oberpräsident) of the Province of Hannover.62 Schmidt began the letter by noting 
the rising number of emergency cases among refugees, and he argued for the establishment of a 
regulation over the governing districts (überbezirkliche Regelung) for dealing with the issue. His 
concern was mostly for three refugee groups for which the Friedland refugee camp would soon 
be responsible: young mothers with infants and small children, disabled veterans who were 
unable to work for the time being and could not return to their homes east of the Oder River, and 
lastly old and infirm persons separated from their relatives by the pressures of flight. Schmidt 
complained that these people wandered from place to place for mosnths without any long-term 
accommodation because their taking residence (Zuzug) in various localities was prohibited. If 
anything, the problem was worsening because other regions had been declared emergency areas 
and shoved the refugees into more welcoming districts. Noting the coming hardships of winter, 
Schmidt called for the development of a reception station to accommodate these groups. Schmidt 
laid the situation bare in his closing: “Göttingen, despite constant and earnest efforts, is not in the 
position to help itself.”63  
                                                 
62 Although this dissertation refers to the geographic region of “Lower Saxony,” it should be noted that Lower 
Saxony as a political unit did not exist until November 1946 when it was created out of the States of Hannover, 
Brunswick, Oldenburg, and Schaumburg-Lippe. 
63 Letter from E. Schmidt to Oberpräsident Hannover, 7 September 1945. Stadtverwaltung und Militärregierung Nr. 
A 1,2. Stadtarchiv Göttingen (hereafter, SAG). 
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 The events in September 1945 raise the question of what had caused such postwar 
population displacement in Germany. In fact, a wide variety of groups took part in this cross-
border traffic, ranging from civilians returning home after wartime evacuations to non-German 
Displaced Persons returning home or searching for lost family. The largest displaced population 
consisted of Germans in the process of expulsion from Germany’s former eastern provinces and 
its neighboring Eastern European states. This chapter is concerned with reconstructing the 
historical path that led to the expulsions.  
Of course, population displacement through war, persecution, and catastrophe stretches 
back to the ancient world, but the phenomenon of deliberate, mass expulsion and forced 
population transfers was a defining feature of twentieth-century history. Already in the wake of 
World War I, European powers began their first experiments with expulsion and forcible 
transfers as modern tools of statecraft. France, for example, transferred roughly 100,000 
“voluntary repatriates” from Alsace-Lorraine to Germany between 1918 and 1921.64 The Treaty 
of Lausanne negotiated between Greece and Turkey led to transfers that quickly outpaced 
Franco-German repatriations; roughly 1.2 million Greeks residing in Turkey and 365,000 Turks 
living in Greece were forcibly removed from their homes.65 Contemporaneous with the 
expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe, the forcible population transfers on the partitioned 
Indian subcontinent in 1947 affected at least 10 million people.66 At the close of the century, 
                                                 
64 R. M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of Germans after the Second World War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2012), 70. See also Carolyn Grohmann, “From Lothringen to Lorraine: Expulsion and Voluntary 
Repatriation,” in Conan Fisher and Alan Sharp, eds., After the Versailles Treaty: Enforcement, Compliance, 
Contested Identities (London: Routledge, 2008).  
65 Pertti Ahonen et al, People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and 
its Aftermath (Oxford: Berg, 2008), 9. 
66 See Yasmine Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007), 6. 
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expulsion continued to play a key role in the “ethnic cleansing” during the wars in the areas of 
the former Yugoslavia, where some 4.5 million persons suffered displacement.67 The scope of 
German expulsions exceeded these all. Postwar expulsions of Germans from Eastern Europe 
displaced at least 12 million people, and the figure may have exceeded 14 million, including 
between 500,000 and 1 million deaths.68 
 Explaining why Germans were subject to such extensive expulsions requires 
consideration of a series of long, medium, and short-term factors. The roots of the expulsion 
reach back to the nineteenth-century rise of the nation as a predominant community of belonging 
in the multiethnic lands of Eastern Europe. The invention of the nation and the nationalization of 
populations by activist groups created a new dimension of political conflict leading to the First 
World War. The reification of nations through the assignment of national categories and 
grassroots identification with national communities also meant that nationally based conflicts 
affected ever more of the region’s peoples. The nationalization of Eastern European populations 
continued during and after World War I, while the postwar order created by the Peace of Paris 
led to sharper national conflicts. 
In the medium-term, the failure of the minority rights protection through the League of 
Nations and the destabilizing influence of nationalist politics in multinational states had two 
effects. First, the region was primed for more violent conflict. Second, the idea that national 
conflict should be resolved by the creation of nationally homogenous states gained more 
adherents. Finally, the postwar expulsion of Germans cannot be understood without reference to 
                                                 
67 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, “Opinion on situation of refugees and displaced persons in some 
parts of the former Yugoslavia,” by Iwinski, Doc. 7397 (Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, 
1995). 
68 Douglas, Orderly and Humane, 1. The extent of the expulsion and death rate remain controversial, but there is 
relative consensus for the above figures. 
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the causative context of World War II. Almost immediately following the outbreak of the war, 
Adolf Hitler and his Nazi regime began a program to remake Eastern Europe along national and 
racial lines, committing atrocities and privileging Germans and their allies at the expense of 
putatively inferior races. This wartime disruption of national communities in turn made it easier 
to imagine and to realize the forcible transfer of the German populations that had seemed to 
provoke or at least provide the pretext for war. 
The Nationalization of Eastern European Populations 
At its most fundamental level, nationalist conflict in Eastern Europe stemmed from the 
region’s patchwork of multiethnic populations. The migrations and invasions of Germanic and 
Slavic groups in the regions generally stretching between the Volga and Oder Rivers and 
between the Baltic and Adriatic Seas produced complicated patterns of settlement during the 
ancient and medieval eras.69 Germanic populations in particular grew along the Baltic Sea as a 
consequence of the Teutonic rule and, later, Hanseatic trade networks. Beginning in the 
seventeenth century, German-speaking settlers moved inland and eastward into the areas of 
Poland-Lithuania, along the Danube, and eventually by invitation into tsarist Russia along the 
Volga, the Black Sea, and in the Caucuses.70 Nevertheless, it is important to note that these 
linguistic and cultural groups did not constitute primordial nations. Instead, these populations 
only became nationalized during the transition to modernity in Eastern Europe. Although the 
descendents of various settler groups may have come to identify in national terms and engage in 
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explicitly national conflicts during the twentieth century, any suggestion that their ancestors 
already constituted nations or that conflicts between different groups is anachronistic. 
 Like other communities of belonging, nations develop from the self-understanding and 
loyalty of their members. Benedict Anderson’s much celebrated and oft-repeated phrasing 
defines the nation as “an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign.” 71 Nations are simultaneously “imagined” and real in the sense that an 
individual conceives of himself or herself as a member of a political community connecting 
complete strangers through cultural ties. The imagining of the nation as a limited, definable 
community thus makes it real. Nations are in turn useful to both the state and its population. 
Anderson, for example, understands the development of nationalism as a beneficial historical 
phenomenon because, in his view, the nation’s sovereignty emphasizes freedom, the 
Enlightenment, and the Revolution in opposition to the “hierarchical dynastic realm.”72 John 
Breuilly’s discussion of nationalism is likewise crucial for understanding what advantages the 
national community offers to the modern state. He argues that the fundamental point of 
nationalism is “above and beyond all else, about politics, and […] politics is about power.”73 In 
particular, nationalist politics are useful to the modern state for their capacity for internal 
mobilization and coordination.74 
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 The European watershed for the emergence of nationalist politics occurred during the 
Revolutions of 1848. A combination of poor harvests and the longer-term discontentment of 
peasants and artisans over economic dislocation led to the outbreak of revolution in France, 
which then spread eastward before stopping short at the edge of Russia. For liberal and more 
radical revolutionaries, the question was not only the introduction of democratic institutions and 
the liberalization of economies, but also the extent to which European states should be reordered 
along national lines. In the German case, the parliamentarians in Frankfurt also confronted the 
issues of national unification and its ramifications for citizenship. Brian Vick has argued that the 
liberal nationalists at Frankfurt hoped to create an expansive, inclusive basis for German 
citizenship with the understanding that Protestant-German culture would predominate.75 The 
prospect of fragmentation along national lines, however, proved particularly worrisome to the 
monarchy in multinational Austria-Hungary and ultimately helped to scuttle a possible Greater 
German solution.76 Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, nationalist groups in the Polish, Hungarian, and 
Czech cases also wrestled with issue of exclusive nationalism and its effect of blunting territorial 
claims.77 Although the eventual conservative victories undermined the goals of radical and 
national revolutionaries, Europe’s monarchies (particularly in Austria-Hungary) increasingly had 
to compete with developing national consciousness for popular loyalty. 
 As the Revolutions of 1848 suggested, the nation constituted only one form of communal 
belonging among many different forms of imaginable communities. Class, religion, localities, 
and even monarchs could also form the basis for primary or situational self-identification. During 
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the latter half of the nineteenth-century, national activists in Eastern Europe therefore not only 
competed with each other to increase the breadth of their communities, but they also contested 
other forms of group identity. 
In a landmark study of the Germany minority in Prague from 1861 to 1914, Gary Cohen 
was one of the first historians to show the contingency of national self-identification. Cohen 
found that nationality was closely tied to class and cultural identity. He further argued that status 
as political, cultural, and economic elites became defining features of German national 
belonging.78 Crucially, Cohen also demonstrated the extent to which national identity was 
malleable and a product of rational class-interested choice. He found that lower-class Germans 
who lived in a predominantly Czech environment “faced strong pressures to assimilate with the 
Czechs […] in the end, many were simply absorbed into the Czech-speaking majority.”79 
 Resistance to the permanent adoption of national identities frustrated national activists in 
Eastern Europe, particularly in the lands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In his examination of 
the Habsburg officer corps from 1848 to 1918—the initial period of intensified nationalist 
activism—Istvan Deak demonstrated that officers from the empire’s constituent groups remained 
stubbornly nonnational. The officers even shed ethnic identities by associating themselves with 
the supranational figure of the emperor and the institution of the army. The officers did 
eventually succumb to nationalization during the second year of World War I when combat 
losses had turned the professional army into a “citizens’ militia.”80 Jeremy King has likewise 
shown that for the residents of Budejovice/Budweis, “individual choice and national 
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competition” slowed the nationalization process, stripping “the process of much of its seeming 
naturalness and irreversibility.”81 
Because definitions of “German,” “Czech,” and other categories were ambiguous enough 
to allow residents to switch between the two for their own advantage, national activists tried to 
force populations to adopt a single national identity during the fin de siècle. Nationalists in 
southern Bohemia, South Styria, and South Tyrol recast these lands as “language frontiers” to 
normalize national identity and to eliminate the possibility of alternative loyalties. According to 
Pieter Judson, these nationalists “struggled to popularize their positions among local inhabitants, 
to make nationalism particularly relevant to local concerns, and to bind local populations 
permanently to one side or the other.”82 At the turn of the century, children also became 
particular targets of national activists’ efforts. As Tara Zahra has argued, children could “slip 
easily between linguistic and national communities, threaten[ing] to expose the deepest 
assumptions of nationalist politics as myths.”83 Indeed, children were so important to nationalists 
that when a nationalist government emerged in post-World War I Czechoslovakia, the 
modernizing state apparatus came into increasing conflict with parents over the nationalization of 
the private, family sphere. 
The outbreak and fighting of World War I further sharpened national divides in Eastern 
Europe. In Austria-Hungary, the start of the war initially caused nationalist associations to match 
their rhetoric to wartime patriotism, because they believed that demonstrations of loyalty through 
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active participation in the war effort would be rewarded later.84 Nationalist groups in Bohemia 
then remained in a “holding pattern” for much of the rest of the war.85 As the war came to a close 
in 1918, however, the inhabitants of languages frontiers began adopting national identities in 
greater numbers. This phenomenon did not emerge because citizens suddenly “realized” their 
identities or found themselves free express national identification, but instead because claiming 
nationality became a requirement for acquiring aid from the Habsburg government and the 
successor states.86 
In Russia, worries about enemy nationalities led to harsher repression than was the case 
in Austria-Hungary. The tsar’s government and military particularly feared German-speaking 
populations as a potential fifth column. As a result, the military targeted German-speakers in the 
western lands of the empire through a program of expropriation, revocation of linguistic and 
cultural autonomy, and deportation.87 The liberalization of Russia following the February 
Revolution in 1917 included the revocation of measures targeting Germans, but the subsequent 
October Revolution undid the relaxation of these policies.88 Such repression of German-speakers 
contributed to the construction of Germans as an enemy nation within Russia. Yet, the 
crystallization of a German national identity in Russia was also part of a larger awakening of 
national consciousness through displacement along the front. Roughly six million people were 
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uprooted by the fighting and Russian military’s program of population displacement. This status 
as refugees sharpened national consciousness among the displaced minorities as well as in the 
minds of the groups hosting them in Russia’s interior territories.89  
Fighting and occupation by German troops on the Eastern European front during World 
War I solidified German and local understandings of nationality. German soldiers arriving in 
territories of Lithuania and the Kurland were shocked by the “elective ethnicities” of the native 
populations. According to Germans, this national confusion and putative backwardness 
necessitated the introduction of German Kultur as part of a civilizing mission.90 Irrational 
economic policies embittered the region’s inhabitants and forced them to view conflicts with the 
occupation force of Ober Ost in starkly national terms.91 Indeed, German heavy-handedness 
proved counterproductive to winning allies among nationalists in Eastern Europe. The plan to 
create Lithuanian and Polish buffer states displeased both nations: Lithuanians would lose 
territory to the Poles, and treaties would have tightly bound the new national states to Germany 
militarily and economically.92 It is therefore unsurprising that German attempts to recruit 
nationalists to their cause were ultimately rebuffed and instead left a legacy of increased 
nationalization through conflict with German occupiers. 
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Minority Protection and Population Transfers 
Despite the seeming triumph of Woodrow Wilson’s concept of national self-
determination, the creation of national democracies in Eastern Europe mostly stemmed from a 
cynical Realpolitik rather than a liberalistic commitment to Wilsonian ideals. To be sure, national 
self-determination had entered the interwar political vocabulary of Eastern Europe. Yet, many of 
the successor states created out of the multinational empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and 
Russia followed a multinational model.93 Multinationality and the resulting conflicts were the 
price paid for the creation of the medium-sized states that France and Britain preferred as 
counterweights to Germany and as “bastions against Bolshevism” farther east.94 
The most obvious example of political realism overriding self-determination were the 
decisions to ensure that Germany emerged from the war with decreased territorial holdings. For 
instance, Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye forbade union between Germany 
and the rump Austrian state by declaring Austria’s independence “inalienable” and barring 
actions that would “by any means whatever compromise her independence.”95 Significant 
German-speaking minorities also lived in Czechoslovakia and Poland, both of which were 
created in part through the acquisition of territories from Germany and Austria. With the 
exception of the 1921 plebiscite in Upper Silesia, these German populations remained national 
minorities in the successor states rather than having the chance to join the Germany or Austria. 
Indeed, plebiscites, censuses, and educational policy served as the primary battlegrounds 
for nationalists in Eastern Europe’s interwar states. Like the other successor states, 
                                                 
93 Stephen Horak, Poland and her National Minorities, 1919-39: A Case Study (New York: Vantage Press, 1961), 
12. 
94 Raymond Pearson, National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848-1945 (London: MacMillan Press, 1983), 160. 
95 Article 88, Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye. 
   
46 
Czechoslovakia was neither linguistically nor religiously homogenous. To national activists, 
however, one of the greatest frustrations was that people who “even ‘shared’ the correct 
language or religion continued to be indifferent to nationalist ideology.”96 In an effort to address 
this putative problem of national indifference, Czechoslovakia’s government empowered census 
takers to “correct” individuals’ declaration of nationality, and citizens who claimed to be German 
could face criminal proceedings for declaring a “false” nationality.97 Czech nationalists also 
resumed intensive lobbying against what they viewed as concessions to the interests of national 
minorities, particularly when it came to schooling. Viewing bilingualism as dangerous to 
national identification and in a practice contemporaneously replicated in Poland, Czech 
nationalists attempted to define children as Czech according “objective principles.” 
Administrators would therefore be able to assign children to Czech schools and prevent 
nationally dubious bilingualism.98 
Although the Polish Republic was declared on October 7, 1918, the territorial reality of 
the Polish state remained in flux for several years.99 Fighting between Polish and Soviet forces as 
well as unresolved western borders with Germany (not to mention a southern border conflict 
with Czechoslovakia) initially made an accurate assessment of Poland’s national demographics 
difficult. These conflicts also galvanized national activists and accelerated the process of 
populations becoming national. When the Polish state could finally complete its first official 
census in 1921, there were just over one million Germans living in its territories. Crucially, the 
census did not include the disputed Upper Silesian region where Polish and German-speaking 
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populations became subjects of intense international debate and radicalizing nationalist 
campaigns.100 
Drafts of Treaty of Versailles originally awarded the entire region to Poland until German 
protests prompted British Prime Minister David Lloyd George to override French and American 
objections and to insert a clause mandating a plebiscite. Still, Upper Silesia remained under 
German control until January 1920, when the treaty came into force. Thereafter came a period of 
intense campaigning and conflict, including sporadic violence. The elections held on March 20, 
1921, nevertheless occurred in a “surprisingly peaceful atmosphere.”101 Germans won the vote 
with 707,488 ballots compared to 479,369 for Poland (844 communes voted for Germany, 678 
for Poland), but voting failed to resolve to whom the territory belonged.102 While the plebiscite 
commission debated its recommendations into May, rumors of a decision favorable to German 
interests led to a Polish uprising in the region and German protests to the Allies that they were 
not honoring their obligation to maintain order under the Treaty of Versailles.103 Finally on 
October 15 the League of Nations put forth a proposal that was ultimately accepted by all parties. 
Germany received 57 percent of the region’s inhabitants and 70 percent of the territory, while the 
Poles received 75 percent of the coal and ore reserves along with most of the industrial 
capacity.104 The partition added some 350,000 Germans to Poland’s population.105  
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As in Czechoslovakia, the German minority in Poland faced a “nationalizing state.”106 
Poles made up only 60 percent of the overall population, but the integral nationalism of 
rightwing Polish parties called for a complete Polonization of the population. Polish nationalists 
viewed Belarusian and Ukrainian populations as nationally underdeveloped and targets for 
assimilation. Germans, however, were considered a developed national group insusceptible to 
assimilation. Polonization of western territories was therefore to proceed through “a 
disassimilationist approach that encouraged the German population, however defined, to 
leave.”107 Educational instruction in Polish, the closing of civil service careers to Germans (at 
least those who did not speak Polish), and higher taxes on German populations produced 
powerful incentives for emigration. Immigration to Germany also depended on pull factors, such 
as the prospect for returning to the top of the national-political hierarchy. By 1922 more than 
140,000 Germans had abandoned Polish citizenship and Poland, and perhaps as many as 750,000 
Germans had emigrated by 1939.108  
The minority protection system developed at the Paris Peace Conference was supposed to 
counterbalance nationalizing forces in Eastern Europe. As Carole Fink has argued, the 
formulation of minority rights was flawed from the outset, because the peacemakers developed 
the system to interact with individuals rather than acknowledge “dangerous overtones of failed or 
future claims to self-determination.”109 There existed a liberal veneer of individual rights, but 
minority protection had functioned as an extension of Realpolitik by Europe’s great powers since 
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the first conventions of the 1878 Congress of Berlin and continued to do so following the Treaty 
of Versailles. 
The first of these minority protection treaties was the so-called Little Treaty of Versailles 
signed on June 28, 1919. The treaty established both the interwar Polish state and the basis for 
subsequent minority protection treaties overseen by the League of Nations. Articles 2 through 8 
of the treaty overrode any existing or future legislation and guaranteed religious freedom, 
conditions for the acquisition of citizenship, equality of minorities before the law, and the right 
to converse in minority languages in public and private.110 The granting of these rights, however, 
was undercut by their focus on individuals rather than official acknowledgment of minorities. 
Having had their fill of the issue at Paris Peace Conference and facing resolute opposition from 
small powers to outside control, the Great Powers then allowed the issue of minority rights to 
devolve to the newly created League of Nations.111 One year later in October 1920, the League 
of Nations formally became involved in the protection of these minority rights in its member 
states by creating a procedure for minority petitions to the League. 
Despite the creation of a formal system for hearing and adjudicating complaints, the 
League’s minority protection scheme failed for a number of reasons. The process for submitting 
petitions was relatively open, and a committee of three was required for every “authentic 
petition” to the secretariat. In practice, however, the system required the cooperation of the 
recalcitrant accused states.112 Great Powers’ refusal to subject themselves to a universal minority 
rights regime further undermined the system’s legitimacy and opened space for Eastern 
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European states to subvert the protection system that the Great Powers showed little interest in 
enforcing.113 Another problem stemmed from perception of the groups that used the system. 
“Imperial minorities” including Germans accounted for upwards of 30 percent of petitions to the 
League, which contributed to the impression that the system served irredentist purposes, 
providing yet another disincentive for nationalist governments to cooperate.114 To be sure, the 
minority protection system provided some counterbalance to nationalist forces in Poland by 
forcing the government to navigate between the minority treaties and extremist positions.115 
Cracks in the system nevertheless emerged, most clearly illustrated by the departure of so many 
Germans from Poland in addition to the 10 percent of Belarusians who emigrated from Poland in 
a sort of “voting-with-the-feet plebiscite.”116 In any event, the system became dead letter after 
Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 and Poland’s renunciation of its 
obligations in September 1934. 
Before the League’s minority protection system could fail, European states had begun 
using population transfers as an alternative solution to conflicts in multinational states. Already 
in 1918 France began a program to “cleanse” Alsace and Lorraine of its German-speaking 
populations.117 The French developed four classifications for the residents of these border 
territories: the “A” marker for those of unquestioned loyalty who lived in the region before the 
Franco-Prussian War, “B” for those who had at least one French parent in 1870, “C” for neutral 
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and Allied nationals, and “D” for the 513,000 “enemy” nationals and their children.118 Persons in 
possession of identity cards of the “D” category were first subject to travel restrictions and 
economic discrimination, so German-speakers began to repatriate themselves voluntarily before 
the French government started to deport the remainder of the category. All told, some 100,000 
people were expelled or “voluntarily repatriated” to Germany between 1918 and 1921.119 
The second major experiment with forcible population transfer in interwar Europe took 
place in Turkey and Greece. After defeating Greek forces near Anakara, Kemalist troops retook 
Greek-held territories and committed atrocities against Greek populations, particularly in 
Smyrna. Thus, mass flight of Greeks had already begun when peace talks opened at Lausanne in 
November 1922. Both Greek and Turkish representatives at Lausanne favored compulsory 
population exchanges, and Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan also all agreed that “unmixing 
populations in the Near East” was the necessary for securing peace in the region.120 Thus, the 
Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations signed in January 1923 
provided for the removal of all persons of Greek Orthodox faith from Turkey and all persons of 
Muslim faith from Greece.121 Some 1.2 million Greeks and roughly 365,000 Turks so defined 
were then expelled, and Greece went on to engage in a similar exchange of 200,000 people with 
Bulgaria.122 
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Even as the Nazi regime complained bitterly over the treatment of German-speaking 
minorities during the 1930s, it also engaged in a program of forced migration targeting Jews. The 
implementation of anti-Semitic legislation to reverse Jewish social, economic, and cultural 
emancipation from 1933 to 1936 had already prompted the flight of approximately 130,000 Jews 
from Germany by 1938. To that effect, the Nazi regime had also concluded the 1933 Haavara 
Agreement with Zionists in Palestine to incentivize Jewish emigration from the Reich by 
allowing émigrés to access the value of the property they were forced to leave in Germany.123 
During the Anschluss with Austria in 1938, Adolf Eichmann led the escalation of Nazi policy to 
deliberate expulsion. In Vienna, Eichmann perfected a system by which Jews who had been 
taken into custody would be released upon the receipt of documents verifying the emigration of 
the individuals’ families.124 A final example of prewar Nazi efforts to expel Jews can be found in 
their transporting of some 16,000 Polish Jews back to Poland in 1938 before the Polish 
government could implement a program to deprive them of their Polish citizenship, which would 
have effectively stranded them in Germany.125 
In light of this common use and acceptance of population transfers and expulsions to 
settle nationality conflicts, it is hardly surprising that Edvard Beneš was already seeking a 
population transfer to resolve the Sudetendeutsche problem before the start of World War II. R. 
M. Douglas has argued that Beneš had the Treaty of Lausanne explicitly in mind when he 
proposed a deal with Hitler on September 15, 1938. Czechoslovakia would cede some 6,000 
square kilometers to the Reich in return for Hitler allowing the compulsory transfer of 1.5 to 2 
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million Sudetendeutsche.126 Hitler never responded to Beneš’s offer. Although Beneš’s initial 
plan never came to fruition, it is clear that the postwar expulsions that Beneš championed and 
ultimately realized grew out of interwar solutions to nationality problems. 
World War II and the Unsettling of Peoples 
The first displacement and resettlement of Germans during World War II was a product 
of Nazi policy for the demographic remaking of Eastern Europe. Although the flight of Germans 
before the Red Army’s advance into East Prussia in 1945 dominates historical memory of the 
first displacements, the actual first uprooting of German communities in Eastern Europe began at 
Nazi initiative in the nearby Baltic states in 1939. In a speech to the Reichstag on October 6, 
Adolf Hitler announced his satisfaction with territorial demands after defeating Poland, and he 
went on to state that he wished to resettle the remaining German populations of Eastern Europe 
within the Reich.127 Hitler had already undertaken a program of population transfers to relieve 
his Italian ally of 60,000 Tyrolian Germans, and the timing of the speech suggests that his 
discussion of resettlement was prompted by concerns for Baltic Germans. In particular, Hitler 
wished to remove Baltic Germans as a potential point of conflict between Germany and the 
Soviet Union, because he had received word from Moscow on September 25 that Stalin intended 
to claim the free hand in the Baltic secretly granted in the Non-Aggression Pact.128 To that end, 
Hitler formally commissioned Heinrich Himmler and the SS with the task of “retrieving 
Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche from foreign lands […] eliminating the harmful alien 
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segments of the population from the German Volk and its lands, and planning and implementing 
the settlement of the land designated for repatriated Germans.”129 
Following Hitler’s speech, the SS branch in charge of repatriation (the Volksdeutsche 
Mittelstelle or VoMi) sent representatives to Estonia and Latvia to negotiate German repatriation. 
The Germans and Estonians quickly concluded a treaty on October 15, while negotiations over 
the disposition of property delayed a treaty with Latvia until the end of October.130 The transfers 
commenced in late 1939 and ended in early 1940 with the arrival of about 84,000 ethnic 
Germans from Latvia and Estonia, leaving a German minority of as little as 2,000 in the two 
countries.131 These transferred ethnic Germans were then housed in temporary reception camps 
while the Central Immigration Office in Łódź oversaw their registration, selection, and 
distribution for resettlement in the so-called Wartheland.132 
After the relatively successful repatriation of Baltic Germans, the Nazi regime turned its 
attention to resettling Volksdeutsche from Bessarabia and Bukovina. While Hitler regarded most 
Volksdeutsche in southeastern Europe as important links between Germany and the region, the 
Germans of Bessarabia and Bukovina required resettlement because of Soviet pressure for 
promised Bessarabian territories as well as lands in northern Bukovina.133 The VoMi ultimately 
evacuated 93,548 Germans from Bessarabia and 43,568 Germans from Bukovina.134 Adding to 
these figures in 1940, Hitler also agreed to the resettlement of an additional 215,000 repatriates 
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from Romania and another 180,000 from Volhynia and Galicia.135 Further repatriations from 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union during the following war years raised the official total of 
resettled Germans to 770,000.136 
Two of the key issues for these repatriation programs were finding temporary housing 
and permanent resettlement locations. In the first case, the VoMi used SS commandos, local 
police forces, and Volksdeutsche auxiliaries to evict Poles and Jews from entire city blocks in 
Łódź.137 Whereas the VoMi could simply throw Polish and Jewish evictees onto the streets or 
into camps, the VoMi within Germany proper found itself compelled to rent space or seize 
property under a requisitioning law of September 1939.138 Through these efforts, the VoMi was 
able create network of 1,500 to 1,800 camps to house repatriates, whether in the form of transit 
camps used for short periods, collection camps used for up to a week before transport, or 
observation camps where the VoMi could observe their charges for “political deviations or 
physical and spiritual deficiencies.”139 
The existence of such observation camps demonstrates that despite nearly a century of 
intensifying nationalization attempts, national identity in Eastern Europe remained mercurial. 
Nazi racial pseudo-science was incompatible with the diversity of populations in the region. 
Moreover, racial scientists faced great difficulty in producing workable standards for identifying 
“German” or “Aryan” individuals. The old nationalist standbys of language, religion, and 
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marriage proved troublesome. Disappointed SS officials found that the Volksdeutsche, whom 
they expected to be carriers of German identity farther East, were in reality difficult to 
distinguish from their neighbors, especially when they had intermarried, converted, and spoke 
pidgin or otherwise incomprehensible German.140 Even in the Bohemian territories, 
“amphibians” who could switch nationalities based on situational advantages proved enormously 
frustrating to Nazi officials.141 
As a result, the SS relied on a four-tier classification system for ethnic Germans. Group I 
was reserved for the racially above-average, Group II for the average, Group III for the below 
average, and Group IV was reserved for those considered unacceptable for resettlement in the 
East. Volksdeutsche with a rural background were generally designated in Groups I–III so that 
they could become the peasant settlers of Himmler’s imagination, while those in Group IV were 
sent to the Altreich for what amounted to agricultural forced labor.142 If the Sipo-SD found the 
Volksdeutsche politically unreliable despite their putative German racial and cultural character, 
then they would be sent to the Altreich as Groups III and IV, no matter their profession. Further 
confusing the entire process, non-Germans with desirable “racial features” were also transferred 
to the Altreich for Germanization, while non-Germans without such features were returned home 
or sent to the General Government in occupied Poland. Given the often-poor farming conditions, 
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sense of unease about the previously evicted owners, and fears of partisan raids, resettlement 
often proved disappointing even for those Volksdeutsche with the best classifications.143 
Nazi Germany was not the only state to engage in extensive programs of population 
exchange, expulsion, and resettlement during World War II. Italian policy in its annexed 
territories envisioned forcible transfer of politically unreliable populations. The Italians carried 
out a census for that purpose in southeastern France, and the occupation forces in Croatia and 
Slovenia targeted specific areas for forced internment and population transfers.144 Hungary and 
Romania engaged in a population exchange during 1940 and 1941. The Hungarian regime also 
deported 35,000 to 56,000 Serbs from its territories in 1941.145 Including ethnic German and 
Hungarian populations already discussed, the wartime Romania government had planned to 
expel upwards of 3.5 million non-Romanians from the Greater Romanian territories.146 
While Hitler and his Axis allies carried out programs of mass expulsion and killing, the 
Czech government in exile began lobbying the Allies for an expulsion of Germans from Czech 
lands once the war ended. Beneš had proposed physically removing the Sudetendeutsche 
problem before the war, but his position on the issue did not harden until after Soviet and 
American entries to the war in 1941. After a series of speeches advocating a punitive approach to 
Germany in 1941, Beneš committed the exile government to the expulsion of Sudeten Germans 
in an interview with Foreign Affairs in January 1942.147 Nazi reprisal killings at Lidice 
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strengthened Beneš’s argument for expulsion. Właysław Sikorski’s Polish government in exile 
soon counted among Beneš’s supporters for an expulsion program when it became clear that 
Poland would be compensated with German territories in exchange for eastern lands lost to the 
Soviet Union.148  
As early as 1941, Stalin had also considered the forcible transfer of German populations 
as a key element of any postwar settlement. Following Stalin’s line, communist factions amongst 
the Czechs and Poles also favored that solution.149 Abandoning any last commitment to 
communist internationalism, Władysław Gomułka claimed, “We must expel all the Germans 
because countries are built on national lines and not on multinational ones.”150 Aware of Stalin’s 
desire for a program of expulsions, Churchill seems to have endorsed expulsions during the 
summer of 1943. Stalin reaffirmed his position later in 1943 as well. That decision left the 
Americans as the last major power to win over. Historian R. M. Douglas has convincingly 
argued that Beneš almost certainly overstated Roosevelt’s support for the scheme following their 
only meeting in 1943—indeed, the State Department refuted Beneš’s claims to that effect—but 
by the end of the year, “the expulsion project had taken on a momentum that only a decision of 
the Big Three could have reversed.”151 
Displacement of German populations toward the end of the war first occurred through 
flight from the advancing Red Army. The first evacuations of Germans were those of 
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Volksdeutsche in Romania and the Serbian Banat in 1944, totaling nearly 150,000 persons.152 
Subsequent evacuations during the summer and fall of 1944 included 300,000 Danube Germans 
in Yugoslavia, up to 60,000 Hungarian Germans, and an indeterminate number of Slovakia’s 
140,000 German residents.153 Mass evacuation and flight from the eastern parts of the German 
Reich began in the winter of 1945. 
On January 12, 1945, the Red Army crossed the Vistula River and drove north through 
the German province of East Prussia before orderly evacuations could begin. The German 
population fled, but the Soviet advance quickly overtook refugees. What followed was a wave of 
pillaging, rape, and killing. In explaining the unleashing of these destructive energies, it is 
important to consider that up to that point, Red Army soldiers had been fighting a hard campaign 
against Germany, were generally aware of German atrocities at Lublin-Majdanek, and had seen 
the destruction of German-occupied Soviet territories. Such experiences and knowledge 
combined with pilfered alcohol and the exhortations of Red Army officers and Soviet 
propaganda to produce the violent attacks on German civilians.154 Roughly 250,000 Germans 
were nevertheless able to flee westward by land. Another 650,000 fled across the frozen Vistula 
lagoon, and some 450,000 refugees took ferries to Gdańsk/Danzig.155 In addition to the refugees 
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from East Prussia, another 3 million Germans fled Silesia, 800,000 fled East Pomerania, 300,000 
fled Brandenburg, 200,000 fled Danzig, and one million Germans fled from occupied Poland.156 
A series of so-called “wild expulsions” in the spring and summer of 1945 also preceded 
the beginning of officially sanctioned expulsions. For Czechs, hatred of Germans promised unity 
to a society “atomized” by occupation, war, and collaboration. Violent attacks on Germans 
“promised a measure of redemption, allowing ‘good’ Czechs, finally, the opportunity to prove 
their courage and patriotism.”157 As the Wehrmacht abandoned Bohemia and the Red Army 
arrived, armed Czechs began to hunt down Germans and collaborators in reprisals that lasted 
until the August. During this period, between 19,000 and 30,000 Germans died, though only 
6,000 died as the direct result of Czech violence. Czech military authorities and civilians drove 
another 600,000 and 900,000 Germans from Bohemia during the summer months of 1945.158  
The initial Polish expulsions of Germans had proceeded less violently than was the case 
in Bohemia. Still, the order to immediately expel all Germans from Polish territory introduced 
violence and urgency when General Karol Świerczewski issued it on June 24.159 Douglas notes 
that estimates of the number of Germans subjected to wild expulsions from Poland range 
between 200,000 and 1.2 million, though he suggests that a figure of 1 million is likely 
conservative. Indeed, one of the major difficulties in assessing the number of Germans subject to 
the expulsions is that some German refugees had tried to return home at the war’s end, so it is 
difficult to arrive at a base estimate of the number of Germans in Poland in June.160 
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The ongoing wild expulsions ensured that regulation of future population transfers was a 
topic of discussion when the British, Americans, and Soviets met at Potsdam in July and August 
1945 to determine a course for the occupation of Germany. Polish and Czechoslovak authorities 
had tolerated violent excesses against German populations not only out of a desire for retribution 
but also because fear might induce more Germans to flee, presenting the Allies with a fait 
accompli on the issue of borders and transfers.161 Such violence led to unease among the British 
and Americans. Even the Soviet commanders in Berlin and along Germany’s eastern border were 
becoming unwilling to accept more displaced Germans.162 As such, the conference attendees 
revisited the issue of expulsions. Stalin remained unwilling to abandon plans for revising 
German borders and transferring populations, but he did pragmatically concede the need for 
better-regulated transfers.163 
Article XII of the conference protocol therefore stated the Allies’ agreement to the 
transfer of the remaining German populations in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The 
governments further agreed, “any transfers that take place should take place in an orderly and 
humane manner.” Recognizing the already existing burden presented by expellees, the document 
called for an “equitable distribution” to be arranged between the powers and the expelling 
countries. Finally, the powers “informed and requested” the governments of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to “suspend further expulsions pending an examination by the 
Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.”164 
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Unsanctioned expulsions of Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia nevertheless 
continued until December 1945. They were immediately followed by the start of officially 
organized transfers, plans for which had been announced by the Allied Control Council on 
November 20, 1945. The plans amounted to the transfer of the remaining 3.5 million Germans in 
Poland and 2.5 million in Czechoslovakia between December 1945 and mid-1946.165 The Soviets 
agreed to take 2.75 million Germans from across Eastern Europe into their zone; the Americans 
agreed to receive 2.25 million from Czechoslovakia and Hungary; and the British would take 1.5 
million from the Polish Recovered Territories.166  
The British began to make good on their commitments under a program codenamed 
Swallow in February 1946. Up to 6,500 expellees arrived per day until a sea link with 
Gdańsk/Danzig established in March further increased the transport capacity.167 By the end of 
1946, the British had managed to overfill their quota, having accepted nearly 1.65 million 
Germans from Poland, mostly from Lower Silesia.168 As 1946 and 1947 dragged on, the Polish 
government also began to include prisoners of war in their transports, bringing the totals to 
593,000 Germans in 1947 and 112,250 Germans for 1948 and 1949 combined.169 In order to 
accommodate these staggering numbers, the British established a system of 1,051 camps, with 
the largest located in the Lüstringen, Poggenhagen, Uelzen-Bohldamm, and Friedland.170 
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Evacuees and DPs 
In addition to the some 12 million German expellees, occupation authorities faced the 
need to resettle two other displaced populations whose significance bears brief mention. The first 
group consisted of the Germans displaced by Allied strategic bombing meant to “de-house” the 
workforce driving Germany’s war machine. Britain’s bombing of Germany began at first 
because it was the only way for the island state to strike Germany, but in 1942 Sir Arthur Harris 
took control of British bomber command and argued that it was not enough to knock out 
individual factories. Instead, as William Hitchcock has characterized the strategy, “the city as a 
whole had to be destroyed.”171 The brutal mathematics of the Allied air campaign were: 2.7 
million tons of bombs dropped on Germany, 3.6 million units of housing destroyed, 7.5 million 
Germans left homeless, and at least 305,000 Germans killed.172 A less obvious problem with 
these 7.5 million homeless Germans in the divided postwar occupation zones was that many had 
been evacuated during the war into regions controlled by different powers after the war. 
Evacuees from the Ruhr region ended up in Soviet-controlled Thuringia, Saxony, and Saxony-
Anhalt.173 Refugees from Dresden found themselves in Lower Saxony, separated from their 
home city and families by the British-Soviet border. Indeed, before Operation Swallow could 
begin transferring Germans from Poland, the British and Soviet forces first needed to complete 
Operation Honeybee for the “head-to-head” exchange of evacuees with families and homes in 
the other zone.174 
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The other significant displaced population in postwar Germany was not German at all. As 
many as eight to eleven million former forced and “voluntary” laborers, POWs, victims of the 
concentration and death camp systems, and former allies of the Nazi regime found themselves 
within Germany at the end of the war.175 These Displaced Persons—“civilians outside the 
national boundaries of their country by reason of war”—were subject to both military authorities, 
who saw them as a problem “chiefly […] of security and order,” and the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration.176 Anglo-American military authorities sought the speediest 
possible repatriation, and the Soviet Union demanded the return of all of its soldiers and civilians 
irrespective of individual preference and without exception. Responding to these pressures, the 
military governments and UNRRA accomplished a feat of enormous organizational efforts by 
resettling the vast majority of these DPs, over 10 million, by the end of September 1945.177 The 
question remained, however, of what should be done with the hardcore of up to 1 million DPs 
who refused repatriation and the non-Germans who continued to flee into Germany well after the 
cessation of hostilities in May 1945. 
Conclusions 
Between 1945 and 1949, the Allied military governments and German officials needed to 
resettle a staggering 30 million displaced individuals. The displacement of roughly 18 million of 
these persons can be explained relatively easily as the immediate consequences of Nazi crimes 
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and World War II. Approximately 7 million Germans had lost their homes to the Allied strategic 
bombing campaigns. Another 11 million non-Germans had been brought to Germany as 
prisoners of war, forced laborers, and victims of racial and political persecution. The process by 
which a further 12 million Germans were expelled from their homes in Eastern Europe, however, 
developed out of a series of long, medium, and short-term factors. 
The longest-range cause of the Germans’ expulsion was the increasing nationalization of 
populations and conflicts in Eastern Europe reaching back to the nineteenth century. The 
development of nations as communities of belonging that cut across traditional loyalties to 
locality and crown accelerated dramatically following the Revolutions of 1848. National activists 
engaged in a concerted effort to convince the peoples of Eastern Europe to think of themselves 
primarily as German, Czech, Polish, Hungarian, and the like. Although these activists suffered 
constant frustrations caused by individuals’ unwillingness to think nationally or commit 
themselves to a single nation, they had nevertheless succeeded in their efforts to inject 
nationality into the region’s politics before the outbreak of World War I. The effects of that war 
on nationality varied, but by 1918, national identification had become more widespread, and the 
defeat of each multinational empire opened space for more intensive activism and conflicts. 
Two medium-term factors contributed to the eventual expulsions. The first of these 
factors was the failure of the minority protection system overseen by the League of Nations 
during the interwar period. Although the Great Powers had subjected the newly created successor 
states of Eastern Europe to conventions protecting the rights of national minorities, they had little 
interest in the enforcement of the regime and no desire to subject themselves to it either. The 
governments of the successor states walked a line between the treaties and the most radical 
demands of national activists, but states such as Czechoslovakia and Poland did engage in 
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campaigns to nationalize their populations and disadvantage minority groups. Petitions by 
German minorities combined with the unabashedly revisionist policies of the Weimar Republic 
regarding its eastern borders. The effect of that was greater intransigence on the part of the 
successor states that viewed the treaties as aiding German irredentism. Such intransigence was 
especially problematic because the system’s structure required their cooperation for the 
adjudication of disputes and because the system might have also been used as a shield against 
German irredentists. 
The second medium-range factor was the increasing use of population exchanges as a 
tool of diplomacy and statecraft during the interwar period. The French government succeeded in 
the displacement of roughly 100,000 Germans from the reacquired territories of Alsace and 
Lorraine between 1918 and 1921. Those French efforts soon paled in comparison to exchanges at 
Europe’s southeastern periphery. By 1923, the Turkish and Greek regimes had forcibly 
transferred over 1.5 million people. Despite the hardships it caused, that transfer and the failure 
of the minority protection system suggested to European statesmen and diplomats that expulsions 
might succeed where liberal ideals and a language of rights had failed to resolve conflict. Thus, it 
was before the outbreak of World War II that nationalist leaders such as Edvard Beneš first 
entertained the notion of expulsion to finally end the conflicts surrounding German minorities in 
the multinational states of Easter Europe. 
World War II was the final, short-term cause of the expulsions. The unsettlement of 
Germans in the aftermath of the war cannot be understood without reference to Nazi plans for the 
destruciton and reordering of Eastern Europe's populations. To that end, Hitler began programs 
for the uprooting of German communities to resettle lands depopulated of their Slavic and Jewish 
owners through programs of expulsion and outright killing. German atrocities in Eastern Europe 
   
67 
in turn hardened the Allies' resolve for expulsion as a form of retribution and as a means to 
finally resolve conflicts surrounding German minorities. Having approved of mass expulsion, it 
remained for the Allies to coordinate with Germans in their respective zones of occupation in 
order to resolve the displacement before it could cause further disaster for public health or lead to 
radicalization against the occupation governments. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OUT OF THE EAST AND INTO CAMPS 
 By the late summer of 1945, the flow of refugees into southern Lower Saxony had 
become untenable. This rural region had largely been untouched by the war, but its infrastructure 
and supplies were inadequate for refugees arriving in the small farming communities near the 
border with goal of reaching American-controlled Hessen or traveling farther into the British 
sector. Late in the summer, former German Red Cross Field Director Körber-Harriehausen 
requested aid from the district’s British commandant, which first came in the form of a 
requisitioned Jeep for transporting amputees.178 On September 9, the situation at the border had 
deteriorated further. Two days after Göttingen Mayor Erich Schmidt had pleaded for help from 
the German authorities for the Hanoverian Province, he wrote to the director of the Reichsbahn 
railroad services in Kassel with a request. He asked for trains to be routed so that they could 
transport the thousands of Germans arriving daily and “flooding the southern portion of the 
district and the city of Göttingen at such a level that their accommodation is no longer possible 
and their evacuation is essential.”179 Finally on September 17, Schmidt wrote to the commanding 
officer of the British 126th Military Government Detachment based south of the city to offer use 
of bomb-shelter beds from Göttingen and to inform him, “by order of the Military Government at 
Hildesheim there is to be erected at Friedland in connexion [sic] with the experimental farm a 
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reception camp for a thousand people.”180 The camp officially opened on the grounds of the 
Göttingen University’s experimental farm facilities a few days later, and on September 25 it 
received the first organized transport from the Soviet zone. 
 From its outset, the Friedland transit camp served two primary purposes. First, the camp 
was supposed to ameliorate the suffering of displaced masses along the border of Lower Saxony, 
Thuringia, and Hessen. The camp therefore provided refugees in the border region with food, 
shelter, and medical attention. Established as a transit camp, Friedland’s second purpose was to 
serve as a collection point for border traffic and function as a distribution mechanism for the 
resettlement of displaced masses. The camp accomplished that task through the control, 
regulation, and identification of individuals traveling into and out of the British zone.  
In order to aid and regulate the displaced populations, administrators at Friedland 
developed a strict, disciplining camp environment. Despite the fragmented nature of the 
documentation from the camp’s early operation, the extant records demonstrate that the two 
goals of humanitarian assistance and the reimposition of order were closely aligned. The camp’s 
procedures for registration, medical examination, and provisioning reveal that the capacity to 
help thousands of refugees per day depended on the camp’s regulatory regime. Yet, the 
regulatory regime also relied on humanitarian efforts as a means to interact with refugees and in 
order to ensure their compliance. A third important feature of this camp regime was the swiftness 
with which it handled the refugees. By necessity and design, the individual lengths of stays 
during the first months of operation were very short. Refugees typically spent as little as 48 
hours, because the camp and the surrounding districts could not accommodate a build-up of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees. Instead the camp quickly accomplished the crucial tasks of 
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medical examination, the registration of individuals complete with travel permits, and 
provisioning for journeys home or to other refugee camps. 
 Another set of questions raised by the events in September concern who was in charge at 
the camp and who provided the labor and material. When the Allied governments agreed to the 
German expulsions, they also agreed in principle that Germans would be responsible for the care 
and resettlement of expellees. In contrast to the non-German Displaced Persons who received aid 
through the United Nations and directly from the Allied governments, German refugees and 
expellees were to be a German problem solved through German means. Yet, the scope of 
German displacement quickly made that Allied approach to the expellees and other displaced 
groups unworkable. Allied efforts to resolve disorder before it could lead to a reradicalization of 
the German population were incompatible with a passive approach to the millions of under-fed, 
homeless Germans seeking accommodation. 
It was therefore the British military government that ordered the construction of the 
refugee camp at Friedland and which nominally oversaw the camp’s operations. British 
supervision and requisition of materials for housing and transport, however, did not mean a 
significant commitment of British manpower. The local German population, particularly former 
Wehrmacht soldiers and German Red Cross members provided the vast majority of the labor, 
including construction, transport, cooking, and administration. Indeed, the camp’s double 
military character—overseen by British military government units and largely staffed by 
Wehrmacht veterans—helps to explain the establishment of the disciplining procedures that 
remained evident in camp operation long after the war’s end. 
This chapter also addresses the question of what populations were housed in the camp. 
The groups passing through Friedland during its first nine months of operation (end of 
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September 1945 to end of June 1946) were diverse. The demographics and specific treatment of 
four categories of camp populations illustrated the complexity of displacement in postwar 
Germany. First, the British-Soviet program codenamed Operation Honeybee accounted for much 
of the camp’s early traffic in the form of wartime evacuees and expellees whose families or 
homes were in the other occupation zone. The second category was split between refugee from 
the Soviet zone and Germans expelled from Poland to the British zone under the auspices of 
Operation Swallow. Prisoners of war released by the Soviets formed a third category of the 
camp’s populations. Non-German Displaced Persons comprised the final group passing through 
the camp. 
Finally, this chapter examines the history of a small contingent of British relief workers 
at Friedland during the winter and spring of 1945/46. These British volunteers from the 
International Voluntary Service for Peace (IVSP) contributed to aid efforts at Friedland by 
transporting infirm refugees across the zonal border to the camp and helping with construction, 
among other tasks at the camp. Reports sent to supervisors in Britain as well as interviews 
conducted with two of the IVSP workers indicate that Germans and the British at Friedland 
enjoyed relatively good relations despite non-fraternization orders. The volunteer contingent 
worked diligently to further improve relations between the recent wartime enemies, a process 
helped by the fact that they occupied a liminal space between British authorities and the German 
camp staff. Finally, examination of the IVSP efforts to organize German volunteers necessary for 
overcoming labor shortfalls suggests that relief work at Friedland contributed to reestablishment 
of local civil society through the development of civic organizations. 
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Refugee Crises and the Development of Camp Operation 
 As the desperate situation in and around Göttingen during the late summer of 1945 
demonstrates, the unsettling of German populations and disorder in border regions created a 
series of problems for the government and residents in the region. The chaotic situation along the 
border endangered refugees, but it also created hardships for farmers and small communities. 
Refugees without families or former homes in the West tried to settle in new communities only 
to face rejection by a local insularity made more extreme by the hardships of scarce food and 
housing. Aside from the question of resources, local communities were wary of exhausted and 
often ill refugees, who represented a particular public health hazard the tight living conditions. 
Authorities in the British military and the provisional German government addressed these 
problems as well as the refugees’ suffering through a regulatory system that combined 
humanitarian goals with methods for reimposing order. Refugee transit camps such as the one 
established in Friedland played a crucial role in helping to bring order to the flow of displaced 
populations while also alleviating the refugees’ distress. Examination of the refugee crisis in the 
Göttingen region and then the establishment and development of the Friedland camp thus makes 
clear that a regulating, humanitarian framework governed the operation of both the camp and the 
overall system for addressing displacement. Although necessarily imperfect at times, this 
response played a vital role in taming unruly masses and turning them into settled, manageable 
individuals. 
 The military government established camps as official reception points in response to 
chaotic and often dangerous conditions along the border. Two days after the Friedland camp 
opened, it received an order from the British military government to help control movement 
along the British side of the border. As of September 28, 1945, all individual traffic to the 
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frontier including border crossing was forbidden. Instead, individuals were required to travel to 
Friedland where they would be processed and organized into closed transports that would cross 
the zonal border under agreements between British and Soviet authorities.181 Such organized 
transports to the Soviet zone addressed a number of concerns. Refugees traveling on their own or 
in small groups were vulnerable to robbery and swindle, particularly because refugees carried 
their remaining property and personal effects. Farmers in the border region also had reasons to 
dislike refugees’ uncontrolled movements. Hungry refugees stole food from fields, and the 
transit of people and carts across fields damaged crops.182 Collecting refugees at Friedland and 
organizing them into supervised transports thus offered the means to ameliorate these problems. 
Sexual assault committed by Soviet border guards made the border region unsafe for 
women. Norman Naimark has demonstrated that rape by Red Army soldiers continued to be a 
significant problem long after the infamous march into East Prussia. Rapes stemming from poor 
discipline continued even after the improvements to law enforcement by the fall of 1945. 
Records from Friedland support Naimark’s assertions that rape was an “endemic problem” in 
border towns and that transportation centers were especially dangerous for German women.183 In 
September 1945, for instance, the administrator of the Göttingen district met with the local 
officer in charge of DP and refugee affairs for the military government, Major Oldham, about 
several rapes committed by Russian troops. According to the district administrator, two women 
had tried to cross the frontier into the Soviet zone whereupon Russian soldiers raped them and 
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sent them back to the British zone.184 In early October, one of the camp’s doctors likewise 
reported three incidents of refugees raped by the border guards. A group of six soldiers attacked, 
beat, and raped one of the women in a small town near Heiligenstadt, which was a waypoint for 
westbound refugees. The other two women were also passing through the same area when Soviet 
soldiers assaulted them, including in one case a local commandant.185 
The Friedland camp helped to address this problem in a number of ways. First, the 
camp’s medical facilities could treat the women’s injuries. Crucially for the individual woman’s 
health as well as for public health more generally, the camp also conducted tests for venereal 
diseases. The incidence of rape also seems to have decreased after the establishment of the camp. 
To the extent that Soviet soldiers attacked women, they seem to have targeted illegal border 
crossers, as this group was the only one to report rapes later into the postwar years.186 It is 
possible this decrease in assaults resulted from changes in the Soviet zone and the Red Army, 
though one should bear in mind Naimark’s finding that rape remained a problem in border towns 
well into 1946 and 1947.187 Given that women attempting illegal border crossings were most 
vulnerable, it is possible that the establishment of official transit camps at Friedland and on the 
Soviet side of the frontier helped to lessen the problem. Organized transports were undoubtedly 
safer for the women than risking encounters with soldiers at isolated border posts. Such 
transports nevertheless depended on the infrastructure provided by transit camps for their smooth 
operation. 
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A key step in addressing problems caused by uncontrolled movement was the 
development of system for permitting transit and residential assignments. Strict limits on 
movement within and between districts initially served security concerns for the occupation 
forces, but these regulations created problems for displaced Germans even as local authorities 
resorted to them in the effort to avoid the burdens and epidemiological risks associated with 
refugees. For example, Marshal Georgy Zhukov responded to an increase in the incidence of 
typhoid infections in Berlin by declaring the city off-limits to migration by individuals without 
proper transit permits on 27 July 1945. At that point, unpermitted traffic to Berlin totaled some 
4,000 to 5,000 persons per day.188 The military government for the Göttingen region likewise 
instituted “circulation restrictions” in June 1945 to address the related issues of displacement and 
housing shortages. These restrictions required that individuals acquire identity papers for the 
district in which they wanted to reside. Individuals wishing to travel outside the district needed to 
apply for permission from the local mayor or district administrator, and these authorities “must 
satisfy themselves that the movement is absolutely necessary.”189 
 The response to an application by a Göttingen resident seeking a residence permit for her 
daughter and grandchildren typifies the local government’s view of the problem and its solution. 
In denying the application, the local refugee authority referenced strict orders preventing him 
from granting permission. Yet, the letter of the law was beside the point for the official who went 
on to lecture the applicant about the reason for the rules: “I am convinced of the necessity and 
sensibleness of these measures, because the unregulated influx of hundreds of thousands […] 
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poses such risks to the general population, both as regards nutrition and in terms of hygiene.” 
Although he recognized the “hardships that undoubtedly arise in individual cases and which 
seem hardly tolerable,” the official nevertheless concluded that these hardships could not enter 
the question because of the dangers posed by refugees.190 
 It is clear that movement and residence restrictions created hardships for refugees, but 
they also proved problematic for city officials. Rather than resolving the fundamental issue of 
displacement, insular-minded officials and communities merely left the problem to fester 
elsewhere. W. Ruediger, the administrator of the refugee facility set up in a Göttingen school, 
noted the false promise of restrictions and called for a more comprehensive solution in a letter to 
the Göttingen mayor and district administrator in early September 1945. She argued that the 
current refugee policies created the “social ill” (Übelstand) of refugees continuously wandering 
around the Göttingen district for months at a time. Even when refugees could find vacant 
housing, local mayors refused to consent to their taking up residence. According to the refugee 
camp administrator, this fact “embittered the homeless persons to the extreme.” Ruediger 
admitted the need to defend against an unplanned influx. Still, she argued that the city mayor and 
county administrator “must consider that some refugees are that the end of their strength and 
they need to be brought to infirmaries immediately because there is danger in further delays.”191 
 In October 1945, British and German provisional authorities introduced new policies to 
overcome regulatory and humanitarian problems posed by displacement. Transit camps played a 
key role in these attempts to address the displacement problematic in a systematic manner. As of 
October 7, 1945, an order issued by the president for the Hannover province required all 
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incoming refugees to pass through a transit camp. To that end, the provincial authority 
designated facilities at Lüneburg, Uelzen, Wittingen, Gifhorn, Braunschweig, Goslar, Osterode, 
and Friedland as official transit camps. No refugee would receive a ration card unless he or she 
entered one of these camps. Once in a camp, refugees received registration cards with a 
destination determined by the British military government. After arrival the destination, refugees 
were to have their cards stamped at the train station, which would in turn entitle them to receipt 
of ration cards at the appropriate office. Aid thus became contingent upon refugees entering the 
state-run resettlement system in order to resolve the problem of vagrant refugees. Indeed, the 
informational sheet distributed to refugees explicitly stated at its end: “A further moving from 
place to place is prohibited by indefinite order of the military government.” This system further 
addressed the problem of insularity in local communities, because the completed documentation 
was straightforward and provided no legal grounds for refusing aid to refugees.192  
Establishment of refugee transit camps throughout the British zone stemmed from two 
logics for managing displaced populations. First, the facilities could tame uncontrolled refugee 
movements by centralizing displaced individuals, thereby beginning the process of obtaining 
transit and residence permits for them and then providing transport to the new places of 
residence. Registration in the camps also enabled the state to reenter refugees into population 
rolls in order to restart its social bookkeeping and rebuild knowledge about the populace it 
governed. The second function of the camp was to begin organized state care for the individuals 
at the facility. Persons needing immediate medical care, such as those Ruediger mentioned, could 
be evaluated and treated within the camps’ medical facilities or sent to nearby hospitals. Rather 
than provoking bitterness through rejection from insular communities, state intervention through 
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refugee transit camps would instead promote relief and gratitude for provisions, medical care, 
and shelter, all while bringing refugees into the existing ration regime. 
The capacity of transit camps to gather information was of further benefit to intelligence 
officials in the British military. Refugees entering the Hanoverian province had the potential to 
inform the British Army of the Rhine about three critical issues. First, British Field Security 
Service officers asked refugees about the size and disposition of Soviet and Polish military 
forces. Second, refugees at Friedland reported on the process of expulsion from Poland, the 
refugee situation in the Soviet zone, and the size and location of any refugee columns headed to 
the West. Finally, refugees and expellees provided intelligence about governance, society, and 
the economy in Poland and the Soviet zone. Officials from the British Field Security Section at 
Friedland were particularly keen to find out the relationship between Poles and the Polish civil 
administration, Soviet policy for rationing in their occupation zone, and the extent of 
reconstruction and the taking of in-kind industrial reparations from the Soviet zone.193 
In order to quickly accomplish the myriad regulatory goals and aid refugees, the 
Friedland camp set up a strictly controlled procedure for incoming persons. Issued shortly after 
the camp became operational on September 26, 1945, Camp Order Number 1 enumerated a 
procedure for camp personnel and arriving persons to follow.194 After the arrival and unloading 
of trucks, personnel sent individuals to register in tents. Only once a registration card had been 
obtained could persons procure their ration cards and have them stamped. Delousing and a 
further stamp as proof came next, and this stamp was required for obtaining food or clothing. 
Individuals then waited until called for a departure overseen by British soldiers. Camp personnel 
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handed out tickets for travel to assigned destinations on the day of departure. At that point, 
processed persons could reclaim what possessions they had brought. The first steps of 
registration, medical examination, and disinfecting as well as questioning by the British security 
services took about 15 minutes per individual.195 In most cases, the camp staff tried to finish 
processing on the day of arrival or shortly thereafter, because a disruption in the flow of refugees 
(roughly 4,000 or 5,000 per day in the early months of operation) would have been 
catastrophic.196 
Registration of individual identities at Friedland served three purposes. First, refugees 
often needed to regain some form of personal identification. In many instances, people arrived 
without personal identification or any sort of papers. Expellees often had their IDs taken, while 
evacuees lost personal papers when their houses were bombed or caught fire. Many refugees 
arriving from the Soviet zone were merely in possession of a paper stating, “free of lice and 
infectious diseases.”197 In most instances, refugees simply made a legal affirmation or oath to the 
camp police about their names, though the camp’s investigative powers were clearly limited in 
its early years.198 David Sainty, a British volunteer in the camp, complained that time spent 
confirming individual identities could have been better spent providing care. He inveighed 
against time spent “stamping papers of all conceivable kinds. Wasted because it is impossible to 
check.”199 The first commemorative history of Friedland likewise admitted, “In isolated cases 
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individuals may have used this opportunity to make a small name change.”200 For individuals 
hoping to escape punishment for Nazi activities or crimes committed during the war, the 
temptation to change names must have been great, indeed. 
Despite the problems associated with confirming individual identities, it was not wasted 
effort as Sainty claimed. One effect of registering refugees at Friedland was to restart the state’s 
social bookkeeping apparatus amid the upheavals of war and expulsion. Other state initiatives to 
assess the populace, such as a census, would have been all but impossible given the fluidity of 
population movements. In this sense, registration efforts at the camp functioned as a first step in 
authorities’ efforts to know how many people lived in a given area and who they were, no matter 
the difficulties in ensuring the truthfulness of registrants’ identities. That process needed to start 
somewhere, so it made sense to begin at the initial point of contact between refugees entering the 
British zone and the provisional German government overseeing them. 
Establishing individual identities at the camp was also important, because individuals 
reentered state rolls with recognition as refugees needing further assistance. In this way, regional 
governments could begin to assess just how many displaced individuals needed to aid. Likewise, 
entry into the camp’s registration records (the Kartei) provided proof of refugee status for future 
welfare claims against the state. Michael Hughes has shown that discussions of financial burden 
sharing (Lastenausgleich) had begun in Germany during the war and continued during the early 
postwar period, in part because fears that the status quo of an inequitable distribution of the 
war’s costs would lead to political instability.201 Although it had not been initially clear how a 
program of burden sharing would proceed, both Germans and the Western occupation powers 
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recognized a need to include the individuals streaming through camps such as Friedland.202 
Individuals processed at Friedland reentered government rolls, but in doing so they could also 
begin laying the foundation for future, special claims on state resources. In fact, early camp 
directives suggest that its administrators were well aware that these records would prove vital for 
refugees in the future. Camp Directive 4 called on the registration employees to record refugee’s 
names and details as exactly as possible, because it was “in the interest of the refugees 
themselves.”203 
Having completed registration, individuals arriving at Friedland underwent delousing. 
Lice posed a significant threat to public health in postwar Germany, because they could 
potentially cause epidemics of typhus and trench fever. By collecting exhausted, malnourished 
populations in tight quarters, the camp actually constituted a particular danger zone for spreading 
lice and lice-borne disease to other refugees and from them to their new home communities. 
Medical examinations routinely revealed that roughly 20 percent of arriving persons suffered 
from lice.204 As such so the camp administration mandated delousing with DDT powder for all 
arriving refugees. By the end of January 1946, the Göttingen office of the State Health 
Department could report that the delousing personnel have been greatly reinforced and put under 
the supervision of a doctor and “reliable” group leaders. The camp had also begun construction 
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on a delousing barracks for refugees’ personal effects.205 Despite these efforts, illnesses did arise 
in the camp, such as the discovery of two cases of epidemic typhus in the camp during early 
January and further cases throughout February 1946.206 In the effort to protect camp employees, 
refugees, and public in the Göttingen region, the camp administration therefore mandated 
vaccinations against typhus and other diseases for the entire camp staff on penalty of immediate 
dismissal.207 
A relatively small camp medical staff cared for these displaced populations and 
conducted the necessary medical examinations. In early December 1945, roughly 15 doctors and 
50 German Red Cross nurses oversaw a medical station with 40 beds. The camp’s medical stocks 
often bordered on insufficient, making treatment of the refugees more difficult. On the whole, 
evacuees from the Soviet zone tended to be healthiest, presumably because they had been living 
in better temporary accommodations than the expellees coming from farther east. Prisoners of 
war returning via the Soviet zone were consistently in the worst overall state of health. An 
observer from the State Health Department described their condition as “catastrophic,” 
“completely exhausted,” and “in an unbelievable state of malnutrition.”208 Illnesses in Friedland 
also contributed to particularly miserable camp conditions in late December 1945. Noting the 
cleanliness and sufficient number of latrines, a report complained, “unfortunately the refugees in 
the area show a catastrophic uncleanliness and use all places in and around the barracks. The 
                                                 
205 Staatliches Gesundheitsamt Göttingen to Oberpräsident Hannover, 23 January 1946, Nds. 380 Acc. 48/65 Nr. 
166, NHStA. 
206 Staatliches Gesundheitsamt Göttingen to Oberpräsident Hannover, 8 January and also 21 February 1946, Nds. 
380 Acc. 48/65 Nr. 166, NHStA. 
207 Ibid. See also Lageranordnung Nr. 7, 30 May 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 84, NHStA. 
208 Staatliches Gesundheitsamt Göttingen to Oberpräsident Hannover, 8 December 1945, Nds. 380 Acc. 48/65 Nr. 
166, NHStA. 
 83 
latrines are only seldom visited, despite numerous signs.”209 Evidently illnesses and malnutrition 
took such a toll on camp residents that they were unable to make it to latrines in a timely manner. 
After completing delousing and medical evaluations, camp residents could obtain food 
rations. Feeding hundreds of thousands of displaced individuals was a massive undertaking. For 
example, from the establishment of the camp until the end of December 1945, it distributed some 
28,000 kilograms of bread and 2200 kilograms of marmalade.210 Later in 1946, the meals for a 
typical day included breakfast, lunch, and dinner. For breakfast, refugees received 178.5 grams 
of bread, 10 grams of meat, 8 grams of fat, and 16 grams of marmalade. Lunch consisted of 7.5 
grams of meat, 3 grams of fat, and 18 grams of nutriment. Dinners included 7.5 grams of meat, 3 
grams of fat, 17.7 grams of nutriment, and 17.9 grams of sugar. Vegetables for these meals were 
either dried or salted. Upon release from the camp, every refugee received provisions for his or 
her journey consisting of 250 grams of bread, 25 grams of fat, and 100 grams of meat or 
sausage.211 
Although narratives about arrival at Friedland tend to emphasize the first warm meal, first 
bed, and even first roof over an individual’s head in days or weeks, conditions in the early camp 
were primitive. When the camp opened in the fall of 1945, the cleaned and disinfected buildings 
of the Göttingen University’s experimental farm functioned as the first camp structures. The 
large cow barn became the first sleeping hall, while other buildings were repurposed for medical 
examinations, camp administration, and so forth. The British military government also ordered 
the erection of ten tents next to the barns, which were later replaced by Nissen huts (a British 
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variant of the Quonset hut). Mud became a significant problem in this camp because it stood 
beneath the water table, so the grounds were wet and the wood floors were constantly damp.212 
By the start of December, the IVSP volunteer Sainty described the camp as “congested and 
filthy, and in the bad weather […] the conditions in the camp are deplorable.”213 
These conditions prompted the camp administration to begin construction of a second 
facility in October 1945. Located on the other side of the Leine River and nearer to the train 
station, the location for the new camp was also supposed to be high enough to avoid the 
problems with mud and groundwater.214 When the camp moved to the new facilities on 
December 3, it was still processing some 5,000 persons per day with 800 to 1,000 sleeping in the 
camp every night.215 Of course, the camp did not actually possess the facilities for that many 
people to sleep indoors. During periods of heavy transport activity in the winter of 1945/46, 
some 2,000 to 3,000 refugees nightly slept in tents or otherwise under the stars.216 The refugee 
office for the Hildesheim governing district nevertheless put the camp’s capacity at as many as 
8,000 persons. Much to the disappointment of these same German authorities, the comings and 
goings of so many individuals also meant that there was the “the same mud as in the old 
camp.”217 
The new camp suffered from shoddy construction as well. Royal Engineers of the XXX 
Corps of the British Army of the Rhine were supposed to finish the last construction in the camp 
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during December, but in Sainty’s estimation, they “made a mess of it.” Evidently, engineers 
trained for bridge-building and bomb disposal “were no better than the next man” when it came 
to laying out a well designed refugee camp. Particularly egregious in Sainty’s mind was the 
construction of the hospital building atop a 12-foot embankment with no entrance for vehicles, 
necessitating supplementary construction of a ramp. The engineers left after three weeks with 
their work in the camp still unfinished. After the last “pitiful remnant” departed the camp, 
staffers were left to sort out labor for the unfinished projects.218 
Well into the spring of 1946, improvements to the camp remained an ongoing project. In 
a report to German authorities in Hannover, a visiting government official at the end of February 
described the camp as “primitive” and “still under construction.” This official allowed that the 
camp administration was doing everything in its power to make the camp “fit for human 
habitation” (menschenwürdig), but the paucity of raw materials held back construction and 
renovation efforts. These conditions were proving problematic, because while they could be 
tolerated for the intended stay of a single day, it was increasingly common that refugees needed 
to remain for up to four days.219 Thorough repairs and improvements to the camp were first 
undertaken in the summer of 1946 after the completion of the Operation Honeybee exchange of 
evacuees with the Soviet zone. Over the course of a little more than a month, the camp shut 
down so that the personnel could begin improving drainages and roads, building new latrines, 
and constructing more permanent barracks to replace some of the Nissen huts.220 
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The early development of the Friedland camp thus reveals the facility as an imperfect but 
nonetheless crucial response to the problems posed by displaced populations. Despite difficulties 
with camp construction, supply shortages, and even infectious diseases, the establishment and 
operation of the camp was an important point of intercession in taming the chaotic conditions of 
peoples on the move, often with no where to settle. The self-defensive insularity of German 
communities necessitated the development of transit camps to collect and identify displaced 
individuals. Once reentered into government rolls, camp residents left Friedland with 
entitlements to housing and with the records necessary for claiming future welfare benefits. In 
this way, the regulatory system deployed at Friedland served both interests in social order and 
humanitarian assistance by beginning the process of resettlement. Accomplishing these tasks also 
meant the creation of a coercive camp environment in which provisioning was tied to 
participation in the registration and resettlement system. 
Camp populations 
 Four general categories encompass the populations processed at Friedland during its 
initial operating period from September 1945 through roughly May/June 1946. The first and 
largest group consisted of 535,306 German evacuees exchanged between the British and Soviet 
sectors as part of the official program codenamed Operation Honeybee. The second category 
included expellees transported from Poland to the British zone as part of Operation Swallow, as 
well as various refugees from the Soviet sector who had not previously lived in the territories 
comprising the British zone. Officially entered in camp statistics as “refugees,” these two groups 
accounted for a total 209,797 individuals passing through the camp. German prisoners of war 
released by the Soviets fell into the third category numbering 12,492. Finally, 3,021 non-German 
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Displaced Persons accounted for a small fraction of the persons passing through Friedland.221 
These groups and the efforts at Friedland to redistribute them further illustrate the complexity of 
the population displacement problematic in postwar Germany. 
 On September 30, 1945, the Policy Section for the PW and DP Division of the military 
government issued a report on resettlement plan for displaced Germans. The three fundamental 
priorities for determining resettlement assignments were: first, accommodation and food in the 
arrival area; second, requirements in a given area for specific categories of people; and, third, 
political factors outside of the military government’s control. The report further clarified that 
North Rhine, Westphalia, and cities including Hannover, Wilhelmshaven, and Hamburg were 
“restricted” for resettlement. Only miners (for the Ruhr), public utility employees, agricultural 
workers, transportation workers, and construction workers were excepted, meaning there was no 
guarantee that displaced Germans would be able to return to their former homes or find 
resettlement in a place of their choosing.222 
 Then in October 1945, British and Soviet authorities undertook a major program to 
resettle displaced Germans from each other’s occupation zones. Codenamed Operation 
Honeybee, the resettlement action was supposed to return Germans evacuated from their homes 
during the war. The operation was to proceed as a “head-for-head” exchange, so that neither 
occupation zone would be unduly burdened. In fact, each zone would presumably expect an 
improvement in the refugee question as Germans returned to home areas. Policy set by British 
military authorities in Hannover in October 1945 called for the return of evacuees to their former 
homes on an organized basis. “Black” or restricted areas, of course, remained an exception to the 
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general rule. Individuals would be allowed to return only to families that had remained resident 
in those zones. In cases of entire families attempting a return, the evacuees would be housed 
elsewhere on a temporary basis in accordance with refugee quotas set for the British zone.223 
 Given its proximity to the Soviet-British zonal border and its good transit connections, 
the newly established camp at Friedland was an ideal facility for participating in the Honeybee 
exchange. All told, the Friedland camp processed some 600,000 evacuees. These evacuees also 
constituted the overwhelming majority of the groups passing through the camp during the course 
of the operation. In absolute numbers, the operation reached its highest point in November 1945 
when 114,384 evacuees passed through the camp, a rate of nearly 4,000 per day. The percentage 
of evacuees in the overall camp traffic dropped below 50 percent only once between October 
1945 and the program’s completion at the end of June 1946 (36 percent in February 1946 when 
the there was a spike in refugee/expellee arrivals). At the end of the operation, the percentage of 
Honeybee participants in the camp reached as high as 88 per 100 individuals.224 
By May 1946, however, the British military government had begun to sour on Operation 
Honeybee, in no small part because the British felt that they were being poorly used by the 
Soviets. In a summary of the operation, the responsible officers with the military government for 
the Hannover region reported a significant disparity between Russian and British tallies for the 
program. Whereas ledgers in British-run transit camps confirmed the transport of 1,175,603 
evacuees from the Soviet zone and 400,440 evacuees to the Soviet zone, the Soviets claimed to 
have accepted 1,170,616 evacuees compared to 966,924 evacuees sent to the British zone. 
According to the memorandum, “the Russian figures bear no relation whatever to the facts, and 
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they know it.” Moreover, the Soviets had begun to block incoming traffic through arbitrary 
variations in the daily number of accepted evacuees, refusal to accept evacuees on certain days, 
and refusal to accept evacuees returning to certain regions. Soviet intransigence had the effect of 
causing “gross overcrowding of transit camps.” When the British decided to respond in kind by 
ending reception of evacuees from the Soviet zone at Friedland, Soviet obstruction of eastbound 
traffic stopped immediately.225 
Increasingly, the British also found that Germans who claimed they were evacuees were 
in fact traveling regularly between the two zones. In light of that circumstance, organizing 
transports and distributing provisions to these groups entailed a commitment of resources that no 
longer seemed worthwhile. Providing transport and food seemed to exacerbate the problem of 
undesired traffic from the Soviet zone. A communiqué to the prisoner of war and DP divisions of 
the military government for the Hannover region stated that information from camps at 
Duderstadt and Friedland confirmed headquarters’ view that most Honeybee traffic consisted of 
“tourists” wishing to visit the other zone for a short period. The root issue was that Honeybee 
transports were the only authorized method of traveling between zones. Rather than opening 
cross-border traffic to other groups, which would have entailed opening new processing 
facilities, the reporting brigadier instead expressed his desire for ending Operation Honeybee.226 
 
 
 
                                                 
225 There is no date given for the report, but it was certainly written after May 10, and it seems that the report had 
been given to another section of the military government and then returned on May 17. See Resume of Situation 
regarding Honeybee and Wasp, n.d., FO 1052/317, BNA. 
226 Communication from 229/MilGov to CONCOMB PW & DP Division, 8 May 1946, FO 1052/317, BNA. 
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Figure 1: Overview of Persons Registered during the First Year of Operation (20 
September 1945 to 19 September 1946)227 
Month Evacuees Refugees Soldiers 
Foreign 
Nationals 
Sum of 
Entries 
Sum of 
Departures Total 
from 20 
Sept. 9,072 4,546 445 73 14,136 0 14,136 
October 57,676 28,286 1,960 98 88,020 51,764 139,784 
November 114,384 28,575 3,719 1,755 148,433 118,655 267,088 
December 85,898 16,056 1,980 98 104,032 28,055 132,087 
January 41,443 35,393 853 457 78,146 0 78,146 
February 20,087 30,552 497 81 51,217 0 51,217 
March 51,279 38,929 398 860 91,463 0 91,463 
April 55,482 11,109 335 640 67,566 0 67,566 
May 74,598 12,701 231 402 87,932 0 87,932 
June 75,303 8,744 293 1,520 85,860 0 85,860 
July 14,944 2,263 49 211 17,467 0 17,367 
August 563 803 6,829 8 8,203 2,127 10,330 
until 19 
Sept. 325 446 14,026 0 14,797 11,421 16,218 
Total 601,054 218,400 31,615 6,203 857,272 212,022 1,069,294 
 
Despite the official end to the exchange on June 30, 1946, a trickle of evacuees continued 
to arrive at the camp through September 1946.228 Roughly 15,000 evacuees came to the camp in 
July, and several hundred more appeared each month in August and September.229 Authorities 
for refugee issues in the governing district of Hildesheim had expected as much in July, when a 
meeting of the Refugee Committee concluded that evacuees would simply arrive as illegal 
                                                 
227 Reproduced from statistics in Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 13/1. 
228 Communication from Regional Commissioner Hannover Region to Chairman Niedersachsen Regional Council, 
13 June 1946, FO 1052/317, BNA. 
229 Aufstellung der Gesamt-Flüchtlinsdurchgangszahlen für die Zeit vom 20.9.1945 bis 19.9.1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 
16/83 Nr. 13/1, NHStA 
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border crossers (“Schwarzgänger” in official parlance). The provisional German authorities 
therefore sought and reached an agreement with the military government whereby the 
Schwarzgänger would be collected throughout the Hildesheim governing district and brought to 
Friedland. The camp would then process the Schwarzgänger and distribute them throughout the 
Göttingen district. In compensation, the Göttingen district received equivalently fewer transports 
of expellees.230 
Expellees from Eastern Europe and refugees from the Soviet zone composed the second 
largest category of camp residents. These two populations merit grouping into a single category 
because refugees from the Soviet zone undoubtedly included persons who fled or were expelled 
from Poland. As one of Friedland’s commemorative histories explained, “The expellees who 
were sent to the Soviet zone as their reception area […] so far as they could attempted to move to 
the West.”231 Of course, refugees from the Soviet zone also included individuals who had long 
resided in those territories and crossed into the west for political, economic, or other reasons. 
Yet, because Soviet zone refugees with expulsion backgrounds did not arrive as part of official 
expulsion transports, camp records did not always record them as expellees. Discussing the 
groups in tandem therefore helps to account for the overlap between these populations. 
 Records from the camp’s refugee registry (the Flüchtlingskartei) indicate that expellees 
from interwar Polish territories and territories ceded to Poland after World War II arrived at 
Friedland before the officially organized transports to the camp had commenced.232 As a rule 
                                                 
230 Protokoll über die Sitzung des Flüchtlingsausschusses des Bezirkslandtages, 15 July 1946, Nds. 120 Hildesheim 
Acc. 54/77 Nr. 9, NHStA. 
231 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, 29. 
232 An interval sample of 300 files based on collecting 50 names each from six letters of the alphabet (the cards are 
stored alphabetically by last name) revealed 11 records listing an expulsion location in present-day Polish territories 
and an arrival in the Friedland camp before the beginning of the first organized expellee transports to the camp. 
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these expellees were women or teenage boys. Of the 11 cases, 8 were women and the other three 
were male adolescents. The oldest of the women was 47 years old, while the two youngest were 
both 17 years old. The male adolescents were respectively 16, 15, and 12 years old. The 
distribution of ages and genders largely conforms to the expectation that women and children 
were most affected by expulsions, while military-aged men were more likely to be held as 
prisoners of war. Presumably the hardships of individual treks to the west account for the lack of 
elderly expellees, though older expellees certainly arrived later in organized transports. Only one 
individual came from a large city (Gdańsk/Danzig), while the rest gave a rural location for their 
last place of residence or place of expulsion. 
 Organized transports of expellees from Polish territories commenced following an 
agreement between the British Army of the Rhine and the Soviet military administration. The 
agreement of February 14, 1946, provided for the transfer of 1,018,000 individuals to the British 
zone under the codename Operation Swallow.233 The first Swallow transport arrived at Friedland 
on March 6, 1946, and by the end of the month a total of 23 transports averaging 1,500 persons 
had arrived. Much to the surprise of refugee officials, the incoming transports contained a high 
percentage of individuals who had previously resided in the British zone. Once in the camp, the 
expellees and other transport members were treated to the same registration, delousing, and 
provisioning procedures as other populations. After completing these steps, the camp attempted 
to resettle the expellees within the Hildesheim governing district. Problems nevertheless emerged 
when a large portion of the expellees and returnees wished to take up residence with relatives 
elsewhere in the British zone. The refugee authority for the Hildesheim governing district thus 
                                                 
233 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, 29. 
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complained that these groups began to file petitions for reassignment immediately after arrival at 
resettlement destinations.234 
 British frustrations with Operation Honeybee eventually affected the processing of 
expellees and refugees at Friedland. With the end of Operation Honeybee and the temporary 
closing of the Friedland camp for renovations in the summer of 1946, the military authorities 
ordered a tighter sealing of the border. Thereafter the camp began to check the identities of 
refugees and expellees more intensively. Resolution to the Schwarzgänger problem nevertheless 
proved difficult, because refugees continued to cross the border illegally anyway. In August 
1946, the camp collected 200 Schwarzgänger from the refugee camp at Osterode in order to 
forcibly return them to the Soviet sector in exchange for prisoners of war released by the 
Soviets.235 Changing the reception policy for Schwarzgänger so that the camp treated them 
equally to evacuees and expellees ultimately proved the only workable, humane solution, and the 
camp began sending them to the refugee camp at Uelzen for processing in September 1946.236 
 Although Operation Swallow was renewed and expanded in scope after its initial end 
date of July 27, 1947, the Friedland camp’s participation in the action largely came to an end in 
the late summer of 1946. At that time, German and military government authorities shifted the 
expellees’ transit location to the refugee camp located at Marienthal near Braunschweig.237 
                                                 
234 Tätigkeitsbericht (März 1946), 3 April 1946, Nds. 120 Hildesheim Acc. 40/51 Nr. 2, NHStA. 
235 Tätigkeitsbericht (August 1946), 2 September 1946, Nds. 120 Hildesheim Acc. 40/51 Nr. 3, NHStA. 
236 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, 31. See also Tätigkeitsbericht (August 1946), 2 September 1946, Nds. 120 Hildesheim 
Acc. 40/51 Nr. 3, NHStA. 
237 Tätigkeitsbericht (August 1946), 2 September 1946, Nds. 120 Hildesheim Acc. 40/51 Nr. 3, NHStA. 
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During its participation in Operation Swallow in 1946, the Friedland camp received a total of 
roughly 310,000 expellees via the Soviet zone.238 
 Released prisoners of war constituted the third significant group of individuals processed 
at Friedland. From December 9, 1945, to January 20, 1946, the British military government 
undertook a massive POW-release program codenamed Operation Clobber. Under the auspices 
of this action, all members of the Wehrmacht still held captive in British controlled Germany 
were to be released, with the exception of those persons who fell under specific arrest categories. 
Although the camp at Northeim was responsible for releases in the Göttingen region, Friedland 
became involved in the operation when released soldiers wished to return to homes in the Soviet 
sector.239  
 Because of its function as a border transit camp, the facility at Friedland also processed 
POWs released into the British zone by the Soviets. Some 31,615 POWs passed through 
Friedland during year from September 1945 to September 1946. In comparison to evacuees, 
expellees, and refugees, POW traffic at Friedland was thus initially quite small, accounting for 
only 4 percent of all traffic in the camp during that first year.240 In September 1946, however, 
British authorities designated Friedland as an official “release camp” or Entlassungslager for 
German POWs released from prisons in the Soviet Union, Poland, and other eastern bloc states 
(the subject of chapter 4). In contrast to the large, closed transports of released POWs beginning 
in September 1946, the POWs arriving at Friedland during the first year had been released on an 
individual basis. Records from the camp’s medical division make clear that as a rule the Soviets 
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Stadtflüchtlingsamt Nr. 40 (2), SAG.  
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released these first POWs due their poor health and inability to work. For instance, a report from 
December 8, 1945, found the health of returning POWs to be “catastrophic” due to their 
complete exhaustion and “unbelievable condition of malnutrition.”241 When the released POWs 
did not need to be sent to nearby hospitals for further treatment, the camp resettled them 
according to the same criteria as evacuees so that priority was given to family reunification and 
returns to former home communities. 
The processing of some 4,000 non-German Displaced Persons at Friedland is initially 
surprising. The facility at Friedland was meant for displaced Germans, after all, while DPs 
theoretically fell under the remit of UNRRA. As the commanding officer for the 1002 (L/K) 
Military Government Detachment, Major Oldham issued orders to that effect on September 24, 
1945, before the camp even official opened. Oldham stated that British authorities expected 
Poles to cross the zonal border with German refugees. Further, “any Poles arriving at Friedland 
will NOT be permitted to leave as arrangements are being made to transfer these Poles into 
special camps.” Whenever the camp staff discovered Polish DPs, German Red Cross nurses or 
members of the registration camp were to take them to the German camp director. The camp 
director was then to immediately contact Lieutenant Colonel Perkins, who oversaw the military 
government for the city and rural district of Göttingen.242 Presumably, Perkins would then 
arrange for the Poles’ transport to the Polish DP camp located in Göttingen. 
 Poles accounted for only one of many DP groups processed at Friedland. Records from 
the camp do not indicate the rate at which Poles arrived during the first few month of camp 
                                                 
241 Communication to Staatliches Gesundheitsamt Göttingen regarding “Beaufsichtigung der Hygiene d. 
Flüchtlingslager,” 8 December 1945, Nds. 380 Acc. 48/65 Nr. 166, NHStA. 
242 Letter from OC 1002 (L/K) Mil Gov Det. to Direktor Flüchtlingslager Friedland, 24 September 1945, Nds. 386 
Acc. 16/83 Nr. 84, NHStA. 
 96 
operation, but it is clear that by 1946 they constituted a small minority of DPs there. For the 
period lasting from January 1 to September 19, 1946, the camp statistician recorded the entry of 
4,060 foreign individuals. Of them, only 62 were Poles. The largest group by far were so-called 
“stateless persons and Jews,” totaling 3,050 individuals. The other significant national groups 
included the Dutch (219), Austrians (170), Yugoslavs (112), Baltic nationalities (67), and the 
French (55).243 For these nationalities, it seems safe to assume that they were former prisoners or 
compulsory labors in Nazi Germany. Stranger was the presence of 41 Brazilians, 33 Americans, 
16 Britons, 2 Abyssinians, 2 Chinese, and 1 Turk. The most likely explanation for many of these 
more unusual groups is that they may have been POWs held by the Nazi regime and then 
required medical care after the capitulation. Because Friedland served as the official border 
crossing station, all of these groups would have needed to pass through the camp as part of the 
organized transports crossing the border. 
 Analysis of the populations passing through the early Friedland camp thus demonstrates 
the complexity of the displacement problem during the immediate postwar period. Wartime 
evacuees’ returns home were suddenly made difficult by the development and increasing 
impermeability of zonal boundaries where no real borders had previously existed. Making such 
homecomings more difficult, evacuees also became caught up in Anglo-Soviet disputes over a 
fair distribution of these displaced Germans. Expellees and refugees likewise proved 
problematic. In addition to finding accommodation for hundreds of thousands of these 
individuals, authorities at Friedland and in the British zone more generally found themselves 
needing to confirm that arriving persons actually belonged in these categories. The processing of 
released prisoners of war likewise shows the link between demobilization and resettlement, 
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suggesting that POWs also belonged to the long list of unsettled groups in postwar Germany. 
Finally, the presence of non-German Displaced Persons at Friedland speaks to the international 
character of the wartime and postwar uprooting of peoples. 
The Camp Personnel 
The paucity of surviving documents and the chaotic conditions surrounding the initial 
operations at Friedland make it difficult to assess the make-up of the early camp’s staff. 
Reconstructing the lines of authority within the camp and the supervising agencies proves even 
more difficult, particularly because it appears that the camp’s staff and superiors were 
themselves confused on that issue. Nevertheless, it is clear that the British contingent within the 
camp itself was small and that the British commandants mostly acted in a supervisory role rather 
than running the camp’s day-to-day business. Germans constituted the overwhelming majority of 
the facility’s staff. Of those German employees and volunteers, former military officers and 
members of the German Red Cross predominated, especially in positions of authority. Finally, 
Polish and Ukrainian Displaced Persons contributed significant labor to the camp. In sum, 
examination of the camp’s staff emphasizes the transnational elements of solving the 
displacement problem while also suggesting that development of camp operation owed much to 
the military bearing of its staff. 
Confusion about the camp’s staffing and lines of authority starts from the very beginning 
of its operation and extends from the top positions down. Even the origin of the orders to 
establish the Friedland facility has been a source of confusion for historians. According to Helga 
Hagelüken and Rainer Rohrbach, the officer in charge of the military government unit for 
Göttingen, Colonel Perkins, entrusted German Red Cross Field Director Körber-Harriehausen 
with the local supervision of refugees. Körber-Harriehausen and Perkins then decided to use the 
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University of Göttingen’s experimental farm in Friedland to establish the camp.244 A letter from 
the Friedland camp director Richard Krause to the Göttingen district administrator (Landrat) in 
February 1946, however, suggests that it was not Perkin’s unit in Göttingen, but rather the 1002 
Military Government Detachment south of the city that ordered the establishment of the camp. 
Krause made no mention of Körber-Harriehausen, instead indicating that the Landrat’s 
predecessor had simply passed on the order from the military government to the mayor of 
Friedland.245 While Körber-Harriehausen was an important figure in refugee relief efforts during 
the summer of 1945, no documentation from the time and none of the official camp histories 
suggest that she exercised authority over the camp. 
Answering the question of who first served as camp director also proves surprisingly 
difficult. The first German camp directors were Gustav Heydenreich and Dr. jur. Johannes 
Erasmus. According to the official history of the Friedland camp published to coincide with its 
twentieth anniversary, their tenures as camp directors overlapped. Heydenreich served from 
September 1945 through March 1946, and Erasmus ran the camp from November 1945 through 
January 1946.246 Curiously, there is little in the early camp records to suggest that the two men 
actually shared responsibilities. In fact, it seems most likely that Erasmus had acted as sole camp 
director during his tenure, given that he signed as the camp director on correspondence and camp 
directives (Lageranordnungen) during that shared period. As to their personal histories, Erasmus 
was former lieutenant colonel in the Wehrmacht, who last served with a Panzergrenadier 
division. There is no record of Heydenreich’s past in camp documents, ministerial personnel 
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files, or the de-Nazification files for the districts Hannover and Hildesheim.247 Nor is it clear why 
Erasmus left his position at the camp in January 1946. 
The circumstances of Heydenreich’s departure from the camp are somewhat clearer. 
According to a newspaper article from the spring of 1946, the Göttingen criminal police arrested 
him for graft and embezzlement, particularly the illegal distribution of order forms for rationed 
foodstuffs. Allegedly, when the camp could not make use of an order form for butter and other 
foodstuffs, Heydenreich would give it to a Göttingen merchant who was eventually caught trying 
to use them.248 Heydenreich was in prison at the end of June 1946 when his successor, Richard 
Krause, reported the names of replacements for Heydenreich and other implicated camp 
employees to the Göttingen Country Refugee Office.249 On July 2, 1946, Heydenreich received a 
one-year sentence for the offense and disappears from camp records other than a brief letter from 
him to the county director (Oberkreisdirektor) in 1947, in which he asked for the return of some 
of tools left at the camp.250 The transfer of German authority over the camp to Krause, a former 
career Wehrmacht officer, constitutes the major dividing line in the camp’s history and is 
therefore discussed extensively in chapter 3. 
                                                 
247 The absence of de-Nazification files and personnel files for either man at the Lower Saxon State Archive makes 
definitive statements about their histories difficult. It is possible that files pertaining to the two men were simply 
lost. It nevertheless seems most likely that neither of them completed the de-Nazification process before leaving the 
camp, meaning that a panel in a governing district other than Hannover or Hildesheim was responsible for their de-
Nazification. 
248 “Schiebungen im Lager Friedland,” n.d., Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 85, NHStA. The clipping in the archival folder 
does not contain the newspaper’s name, but it seems most like that it was from the Hannoversch’ Neueste 
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Verwendung v.Lebensmitteln,”  27 June 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 97, NHStA. 
250 Letter from Krause to Kreisflüchtlingsamt Göttingen, 6 July 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 97, NHStA. See also 
letter from Heydenreich to Oberkreisdirektor Solf, 3 January 1947, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 97, NHStA. 
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If little information exists about the first German administrators of the camp, there is 
even less record of the British commandants at the camp. The first British commandant was 
Major Oldham of the 1002 (L/K) Military Government responsible for the Göttingen district. 
Oldham’s primary responsibility seems to have been the coordination of the various work groups 
in the camp, including a small contingent of British soldiers, the much larger German paid staff, 
German Red Cross workers, Catholic and Protestant charities, and British and German 
volunteers. Neither Oldham nor his successors actually engaged in the direct oversight of 
refugees, other than in exceptional cases. During the four months at Friedland, Oldham 
developed a close relationship with the German camp administrators, but he was abruptly 
transferred to military government work in Göttingen during January 1946.251 
Oldham’s successor was Captain Howie of the Black Watch, the officer in charge of the 
201(R) Military Government Detachment in Obernjesa near Friedland. As in Oldham’s case, the 
British records pertaining to Howie indicate the transfer orders, not the reasons behind them or 
the officer’s previous service record.252 As was also the case for his predecessor, Howie’s exact 
authority in administering the camp remains unclear. In a November 1946 note regarding de-
Nazification, Howie did finally state, “the Friedland camp does not run under the Military 
Government, but rather under German administration.”253 Still, the British did not formally 
transfer the camp to Lower Saxon administration until 1947. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, 
the British retained control of the camp’s prisoner of war demobilization and release functions 
and continued to exercise authority over which populations were sent to the Friedland camp after 
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the 1947 transfer. The British did not completely leave the camp until 1952. Thus, while de facto 
authority within the camp had passed to German administrators by the end of 1946, the lines of 
authority within and overseeing the camp remained tangled and a source of conflict well after the 
initial confusion of the first months subsided. 
The camp’s staff, which exceeded 500 persons in the first month, conducted day-to-day 
operations.254 Their tasks included, among others, helping to transport infirm refugees to the 
camp, registration, overseeing delousing and medical examinations, preparing and distributing 
food, distributing clothing, maintaining the cleanliness of the camp, and coordinating with 
refugee and housing authorities in areas to which the displaced Germans wished to travel. In 
order to rationalize this labor, the camp administration organized the work force into a hierarchy 
with the German camp director overseeing a series of labor battalions (Arbeitskommandos) for 
the following areas: the camp administration and orderly room, registration and the camp 
records, the motor pool, construction and technical management, clothing, the kitchens, camp 
police and security, disinfection, medical services, the German Red Cross nurses, and the three 
sub-camps consisting of Nissen huts.255 A permanent camp employee headed each of these labor 
battalions, supervising the operation of the given battalion and work groups within it, enacting 
directives from the German camp administration (the British seem to have been left out of this 
organizational structure), and relaying information from their battalions to the camp 
administration. 
Although information about the early battalion leaders and members of the camp’s 
personnel council is incomplete, de-Nazification files and personnel files from later camp 
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records do shed light on them as a group.256 Most of these men had previous experience as white-
collar office workers or skilled technicians (mechanics, electricians, etc), excepting of course 
medical doctors. Few of them had served in the military until the outbreak of war, meaning that 
while career officers such as Richard Krause and later Franz Freßen did hold the position of 
camp director, the military background of the camp’s staff stemmed from the general wartime 
mobilization of German men. In the military, however, most of the camp’s leading staffers did 
attain the rank of a noncommissioned or commissioned officer, suggesting past command 
authority played a role in attainment of leadership positions at the camp. Most interestingly, the 
personnel in early leadership positions were divided among locals from the Göttingen city or 
district, individuals from the Soviet zone, and individuals from territories ceded to Poland or 
Czechoslovakia. The Friedland camp was not a case of locals caring for displaced populations, 
but rather the camp staff relied upon the leadership of persons who were affected by 
displacement. 
Individuals with a displacement background were also well represented in the camp’s 
general staff. The large number of camp staffers, fluctuations in employment, and incomplete 
records levels make it difficult to assess the early camp staff as a whole. A personnel list for the 
camp registration work group does nevertheless offer further confirmation of displaced 
individuals being overrepresented in the camp work force in comparison to the number of 
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displaced Germans in the Göttingen region.257 According to a census of Lower Saxony’s 
population in October 1946, expellees and refugees from the Soviet zone and Berlin respectively 
accounted for 22,775 (17.7 percent) and 11,006 (8.5 percent) of the 128,997 people living in the 
city and rural districts of Göttingen.258 In the Friedland camp’s registration work group, by 
contrast, expellees and refugees from the Soviet zone and Berlin accounted for 20 of the 37 
people.259 One should of course be cautious about generalizing from this single case. For 
instance, the camp administration may have preferred to have refugees and expellees work in the 
registration, presumably due to their potential familiarity with the regions from which camp 
residents came. Yet, there is no administrative record indicating such a preference in assigning 
camp labor based upon background. Such an overrepresentation could also be explained by a 
desire to find work helping fellow expellees and refugees, the taking of available work in a new 
home, or some combination of the two motives. 
Prisoners of war provided another significant labor source early in the camp’s operation. 
Camp documents confirm the presence of POW labor until the middle of December 1945. In a 
message to the camp personnel from December 10, 1945, the camp’s British commandant, Major 
Oldham, explained that he had been ordered to release all members of the Wehrmacht for return 
to civilian life. These POWs were to be taken by train to a release and demobilization center, 
from which they should reach home by Christmas. Oldham valued what he felt was the high 
quality of their work, and he offered civilian appointments to any POW wishing to return to the 
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camp.260 Indeed, in a letter to the camp administration upon his transfer a month later, Oldham 
wrote, “as you well know, I have always had particular respect for the former members of the 
Wehrmacht.”261 
Little information exists regarding the backgrounds of these POW laborers, but one 
former camp employee alleged that they had been members of a Waffen-SS company. In a 
transcript of an interview with the public broadcaster Westdeutscher Rundfunk, the former camp 
statistician Karl Lattmann claimed, “back then the English regarded German soldiers, 
particularly from the Waffen-SS, very highly.” He went on to state, “an entire Waffen-SS 
company was thus employed in the camp kitchen,” and was responsible for putting together 
6,000 meals per day. Regarding the December 1945 release mentioned in the memo from 
Oldham, Lattmann claimed that the train traveled to the POW release center at Munsterlager 
where they were being loaded into a sealed train headed for mines in the British-occupied Ruhr 
industrial region. The POWs piled out of the train when they learned of its destination, and they 
returned to Friedland within 8 days. According to Lattmann, a relieved Oldham praised them for 
their return because in their absence the camp’s provisioning system for refugees “threatened to 
collapse” and their labor was desperately needed.262 
Assessing the veracity of Lattmann’s allegations is difficult. It is clear that the camp 
depended on POW labor during the fall of 1945, but Lattmann is the sole source of the Waffen-
SS allegation. Documents from the military government, the camp, and provisional German 
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authorities reveal nothing beyond the facts that POWs did work in camp and there was an order 
to release them in mid-December 1945. Ultimately, even if Lattmann’s claims are true, POW 
labor seems to have been menial, no matter how highly the British commandant thought of the 
POWs. These prisoner laborers did not hold positions of authority within the camp, so this issue 
speaks more to the source of labor than to any sensationalist notion of Friedland as a Nazi-run 
camp. 
The discussion of camps in postwar Germany obviously raises questions about 
connections with the Nazi regime and its network of labor, concentration, and extermination 
camps. Indeed, postwar refugee camps were often located in former prisoner of war or 
concentration camps, notoriously including the Dachau camp’s housing of expellees in the 
American sector.263 Of course, not all Nazi camps were directed against the regime’s enemies. 
The Nazi regime also used an extensive camp system for the resettlement of Germans under the 
auspices of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. Peter Fritzsche’s study of everyday life in Nazi 
Germany has also emphasized the importance of “community camps” in the attempted remaking 
of German society into the Nazi’s racially based “people’s community” (Volksgemeinschaft) that 
transcended class and regional differences. All told, the Nazi regime administered some 3,200 
military-style camps for youth labor service and thousands more camps for the use of party 
officials, the SS and SA, and the Reich Labor Service.264 
The facility at Friedland, however, was not constructed until well after the Germany’s 
defeat and there does not seem to have been any continuity in personnel between the Nazi camp 
systems and the early Friedland camp. Despite the vagaries of the de-Nazification process, it is 
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hardly surprising the officials from the Nazis’ punitive and slave labor camp systems were as a 
rule not part of the Friedland leadership. The one exception to that general statement seems to 
have been a member of the registration work group who much later became part of the personnel 
council. In this case, the staffer had previously worked as a labor “procurer” (Vermittler) in the 
occupied Baltic and Ukrainian regions, which undoubtedly involved acquiring and distributing 
Slavic slave laborers.265 As far as can be determined from available de-Nazification documents, 
none of the Friedland leadership had been involved in the resettlement of ethnic Germans during 
the war. Nor does it seem that anyone in leadership positions at Friedland had administered any 
“community camps” for the regime, though clearly younger staffers would have experienced 
Hitler Youth camps. Other staffers belonging to the Reich Labor Service had certainly been 
housed at a “community camp” at some point as well. Despite staffers’ exposure to “community 
camps,” it is difficult to identify particular operations at Friedland as influenced by the Nazi 
camp systems. Moreover, the men at Friedland had nearly all served in the military. Garrisons, 
field postings, and other military facilities would have also introduced staffers to the structured 
operations of camp environments. 
After the discharge of the roughly 300 POWs working at Friedland, staffing in the camp 
became more desperate. In a report from the International Voluntary Service for Peace 
contingent, the IVSP leader David Sainty complained that the POWs’ 120 replacements mostly 
consisted of old men. When Oldham returned from a later trip to the dispersal center in nearby 
Northeim, he told Sainty that he had personally picked out 150 new men. The next morning, 
Oldham and Sainty were disappointed to discover that they would only receive 25 of the 150 
selected men. When the new POWs finally arrived at Friedland, the camp discovered that they 
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were either too old to work or possessed medical certificates excusing them from labor. Other 
British military units in the region also exacerbated the camp’s search for German laborers by 
using Göttingen as for their headquarters. When the units arrived, according to Sainty, they 
evicted Germans from homes to make space for themselves. Evicted Germans would simply 
leave town, meaning that compulsory labor orders made in Göttingen did little to resolve staffing 
shortfalls.266 
The Friedland administration finally resolved this labor problem by employing Ukrainian 
and Polish (DPs) housed in Göttingen. In particular, these groups contributed to renovations, 
repairs, and construction in the camp. Already in early January 1946, the IVSP suggested that 
Polish DP labor could be used in the camp if not enough Germans were available. While Sainty 
continued to coordinate with Frege in recruiting German university students, other IVSP 
members began to make inquiries with the DP camp near the former Hermann Goering 
Steelworks where the IVSP contingent had worked before coming to Friedland. These efforts, 
however, initially proved fruitless.267 
The shortage of German labor reached its nadir in February 1945. Heavy precipitation 
that month caused continuing problems for the latrines and with mud in and around the camp, 
despite the move across the Leine River to higher ground at the end of 1945. Although the camp 
had managed to acquire some compulsory German laborers to begin work on the drainages, late 
in the month, the Göttingen Arbeitsamt (employment authority) reassigned these German 
laborers to their employers in the city. Evidently the Arbeitsamt feared that a longer work 
assignment would be catastrophic for those businesses. In response, the camp coordinated with 
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officials from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) for 
roughly 100 Ukrainian and Polish DPs to help with drainage projects. When the commandant for 
the Polish DPs held back their labor, efforts by the camp, the Military Government Detachment 
201 (R) Obernjesa, and UNRRA failed to reach a new agreement. Thereafter only the Ukrainians 
remained as auxiliary labor. In addition the drainage projects, these Ukrainians also worked 
through the month on barracks for the camp’s new quarantine section.268 By May 1946, the 
number of Ukrainian laborers had dropped to an average of 30 persons who worked with a group 
of ten construction workers from the camp. Their tasks included: renovating and building new 
latrines, erecting a building for the German Red Cross nurses, widening streets, digging a 
vegetable cellar for the camp kitchens, fencing in the camp with barbed wire, and converting a 
bathing barracks to a multi-use entertainment space.269 Over the summer of 1946, some 50 
Ukrainians continued work in the camp to improve latrines, drainage and sewage, and the 
quarantine section of the camp, among other tasks.270 
Receiving, aiding, and redistributing thousands of displaced Germans traveling between 
occupation zones on a daily basis required a large labor force. Even then, in order to processes 
such masses, the camp administration needed to organize labor along rationalized lines, 
contributing to the regimented character of staff responsibilities. Laborers at Friedland mostly 
consisted of Germans, both locals and persons recently resettled near Friedland, but units of the 
British military government supervised and contributed to these efforts. Previous military service 
and experience of “communal camps” for the Hitler Youth and Reich Labor Service likely 
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contributed to the staff’s sense of needing clear, strict regulation and divisions of responsibilities 
for running a successful camp. Unrecognized in previous scholarship about Friedland, the camp 
also depended upon the efforts of hired Ukrainian and Polish DPs in the construction and 
improvement of camp facilities in order to turn the Friedland camp into a permanent institution. 
Finally, examination of this early staff demonstrates that authority did not function in a clear 
dichotomy between British authority and German subordination. Instead, lines of authority for 
Friedland were thoroughly tangled from the beginning, helping to explain points of confusion 
and conflict that emerged in the Anglo-German relationship later in the camp’s history.  
British and German Volunteers, Fraternization, and Reconstructing Civil Society 
In addition to German staff and charities, the Friedland transit camp also depended on the 
efforts of British and German volunteers during its early operation. The first British volunteers to 
work at the camp were members of the British chapter of the International Voluntary Service for 
Peace. As members of an international organization founded by Swiss engineer Pierre Ceresole 
in 1920, the British IVSP unit of roughly ten people at Friedland helped by transporting injured 
and infirm refugees across the border, aiding the construction of new camp buildings, and 
contributing manpower and materiel to various other tasks in the camp.271 The civilians of the 
IVSP performed an important task in helping to mediate the fraught relationship between the 
German staff and the occupiers overseeing them. The IVSP’s work at Friedland had the further 
effect of encouraging the development of nascent civil groups. 
The IVSP unit that served at Friedland during the fall and winter of 1945/46 took a 
meandering course of providing humanitarian assistance in war-torn Europe. After completing 
training in Britain, the unit under the command of David Sainty landed on the Belgian coast in 
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early 1945 and then traveled to Arnhem where they provided medical transport services while 
the British military advanced into Germany. Once the British military liberated the Bergen-
Belsen camp, they asked the IVSP unit to help with repatriating Dutch survivors, but according 
to IVSP volunteer Harold Stanley Slee, the work there was “beyond our capabilities.” The unit 
therefore quickly moved on to the DP camp at the former Hermann Goering Steelworks in 
Salzgitter. There the volunteers helped with sorting and transporting the former forced laborers. 
Having worked there for several months, the unit received a request to help with the 
establishment of the transit camp at Friedland.272 
 In November 1945, Sainty, Slee, and the other IVSP volunteers arrived at Friedland. At 
first, Sainty was frustrated in his efforts to integrate the unit into the camp’s labor groups. In a 
letter to a superior in Britain, Sainty complained that the British commandant had emphatically 
requested assistance, “but at the moment there is not much for us to do […] the actual work of 
the camps is being done by German civilians and prisoners and Red Cross.” Sainty felt that his 
group could not “very well muscle in,” so they held back for the first weeks until they could use 
their vehicles to begin transporting German refugees across the border.273 
Transporting sick, injured, and elderly refugees to the camp was one of the most 
significant contributions made by the IVSP. The population transfer agreements between Poland, 
the Soviet Union, and Britain stipulated that the British military government would help with the 
transport. Yet, lack of a rail connection between Friedland and the border meant that most 
expellees and refugees had to cross the border on foot and walk to the zonal transit camps before 
rail services could again fulfill the transit agreements. When sick, injured, and elderly refugees 
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could not cross the border under their own power, the SCI unit at Friedland drove into the Soviet 
zone to collect and transport them back to the camp using one of their 10 vehicles. 
Having British volunteers involved in the transit also proved helpful in dealing with 
Soviet border guards. In contrast to the difficult, mistrusting relationship between Germans and 
Soviet occupiers, both Sainty and Slee recounted friendly attitudes that Soviet border guards had 
toward the British. Indeed, to the extent that the IVSP drivers encountered any trouble other than 
bureaucratic stubbornness it was when Slee did not reciprocate the guards’ friendliness. 
According to Slee, Soviet border guards once ordered him out of his truck after he refused to go 
share a drink. Another border guard patted Slee’s accompanying German nurse on the head, 
calling her “a pretty little thing.” Slee defused the momentarily tense situation by handing out 
some cigarettes, tossing the rest in the field, and driving off with a “cheerio,” while the nurse 
“was weeping with relief that she got away alright.”274 
Ten vehicles proved woefully insufficient for transporting the masses of displaced 
Germans along the border. In a report from December 1, 1945, Sainty complained that he was 
having trouble organizing more vehicles, especially when half of the presumably available, 
locally owned vehicles were already providing transport for profit. Sainty seemed to have his 
doubts about the efficacy of running transports at all. Police tried to keep the refugee columns 
moving along, but “every time a vehicle does draw up, the road is a little more congested.” The 
chaotic situation also brought out selfish tendencies among the refugees, because when one of 
the IVSP trucks did stop along the road, refugees would swarm it without consideration for those 
physically most in need of the transport.275 
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The IVSP volunteer also found roles for themselves in the camp and elsewhere in the 
British sector. Volunteers helped with the construction of the new camp across the Leine, and 
they also helped to ensure that camp residents had adequate meals. Sometime in early December, 
the commandant, Major Oldham, put Sainty and the IVSP in charge of the camp’s hospital block 
to relieve himself of the responsibility. The IVSP thus became involved in bringing refugees to 
the medical barracks for mandatory examinations and coordinating closely with the German Red 
Cross doctors.276 IVSP volunteers also performed spot checks to ensure that refugees were being 
integrated into local communities. The IVSP and the German administrators knew that refugees 
could lie to administrators at Friedland in order to obtain travel permits to preferred locations. 
So, part of the idea behind the follow-up visits “was to avoid people saying we are from so-and-
so and we ought to go back there.”277 
Sainty’s early efforts at Friedland in November and December 1945 included the 
recruitment of German volunteers. Having met with representatives from Caritas and Innere 
Mission and seen their attempts to raise volunteers at the start of December, Sainty suggested 
organizing students from the university in Göttingen.278 He proceeded to discuss volunteer work 
with a “professor’s wife who runs the student ‘Hilfswerke’ [relief organization] and the student 
head of this” sometime in the following week.279 Sainty did not identify the student head of the 
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organization, but it seems likely he had spoken with Joachim Frege, a law student living in the 
town of Friedland who began recruiting friends to help on the weekends.280 
 The coordination between the Sainty and the student groups led to the distribution of a 
flyer and printing of a newspaper article later in December that called upon students to help at 
the camp. The flyer proposed that students could look after children, the elderly, and the sick. It 
also argued, “the Göttingen student body must […] regard helpfully joining in as its foremost 
task.”281 Paul Stein, a fellow law student of Frege’s and a member in the student group “Die 
Gleichen,”282 wrote an article for the university newspaper about service at Friedland. After 
describing the difficult conditions facing expellees and refugees, Stein tried to rally students to 
their aid: “Opportunities to help? Hundredfold. We push and pull the carts, repair broken 
vehicles, carry luggage, sacks, trunks, boxes, give advice, in short, we are willing to do anything 
[wir sind Mädchen für alles].”283  
In fact, the transportation of baggage from the border to the camp was a particularly 
important if menial task. All sorts of refugees arrived at the border with handcarts full of 
possessions. From there, the refugees had to travel roughly 3 kilometers along often-muddy 
roads to reach the camp. In December 1945 the carts had become a point of dispute. When Field 
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Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery toured the camp, he ordered that the empty carts be burned, 
preventing the refugees from using them to transport possessions within the British zone. The 
order also denied use of abandoned carts to the camp, which could have used them to help the 
elderly, disabled, and mothers of small children.284  
The local economy responded to the market created by refugees’ needs, and residents of 
began to hire out their labor often at exorbitant prices. Worse, the situation was ripe for petty 
criminality, particularly thievery.285 The camp administration therefore felt compelled to 
intercede on humanitarian and legal grounds. Camp director Richard Krause wrote to the county 
director (Oberkreisdirektor) in May 1946 to relay refugees’ complaints about “extortionate 
prices” and to ask the county for outlaw this business along the Besenhausen-Friedland road. 
Although Krause’s language suggested his sympathy for the refugees, his intercession stemmed 
from financial problems that the local transport economy was creating for the camp. Simply put, 
the private labor was becoming too expensive for the camp administration. Administrators felt 
compelled to cover the transportation costs in emergency cases, lest the refugees be financially 
crippled and the local population become resentful from non-payment. Along with the plea for 
legal intervention, Krause noted that volunteers equipped with omnibuses and trucks had been 
working to resolve the problem from the camp’s end.286 While the complaints suggest that 
volunteer labor from students and the ISVP alone were not enough to resolve the issue of 
                                                 
284 Montgomery’s visit to the camp seemed to have worsened German-British relations firstly because much of the 
camp had to be cleared in anticipation of his inspection; see Lagebericht from Oberbürgermeister Göttingen, 31 
December 1945, Nds. 120 Hildesheim Acc. 40/51 Nr. 1, NHStA. Literature on the camp tends to treat the 
destruction of the carts as having been senseless and without explanation, but IVSP volunteer Slee recalled that 
Montgomery was upset that the carts might overburden rail capacity in the British zone; Slee, Interview. 
285 A 1946 summary sent by camp administration to the Police Sonderkommando in Reiffenhausen, lists multiple 
instances of baggage theft in and outside of the camp of during the spring months; 8 November 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 
16/83 Nr. 97, NHStA. 
286 Letter from Friedland Lagerleitung to Oberkreisdirektor Göttingen, 20 May 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 97, 
NHStA. 
 115 
predatory transportation services, the two groups were actively contributing to the amelioration 
of the problem. 
 The collaboration between the IVSP and the Göttingen student body quickly expanded in 
size. The volunteers took on tasks beyond helping to transport refugees and their possessions 
later in the winter of 1945/46. Sainty and his German colleagues worked hard to increase the 
number of German volunteers in January 1946, because “the permanent labour position in the 
camp is very bad,” particularly because desertion and other causes had decreased the number of 
POWs working in the camp.287 In order to increase the number of volunteers, Sainty relied upon 
already existing semi-formal social networks, such as Frege’s law student friends and an the 
association known as “Die Gleichen.” By the end of February 1946, Frege was co-responsible 
for coordinating a month-long effort by the IVSP and the univeristy’s student government 
(Allgemeiner Studententausschuß) that included 36 students, a German relief worker, and two 
British relief workers. From February 25 to March 26, 1946, the IVSP and Frege’s group 
completed the following tasks: assembling Nissen huts with wooden floors, the removal and 
transport of barracks for their reconstruction, the erection of porch roofs and a fence, snow 
removal, the cleaning of drainage ditches and pipes, and the transport of refugees’ luggage.288 
The cooperation between the IVSP, local volunteers, and the camp administration also 
raises the issue of German-British relations. Unsurprisingly, the relations between occupation 
force and civilian population in occupied Germany could be frosty. Patricia Meehan has argued 
that the British occupiers “slipped easily into the imperial mode” treating Germans as a subject 
people, while the hodgepodge staffing of the occupation administration with officials ignorant of 
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the language led to a “government by interpreter.”289 Montgomery’s non-fraternization order 
further contributed to difficulties between Germans and the British military. The order issued in 
Montgomery’s March 1945 Letter by the Commander-in-Chief on Non-Fraternisation required 
the British military to “keep clear of Germans—man, woman, and child—unless you meet them 
in course of duty,” barring soldiers from socializing or even shaking hands with the Germans 
before finally being lifted in September 1945.290 Even after Montgomery ended the rule, 
institutional inertia within the military meant that attitudes toward Germans and refraining from 
friendly relations were slow to change. For example, only in October 1946 did Montgomery’s 
successor finally countermand the standing order that required Germans to always cede right of 
way to British forces.291 
The issue of non-fraternization affected members of the British military stationed at 
Friedland. German volunteers remembered that those rules made relations between Germans and 
British soldiers “very complicated and not self-evident.”292 A concrete example of difficulties 
posed by seeming to be too friendly and the vague rules governing interactions can be seen in the 
previously noted transfer of Major Oldham, the initial British commandant of the camp. 
According to former camp staffer Karl Lattmann, the army reassigned Oldham because he had 
been too “German friendly.”293 Documents from Oldham and the German camp administrators 
make clear that the transfer ended a friendly working relationship, even if they do not explicitly 
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state the reason for his transfer. Two notes from Oldham to the camp staff clearly indicate his 
collegial relationship with the German staffers as well as potentially problematic attitudes for an 
authority in the military government. In the release announcement for the German POWs 
working at the camp Oldham thanked them for their “magnificent work,” promised a position to 
anyone who returned after their release/demobilization, and offered to intercede on their 
behalves if they needed help in the future.294 Upon his transfer from Friedland, Oldham again 
expressed his thankfulness for the work of the German staff. He went on to write that he would 
“always think of the staff as the most loyal friends” whom he would always be willing to help in 
case of difficulties.295 
British requisitioning policy also contributed to Germans’ resentment of the occupation 
government, further complicating relationships between the two groups. In Göttingen, the local 
population complained bitterly about what they saw as wasted space and excess in British 
housing requisitions of 30 to 40 square meters per person for members of the occupation force. 
In comparison, the city’s German population was subject to rationing of living space that left of 
just over 6 square meters per person. Adding to resentments over the denial of using home and 
property, Germans in Göttingen understandably feared that troops or refugees in their homes 
might damage or steal their possessions.296 
The IVSP volunteers likewise encountered the seeming arbitrariness and callousness of 
housing requisitioning and actively worked to ameliorate potential conflict. When the 12 British 
volunteers first arrived and needed housing in a town near Friedland, a major from the local 
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military unit brought them to an inn with a small restaurant on a farm outside of Göttingen. The 
major informed the residents that he was requisitioning the home and that they had to leave 
within 30 minutes with nothing more than their clothes, leaving the rest of their property in the 
house to the unit. Feeling guilty about the Germans’ eviction, the volunteers immediately hired 
two of them as the cook and housekeeper to which the unit had been entitled. According to Slee, 
the IVSP unit and their German hosts became close friends during the course of their stay, 
ignoring standing attitudes against fraternization.297 
This liminal role—not military but also attached to the occupying military government—
makes the IVSP activities and their perspectives on Anglo-German relations worth noting. 
Germans regarded the IVSP aid workers differently from soldiers in the military government. 
Slee recalled that Germans treated IVSP workers very well because these workers wore Red 
Cross uniforms rather than the military uniforms of the British Army of the Rhine: “Red Cross 
means a hell of a lot throughout the world. And we were wearing Red Cross uniforms and doing 
out best to keep everybody happy.” Nor did the British volunteers experience resentment from 
expellees and other refugees. Slee explained that expellees at the camp were not bitter toward the 
British at Friedland, because “by the time we saw them, they had reconciled to it […] they were 
just relieved to be finishing with the travel.”298 
Bitterness among refugee and local populations was, however, a significant problem 
when displaced groups arrived in new communities. Mood reports collected from provisional, 
local German authorities throughout in the Hildesheim governing district make clear that insular 
communities facing scarcities rejected new refugee residents. In a December 1945 report, 
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authorities for the counties of Hildesheim and Marienburg noted local feelings that the number of 
refugees was too high, given the paucity of living space and the insufficient number of beds.299 
The mayor of Gronau in the Hannover region reported an even worse situation. According to 
him, the local population made constant difficulties for the refugees. He further regretted that 
there was so little empathy for those affected badly by the war, such that conversations with 
property owners were insufficient to convince them help refugees. In the mayor’s view, 
“stronger and drastic measures must be made available to the local police, so that proper 
accommodation for refugees can be assured.”300 
Rejection by these communities led to frustration among refugees and expellees who felt 
they had borne a disproportional share of the war’s costs. In the spring of 1946, the county 
director for the border region of Duderstadt made the familiar report of homeowners refusing to 
take in refugees or accommodating only those refugees who could help with agricultural work. 
When refugees did receive a room, more often than not it was completely empty with no 
furniture, dishes, or utensils for the refugees to use. The county director further reported that 
attitudes among refugees were consequently quite poor and “bitterness has taken hold.” In his 
estimation, “drastic measures from the German and English authorities are necessary to 
overcome these untenable circumstances.”301 Noting refugees’ bitterness and resentments, the 
refugee authority for the Hildesheim governing district explained, “a simple inability is seen as 
ill will, and the thought arises, why should the still propertied here have a better situation than 
                                                 
299 Lagebericht, 4 December 1945, Nds. 120 Hildesheim Acc. 40/51 Nr. 1, NHStA. 
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themselves, and whether it would not be much more right and fair to divide what remains equally 
amongst everyone.”302 
In light of these material difficulties and growing ill feelings, the IVSP unit at Friedland 
began to make follow-up visits to communities in the British zone in 1946. After allocating and 
sending refugees to a given region, Slee recalled that he and other IVSP workers “would go on to 
make sure they had been properly integrated.” Yet, Slee’s account suggests that beyond the 
necessarily limited efforts by the small group of IVSP workers, local British authorities were 
unwilling to meet the requests for drastic measures made by provisional German governments. 
According to him, unlike the heavy-handed Soviet occupation forces, the British authorities 
“were trying to stay on the right side of local population. Trying not to make it difficult.”303 The 
IVSP made its best efforts to ensure good living conditions (the Friedland unit moved on to 
Siegen to focus on this task in the summer of 1946), but integration into home communities 
would ultimately come only with improved material circumstances, while camps such as 
Friedland worked to keep communities from becoming too overwhelmed with refugees. 
A final issue raised by the collaboration between British and German volunteer groups 
was the question of reconciliation. In his recollections about helping at Friedland, Frege 
emphasized, “the trusting collaboration of former war foes in the Friedland camp only seven 
months after the end of a very hard war was a decisive experience.”304 Paul Stein likewise 
reported that “evening discussions were conducive to mutual understanding” between members 
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of the IVSP and Die Gleichen.305 Although the two groups had a different “ideological outlook” 
(Ideenrichtung), Stein felt that the combined British and German efforts to relieve the hardships 
at Friedland “yielded a good synthesis.”306 An IVSP report on their activities from the fall of 
1946 likewise noted the successful cooperation between British and German volunteers, which 
led to the creation of another four IVSP-German partnerships in Berlin, Hamburg, Twisteden bei 
Geldern, and Meschede. Summarizing the efforts at Meschede, the IVSP director for Germany 
adopted similar language to the Germans’ recollections of Friedland. He emphasized the 
importance of reconciliation to organization’s founding ideals and ongoing efforts: “Like the 
IVSP schemes after the last war, when IVSP was in its infancy, the men and women of at least 
two nations, former enemies, were helping […] to start building for peace.”307 
Despite its small size, the IVSP unit at Friedland played an important role in the facility’s 
early development. These British volunteers transported infirm refugees from across the border 
to Friedland and worked on other tasks in the camp. Crucially, they also helped to recruit local 
German volunteers at a time (winter 1946) when the camp faced a serious labor shortfall. IVSP 
reports and recollections by volunteers further help to illustrate the complicated relationships 
between Germans and the occupying British military government as well as refugees’ attitudes 
about their displacement vis-à-vis the British who had agreed to the eastern expulsions. 
Occupying a liminal space between military occupier and civilian aid workers, these IVSP 
staffers also helped to normalize relationships between the defeated Germans and occupying 
British. A final contribution had to do with normalizing civil society in Germany after years of 
                                                 
305 Die Gründung der ‘Gleichen’ und ihre Entwicklung in den ersten Semestern, B 45 12 20 – 4 01, ASCI. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Basil Eastland, International Voluntary Service for Peace - Work in Germany, 30 September 1946, B 46 09 30 - 6 
01, ASCI. 
 122 
Nazi rule and war. As one IVSP recalled, “Our special remit, I think, was to regenerate the local 
welfare organizations for the Protestant Church, the Lutheran Church, the Caritas Verband, the 
Arbeiterwohlfahrt.”308  
Conclusions 
 Beginning late in the summer of 1945, provisional governments within the British 
occupation zone faced a crisis of displaced populations. Germans who had been uprooted by 
wartime evacuations and postwar expulsions streamed across the zonal boundary in southeastern 
Lower Saxony. Although the region had largely escaped damage from the war, it was entirely 
unprepared to feed and shelter hundreds of thousands of refugees. Uncontrolled movement by 
refugees also threatened to flood the nearby city of Göttingen as well as damaged cities further 
into the British zone with needy persons for whom they could not care. This crisis therefore 
provoked a self-defensive, insular rejection of refugees even when housing was available. Rather 
than resolving displacement by accepting and settling refugees, local governments exacerbated 
the problem by attempting to shove arriving refugees to the next community down the line. 
 Addressing this crisis required the establishment of a system of regulation to control the 
movement of refugees. Refugee transit camps such as the one established at Friedland served as 
the institutional lynchpin for this new system. Able to capture and resettle the diverse groups of 
displaced Germans, these camps could then begin the process of equitably distributing uprooted 
individuals throughout the British zone. This regulatory intervention was simultaneously 
coercive and humane in its approach to subject populations. For example, the Friedland camp 
restricted refugees’ choice in resettlement destinations, but registration and reassignment at the 
camp also meant that local authorities would have no grounds to refuse accommodation to 
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persons who had passed through the camp. Registration at the camp had the further benefit of 
entering refugees into government records as persons who could later demand special welfare 
provisions through the postwar burden-sharing programs. The interplay of disciplining regulation 
and humanitarian relief also governed the development of operations within the camp. Taking 
health as an example, refugees were forced to submit to delousing with DDT and medical 
examinations in order to reduce the risks to public health presented by refugees. Yet, these same 
procedures benefited camp residents by improving their own health and enabling medical 
intervention in life-threatening situations. 
 The populations that initially passed through the Friedland camp offer a snapshot of the 
complex nature of postwar displacements. Expellees have come to dominate memories and 
histories of the mass unsettling of Germans during the period lasting roughly between 1944 and 
1949. Friedland’s role as a border transit facility, however, meant that myriad groups passed 
through camp. Records from Friedland show that wartime evacuees, released prisoners of war, 
and non-German displaced persons comprised significant portions of the postwar population 
displacements in addition to the more widely recognized expellees. Moreover, examination of 
camp registration records and policy discussions in German and British offices blur definitions 
of these categories. Not all Germans claiming to be evacuees and expellees were in fact victims 
of damage to their homes or expulsions, but instead some Germans claimed membership in these 
groups in order to make it across the zonal frontier. 
 Finally, relief and regulation at Friedland required a considerable amount of labor. Much 
of the work in the camp was done by Germans, many of whom had been affected by 
displacement before settling at Friedland. German prisoners of war and later Polish and 
Ukrainian displaced persons also provided vital labor in the camp’s continuing construction and 
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renovation projects. A small contingent of British volunteers from the International Voluntary 
Service for Peace offered additional transport and medical services. The history of IVSP 
involvement in camp also demonstrates that Anglo-German cooperation in addressing the 
refugee crisis contributed to reconciliation between these former enemies. Moreover, IVSP-led 
attempts to organize volunteer German laborers facilitated the postwar revitalization of civic 
networks in and around Göttingen. Lastly, overseeing all of these efforts was a camp 
administration composed of German and British authorities. The character of this camp 
administration was strongly influenced by military experience. In addition to military 
government officers, the camp leadership depended upon Germans who had previously exercised 
command authority in the Wehrmacht. While these British and German administrators failed to 
clarify lines of authority within the camp, they were enormously successful in implementing the 
strict camp environment necessary for overcoming the mass nature of the displacement crisis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FROM PROVISIONAL TO PERMANENT: BRITISH AND GERMAN 
ADMINISTRATION, 1946-1952 
Having undergone significant renovation during the summer of 1946, the Friedland camp 
reopened during the fall of that year with the primary purpose of facilitating the release and 
transfer of prisoners of war across zonal boundaries. These POWs along with refugees and 
expellees nevertheless encountered a camp still in the midst of transformation. The new German 
camp director, Richard Krause, had undertaken a campaign to reform the camp’s staff in order to 
provide more efficient, humane care for the residents. Still, questions remained about which 
administrative entities, both British and German, held authority over the camp. 
This chapter examines the oversight of the Friedland camp by authorities with the British 
military government. Although the early relationship between German and British administrators 
at Friedland was good, discord rather than friendly cooperation increasingly marked the British 
oversight that lasted until 1952. The quality of the relationship between the British and Germans 
partly depended on the individual British commandants. In contrast to the stable leadership under 
Krause and other top-level German administrators, four different British officers oversaw the 
military units there, and each of them interacted differently with their German counterparts. The 
tension also resulted from the structural factor that the German civil government’s capabilities 
grew while British occupation dragged on. Key points of conflict included supply, financing, and 
the extent to which German administrators could act independently of the British commandant. 
Examination of the German administration at Friedland demonstrates the crucial role that 
Krause played in shaping camp operations. After his appointment as camp director, Krause 
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worked hard to reform the camp’s staff by increasing standards for professional conduct and 
dismissing employees who failed to meet these standards. In particular, Krause stamped out 
black-market trade and other forms of petty corruption in the effort to ensure efficient operation 
and to restore the camp’s public reputation. Demands for a more responsible staff also 
necessitated the creation of a workers’ council to protect employees’ interests. Krause further 
fought to improve the camp’s reputation and public faith through direct confrontations with the 
German press when reporters wrote unflattering or incorrect reports about the camp at Friedland. 
The camp’s staff during this six-year period of reform exhibited a number of distinctive 
characteristics. Analysis of personnel records indicates that the upheavals began by Krause in 
mid-1946 ended by the close of 1947. As a result, a progressively more experienced staff was 
running the camp by the end of the 1940s. The composition of the camp’s staff was 
predominately male and disproportionately made up of former refugees, which resulted from 
state priorities for welfare and employment with a gendered emphasis on male breadwinners for 
most types of jobs at the camp. In addition to state employees, the camp at Friedland depended 
on charities for additional labor, financing, and supplies. Although men held most leadership 
positions within the camp, such charities also offered women paths to influential positions. 
While camp at Friedland continued to operate as a major clearing house for populations 
displaced during and after the war, many other transit camps closed during the period between 
1946 and 1952. When the Friedland camp was first operating in the fall of 1945, it was one of 
five border transit camps within the British XXX Corps District, not to mention other facilities in 
Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein.309 By 1952, the towns of Friedland and Uelzen hosted 
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the only border transit camps in Lower Saxony. Why did the camp at Friedland survive? Indeed, 
in mid-1950, there were even discussions within federal and Lower Saxon refugee ministries 
about closing the camp. This chapter examines the first of two crucial factors that helped to 
ensure the camp’s operation through the period of 1946 to 1952. First, the camp administration 
organized an increasingly effective, experienced staff, while also jealously defending the camp’s 
reputation from critics. The second factor, the diverse nature of postwar displacement creating 
the continuing need for such a camp, is addressed in chapter 4. 
British Oversight 
 Between 1946 and 1952, British commanding officers at Friedland experienced a high 
rate of turnover and steady deterioration of their working relationships with the camp’s German 
administration. During that time, the British military oversaw the release of German POWs and 
contributed to other areas of camp administration. In the winter of 1946, the prisoner release unit 
commanded by Captain Howie of the Black Watch transferred from its station in Northeim north 
of Göttingen to the Friedland camp.310 The most likely reason for the unit’s transfer was to 
facilitate Operation Clobber, which required the transfer via Friedland of some 120,000 British-
held POWs back to their homes in the Soviet zone.311 For day-to-day operations, however, 
Howie and his subordinates respected the German administration’s authority over the camp and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Marienthal; see Diagram of Exchange Points and Communications, FO 1052/316, British National Archives at Kew 
Gardens (hereafter BNA). 
310 Communication from Howie to HQ Mil. Gov. Hannover Region, 24 January 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 97, 
NHStA. The unit, 201 (R) Det. Mil. Gov., had previously been responsible for prisoner release camps at Northeim 
and Friedland from November 18, 1945 until Howie took command of it on December 18, 1945, at which point the 
unit became responsible for the Northeim and Immensdorf camps. See War Diary, WO 171/7927, BNA. 
311 Communication from Major Leishman to Regierungspräsident Hildesheim, 12 December 1945, 
Stadtflüchtlingsamt Nr. 40, SAG. The 120,000 POWs passing through Friedland on their way home to East 
Germany constituted roughly 20 percent of the POW traffic in the camp. See 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, ed. 
Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte (Heidelberg, 1965), Appendix 4. 
   
128 
were primarily responsible for completion of D-2 Discharge Certificates (Entlassungsscheine) 
for the POWs. 
Howie’s tenure in the camp demonstrated the importance of interpersonal relationships in 
the cooperation between German and British administrators. For example, Howie interceded in 
the de-Nazification process on behalf of the camp. In October 1946 Howie provided a statement 
with fulsome praise for a senior member of the camp administration who was facing dismissal 
due to difficulties with the Göttingen Main De-Nazification Committee. Howie stated that the 
administrator’s work “at all times has been satisfactory and he has assisted in no small measure 
in bringing the camp to its present state of efficiency.” He made special note of the 
administrator’s efforts to care for the staff’s welfare and to organize sporting activities for them, 
including soccer games and boxing matches. He concluded with the assessment, “I have always 
found him to be a loyal, hard working and pleasant man to work with.”312 In a subsequent 
memorandum in November, Howie informed the camp’s personnel that they would not undergo 
a de-Nazification process and that in case of difficulties they should refer the de-Nazification 
committee to him.313  
Over the course of his fifteen-month command, it seems that Howie developed a 
particularly close working relationship with his German counterpart, Richard Krause. When 
Howie (now promoted to the rank of major) was transferred to a different command in April 
1947, he wrote a remarkably personal note to Krause to express his thanks for Krause’s loyal 
cooperation with him: “We had much in common, and I flatter myself to say that we achieved 
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considerable steps in the construction of a healthy organization and that we […] were able to 
relieve the unfortunate souls coming through the camp of some of their hardships.” Howie went 
on to praise Krause’s efforts to organize the sub-camp for vagrant youths, the voluntary nature of 
which made it all the more worthy of recognition. Howie also asked Krause to convey his thanks 
to the camp personnel for their readiness to cooperate and that it “was a pleasure to work with 
such a staff, and I wish them all the best for their future.” In closing, Howie promised to try to 
visit when he could and he wished “all the best for the future that a friend can wish to you and 
your family.”314 
Following Howie’s departure, the close cooperation and friendly relationships between 
German and British administrators cooled. Howie’s immediate successor in April 1948 was 
Major Garrow of the 68th DPACS (Displaced Persons Assembly Center Staff). Given that the 
Friedland camp was not responsible for the care of DPs at the time, it is not clear why the British 
military government transferred Garrow’s unit to Friedland. Perhaps they made the transfer 
because the unit possessed buses useful for transporting groups from the border to the camp. In 
January 1948, Garrow and his unit were transferred from Friedland. According to Krause’s 
memorandum to the refugee authority in Hildesheim, Garrow explained that his unit would leave 
the camp and be replaced by the British Army. His superiors had declared they would no longer 
be responsible for Friedland, because the camp was housing only German refugees and 
discharged POWs, whereas DPACS units were solely responsible for DPs.315 
Captain Dean and his unit, the 2nd PWDC (Prisoner of War Discharge Center), thus took 
over as the British presence in the camp in the winter of 1948. According to Krause, the British 
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Army understood its sole responsibility to be POW discharges, while the camp’s German 
authorities would be responsible for only civilian traffic. To that end, a British colonel suggested 
the formal division of the camp into a POW discharge section under British command and a 
civilian section under German control. Krause argued against such a division, fearing that it 
would create difficulties for administration and provisioning in the camp.316 
For the camp’s German administrators, it seems that there was great fear in early 
February that they would lose the vehicles necessary for transporting civilians to and from the 
camp. The 68th DPACS unit was taking its buses with them, and Krause also received orders 
from postal authorities (Reichspostdirektion) in Braunschweig that the camp was to give up all of 
its omnibuses. When the camp administration asked for assistance from Dean and the 2nd PWDC, 
Dean refused to help, declaring that such traffic lay beyond his unit’s responsibilities and that it 
was a matter for German authorities alone. Krause and the Hildesheim refugee authority 
prevailed upon Dean that the POWs became civilians in the camp when they received their 
discharge certificates, meaning that the camp still required buses to transport sick and injured 
POWs (as civilians) to area hospitals. Because the British army still would not provide vehicles, 
a senior refugee ministry official requisitioned 5 buses from the Göttingen Department of Motor 
Vehicles (Straßenverkehrsamt). Despite the disagreements, Dean expressed his “hope and 
certainty for a good working relationship” and promised army support for the camp. Shortly 
thereafter, Dean committed to provide 3,000 straw sacks, 1,000 beds, and several thousand 
blankets for POWs. The Germans agreed to construct an office for the 2nd PWDC in the camp.317 
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The dual administrative structure that developed in the camp also created confusion about 
British and German financial obligations. In 1949, for example, German and British 
administrators came into conflict over responsibility for utilities costs for newly constructed 
POW barracks with electrical heating and ventilation. The camp leadership argued that they had 
made clear to the British Army at the time of construction that they could not pay for electricity 
for the barracks. Dean, as camp commandant, refused to pay for the electricity, stating that he 
could only authorize the payment if the army were to requisition the entire camp. He did offer, 
however, to take up the matter with his superiors if the refugee authority in Hildesheim also 
refused to make the payment.318  
In October 1949, Dean (now promoted to major) returned to England and was replaced 
by Major Middlemas as commander of the 2nd PWDC.319 During his tenure as the unit 
commander, Middledmas likewise had an uneven working relationship with the camp’s German 
leadership. On the positive side of the ledger, shortly after his arrival Middlemas conducted an 
inspection of the camp and praised the German staff and administration.320 Middlemas also 
interceded in support of the German administration when problems with ex-DPs and Infiltrees 
emerged (see chapter 4). 
There remained the question of to whom the camp really belonged. In the spring of 1951, 
Middlemas noticed renovations undertaken using repurposed camp materials. He complained to 
the German administration that while it was not his wish to reduce cooperation between their 
offices, he “would welcome it, if one were to consult with him beforehand about these plans, 
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changes, and use of materials.” According to Middlemas, “a reason for this is that the camp is 
first and foremost a British military camp.”321 The German camp leadership explained to the 
refugee ministry in Hannover that they had, in fact, informed Middlemas about important 
changes and that Middlemas was complaining about even the smallest things, such as moving 
pipes from one room to another.322 Officials in Hannover responded by forwarding the entire 
affair to the Federal Ministry for Expellees to ask them to “once again energetically work 
towards abolishing the British administrative office in Friedland, which now no longer has a 
right to exist [Existenzberechtigung].”323 
On both German and British sides, there may have been increasing fatigue with the 
continuing British military presence in Friedland and its environs. Although there were surely 
problems with discipline before Middlemas’s arrival, he had to address the misbehavior of 
British soldiers several times in his routine orders. During January 1950, Middlemas discovered 
that drunken British soldiers had smashed shop windows and uprooted fences in Göttingen 
during the Christmas holidays. He warned, “If any further cases of willful damage occur in 
Gottingen, [sic] the Beer Bar at the Varsity Club will be closed.”324 A month later, Middlemas 
noted that German police in Göttingen had been working hard to prevent the spread of venereal 
diseases. At a garrison dance, however, British soldiers had obstructed the police who were 
“attempting to question suspected and known prostitutes.” Middlemas warned of severe 
disciplinary action if soldiers again interfered with German police. In the same routine orders, 
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Middlemas explained that many officers and enlisted soldiers in the British zone were “believed 
to be illegal possession of firearms” that they left unguarded, with the result that “shootings have 
occurred, causing injuries and, in some cases, death.”325 
In the winter of 1951, the need for a British unit at Friedland came under serious question 
from German administrators. In a memorandum to his superiors at the Lower Saxon Ministry for 
Refugees, Krause addressed British responsibilities and the possible reduction of German 
support personnel for the 2nd PWDC. According to Krause, the practical aspects of the 
acceptance, processing, and distribution of POWs had always been the responsibility of German 
staffers. In the past, the British military units had been responsible for coordination with Soviet 
border authorities, but they were no longer needed for that task. Moreover, the enactment of the 
Returnee Law meant that POWs could attain returnee status without the D-2 Discharge 
Certificate issued by the British. Those factors combined with the dramatic reduction of POW 
transports meant that that the “presence of the 2nd PWDC no longer seems necessary.” In 
Krause’s eyes, the camp could undertake a substantial reduction in the number of support staffers 
(office workers, mess cooks, chauffeurs, and the like) for the British, who were increasingly 
using them for personal errands.326 
The arrest of Middlemas by British authorities and his replacement by Major Barrett 
during the summer of 1951 exacerbated the simmering tensions. As far as the German camp 
administration could determine, Middlemas was arrested in August for the unauthorized sale of 
Nissen huts and scrap from unusable huts as well as for using his position on the British housing 
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commission in Göttingen for personal profit.327 British authorities questioned Krause and 
Thederan at the camp and subsequently in Hannover. Both men insisted that they had informed 
the British of Middlemas’s actions to the extent that they had been aware of them. Major Barrett, 
however, treated Krause and Thederan with skepticism. He made “the most serious allegations” 
(schwerste Vorwürfe) against the German camp leadership and threatened to have them 
dismissed if it were discovered that they had not adequately warned a higher British office, the 
Kreis Resident Officer, or the Public Safety Officer.328 
Once taking charge of the 2nd PWDC, Barrett renewed the conflict over the extent to 
which German administrators could operate independently of British authority. He informed the 
German leadership that no changes could be made to the buildings in Friedland without his 
consent because the British military had requisitioned the camp property.329 In a subsequent 
meeting, Thederan argued to Barrett that with respect to the dispute over the demolition of 
Nissen huts in the spring, the British themselves knew that the huts were good for only five years 
and had needed to be demolished. Barrett nevertheless thought that the Germans had undertaken 
the demolition prematurely.330 Barrett also criticized the German staff for their handling of 
released POWs. According to the German leadership, Barrett claimed that the camp used 
“Gestapo and Nazi methods” in processing the POWs. Camp records do not specify the 
allegations beyond that, but they were likely in reference to the questioning of POWs about the 
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circumstances of their imprisonment, which was necessary for determining their eligibility for 
official returnee status. He warned that the director of the camp’s police (Ordnungsdienst) 
needed to fundamentally change their approach to the POWs. Barrett further reasserted the 
British military’s continuing, sole authority over the issuing of D-2 Discharge Certificates.331  
German administrators’ sour relationship with the British military had begun before 
Barrett’s arrival, of course, and his short tenure during the unit’s final months in the camp did 
not help the situation. For example, when the camp received firefighting equipment in September 
1951, Barrett wanted the camp personnel to practice using it weekly. At some point, Thederan 
tried to explain to Barrett that the water supply (Wasserverhältnisse) in the camp was insufficient 
for firefighting and that the camp would have to resort to water from the Leine River in the event 
of a significant fire. Barrett dismissed the objections and accused the German leadership of using 
this issue to “set up opposition.”332 On the whole, German administrators chafed at British 
oversight they found unnecessary, while Barrett was likewise inclined to see an effort to 
undermine the British position even when German administrators were not attempting that. The 
situation was finally resolved with the transfer of the remaining 2nd PWDC personnel and the 
British completely handing over the camp to the Germans on March 31, 1952.333 Even after the 
British ceded all authority over the camp, though, an interrogation team from the Field Security 
Service remained at Friedland until 1955 to question persons arriving at the camp.334 
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333 “Da legten die Engländer die Gewehre beiseite,” Norddeutsche Zeitung, 31 March 1952.  
334 Dagmar Kleineke, “Enstehung und Entwicklung des Lagers Friedland” (PhD diss., University of Göttingen, 
1994), 103. 
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In addition to the roles of individual commanding officers, three general factors were at 
play in the sometimes-strained relationship between British authorities and German 
administrators. First, the nature of the British presence in Germany changed over the course of 
the British co-administration at Friedland. Initially the military government needed to be 
involved, given the size of the undertaking, the cross-border nature of the population movements, 
and the piecemeal character of German civil administration at the time. Over time, however, the 
governing organs regrew and Germans reasserted their agency, raising the question of the 
necessity for British oversight. 
Second, the British soldiers’ own perception of their role seems to have shifted and 
worsened their relationship with their German counterparts. Whereas the British saw the task of 
overseeing the camp as important in the early going, surely soldiers themselves wondered if 
there were not more pressing tasks than overseeing the release of physically ruined POWs from 
the East a half-decade after the war. Friedland may have been close to the border, but it was not 
really a front for soldiers in the emerging Cold War.335 
Third, there were also strains of a colonial mindset in British attitudes toward the camp. 
The British presence at Friedland was a vestige of a hard-won British victory that produced 
hardened governing structures that persisted even after the nominally independent Federal 
Republic came into being.336 The British were somewhat absentee authorities in the camp, rarely 
appearing in matters of day-to-day administration. Yet, when troubles emerged, the British were 
quick to reassert their ownership and supervision of the facility. They were content to devolve 
managerial authority to the Germans, but they reacted unfavorably whenever they felt their 
                                                 
335 In fact, Barrett was transferred to Korea in mid-March 1952. “Da legten die Engländer…” Norddeutsche Zeitung. 
336 Occupation statutes meant continued Allied authority through the High Commission, which affected the 
Friedland camp in the acceptance of resettlers from Poland; see chapter 4. 
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interests were challenged. Thus, although the reason for British authority over the camp was 
becoming less clear over time, they also saw little reason to give it away. 
Reformation of the German Administration 
When Richard Krause took over as the camp director in the spring of 1946, it marked a 
significant transition in the German administration of the camp. Krause was an able, energetic 
administrator, and he worked hard to reform the camp’s staff to make it more efficient and 
humane in its treatment of camp residents. Krause became camp director as a result of corruption 
allegations against the preceding camp director (see chapter 2), and his first priority was to 
improve operations and public confidence in the camp. In Camp Order Number 1, Krause 
explicitly called upon the staff to do everything possible to “restore the good reputation of the 
camp.” He further ordered that they must always remember, “the refugees are not there for us, 
but rather we are there for them.”337 Krause’s reform efforts also entailed changes in the camp’s 
personnel and administration, which stabilized through the year following his assumption of 
duties as camp director. 
Although Krause was not a trained civil servant prior to joining the Friedland camp’s 
administration, he had previously served in the Wehrmacht as a commissioned officer with 
training in military administration. Born in 1911, Krause was raised and educated in Bad 
Saarow, Brandenburg. Lacking other professional options, Krause entered the Reichswehr in 
1930. Between 1937 and 1938, Krause studied at the Army Technical School for Administration 
(Heeresfachschule für Verwaltung), though the outbreak of war prevented him from completing 
the examination in military administration. Over the course of the war, Krause received two Iron 
Crosses (first and second class), an Infantry Assault Badge, and a Wound Badge. He also earned 
                                                 
337 Lagerordnung Nr. 1, 18 April 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 84, NHStA. 
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several promotions, finishing the war as a cavalry captain (Rittmeister). Initially after the war, 
Krause worked in agriculture near Göttingen. In November 1945, he wrote to the county 
administrator for Göttingen to ask about employment. He had heard that the camp had a labor 
shortfall and he said that he would be glad for work at Friedland in any capacity. The camp hired 
Krause shortly thereafter, but it is not clear what positions he held before becoming camp 
director.338 
The exact reasons for the selection of Krause as Heydenreich’s successor are also 
unclear. Given Krause’s background in military administration and his competences with 
different types of transportation, he must have seemed an ideal candidate.339 As a military 
administrator, Krause would have been experienced with the logistics of transporting and 
organizing large numbers of people. Krause may have also benefitted from a sort of military 
fraternity with the early British commandants. Major Oldham, of course, had explicitly stated his 
respect for former Wehrmacht soldiers in his farewell address to the camp in January 1946, and 
Major Howie referred to Krause as a friend.340 Because Krause had not belonged to any political 
parties, he could also offer a politically safe administration for the camp when acceptable civil 
administrators may have been in short supply.341 
                                                 
338 See Richard Krause to Landrat Göttingen and the attached Lebenslauf, 18 November 1945, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 
Nr. 532, NHStA. See also a transcription of Krause’s army paybook made in 1950, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 532. 
339 Krause’s army paybook indicates that he was riding and driving instructor. Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 532, 
NHStA. 
340 On Oldham, see chapter 2. 
341 After all, as Michael Hayse argues, “Rapid advancement in all ranks of the civil service in the Third Reich 
presupposed Nazi party affiliation. Moreover, the Civil Service Law of 1937 codified Nazi party oversight (although 
not outright control) over personnel policy.” See Michael Hayse, Recasting West German Elites: Higher Civil 
Servants, Business Leaders and Physicians in Hesse between Nazism and Democracy, 1945-1955 (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2003), 44. 
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As camp director, Krause had a wide range of responsibilities. Foremost, he was the 
supervisor for all camp personnel. He was also responsible for decision-making in fundamental 
issues of the camp’s operation, communication with British offices and with superior and equal 
German offices, direct supervision of the camp’s interpreter, and signing on behalf of the camp. 
Initially, the camp administration had deputy camp directors for internal and external affairs.342 
Krause’s first deputy director for external affairs was likewise a former Wehrmacht officer. This 
young administrator had graduated from a Gymnasium in Mecklenburg mere months before the 
outbreak of the war and then entered the Wehrmacht. He attended and graduated from the 
military academy at Potsdam, ultimately earning promotion to the rank of first lieutenant as well 
as two Iron Crosses (first and second class) among other commendations and being wounded 
four times.343 
The upper level of the camp’s administration stabilized late in 1946 when Hans Thederan 
became the sole deputy camp director, a position he held until 1953. Thederan was born in 
Hamburg in 1913, where he lived and worked as a salesman in the foreign sales unit of a 
company until the outbreak of the war. From 1937 to 1938, Thederan also served as a sergeant 
(Hauptfeldwebel) in the Luftwaffe. His de-Nazification files show that Thederan served in the 
Wehrmacht from August 1939 to June 1945, though there is no indication of his rank or field of 
service. During the war, Thederan’s family was bombed out of its Hamburg home, and it had 
taken up residence in a community outside of Göttingen by the end of 1945. Thederan found 
work in the camp during November 1945 as the English-language interpreter for the German 
                                                 
342 Dienstordnung des Flüchtlingslagers Friedland/Leine, 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 7, NHStA. 
343 De-Nazification files, Nds. 171 Hildesheim 60034, NHStA. 
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administration (he had “perfect command of English speech and writing”).344 Presumably his 
language and organizational skills from his earlier career made Thederan a valuable 
administrator, particularly in dealing with the British. He was promoted to deputy camp director 
sometime in the latter half of 1946.345 
The official regulations for the camp that came into effect on June 1, 1946, established a 
clear hierarchy of administrative responsibilities. Beneath the top two tiers of camp 
administration there was a wide array of departments. The housing portion of the camp was 
divided into three sub-camps, each of which had a director and deputy director. Various other 
departments reporting directly to the camp directors included: the main office, statistical office, 
registration, card index, personnel, accounting, doctors, nursing, clothing distribution, provisions 
distribution and various messes, maintenance, an auto pool, and police. Official regulations for 
employees noted that the constant stream of arrivals meant that the camp needed to be open 
throughout the day with reductions in staffing for the night hours. Indeed, the regulations set the 
minimum hourly work for employees at 48 hours per week.346 In return for their hard work, the 
military government in Göttingen had agreed to classify camp employees as heavy workers for 
ration allocation. Nevertheless, the commanding officer in Göttingen and former camp 
commandant, Major Oldham, asked the city and county directors to use their discretion, because 
                                                 
344 From list of Lagerangestellten, 28 July 1950, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 403, NHStA. 
345 Although Thederan was not a member of the Nazi Party, he had belonged to National Socialist Flyer’s Corps as 
well as the Association for Germanness Abroad (Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland) and the Reich Colonial 
League without leadership positions in any of them. In August 1946, the de-Nazification committee classified him 
as a nominal supporter, but they had no objections to his employment. See de-Nazification files Nds. 171 
Hildesheim 28474, NHStA. See also Friedland Betriebsrat to Niedersäsischen Minister für Flüchtlinge, 23 April 
1952, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 401, NHStA. 
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“it is all right [sic] as far as heavy manual workers are concerned, but I do not want office 
employees in general to draw the same rations.”347 
One of the first problems that Krause needed to confront was staffers’ abuse of their 
positions for personal gain. Here, it is worth bearing in mind that black-marketeering in a ration 
economy could have easily been a means to get by as opposed to profiteering. Nevertheless, 
trade between camp employees and incoming refugees and POWs was a serious problem. The 
general camp directives (Lageranordnungen) from May 1946 to the end of the year are replete 
with notices of employees’ dismissal for such activities and other breaches of camp regulations. 
Typically listed under the “Personnel Matters” (Personalangelegenheiten), these dismissals often 
gave the individual’s name and general type the offense for which the employee was fired. For 
instance, in November 1946: “[Herr N] has been summarily dismissed and arrested by the police 
for theft of baggage, falsification of residence permits, and unpermitted copying of registration 
certificates.”348 
Aside from possibly creating the impression of profiting from others’ misfortune, illicit 
trade between residents and personnel could indeed lead to corruption. In April 1946, the camp 
police investigated allegations that camp employees had taken payment for changing the 
assigned city on registration cards. Evidently three refugees had received assignments to towns 
against their wishes. One man from Upper Silesia had received a housing assignment to 
Northeim, but he wanted one for the Sauerland region of North Rhine-Westphalia where he 
knew someone willing to house him. A refugee from Berlin wanted a new assignment to 
                                                 
347 Minutes of Conference between OC Det, the Oberstadtdirektor and Oberkreisdirektor, 15 March 1946, 
Stadtverwaltung und Militärregierung Nr. B28, SAG. 
348 Dismissal in Lageranordung Nr. 24, 5 November 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 84, NHStA.. For other 
examples, see among others Lageranordnungen Nr. 8, 13, 16, 22, 24, and 26, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 84, NHStA. 
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Struthütten, North Rhine-Westphalia. The third refugee, a woman from Saxony, wanted to have 
her assignment changed to an unnamed location to be with her husband. According to the first 
refugee, they had become aware that a camp employee was willing to change the assignment in 
exchange for schnapps or cigarettes. Lacking either form of payment, the woman had needed to 
buy cigarettes from yet another camp employee to then trade for the new registration card. All 
told, the employee who was selling the new permits using registration cards stolen from a table 
in a nearby barracks received two cigars, ten cigarettes, and a beer bottle filled with schnapps (or 
half-full, depending on the testimony). Evidently, enough of the transaction had occurred in front 
of other refugees who informed the camp police, and the police took the refugees and several 
camp employees into custody before the new cards could be filled out.349 
Efforts to make the camp staff more professional also meant allowing employees to 
organize themselves in the form of a workers’ council (Betriebsrat). According to a statement 
from Krause, he had established a consultative council (Vertrauensrat) as one of his first acts as 
camp director to help him look after the “orderliness, cleanliness, and social supervision of the 
employees.”350 One of the council’s foremost tasks was helping Krause and the rest of the camp 
administration prevent employees from engaging in black-market trade and exploitation. In light 
of the council’s early success, Krause encouraged members of the consultative council to 
approach the Göttingen General Trade Union (Allgemeiner Gewerkschaft) in order to formally 
establish a workers’ council, which was agreed to in August and elected in September 1946.351 It 
seems that from the beginning Krause understood the workers’ council as an administrative 
                                                 
349 See interrogation records from 29 April 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 105, NHStA. 
350 Krause, Stellungnahme der Betriebsleitung zur Gewerkschaft, 22 March 1947, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 64, 
NHStA. 
351 Ibid. See also Vorbereitungen zur Wahl eines Betriebsrates für das Flüchtlingslager Friedland/Leine, 30 August 
1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 64, NHStA. 
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organ meant to support both workers and effective operation of the camp. Although the camp 
administration retained the authority for personnel matters, it was supposed to consult with the 
council on “fundamental decisions, employment, and dismissals.”352 For its part, the council 
understood itself as not standing “in extreme opposition to the conduct of business, rather 
working together with [the camp administration] to achieve the best for the overall well-being of 
all wage-earning and salaried employees.”353 
Despite those early assurances of cooperation, a conflict soon developed between Krause 
and the shop steward (Betriebsobmann). The problem seems to have originated in January 1947 
when Krause dismissed the registration director for black-marketeering.354 Krause had felt that 
“a summary dismissal could not be avoided,” but the workers’ council had refused it. So, Krause 
in consultation with the “supervising authority” fired the employee anyway.355 Evidently the 
shop steward responded badly, including organizing what one union member described as a 
“hate-demonstration” (Haßkundgebung) against Krause that “aired the camp’s dirty laundry.”356 
When the conflict came to Major Howie, he claimed overall responsibility for the camp. Howie 
further argued that he had expressly given Krause authority in personnel matters and he was 
happy with Krause’s conduct. In light of the council’s intransigence and his approval of Krause’s 
                                                 
352 Betriebsordnung des Flüchtlingslagers Friedland, April 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 13, NHStA. 
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Acc. 16/83 Nr. 64, NHStA. 
   
144 
work, Howie stated, “as far as I am concerned the works council [sic] is dissolved.”357 
Apparently Krause was able to convince Howie of the necessity for a workers’ council, but 
Thederan and two other employees called for a confidence vote on the council leadership in late 
April. The vast majority of eligible employees voted to remove the steward and his deputy, 
ending the only significant conflict between the workers’ council and Krause’s administration.358 
Krause’s attempts to clean up the camp, as it were, also played out much more literally. 
The camp administration struggled to keep the camp from devolving into a lagoon of mud due to 
poor drainage, the region’s notoriously wet weather, and heavy traffic. Wet conditions were also 
problematic for the camp’s latrines, which were a real source of concern in the spring of 1946. 
Indeed, the camp had run out of chlorinated lime for the latrines and had needed to resort to less 
effective lime wash and turf in April 1946.359 Latrines were thus a priority for renovations over 
that summer.360 In 1947, Krause also enlisted his staffers in a long-running battle against the 
“plague of rats” (Rattenplage). The camp administration promised a reward to individual 
employees for every rat they caught.361 Employees’ enthusiasm for catching rats, however, fell 
off in 1948. In camp directives from March of that year, the administration complained about the 
lack of effort and asked employees to regain their interest in the fight.362 Despite the efforts to 
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eradicate the rats or, failing that, efforts to make the staffers try to do something about the rats, 
the problem continued as late as 1951. A set of camp directives from that spring included special 
commendation for a camp employee who had “applied himself to the rat control 
[Rattenbekämpfung] in an outstanding manner and has so far caught well over 200 rats.”363 
Krause also worked diligently to improve its reputation in the press. As Sascha Schießl 
has argued with respect to the creation of a Friedland mythos, the camp administration did not 
possess a dedicated press office, and it “largely operated independently of higher authorities” to 
burnish the camp’s public image. The administrators also threatened publishers and radio 
programs that they felt “misrepresented operations at the camp.”364 For example, in December 
1947, Krause wrote to a Hannover newspaper to dispute an article reporting that returning POWs 
did not receive adequate medical attention at the camp. Krause noted that the camp employed 8 
doctors, one of whom was a tuberculosis specialist, as well 26 nurses. The letter ended with the 
statement “for the clarification of the above article, the camp administration would be pleased to 
welcome [your reporter to the camp] soon.”365 The camp administration in at least one instance 
went so far as to threaten legal action against a newspaper. In 1949, the Norddeutsche Zeitung 
published an article on a transport of children from the Soviet zone to relatives in West 
Germany. In the correction letter, Krause noted that the camp had already felt compelled to 
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2014), 217. 
365 Lagerleitung Friedland to Hannoversche Neuste Nachrichten, 15 December 1947, Nds 386 Acc 16/83 Nr 85, 
NHStA.  
   
146 
correct the newspaper once in 1948. He closed by threatening, “Henceforth in repeated cases, we 
will use the legal means available to us.”366 
Two factors help to explain why the leadership at Friedland so jealously guarded the 
camp’s reputation. First, the administrators undoubtedly understood that repeated bad press 
would undermine state and public support for the facility. Second, the camp administrators also 
felt that it was important to maintain the reputation of refugee camps in general for the sake of 
the refugees and other populations. In one remarkable instance, Krause wrote a complaint about 
a report in Augsburg, Bavaria that had not mentioned Friedland at all. Apparently Krause took 
seriously the article’s account of a court giving a convict the choice between serving his sentence 
in a prison or a refugee camp. He argued that the report’s contents were “in the eyes of the 
Friedland camp administration, a defamation of refugee camp camps that could not have 
occurred in a more blatant manner [krasseren Form].” Krause further explained that refugee 
camps served not only refugees but also communities that could not accept them, so he felt 
compelled to defend refugee camps from equation to prisons. In addition to judgment’s effect on 
refugees’ morale, Krause asked if the court realized that “a prison and refugee camp were worlds 
apart.” He concluded, “If an official office comes to such a judgment, it can be no surprise that 
refugees and expellees are often treated as second-class human beings [Menschen 2. Klasse] by 
their hosts.”367 
Although Krause worked hard to instill politeness and respect for refugees among camp 
employees, the scale of operations still necessitated strict regulation. Indeed, the military bearing 
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that lent itself to camp administration also led to complaints about Krause. The county director 
for Eckernförde, Schleswig-Holstein wrote to the county government for Göttingen to warn them 
about what he saw as Krause’s poor treatment of incoming refugees in 1948. On a trip to pick-up 
someone from the camp, the official accompanied Krause to the border for the reception of a 
transport. The official was horrified to see how Krause directed people at the border. While he 
allowed that it might be necessary to clear the streets, he had “absolutely no understanding for 
the corresponding directions being given in a Prussian military tone [preußischen Kommißton].” 
The official further recounted that Krause had exactly the same bearing and tone in his dealings 
with the arriving transport. Supposedly a police officer also told him that locals were fed up with 
Krause. In any event, the official said that he could not bear to think of refugees who had already 
experienced the “heaviest physical and psychological suffering,” facing such a welcome to the 
British zone. Despite the official’s stated confidence that the investigations would lead to the 
same conclusion and a “remedy” of the situation, there is no record of Krause’s superiors 
rebuking him, much less punishing him.368 
Even though the overseeing authorities had favorable impressions of Krause and his staff, 
the camp briefly faced closure due to waning numbers of POW returns in 1950. In an April 1950 
memorandum, an official with the Lower Saxon Ministry for Refugees explained that it would be 
reasonable to expect the closure of the camp by the end of the fiscal year, because there were 
only 30,000 POWs and another 25,000 resettlers left to pass through the camp.369 Officials from 
the federal and Lower Saxon ministries expected that a small staff might remain until March 
1951 to shut down the camp, but they worried about finding work for the camp’s current 
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employees. Thus, the official suggested that the remaining transit camps first look to the 
“qualified personnel” from Friedland.370 It seems that the impetus to close the camp had come 
from the Federal Ministry for Expellees, but at some point during the summer the federal 
ministry had decided to instead keep the camp at Friedland open and add to its responsibilities.371 
Most likely, making the camp at Friedland an official border transit camp for the Federal 
Republic was related to the decision to continue operations there, though the decision-making 
process at the federal level remains unclear.372 The recommitment also entailed renovations to 
prepare the camp for winter and the construction of a new permanent barracks for storing 
baggage brought by resettlers at a total cost of 40,000 DM to the state of Lower Saxony.373 
Camp Staff, Gendered Division of Labor, and Charities 
Staff lists made during the summer of 1950 in preparation for the camp’s expected 
closure provide remarkable insight into the camp’s personnel.374 First, analysis of the records 
indicates that the personnel upheaval had mostly ended by the close of 1946. Second, the 
overwhelming majority of the staff on the lists consisted of former expellees and refugees. Third, 
the camp had a clear gendered division of labor in which women worked as nurses and office 
staff, while men were responsible for skilled and unskilled labor as well as administrative 
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positions. Although women were mostly excluded from leadership positions in the camp’s 
German administration, some women nevertheless found their way into leadership positions 
mostly through charity work at Friedland. 
Refugee management was not yet a specialized profession, but by 1950 most of the 
camp’s staff had several years of experience of working with refugees. Of the camp’s 67 wage-
earning employees (Lohnempfänger), a clear majority began work at Friedland in 1946: 15 
percent began in 1945; 57 percent in 1946; 13 percent in 1947; 9 percent in 1948; and 2 percent 
each in 1949 and 1950. Although a bare majority of the camp’s salaried employees (Angestellte) 
likewise began work at Friedland in 1946, the overall proportion was more tilted toward early 
employees: 35 percent began in 1945; 51 percent in 1946; 7 percent in 1947; 5 percent in 1948; 
and 1 percent each in 1949 and 1950. Several factors might explain the substantially higher 
percentage of salaried employees from 1945 in comparison to wage-earners from that year. As 
the inflow of POWs and other groups tailed off and the number of construction projects likewise 
decreased later into the 1940s, wage-earners responsible for manual labor would have been more 
likely to be dismissed. Moreover, as the West German economy began to recover after the 
currency reform, wage-earners may have chosen to find work in their trades elsewhere. 
Two characteristics stand out from the camp’s earliest employees. First, many of them 
were young when they took their jobs. Second, they had previous training in their fields of work. 
The absence of people working outside their vocations may have resulted from non-specialists 
being trimmed from the camp payroll during staff reductions between 1945 and 1950. Among 
the camp’s longest-serving employees in 1950 were two doctors. One 35-year-old clinician lived 
in Göttingen and had completed his doctoral work and states exams before serving in the 
Wehrmacht. He held no official employment until September 27, 1945, when he took a position 
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with the camp’s first aid station. Another young doctor (also 30 years old in 1945) who entered 
camp employment in December 1945 had studied medicine in Göttingen as part of his military 
service. He served as a Wehrmacht medical officer from 1942 to 1945. The next-longest serving 
employee seems to have been a 60-year-old man who had worked in the administrations of 
various cable factories from 1920 to 1945. He joined the camp’s registration staff in mid-
November 1945. One of the early female employees worked in the bookkeeping and 
correspondence offices. Only 18-years-old when she found her job at the camp in December 
1945, the young woman had gone to a trade school for administration and previously worked for 
the public health insurance company in Göttingen. 
The personnel records further reveal that refugees and expellees comprised an 
overwhelming majority of the camp’s staff. Of the wage-earners, 76 percent were classified as 
refugees, and 79 percent of the salaried employees possessed refugee status. It is not clear how 
many staffers might have been processed as refugees or expellees at Friedland before finding 
employment at the camp. Still, one of the camp’s doctors had gone through the camp as a 
returnee from imprisonment in the Soviet Union in 1947 and later found employment in the 
camp in 1948.375 
Lower Saxony, of course, had taken in more expellees and refugees as a percentage of its 
overall population than any state other than Schleswig-Holstein.376 Nevertheless, the percentage 
of refugees among camp workers would have been a little more than double the percentage of 
                                                 
375 Richard Krause to Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Flüchtlinge, 27 March 1952, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 34, 
NHStA. 
376 In 1950, expellees accounted for 26.8 percent of the Lower Saxon population, and Soviet zone refugees 
accounted for a further 3.9 percent (30.7 percent total). Expellees and refugees respectively accounted for 34.9 
percent and 3.9 percent of the population in Schleswig-Holstein. Bavaria had the third highest proportion with 21 
percent and 2.7 percent, respectively. P. J. Bouman, G. Beijer and J. J. Oudegeest, The Refugee Problem in West 
Germany, trans. H. A. Marx (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), 15. 
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refugees in the Göttingen region.377 The disproportionately high percentage of expellees and 
refugees working in the Friedland camp staff probably resulted from their interest in helping 
fellow victims of displacement and their lack of rooted employment in the local economy. 
Indeed, expellees in West Germany faced an unemployment rate of 31.8 percent while only 
comprising 18 percent of the overall population in 1950.378 Thus, the employment opportunity 
presented by the camp must have been particularly welcome to refugees and expellees near 
Göttingen. 
The piecemeal information about places of birth and residence in the personnel list makes 
it difficult to come to general conclusions about characteristics of the staff or what role their 
backgrounds and refugee status played in their employment. One of the registration employees, 
for example, had worked for the county savings bank in Słupsk/Stolp, Poland before entering 
military service in 1940. It is not clear, however, how he came to reside in a small town outside 
of Göttingen and find employment in the camp in February 1946. By contrast, one of the German 
Red Cross nurses had lived most of her life in Katlenburg just north of Göttingen. She left her 
position as a lab worker for a Göttingen chemical company to become a lab worker at Friedland. 
In many cases, however, the lists do not indicate previous places of residence or employment for 
employees regardless of refugee status. One such example is the typist for the camp 
administration, who was listed as a refugee but for whom details about education and 
                                                 
377 According to the Statitisches Bundesamt, 30 to 35 percent of the population of Göttingen and its environs in 1956 
was expellees or other non-natives. See map “Vertriebene und Zugewanderte in vH der Gesamtbevölkerung,” Nds. 
380 Acc. 62/65 Nr. 422, NHStA. 
378 The states Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, and Bavaria were hardest hit with expellee unemployment, 
particularly in rural regions. Werner Middlemann, “Das wirtschaftliche und soziale Problem der Vetriebenen,” 
(paper presented at Konferenz der Liga der Rot-Kreuz-Verbände, Hannover, Germany, 9-14 April 1951), Nds. 386 
Acc. 16/83 Nr. 95, NHStA.  
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employment are limited to vocational training in a pastry shop followed by administrative work 
for the Wehrmacht. 
The case of one departmental director at Friedland illustrates how refugee status did not 
preclude the individual from having local roots. Although the personnel list labeled this 
particular administrator as a refugee, the de-Nazification files for him indicated that he had been 
born and educated in Göttingen, where he graduated from a business school in 1918. According 
to a de-Nazification subcommittee, in March 1919 he joined the Hessian Freikorps and fought in 
Munich and in the Silesian Uprisings. Regarding the following decade, the files only record that 
he had worked in sales before 1933 and that he had been unemployed from 1930-1934. He had 
most likely been living in Göttingen or somewhere else in the Hannoverian province during that 
period of unemployment, because in 1932 and 1933 he voted for the Deutsch-Hannoversche 
Partei, a right-wing, regionalist party. In 1934, he found employment as a warehouse manager 
for a cigarette company in Dresden where he worked until 1942. He then worked as an 
intermediary (Vermittler) for the Hannover Employment Authority and in that capacity he was 
sent to work for the Nazi occupation regime in Ukraine in 1943 and in the Reichskommissariat 
Ostland in 1944. He ended the war as a combat engineer stationed in Halberstadt, Saxony-Anhalt 
where he was captured. The likely destruction of the employee’s home in the bombing of either 
Dresden or Hannover was probably the reason for his refugee status. It is unclear when exactly 
he returned to Göttingen, but his de-Nazification questionnaire from several days after finding 
employment at Friedland in 1946 listed Göttingen as his current and permanent residence. 
Indeed, it is unsurprising that he returned to the city of his birth and youth, where most likely he 
still had family.379   
                                                 
379 See de-Nazification file Nds. 171 Hildesheim Nr. 19790, NHStA. The employee in question had initially been 
put in Category II. Because the main committee had no evidence other than the employee’s own testimony about his 
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Employing former refugees and expellees at Friedland also presented advantages to the 
Lower Saxon government. One way to way to resolve the question of welfare was to put 
refugees and expellees to work, so that they shifted from welfare rolls to payrolls. Having 
experienced displacement and hardships themselves, the former POWs, refugees, and expellees 
would have better understood the difficulties that the camp populations had faced. Camp staffers 
who came from the same regions as the refugees and expellees would have also been able to 
overcome difficulties with language. At the time, only educated persons spoke High German. 
Familiarity with regional dialects would have therefore been necessary.380 Employees from those 
regions could also better determine the veracity of statements made by individuals in the camp. 
Some individuals passing through Friedland had incentives misrepresent their identities, 
making staffers’ ability to verify statements all the more important. For expellees and refugees 
forced to leave with few possessions and no documentation, registering at the camp and 
reentering government rolls could offer a sort of rebirth to escape a Nazi past. Historian Joseph 
Schechtman argued that the difficulty of verifying expellee claims about their former lives 
created bitterness in “Nazi or near-Nazi circles” toward expellees who were safe because they 
arrived “without their past, for it was difficult to muster the evidence necessary to indict 
them.”381 In cases of black-marketeering, individuals made false statements to provide legal 
cover for crossing the border. Still others sought a more favorable classification, particularly as 
                                                                                                                                                             
role in the procurement of “Ostarbeiter” in Ukraine and the RKO, he was re-classified into Category IV in 1946. It 
appears that he successfully appealed for re-classification into Category V in 1949. 
380 Andreas Kossert has argued that the distinctive regional dialects and accents contributed to the alienation and 
exclusion of expellees from local communities. According to him, expellee parents also found it painful that their 
children learned local speech or High German, thereby losing the linguistic connection to their former Heimat. 
Andreas Kossert, Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945 (Munich: Siedler, 2008), 
122-127. 
381 Schechtman, Postwar Population Transfers, 322. 
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returnees. In the event of lost papers, camp directives required individuals to make a sworn 
statement to the camp police had some limited investigative powers.382 
In the early years when camp traffic was at its highest, investigations must have been 
cursory indeed. A case list for February to November 1946 sent from the camp police to a special 
police commission included only three cases of arrests for false identifications and using falsified 
documents.383 Four years later, some combination of improved investigation methods, lower 
traffic, and/or a change in types of traffic meant that the camp police found or suspected false 
identities far more often. From a list of cases sent to Friedland town police station in 1950, next 
to the names 41 of 48 detained individuals there were notations such as: “false sworn 
declaration,” “false documents,” “conman” (Schwindler), “fraudster” (Betrüger), “for 
verification,” and “false returnee.”384 
Responsibilities for male and female employees were split along the lines typical for the 
early 1950s. Of the 81 salaried employees, only 25 were women. Women’s representation in the 
workforce was bolstered by the need for nurses to care for injured, ill, or infirm persons arriving 
at the camp. Eighteen of the 25 women were nurses, plus another woman worked as a doctor in 
the camp. The remaining six women all worked in administrative jobs (typists, switchboard 
operators, and so forth). Among the camp’s 67 wage-earners, the only woman was a seamstress. 
That disparity is unsurprising when one considers that manual laborers accounted for most of the 
wage-earners along with tradesmen such as carpenters, mechanics, drivers, and the like. 
                                                 
382 See Lageranordnung Nr. 23, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 84, NHStA. 
383 Nachweisung über die im Durchgangslager Friedland geführten Ermittlungen in der Zeit vom 9.2. bis 5.11.1946, 
Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 97, NHStA. 
384 Zur Pol. St. Friedland 1950, n.d., Nds. 386 Acc 16/83 Nr. 30, NHStA. Most of the other cases were for wanted 
individuals whose names were in the wanted list (Fahndungsbuch). 
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The lists’ lack of women working as cooks and housekeepers raises the question of 
whether such women were excluded from the lists or if male employees were responsible for 
those tasks. The camp possessed a number of different messes, including those for residents, 
employees, and different organizations in the camp. For example, the German Red Cross had its 
own separate employee mess.385 It may be that women working in some of those messes were 
not state employees, meaning that they were excluded from the state employment lists. Lists of 
eligible voters in elections for the employee council nevertheless indicate that the camp 
administration employed men in camp messes. The voter list from 1947 idicates that only men 
worked in the messes responsible for employees, residents, and travel provisions.386 The 
workers’ council did not formally divide housework into a separate division with a distinct 
voting bloc, meaning that such staff must have been attached to other divisions. Two of the sub-
camps, however, had no women at all. So, male housemasters must have been doing the cleaning 
along with other maintenance. 
The predominance of men in the staff likely resulted from the government prioritizing the 
employment of male breadwinners. Married men comprised clear majorities of the wage-earning 
and salaried employees. Single men were slightly better represented among the wage-earning 
employees (14 of 66 men) than the salaried employees (9 of 52 men). Of the remaining salaried 
                                                 
385 The British military unit also had its own kitchen, though it appears that the Lower Saxon government was 
responsible for staffing the kitchen as well as for providing office workers. Indeed, state outlays for this support staff 
became a point of contention between the German and British administrators at Friedland. See memorandum on 
“Notwendigkeit der 2.PWDC im Lager Friedland,” 28 February 1951, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 34, NHStA. 
386 Wählerliste, January 1947, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 13. It is also worth remembering that men held by the British 
as POWs had provided much of the kitchen labor during the camp’s first few months of operation; see Chapter 2. 
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men, 15 were married without children, 25 were married with children, and 3 were divorced with 
children.387 
Prioritizing the employment of male breadwinners came at the expense of married 
women who would have been double-earners. The overwhelming majority of the camp’s female 
employees consisted of single women, and the few married women working at Friedland had 
special circumstances that may explain their employment. In the case of the camp’s wage-
earning employees, the sole woman was married, but she possessed refugee status and may have 
been married or related to a fellow wage-earner.388 Of the 25 women on the salaried-employee 
rolls, only two were married. One of the married women was a medical doctor who was a 
refugee from Hamburg.389 The other married woman was a nurse with refugee status and who 
also had a child. Among the single women, two of them had children, but it is unclear if they 
were widows or had borne the children out of wedlock.390 The types of work open to the single 
women (i.e. nurses, typists, operators, and such) were so female coded that the camp 
administration and state must not have considered men for those jobs. 
The lists of state employees may have underreported the number of women in the camp’s 
workforce because they excluded workers from charitable organizations. Some nurses from the 
German Red Cross, of course, were on state payrolls, but it is possible that the organization also 
                                                 
387 Unfortunately, the list of wage-earners does not indicate if the individuals had children. Two salaried employees 
listed without details of family status were excluded from these counts. 
388 The female employee did not have a common family name, but there was a slightly older, married male wage-
earner with the same last name. 
389 Again, judging by a relatively uncommon family name, the doctor in question may have been married or related 
to a doctor who had directed the camp’s medical services from 1946 to 1947 and who held a professorship at the 
Göttingen University’s chirurgical clinic.  
390 The employee lists distinguished between single, married, and divorced, but they did not include information on 
whether single women or men were widows/widowers.  
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employed women in other capacities. Certainly other charities paid for their own workers in the 
camp. The Protestant charity Evangelisches Hilfswerk, for example, was the employer for 
staffers of the sub-camp for vagrant male youths that operated from 1947 to 1951, though only 
men worked as supervisors in the youth camp.391 Volunteers for charitable organizations would 
also have been excluded from the staff lists despite contributing to the camp work force as 
well.392 It is unclear how many employees and regular volunteers the charities brought to the 
camp’s workforce in the late 1940s, but a report on the camp in 1956 indicated that the various 
charities accounted for 20 of their own paid employees and another 100 volunteers.393 
Despite the relatively small number of female employees, several women did take on 
leadership roles. In particular, women found paths to leadership through involvement in 
charitable organizations at the camp. Major Mitchell of the British Salvation Army, for example, 
directed that organization’s charitable efforts at the camp. In the case of the sub-camp for male 
youths, she played a consultative role in the sub-camp’s leadership (see Chapter 5). The nurses 
of the German Red Cross were responsible for the supervision and supply of the camp’s hospital 
and first-aid stations.394 The first head nurses, Charlotte Mietz and Ilsabeth von Rothkirch, 
oversaw the nurses’ hospital work and directed the nurses’ mess.395 Women also sometimes 
stood in elections for the workers’ council at Friedland. One of the Red Cross nurses, Barbara 
                                                 
391 In a police report about missing rations cards, for example, the background data on youth camp staffers indicates 
that they were employees of the Innere Mission, not the Friedland camp, earning a between 200 and 350 DM per 
month. See police statements from 12 November 1948, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 39, NHStA. See also Chapter 5. 
392 Anecdotal evidence suggests that some nurses working in Göttingen volunteered in the camp on weekends. 
393 These figures come from records prepared for a press conference on the camp’s capacity for receiving the last 
POW returnees from the USSR. 25 February 1956, Nds. 380 Acc. 158/94 Nr. 38, NHStA. 
394 Betriebsordnung des Flüchtlingslagers Friedland, April 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 13, NHStA.  
395 See Dienstordnung des Flüchtlingslagers Friedland/Leine, 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 7. Rothkirch replaced 
Mietz in December 1946. Lageranordnung Nr. 26, 25 November 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 84, NHStA. 
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Kramer, won a position on the council in a 1951 election and was therefore involved in 
negotiations over the revised collective bargaining agreement in 1953.396 
The most prominent woman in the camp’s early history, however, was the director of the 
German Red Cross nurses, Head Nurse Charlotte Wagner. Wagner was born into a reasonably 
well-to-do farming family in a rural community near Wriezen an der Oder, Brandenburg in 1897. 
Growing up, Wagner attended a private school and later studied at a finishing school (höhere 
Töchterschule) and a women’s lyceum. Wagner then returned to manage the four-hectare farm 
that had been in her family’s possession since the eighteenth century. Wagner had only limited 
political engagement before the war. She voted for the conservative, nationalist 
Deutschnationale Volkspartei in 1932 and 1933, and she joined the National Socialist People’s 
Welfare (NSV) organization in 1938. Following her entry into the German Red Cross as a nurse 
in 1940, Wagner served in France (she had learned French in school). She first worked as an 
assistant nurse and later as a home director until being taken as a prisoner of war in 1944. 
Following her release in 1946, the first work she found was at Friedland in the fall of 1947.397 
In addition to her responsibilities supervising the nurses, Wagner worked in collaboration 
with other charity directors at Friedland. In particular, Wagner coordinated with the directors of 
Caritas, Evangelisches Hilfswerk/Innere Mission, the Young Men’s Christian Organization, and 
Bruderhilfe (a fraternal aid organization of the Baptist Free-Church Congregation).398 In 1950, 
                                                 
396 See Protokoll über die am 26.4.1951 im Flüchtlingslager Friedland/L. durchgeführte Betriebsratswahl, 27 March 
1951, and also Betriebsvereinbarung, 9 April 1953, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 64, NHStA. 
397 In 1947, the de-Nazification commission grouped her into Category V. See de-Nazification file from 1947 in 
Nds. 171 Hildesheim 28504, NHStA. Wagner was also classified as a refugee, mostly likely because the family 
holdings in the Brandenburg would have been lost to land re-distribution. See personnel file list from July 1950 in 
Nds. 380 Acc. 62/65 Nr. 422, NHStA. 
398 Bruderhilfe, however, only operated in the camp from 1946 to 1951, during which time it helped with the 
organization and distribution of clothing donations (including from American Baptists). See Karl Heinz Bleß, “Die 
‘Bruderhilfe’ in Friedland,” in Suchet der Stadt Bestes: Festschrift 100 Jahre Baptistengemeinde Göttingen, 
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for example, the directors signed a letter to Lower Saxon Minister for Refugees Heinrich Albertz 
in which they protested the apparent refusal to accept German resettlers from Poland while the 
camp was forced to house foreigners.399 Indeed, over the following two years, Wagner and her 
colleagues paid special attention to the issue of the foreigners living in the residential sub-camp. 
That included working with the camp administration to organize a 1952 conference with several 
foreign charities to address the matter.400 Wagner and her colleagues from the camp charities 
also consulted with the Special Commission of the United Charities on Returnee Care located in 
Bonn in the attempt to determine the extent to which the returnee aid organization 
(Heimkehrerhilfe) at Friedland could operate independently of Returnee Care in dealings with 
the press and undertaking donation campaigns.401 
Aside from Wagner and Major Mitchell, though, men held the leadership positions for 
camp charities. Although Göttingen and its environs were largely Protestant, the Catholic charity 
Caritas led by Monsignor Doctor Josef Krahe was one of the most active charities in the camp. 
Krahe served as the camp’s Catholic priest and oversaw the Caritas organization in the camp 
from 1948 to 1960. Krahe was born in Efferen near Cologne in 1914. After a semester of study at 
the University of Bonn, he left for the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome where he was 
ordained and earned his doctoral degree before returning to Germany in 1942. According to a 
short, celebratory biography of Krahe in a Caritas almanac, after time as chaplain in Neuß near 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Göttingen: Baptistengemeinde Göttingen, 1994). The Göttingen Arbeiterwohlfahrt organization became active in 
coordinated charitable efforts after Bruderhilfe left the camp. 
399 Hilfsverbände to Flüchtlingsminister in Niedersachsen, 23 March 1950, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 472, NHStA. 
400 See memorandum by Hans Thederan, “Bericht über eine am 29.1.1952 im Lager Friedland stattgefundene 
Sitzung,” 29 January 1952, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 95, NHStA. 
401 Minutes of meeting with Sonderausschuss "Heimkehrerbetreuung" der vereinigten Wohlfahrtsverbände, 30 
November 1955, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 529, NHStA. 
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Düsseldorf and as a hospital priest in Siegburg, Krahe tried and failed to gain a position as a 
priest for German POWs held in France. The biographer recounts that “because [Krahe] 
absolutely wanted to do something for the people of his generation who still suffered the war’s 
consequences,” Cardinal Josef Frings suggested that Krahe take over as priest at Friedland.402 
Aside from holding mass and ministering to the camp’s residents, Krahe used his position 
as camp priest to oversee a number of charitable initiatives. In 1948 in cooperation with a 
Protestant pastor, most likely Gustav Baron von Girard, Krahe had helped to found the Friedland 
Heimkehrerhilfe organization that other charities later supported.403 When material donations 
from the other charities for returnees slackened in 1950, Caritas was the only charity that could 
provide the necessary items (mostly clothing) for returnees.404 By that time, Caritas was using 
seven Nissen huts provided by the camp administration and they had built their own barracks for 
church services. The charity also ran a camp kindergarten primarily for the supervision of 
orphaned children brought through the Operation Link resettlement program.405 Finally, Krahe 
oversaw the construction of a housing development near the camp with the support of the St. 
Stephens charity of Osnabrück, Lower Saxony during the early 1950s. In September 1953 there 
were already 32 completed houses and another 27 planned. Although the development was 
                                                 
402 Supposedly in his wartime position as chaplain in Neuß, Krahe had taken a particular interest in caring for forced 
laborers, resulting in the threat from a local SS officer that Krahe would hang after the war. Later in life, Krahe rose 
to the rank of prelate. Hermann Mors, “‘Friedlandpfarrer bleibt sein Ehrenname,” in the Caritaskalender 1986. The 
excerpt was in Dagmar Kleineke’s dissertation notes, “Reste,” in the Kreisarchiv Göttingen. See also the obituary 
from the Hildesheim diocese, “Botschaftler der Menschlichkeit,” 12 September 2005. 
403 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, 75. 
404 Krause to Lower Saxon Refugee Ministry, “Betreuung der Heimkehrer und Flüchtlinge im 
Flüchtlingsdurchgangslager Friedland,” 31 October 1950, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 399, NHStA. 
405 Vermerk by Amtsrat Gröner on charities at Friedland, 19 December 1950, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 399, 
NHStA. 
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intended as a form of self-help for refugees, the workers’ council asked for state funds so that 
camp employees could purchase residences in it.406  
 Under the direction of Johannes Lippert, the Protestant Evangelisches Hilfswerk was the 
other major religious charity in the camp. As with Caritas, much of their efforts focused on 
providing material aid to returnees and civilian refugees. Evangelisches Hilfswerk used five 
Nissen huts provided by the camp administration. Like Caritas, they built their own barracks for 
church services and ran a kindergarten. Finally, Evangelisches Hilfswerk paid 800 DM towards 
the construction costs for the youth sub-camp as well as the wages for several youth camp 
workers.407 Letters from Lippert to his superiors also show that from the Protestant perspective at 
least, there was competition between confessional charities in the camp to make the largest 
possible impact, thereby securing the church’s reputation.408 
 Although nurses from the German Red Cross were paid employees of the state, the 
organization did make other charitable contributions in the camp. For the returnees, the German 
Red Cross provided clothing donations as well as tea, coffee, and pastries entailing the 
significant expense of 1,200 DM per month. They also provided an additional three paid helpers 
who worked in a barracks donated to the camp as well as supporting the Caritas kindergarten.409 
 A coterie of other charities rounded out the support organizations in the camp. The 
Arbeiterwohlfahrt (a workers’ welfare organization) offered general support for the returnee 
                                                 
406 Betriebsobmann Friedland to Regierungspräsident Hildesheim, 7 September 1953, Nds. 380 Acc. 2003/015 Nr. 
75, NHStA. Of course, most employees qualified as refugees. 
407 Vermerk by Amtsrat Gröner on charities at Friedland, 19 December 1950, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 399, 
NHStA. 
408 This competition contributed to the Protestants’ decision to support the construction and operations of the youth 
sub-camp; see Chapter 5. 
409 Vermerk by Amtsrat Gröner on charities at Friedland, 19 December 1950, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 399, 
NHStA. 
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transports, including paying for two aid workers. The Young Men’s Christian Association 
provided further general support for processing returnees. Finally, Major Mitchell represented 
the British Salvation Army at Friedland. She oversaw another two paid Salvation Army staffers 
who helped with the distribution of material donations from Great Britain. The Salvation Army 
also provided several ambulances and other transport vehicles for sick and injured persons. All 
told, the various charities made a significant contribution to the camp’s operations, particularly 
in providing material donations (clothing, shoes, and so forth) for the returnees that civil 
authorities would not have been able to provide otherwise.410 
End of an Era 
 In addition to the departure of the British military unit at Friedland, the departures of 
Richard Krause and Hans Thederan in 1952/53 marked the end of an era in the camp’s 
administration. On March 10, 1952, Krause took over the directorship of the new emergency 
reception camp for refugee youths located in Sandbostel, Lower Saxony. The reason for 
Krause’s transfer from Friedland to Sandbostel is unclear. Krause had taken a special interest in 
the sub-camp for youths at Friedland between 1947 and 1951 (see chapter 5), and in 1952 the 
Friedland camp faced staff reductions because POW and resettler transports had slackened in 
size and frequency. So, he may have requested the new assignment when the refugee youth camp 
group at Poggenhagen was transferred to a former POW camp at Sandbostel in 1952. Initially, 
the ministerial officials overseeing Lower Saxon camps did not expect that the assignment to 
Sandbostel would prevent Krause from continuing duties at Friedland.411 Within a month, 
                                                 
410 Ibid. 
411 Niedersächsischer Minister für Vertiebenen to Regierungspräsidenten Hildesheim, 28 March 1952, Nds. 380 
Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 532. 
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however, ministerial officials decided to assign the Poggenhagen camp director, Doctor Franz 
Freßen, to Friedland as a Krause’s replacement. 
 Like Krause, Freßen was a former military officer with extensive administrative 
experience. Freßen was born in the town of Bensberg near Cologne in 1893. Freßen passed his 
university matriculation exam in Düsseldorf during the spring of 1914, but mobilization for war 
interrupted his studies in July 1914. He served throughout World War I, reaching the rank of 
lieutenant. Freßen did not resume studies until 1920, and he completed his doctoral degree in 
political science in 1922. Freßen worked as a trainee in private industry for three years before 
finding a position as corporate counsel (Syndikus) for the Opladen branch office of the 
Düsseldorf Chamber of Craftsmen (Handwerkskammer) in 1925.412 
According to de-Nazification documents, Freßen felt compelled to give up that position 
due to Nazi persecution in 1936. He claimed to have been automatically entered into the Nazi 
Party and the SA-Reserves in 1934 because he had held a local leadership position in the 
Stahlhelm paramilitary organization. Evidently, Freßen opposed the Nazi Party but could not 
secure release from the SA or party membership until 1936. Sworn statements from colleagues 
supported Freßen’s claim that his opposition to the Nazi Party had forced him to give up the 
position with the chamber.413 In a memorandum written as part of his 1951 application for 
restitution as a victim of Nazi persecution of civil servants, Freßen explained that he had been 
subject to Nazi “chicanery” beginning January 30, 1933. He therefore decided to approach an 
acquaintance who was a commander with the Münster artillery regiment to request reactivation 
                                                 
412 Melde- und Personal Bogen for Franz Freßen, 14 July 1951, Nds. 120 Hildesheim Acc. 19/76 Nr. 101/13, 
NHStA. 
413 Decision from Spruchkammer Weilheim/Oberbayern, 14 February 1947, Nds. 120 Hildesheim Acc. 19/76 Nr. 
101/13, NHStA. 
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for military service to escape the persecution in 1934. Nevertheless, the local Nazi Party officials 
delayed Freßen’s reentry into the army until 1936.414 Over the course of World War II, Freßen 
rose through the ranks from captain to colonel. Because he lost his home near Düsseldorf to 
Allied bombing in 1943, Freßen and his wife lived as refugees in Upper Bavaria after the end of 
the war.415 
In 1947, Freßen became the director of the camp at Poggenhagen after the preceding two 
camp directors there were sacked. The first director lost his job when Lower Saxon officials 
discovered that there was a warrant for his arrest in connection to his service as a military 
commandant (Kampfkommandant) in Bavaria. Allegedly, he had overseen the execution of a 
woman for listening to foreign radio during the war. In 1948, a court in Bavaria acquitted the 
first director of the charges, which the British commandant at Poggenhagen had regarded as 
baseless since the beginning. Much like at Friedland, the military government and German civil 
authorities clashed over the question of authority over the Poggenhagen camp. The British 
commandant had apparently liked the director and complained about the “high-handed” 
dismissal: “Anyway it is unknown to me that a law exists in Germany that a man is instantly 
dismissed for a crime for which he is not yet proved guilty.” While the commandant refused to 
recognize the dismissal, it seems that the German authorities prevailed with the argument that 
they did not need British approval for dismissing a temporary employee.416 
The senior official for the Hannover governing district, Regierungspräsident Theanolte 
Bähnisch, recommended Freßen as a replacement when the Poggenhagen deputy camp director 
                                                 
414 Freßen to Regierungspräsidenten Hannover, 28 March 1952, Nds. 120 Hildesheim Acc. 19/76 Nr. 101/13, 
NHStA. 
415 Decision from Spruchkammer Weilheim/Oberbayern, 14 February 1947, Nds. 120 Hildesheim Acc. 19/76 Nr. 
101/13, NHStA. 
416 See the personnel documents in Nds. 50 Acc. 96/88 Nr. 1422, NHStA. 
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proved unsuitable.417 Evidently, the British military government had raised objection due to the 
deputy director’s Nazi past. When the first camp director tried to regain his position after his 
acquittal in 1948, he claimed that Bähnisch’s acquaintance with Freßen had led to the “personal 
intrigues” that cost him his job. Bähnisch explained that she knew Freßen and had recommended 
him because he was an effective administrator. She defended the hiring by noting that the state 
chancellery had made the decision after first trying to promote the deputy camp director. 
Bähnisch further noted that the German Red Cross had disliked the first director, and the 
workers’ council at Poggenhagen had alleged that he had done a poor job and relied too heavily 
on subordinates to manage the camp. On the other hand, all parties were happy with Freßen, who 
kept his position until the transfer to Friedland in 1952.418  
 Upon discovering that Freßen would be the new camp director, the workers’ council at 
Friedland submitted a complaint to the Lower Saxon Ministry for Refugees. The shop steward 
argued that Thederan should take the directorship, because camp personnel had enjoyed priority 
in promotions to vacant positions in the past. The chairman further suggested that personal 
contact with East German authorities was a crucial component of the camp director’s work, 
meaning that relationships that Thederan had developed over years of service would make him a 
more suitable director than Freßen.419 In his response to the complaint, Minister Erich Schellhaus 
                                                 
417 Bähnisch had been the Regierungspräsident for Hannover since 1946. According to an article published in Die 
Zeit, “in the fall of 1946 when thousands of youths, orphaned and without a home [heimatlos], wandered about on 
Germany’s highways, [Bähnisch] founded Lower Saxony’s first youth refugee camp at Poggenhagen.” Bähnisch 
likely knew Freßen through university education and the civil service. Both Bähnisch and Freßen matriculated from 
the University of Münster in 1922 before working in the civil service, and Bähnisch’s husband, Albrecht, completed 
his practical training in the Münster civil service. On Bähnisch, see Ilse Langner, “Das Frauenporträt: 
Regierungspräsidentin Theanolte Bänisch,” Die Zeit, 21 February 1957. 
418 Ibid. 
419 It also seems that the workers’ council viewed Freßen with suspicion: “It is apparent to the workers’ council and 
also the entire personnel which reasons Dr. Freßen has for taking this transfer.” The complaint did not go into 
further detail, and it confused officials in Hannover, who put a question mark in the marginalia next to the 
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explained that a promotion for Thederan was out of the question because the decision had 
already been made and could not be reversed. He added that because the directorship was not an 
open position (Krause and Freßen were simply exchanging jobs), priority for in-house promotion 
did not apply anyway. Schellhaus noted that the ministry valued Thederan’s work in the camp 
and expected him to contribute to camp operations by “making use of his good personal 
relationships with GDR authorities.”420 
 Thederan’s promotion to the level of camp director instead came as Krause’s replacement 
at Sandbostel rather than at Friedland. Krause lost his position as camp director at Sandbostel 
because of allegations of misconduct relating to an automobile accident. According to the state, 
in June 1952 Krause had been driving a camp vehicle recklessly and without authorization when 
he had an accident resulting in damage that cost 45 DM to repair. The state further alleged that 
under questioning in September 1952, Krause admitted to intentionally falsifying the accounting 
of the costs in order to hide that the car had needed repairs, whereupon the state placed him on 
leave.421 When in late September Minister Schellhaus notified Krause that the state had initiated 
proceedings for a summary dismissal, Krause responded by resigning his position effective 
November 30, 1952.422 
 Over the course of a subsequent lawsuit by the state seeking to recover damages from 
Krause, his lawyer presented a far different explanation of events. The lawyer argued that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
allegation. Kotzam to Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Flüchtlinge, 23 April 1952, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 401, 
NHStA. 
420 Niedersächsischer Minister für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, und Kriegsgeschädigte to Betriebsrat Friedland, 28 
April 1952, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 401, NHStA. 
421 Lawsuit by State of Lower Saxony against Richard Krause, October 1953, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 532, 
NHStA. 
422 Correspondence between Schellhaus and Krause, 23 and 25 September 1952, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 532, 
NHStA. It appears that Krause later worked privately as a riding instructor in Kassel, Hessen. 
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camp’s driver pool was short of the state’s allotment, so Krause needed to drive the vehicle for 
meetings with state officials in Hannover and to oversee the other camps under his direction at 
Loccum, Kircherode, and Poggenhagen. The lawyer rejected the claim that Krause had 
purposefully tried to hide the costs. He argued that a senior official had told Krause that the 
account for automobiles was overdrawn, so he could not book the costs to it. Supposedly Krause 
then shifted the expense to the account for camp trucks while also producing the repair receipts 
for inspection.423 
 Reconciling Krause’s tenure at Friedland with the Sandbostel allegations is difficult. 
After all, Krause was assiduous in his efforts to stamp out impropriety at Friedland. Even 
allowing for a gap between prescription and personal behavior, there is certainly a disconnect 
between the man who closed his first Friedland camp orders by calling for “justice and honor” 
with the accusations that he falsified accounting to hide wrongdoing at Sandbostel six years later. 
Krause’s confidence and independent streak that served him well in the administration of the 
Friedland camp may have contributed to problems that developed at Sandbostel. It is worth 
bearing in mind that Krause was a trained riding and driving instructor, so in combination with 
his position as camp director, he probably did not see an issue with his using the camp vehicles. 
The worst of the alleged offences, of course, was trying to conceal the accident and 
expenses. There is no written record of Krause’s exact confession, so it is unclear whether he 
confessed to purposefully concealing the damages or just admitted to having booked the expense 
to a different account. It would be understandable if Krause had tried to conceal the accident 
from his superiors out of fear or repercussions or embarrassment. Still, he must have also known 
that consequences would be much worse for falsifying the accounting. Krause’s explanation of 
                                                 
423 Lawsuit by State of Lower Saxony against Richard Krause, October 1953, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 532, 
NHStA. 
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his actions seems more plausible and in keeping with his past behavior. Rather than hiding 
anything, upon learning that the automobile repair account was overdrawn he acted too 
independently. He rebooked the expense to the truck repair account without first getting 
permission from his superiors, who then viewed Krause’s actions in an entirely different light. 
Krause’s departure from the civil service created an opening for Thederan’s promotion to 
camp director at Sandbostel, marking an end to the formative era in the administration’s history. 
Thederan took the temporary position of acting camp director at Sandbostel on January 1, 1953 
and was confirmed as camp director with a corresponding pay-grade increase on April 1, 
1953.424 Despite Krause and Thederan leaving Friedland, there were not any immediate, 
significant changes in the operation of the camp. This absence of change speaks to two issues. 
First, the early administrators had set effective procedures and organization for the camp, so 
there was no need for reform as was the case when Krause and Thederan first took control of the 
camp. Second, as German civil government became more robust, there was less need and 
consequently less administrative leeway for camp directors at Friedland to act independently. 
It is ironic but also readily explainable that the German camp administration operated 
relatively freely during the period under British military oversight. In fact, the British authorities 
may have contributed to the independence of the camp’s German administration in several ways. 
First, the early British commandants fostered good relations with their German counterparts, and 
they happily devolved much authority for camp operations to them as long as British interests in 
maintaining control of POW release and border traffic were untouched. Howie even interceded 
on behalf of the German administration when it encountered difficulties with German authorities 
                                                 
424 Niedersächsischer Minister für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge u. Kriegsgeschädigte to Niedersächsischer 
Ministerpräsident—Staatskanzlei, 23 June 1953, Nds. 50 Acc. 96/88 Nr. 1422, NHStA. Thederan applied for and 
received a pay-grade increase in 1957, despite much ministerial grumbling about his lack of a higher degree. 
Thederan left the directorship at Sandbostel and the civil service for unknown reasons in 1958. 
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and organizations (e.g. de-Nazification and the workers’ council). Howie supported Krause’s 
administration because he seemed run the camp in an effective manner, meaning that the British 
could trust in him personally and rely on him for management during the chaotic earliest years. 
Later, when British and German authorities soured on each other as a consequence of the 
growing strength of the German civil government, the increasingly antagonistic relationship may 
have given Krause and Thederan more operating space with respect to German civil authorities. 
British officials mostly left the German camp administrators to their duties, and when points of 
conflict arose, Krause and Thederan became important go-betweens for higher British and 
German offices. 
Examination of the camp’s staff and personnel decisions made by refugee ministry 
officials leads to several further conclusions. First, operations at Friedland were largely a matter 
of refugees and expellees caring for fellow refugees, expellees, and released POWs. This 
composition of the camp staff may have helped both residents and the German government by 
increasing understanding between staffers and the people they processed. Second, the 
predominance of men and refugees in the camp staff was likely a result of the state’s efforts to 
keep people off of welfare rolls by employing male breadwinners and people who would have 
had more difficulty in finding work than the rooted, native locals. Third, although it was too 
early to label refugee management as a profession, by 1950 the camp staff was largely composed 
of individuals with years of experience working at refugee camps. The state recognized the value 
of such experience by prioritizing refugee camp employees for open positions at other camps, 
which seems to have extended beyond the civil service obligations to provide work for current 
civil servants generally. 
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Finally, an enduring legacy from Krause’s tenure was the commitment to treating 
incoming populations humanely. Krause took charge of the camp at a time when its reputation 
had reached its nadir because too many employees saw displaced individuals as targets to 
exploit. Of course, regulation at Friedland was necessarily impersonal and bureaucratic due to 
the masses involved, which could also produce undesirable residential assignments for 
individuals (hence the trade in residence permits). Nevertheless, Krause’s administration 
emphasized treating residents with dignity and respect, which also required a fairness and 
equality in application of rules and distribution quotas. To the extent that it was possible, the 
administration and charities at the camp tried to ameliorate the conditions by providing donated 
goods, spiritual care, and even small niceties such as coffee and tea. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FROM PROVISIONAL TO PERMANENT II: CAMP POPULATIONS, 1946-1952 
During a brief period in 1950, the camp at Friedland faced closure by officials in the 
federal and Lower Saxon refugee ministries. The possibility of the Friedland camp’s closure 
raises two questions. First, why had the camp at Friedland survived until 1950 when many other 
transit camps had already closed? Second, why did the camp remain in operation past that point 
in 1950? The increasingly experienced and effective camp staff, of course, played a role in the 
facility’s survival. The diverse nature of postwar displacement helps to account for why the 
camp operated into the 1950s. Camp operation was contingent upon continuing need for a 
facility to collect, register, aid, and redistribute uprooted groups well past the end of the war and 
initial expulsions. Although officials did not envision the camp as a permanent institution, the 
overall trajectory of the camp’s development from early improvisations to durable structures 
depended on the arrival of new groups as the inflow of other displaced populations tailed off. 
The arrival of three different groups at the camp during the period 1946 to 1952 therefore 
account for the facility’s survival: prisoners of war needing to cross the zonal boundaries, 
German “resettlers” (Aussiedler) from Poland who arrived at the camp as the POW traffic stalled 
in 1950, and finally foreign nationals who had either lost their DP status or entered West 
Germany illegally. 
This chapter first addresses how the release and transport of prisoners of war to their 
homes in the British sector proved a demanding task for the camp personnel and the affected 
civil offices. The size of the undertaking, the POWs’ nearly uniformly poor health, and the 
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complexities of the POWs’ backgrounds and needs for assistance all contributed to the difficulty 
of their reception and release. Among many other issues, the camp and refugee authorities 
grappled with the question of what to do with the so-called “returnees without a homeland” 
(heimatlose Heimkehrer) released to West Germany rather than their former homes in Eastern 
Europe. Particularly after the 1950 enactment of the Returnee Law (Heimkehrergesetz), the 
camp’s official recognition of returnees as POWs became more difficult and contentious due to 
questions about individuals’ qualifications for returnee status as well as the considerable benefits 
enjoyed by officially recognized returnees. 
The arrival of the first waves of German resettlers from Poland in 1950 put German and 
British authorities in conflict over the acceptance and handling of populations at Friedland. 
British authorities had approved of Operation Link in 1949, which was a program for 
transferring some 25,000 Germans from Poland in order to reunite them with families living in 
West Germany. When the first transports arrived, however, it became clear that many of the 
resettlers did not belong to the preapproved lists, and British authorities tried to prevent their 
acceptance into West Germany. German administrators and press decried the British refusal of 
the transports as inhumane and demanded their immediate acceptance into West Germany. At the 
heart of this dispute were two issues. First was a British misapprehension of Polish intentions to 
flood West Germany with refugees. Second, there was a fundamental disagreement between the 
British and Germans over what constituted proper regulation and humane treatment of the 
resettlers. In British eyes, it was neither fair nor humane to accept them if they could not be 
adequately housed and integrated into the German economy. From the German point of view, 
there was a humanitarian obligation to care for their co-nationals trapped in limbo. 
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Foreign nationals housed in the camp between 1949 and 1952 proved more difficult than 
any other group present at Friedland. These foreigners consisted of a mixture of former 
Displaced Persons and individuals who had entered West Germany illegally since the end of the 
war. The British authorities of the International Relief Organization faced the task of finding 
housing for them. Almost immediately upon the foreigners’ arrival, the authorities at the 
Friedland camp as well as local civil administrators and police protested the IRO’s decision. In 
the eyes of camp administrators and locals, these foreigners were a burdensome and sometimes 
dangerous criminal group. The resulting three-year dispute over accommodating the foreigners 
demonstrates the difficulties of disentangling questions of authority over the camp, even though 
its administration putatively lay in German hands. Indeed, the controversy even set members of 
the camp’s British military unit and the British Salvation Army against British authorities for the 
IRO in Hannover. In contrast to feelings of solidarity and obligation to their co-nationals 
resettling from Poland, German authorities did not view troublesome groups of foreigners in the 
same way. 
Prisoners of War 
 From the time of Germany’s capitulation, the British occupation forces had grappled with 
the question of what to do with German soldiers in their custody. Field Marshal Bernard Law 
Montgomery, the first commander of the occupation army, listed POWs among the displaced 
populations contributing to the “terrific” problem of governance: “We had in our area nearly one 
and a half million German prisoners of war. There were a further one million German wounded, 
without medical supplies […] In addition, there were about one million civilian refugees who 
had fled into our area from the advancing Russians; these and ‘Displaced Persons’ were roaming 
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about the country, often looting as they went.”425 Imprisoning these captive soldiers presented 
the British with the dual problem of needing to provision them and removing them from an 
already desperately shallow pool of labor. As such, in anticipation of the coming winter, the 
British undertook programs to put POWs to work in agriculture through Operation Barleycorn as 
well as the coalmines of the Ruhr through Operation Coalscuttle during the fall of 1945.426 
 The organization of these POWs into so-called “service groups” (Dienstgruppen) 
nevertheless proved problematic. According to Noel Annan, when General Sir Gerald Templer 
organized these groups, he “simply kept the German army in being—though without badges of 
rank.”427 Upon learning of the program, Marshall Georgy Zhukov accused the British of 
violating the Potsdam Agreement, necessitating the groups’ dissolution under the program 
named Operation Clobber.428 This operation, however, encompassed all German POWs captive 
in the British zone who did not fall under special arrest categories. In a memorandum from the 
military government to authorities with the Hildesheim governing district, the British explained 
that the operation would run from December 9, 1945, to January 20, 1946. During that time, the 
British planned to release 24,000 men to be settled in the cities and counties of the district 
according to quotas from the state employment authority. Local offices were to treat the Clobber 
men as refugees and register them with the competent rationing, housing, and work offices. 
                                                 
425 Montgomery’s Memoirs quoted in Christopher Knowles, “Winning the Peace: The British in Occupied Germany, 
1945-1948” (PhD diss., King’s College London, 2014), 46. 
426 Ibid., 51. 
427 Noel Annan, Changing Enemies: The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1995), 149-150. The POW labor early in the Friedland camp’s history (see Chapter 2) likely had been 
under the auspices of such a program. 
428 Ibid. Reading between the lines, it seems that Zhukov’s objection was to the de facto organization of the service 
groups along military lines, not the use of POWs as a labor source (after all, the Soviets made extensive use of POW 
labor). 
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Indeed, because the British had agreed to resettle Sudeten German soldiers in their zone, many of 
them essentially had been displaced by the war. These offices were also responsible for picking 
out men particularly suited for work in Ruhr mines, reconstruction in Hannover, and bridge 
rebuilding in the Ruhr.429 
Although the facility at Friedland was already in operation as a transit camp, it was not 
initially responsible for releasing British-held POWs into the Soviet zone. Instead, the British 
made use of the camp at Poggenhagen for Clobber men being released across the British-Soviet 
border.430 During the fall and winter of 1945/46, the Friedland camp was nevertheless 
responsible for cross-border POW traffic from the Soviet zone. In the last few months of 1945, 
the camp had accepted roughly 8,100 POWs from Soviet captivity.431 Given that these first 
returning POWs had included many amputees, invalids, and the seriously ill, Soviet units must 
have released them due to their incapacity for work.432 
At some point during the spring of 1946, the camp at Friedland took responsibility from 
Poggenhagen for POW releases to the east. For their own zone, the British had set up release 
facilities at the so-called Munsterlager in Lower Saxony and also in the Westphalian city of 
Münster, but Friedland received the task of “sluicing” across the border any POWs with homes 
in the Soviet zone.433 The exact competences for the camps seem to have been in a state of flux, 
                                                 
429 HQ 117/1007 (L/R) Mil. Gov. Det. to Regierungspräsidenten Hildesheim, 12 December 1945, 
Stadtflüchtlingsamt Nr. 40, SAG. 
430 January Tätigkeitsbericht for Flüchtlingsdezernat in Regierungsbezirk Hildesheim, 2 February 1946, Nds. 120 
Hildesheim Acc. 40/51 Nr. 2, NHStA. 
431 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, 52. 
432 Ibid. See also Chapter 2. 
433 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, 53. Despite the similarity of names, the Munsterlager was not located in or near 
Münster. At the time, the Munsterlager was a former German military installation near the town of Munster located 
in the Lüneberg Heath. 
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but the desire to organize types of traffic by camp type suggests an attempt to increase efficiency 
through specialization. Friedland was responsible for the transit of POWs across the British-
Soviet border, Munsterlager for the actual processing and release of POWs, and Uelzen for 
refugees. 
A pair of directives in 1947 further clarified the responsibilities. In January, the Refugee 
Branch of the Military Government Headquarters in Hannover ordered that POWs “willing to 
return to the Russian Zone will be dispatched to FRIEDLAND Camp. No compulsion will be 
excercised otherwise they may join relatives in this Zone or if they have none be sent to 
UELZEN.”434 A later directive from the Lower Saxon Ministry of Labor, Construction and 
Public Health explained that every German POW held in British captivity was to be brought to 
the Munsterlager for their official release, suggesting that the Friedland facility was merely 
responsible for transport to the border.435 Indeed, POWs released to the Soviet zone typically 
spent less than 24 hours in the camp.436 Between 1946 and 1952, the camp processed a total of 
119,560 prisoners of war returning to homes in East Germany. All but a handful of returns 
occurred during the years 1947 (64,664 POWs) and 1948 (50,019 POWs).437 
These POWs later featured in the Friedland mythology in three ways, all of which played 
into anticommunist Cold War narratives. First, eastbound POWs saw the condition of their 
                                                 
434 Subject: Discharged Wehrmacht, 2 January 1947, Stadtverwaltung und Militärregierung Nr. I 73, SAG. 
According these orders, POWs with homes in the “Polish occupied territories” or whose homes had been destroyed 
were to be treated as refugees and brought to the refugee camp at Uelzen.  
435 Erlaß betr. Betreuung heimkehrender Kriegsgefangener, 28 August 1947, Nds. 380 Acc. 32/97 Nr. 4, NHStA. 
436 Lagerleitung Friedland to Hermann Lindemann, 20 January 1948, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 97, NHStA. Camp 
directives indicate that returnees to and from the Soviet zone were housed in different sub-camps, mostly likely to 
simplify processing and loading transports. The camp administration also asked employees to ensure that returnees 
for Thuringia were seated at the front of transports in order to speed processing on the East German side. See 
Lageranordnung Nr. 88, 3 April 1948 and Lageranordnung Nr. 92, 5 June 1948, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 84, 
NHStA. 
437 Statistics in 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, Anhang 3. 
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compatriots coming from Soviet captivity and tried to instead remain in the British zone. Second, 
“other [POWs] appeared just days or weeks later back at Friedland or in the Uelzen emergency 
reception camp after their flight to the West.” Third, “many fell into captivity again, this time by 
the Soviets, and came many years later in the reverse direction back through Friedland.”438 
These narratives are surely based in truth. For example, the camp processed an 
application for returnee status from a man who had been captured by American forces and then 
arrested after his return to the Soviet zone. The man in question had served in the police in 
Weißenfels near the Saale River. The circumstances of his capture are unclear, but the 
Americans had held him at a POW camp near Koblenz until 1947, when he was released and 
returned to Weißenfels. There he took ill and somehow came to the attention of the police. 
According to him, the Volkspolizei cleared him of having been a Gestapo agent or Nazi 
functionary, but they still held him at the Torgau prison as a former member of the Wehrmacht. 
From Torgau they sent him to Russia. He arrived at Friedland with a POW release transport from 
Russia in 1953, and the camp sent him to Bremen.439 
Assessing the rate of return to Friedland after reimprisonment or flight as a refugee is 
nevertheless difficult. The camp administration did not keep statistics on whether POWs released 
by the Soviet Union or other Eastern European states had previously been through the camp. The 
administration of the Uelzen refugee camp may have kept records on the number of former 
POWs who fled back to British zone out of fear of reimprisonment. Yet, if the authorities at 
Uelzen did try to verify that their refugees had actually been through Friedland, they must have 
                                                 
438 Ibid., 53. 
439 See the application for a Heimkehrerbescheinigung in Nds. 386 Acc. 67/85 Nr. 87, NHStA. The returnee also 
complimented the camp staff on his treatment there, approvingly noting their equitable treatment of people with 
former homes in the East and West. 
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done so by telephone or possibly telegraph, because the camps do not seem to have corresponded 
officially about it.440 Nothing in the surviving camp directives or correspondence with higher 
ministerial authorities regarding returnees suggests that the administration paid much attention to 
the matter. Thus, while individual cases may have helped to fuel such narratives, it is doubtful 
that double returnees or refugees comprised a significant portion of the roughly 120,000 POWs 
sent eastward. Indeed, returnees to the east, who constituted just over 22 percent of POW traffic 
in the camp between 1946 and 1952, along with 265,506 evacuees also returned to the Soviet 
zone provide a counter-narrative to the dominant memory of Friedland as the Gateway to 
Freedom in West Germany.441 
 
                                                 
440 Telegraphs are rare in the archival documents concerning Friedland, suggesting that as a rule they were not 
saved. 
441 Statistics calculated from 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, Anhang 3. On the exchange of evacuees under Operation 
Honeybee, see chapter 2. 
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
1
9
4
5
1
9
4
6
1
9
4
7
1
9
4
8
1
9
4
9
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
1
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
3
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
6
1
9
5
7
1
9
5
8
1
9
5
9
1
9
6
0
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
R
e
tu
rn
e
e
s
Year
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In the summer of 1946, exchanges at Friedland for returnees from the Soviet zone 
increased in scope. The cross-border release of Soviet-held POWs was first tied to the return of 
refugees to the Soviet zone. According to a memorandum from the Göttingen City Refugee 
Office, the German civil authorities in Hildesheim instructed the camp to maintain its refugee 
distribution unit, particularly for illegal border-crossers from the Soviet zone, even though the 
camp would now be responsible for released prisoners of war.442 The August activity report for 
the Hildesheim governing district indicated that the exchange program was running despite the 
overall decrease in border traffic during the summer. Two-hundred refugees with residence 
permits for the Soviet zone came to Friedland from the camp at Osterode, and the camp at 
Friedland provided them transport to the border in exchange for 200 POWs held by the 
Soviets.443 A subsequent activity report from December noted the continued smooth operation of 
the one-for-one (Kopf gegen Kopf) transfers. The exchange had gone so well, in fact, that the 
camp became the sole transit point for refugees willing to return to the Soviet zone. Whereas 
authorities had expected difficulties in processing the simultaneous streams, the large personnel 
had managed the task without problem by dividing the facility in two. For their part, the British 
camp authorities declared that Friedland would continue those functions for a long time.444 
 The number of westward POW returns grew massively in the following years, indicating 
an end to the limit of one-for-one exchanges. In 1946, the camp at Friedland processed 40,375 
returnees to the British zone, and a further 65,245 POWs came in 1947. As the Soviet Union, 
Poland, and other Eastern European states released more prisoners, the inflow doubled in size. In 
                                                 
442 Vermerk, 11 July 1946, Stadtflüchtlingsamt Nr. 44, SAG. 
443 Tätigkeitsbericht (August 1946), 2 September 1946, Nds. 120 Hildesheim Acc. 40/51 Nr. 3, NHStA. 
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1948, the camp processed 129,281 returnees, and the releases reached their apex in 1949 when 
149,688 POWs returned to West Germany via Friedland. Returnee traffic fell off sharply in the 
following years with 20,966 POWs passing through Friedland in 1950 and only 991 and 722 
returns in 1951 and 1952 respectively. Of the roughly 450,000 returnees, nearly 90 percent of 
them came from Soviet captivity, followed in descending order by returnees from Yugoslavia, 
Poland, and various other states. The vast majority likewise consisted of former soldiers, with so-
called civilian “internees” comprising only 15,000 cases.445 
Figure 3: Overview of Returnees Registered in 1949446 
Month 
Received 
from Camp 
Heiligenstadt 
Received 
from Other 
Locations Total 
Women 
Included in 
the Total 
January 6,403 57 6,460 17 
February 944 78 1,022 5 
March 9,399 63 9,462 10 
April 14,263 200 14,463 133 
May 9,653 283 9,936 15 
June 9,176 302 9,478 6 
July 6,697 281 6,978 13 
August 7,529 304 7,833 11 
September 19,081 523 19,604 3 
October 13,741 623 14,364 657 
November 18,927 472 19,399 652 
December 26,587 430 27,017 1,003 
Total 142,400 3,616 146,016 2,531 
  
A sampling of returnee registration cards at Friedland offers further insight into returnees 
as a group.447 Given the predominantly military character of the imprisonment, it is not 
                                                 
445 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, Anhang 3. 
446 Reproduced from statistics in Nds. 380 Acc. 158/94, Nr. 24, NHStA. 
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surprising that the overwhelming majority of returnees were male. As little as 3 percent of 
returnees were women, all of whom had been classified as civil internees. This sample of 
registration files further indicates that roughly 10 percent of the returnees were not originally 
from West Germany and would have therefore been classified as heimatlose Heimkehrer. Most 
of the returnees had served in the army, the Volkssturm (militia), or with Luftwaffe flak units. 
Less than 5 percent of registration cards gave Waffen-SS or SS units as the last posting. The 
small percentage of SS soldiers resulted in part from the relatively smaller size of SS formations 
in comparison to the Wehrmacht as a whole. Prisoners from SS formations also likely had a 
relatively low survival rate after capture, whether through execution, harsher treatment in prison 
camps, or simply because SS soldiers were generally kept in camps longer than normal soldiers. 
 When returnees arrived at Friedland, they underwent processing procedures similar to 
those developed for refugees and evacuees early in the camp’s operation. Camp employees met 
the transports at the border, where they distributed cocoa and bread before loading the returnees 
into vehicles to bring them to the camp. Upon arrival in the camp, the returnees were supposed to 
fill out political questionnaires. Official registration with the British unit at the camp ended with 
the completion of the D-2 Certificate of Discharge that indicated the returnee’s name and 
medical condition. Until the enactment of the 1950 Returnee Law, this certification was 
necessary for registration and aid in their destination cities. Following registration, the returnees 
underwent delousing and a medical examination. Those who did not need more immediate 
medical care then received provisions consisting of the normal ration as well as a supplemental 
                                                                                                                                                             
447 The following figures are based upon an interval sample of 300 files developed by collecting 50 names each from 
six letters of the alphabet (the cards are stored alphabetically by last name) of the Heimkehrerkartei maintained by 
the Friedland Außenstelle of the Bundesverwaltungsamt. 
 182 
ration paid for by British charities.448 By 1948, the camp administration had also set up a wash 
barracks for returnees complete with soap and razors.449 
Questioning by intelligence services was an important aspect of returnees’ processing at 
Friedland, though one that is difficult to reconstruct from archival documents. Both German and 
British intelligence services were interested what information POWs could provide about 
economic conditions and the disposition of military units throughout Eastern Europe. Reinhard 
Gehlen’s “Org,” the predecessor to the Bundesnachrichtendienst, engaged in a “painstaking” 
questioning of POWs under the codename Hermes. The British at Friedland had a similar 
program under the codename Wringer.450 Camp directives provided for the division of returnees 
by unit to make questioning by the British Field Security Service at the camp more efficient, and 
directives noted that questioning was mandatory even for sick returnees.451 American 
intelligence services sometimes operated in the camp in addition to their British and German 
counterparts.452 Such questioning led to a press complaint in 1953, which characterized the 
British unit’s “sharp questioning” and detention of some returnees as an “abuse of these persons 
for British spying,” whereas the returnees reported having been left alone by East German 
intelligence services.453 
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Heuß, who had just visited the camp but declined to do anything about it. Presseausschnitt “Im Lager Friedland 
zurückgehalten,” November 1953, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 527, NHStA. 
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Counter-intelligence services also operated at Friedland, given the fear of infiltration of 
the West through displaced populations. In 1954, for example, the camp put an employee on 
leave in connection to the Lower Saxon State Office for the Protection of the Constitution 
(Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz, LfV) questioning him about the transfer of an amnestied 
prisoner from East Germany and concerns for the employee’s safety.454 A 1955 memorandum 
from officials in the refugee ministry passed along to the director of the LfV reported that the 
German deputy camp director had come into conflict with the British intelligence service at 
Friedland. The conflict revolved around whether the British were allowed to question refugee 
East German youths awaiting transport to the camp at Sandbostel.455 A senior official from the 
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungschutz) was 
likewise involved in a conference organized by the Lower Saxon Ministry for Refugees 
regarding the closure of the Sandbostel camp and transfer of its responsibilities back to Friedland 
in 1958.456 
Transport from the camp generally occurred within 24 hours of the returnees’ arrival. 
Initially, the camp sent returnees to the Munsterlager for their final release in specially arranged 
transports or, in cases of individual returnees, with prepaid train tickets.457 Female returnees, 
however, received train tickets directly to their home cities beginning in March 1947.458 In 
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November 1948, the Munsterlager closed for the official release of returnees, meaning that the 
camps at Münster and Friedland were camps still in operation for POW releases in the British 
zone.459 It therefore seems that Friedland took on all responsibility for POWs released from the 
Soviet Union and the other “eastern detention states” (östliche Gewahrsamsländer) as they were 
known in official parlance. 
Figure 4: Distribution of the Returnees Registered in 1949460 
Month NRW 
Lower 
Saxony Hamburg 
Schles.
-Hol. 
American 
Zone 
French 
Zone 
To Medical 
Institutions 
Returnees 
without a 
Homeland 
Soviet 
Zone 
Jan. 3,580 1,667 356 595 13 2 1,641   193 
Feb. 546 259 71 110 10 1 310   27 
March 5,602 2,007 557 1,093 5 8 2,792   28 
April 8,105 3,499 757 1,733 12 12 3,890   17 
May 5,172 2,925 501 1,134 17 6 2,183   12 
June 4,984 2,807 491 1,047 10 6 1,939   27 
July 3,607 2,124 324 814 12 6 1,316   11 
Aug. 4,109 2,425 385 805 5 2 1,544   8 
Sept. 10,754 5,542 941 2,016 35 32 3,168 100 9 
Oct. 7,389 4,280 763 1,693 30 11 2,795 215 9 
Nov. 10,115 5,676 1,066 2,257 17 12 3,448 175 12 
Dec. 13,774 8,196 1,312 2,969 22 16 3,775 260 20 
Total 77,737 41,407 7,524 15,266 188 114 28,801 750 373 
 
The so-called “returnees without a homeland” presented a further complication, because 
unlike their comrades they could not simply be returned to former homes or their families. 
                                                 
459 “Munsterlager: Das Dorf ohne Zukunft,” Hamburger Abendblatt, 8 November 1948. 
460 Reproduced from statistics in Nds. 380 Acc. 158/94, Nr. 24, NHStA. 
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Initially, they received train tickets to the Munsterlager where search services would hopefully 
provide an address for family in the western zone. If not, the returnees would continue on to the 
camp at Uelzen for distribution in keeping with refugee quotas for various districts.461 Beginning 
in 1949, however, the Friedland camp took over responsibility for returnees without a homeland. 
The camp’s police would initiate contact with employment advisors and charities in the attempt 
to find work and housing placements. If no placements were available, the returnees would be 
released to the Friedland camp officially and then distributed as refugees according to quotas. 
Sick or injured among them were sent to a hospital in Göttingen or other medical facilities, and 
after their recovery they returned to the camp for the same processing as healthy returnees 
without a homeland.462 
Surviving camp records contain few individual histories of these returnees without a 
homeland. The paucity of individual histories may result from the absence of records from the 
state representatives responsible for determining residential assignments in accordance with 
distribution quotas, though those administrators may not have recorded extensive personal 
histories either. That being said, these returnees do appear in offers made by private individuals 
and charitable institutions to house them. Individuals or larger firms requested that the camp 
send them returnees who could help them in business, as was the case with many farmers and a 
butcher seeking an employee. In one instance, a family near Cuxhaven, Lower Saxony, 
registered with their local welfare office to house a returnee who might help on their farm. The 
wife was a local to the area, but her Rhenish husband noted that they would prefer a fellow 
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Rhinelander if possible.463 Regional kinship was not the only connection that people sought in 
housing offers for returnees without a homeland. Several letters included specific requests for 
Waffen-SS veterans, presumably because the writers were themselves former members of the 
Waffen-SS and felt a particular comradeship and accompanying obligation.464 
Dutch nationals who served in the German military complicated the notion of a “returnee 
without a homeland.” Some 100 Dutch members of the Waffen-SS Division Niederlande arrived 
at Friedland after release from the Soviet Union in November 1950. According to state refugee 
ministry memoranda, these POWs would be given the opportunity to return to the Netherlands or 
remain in Germany, in which case they must have qualified as returnees without a homeland.465 
For example, the camp received a 1954 application for returnee status from a Dutchman who had 
served in the Niederlande Division and returned from Soviet captivity to Holland via Friedland 
in 1953. He claimed that he had lost his Dutch citizenship upon arrival in the Netherlands, so he 
returned to Germany to live with his German wife in Mühlheim an der Ruhr, North Rhine-
Westphalia. Having received the completed questionnaire, the camp administration conferred 
returnee status to him.466 
Despite efforts to process the returnees as quickly as possible, they nevertheless 
experienced some down time in the camp. The line for registration in particular resulted in long 
waits. In an effort to make waits and work more pleasant, the administration played music 
                                                 
463 Perhaps they thought that a returnee who had lost his or her home to bombing would count as heimatlos as well. 
Declaration made to Sozialverwaltung Cuxhaven, 14 January 1954, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 4, NHStA. 
464 See various letters in Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 4, NHStA. 
465 See memoranda from 7 and 9 November 1950, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 519, NHStA. 
466 See decision on Heimkehrerbescheinigung from 15 May 1954, Nds. 386 Acc. 67/85 Nr. 121, NHStA. 
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through the loudspeakers located throughout the camp.467 The admnistration also made an effort 
to provide reading materials to the returnees. When in 1949 a representative of the Schwäbische 
Illustrierte Presse wrote to the camp to offer the free distribution of newspapers for returnees at 
Friedland, the surprised and grateful camp administration suggested that the newspaper send 
between 3,000 and 5,000 copies per week. Krause noted that the returnees waiting for the 
finalization of their release would therefore have an opportunity to catch up on recent events.468   
The line between political reading materials and active campaigning was a source of 
controversy in 1949. The county organ of the Social Democratic Party of Germany submitted a 
complaint to the camp administration in which they claimed to have been told that political 
advertising (politische Werbung) was prohibited in the camp, but a camp employee had 
campaigned for himself and the Christian Democratic Union at Friedland. The SPD further 
complained that two camp employees were distributing flyers for the right-wing Deutsche 
Rechtspartei.469 Krause’s response confirmed that political advertisement was indeed forbidden 
in the camp. He was grateful for the notification about the distribution of flyers, which he had 
ordered the two men to cease. Regarding the employee campaigning for himself, Krause 
explained that the administration had lifted restrictions so that only employees who lived in the 
camp could campaign among other resident employees (including several SPD candidates). 
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Krause further suggested that the SPD was allowed to provide its party newspaper for the benefit 
of returnees who wished to educate themselves about current politics in West Germany.470 
The camp administration also organized cultural events for the returnees to keep them 
entertained and feel welcomed to their homeland. In 1947, the camp administration decided to 
form an entertainment group from the staff. The goal was to play music and sing for returnees in 
the camp and in the villages near Friedland. Any income from the performances would be “used 
for the benefit of the war invalids and refugees in the county.” To that end, the camp needed 
singers for a choir as well as an announcer, a comic, and a magician. The camp directives 
indicated that interested employees should register themselves with the entertainment committee 
of the workers’ council.471 A few months later, camp directives noted the returnees’ repeated 
thanks for the choir’s efforts.472 
Because it was not always possible to release returnees on the day of their arrival, the 
camp administration also arranged to show films to them. Evidently the camp had shown films to 
returnees at a substantially reduced price before 1948, when a conference of film distributors and 
theater owners banned the practice. The camp administration noted that the set price of 1.25 DM 
per attendee was far too high, so they had suspended film showings while they waited for 
German civil authorities and the British military government to act on the camp’s complaints.473 
The camp won an exception in the spring or early summer of 1948, because it was later able to 
conclude a contract with a film presenter for the previous reduced price. The camp agreed to 
provide a space free of cost as well as member of the camp police for maintaining order. The 
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presenter received .25 DM per attendee to be paid by the camp rather than by the returnees 
themselves.474 Later in the year, the camp administration wrote to district refugee office in 
Hildesheim to request 5,000 DM so that it could offer ongoing film presentations.475 
Unfortunately, there is no record of the films shown at the camp, but much like newspapers 
would give returnees a sense of current events, films would acquaint them with popular culture 
after years in prison camps. 
The returnees’ stay in the camp also presented the opportunity to enquire about the status 
of missing soldiers through a centralized search service. In 1948, the camp developed a pictorial 
search service (Bildersuchdienst) in the registration area, which the former POWs could peruse 
in order to identify former comrades in their military units or prison camps. Information about 
the status of comrades was vital for families of missing soldiers, not the least for psychological 
reasons, but also because it affected questions of property and civil status. The Protestant charity 
Innere Mission was responsible for soliciting and collecting the photographs as well for writing 
to family members in case of a positive identification.476 In May 1948, the photo catalogue 
contained over 14,000 pictures with individuals’ field post numbers.477 
 The returnees’ ragged condition played a key role in narratives about Germans 
overcoming British suspicion in favor of cooperation at Friedland. When the British discharge 
unit departed the camp in 1952, a newspaper article about their time at Friedland encapsulated 
the oft-repeated story about British horror at the Soviets’ treatment of POWs. Supposedly the 
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British had worried about possible danger from the returning soldiers, so in July 1946 they met 
the first Soviet transport at the border with five battle-ready tanks (Panzer in Gefechtsstellung). 
Upon the transport’s arrival, however, “shocked and speechless, the Tommies gaped at the 
platoon, a tired, grey inchworm [Heerwurm, literally army worm] creeping up, walking skeletons 
in tatty, filthy cotton uniforms without bags, hardly even a tin as bowl at hand.” Dropping their 
weapons, the British soldiers helped the returnees into the camp’s omnibuses and, “at the next 
transport, machine guns no longer awaited the returnees, but rather an English Quaker 
organization with cocoa and marmalade bread.”478 Neither camp documents nor British military 
records recorded the incident—the story may have overdramatized British expectations—but it is 
true that returnees from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states tended to be in poor 
condition. 
The camp’s medical staff inspected every person processed at Friedland, and reports from 
the medical station give insights into the variable condition of returnees. The yearly medical 
report for 1947 shows that of the roughly 65,000 returnees, the camp needed to send 10,739 (16 
percent) to its hospital station.479 In 1948, just over 25,000 returnees (20 percent) from the Soviet 
Union, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia required hospital care.480 The rate at which 
returnees needed hospital care remained constant at about 20 percent through 1949 and 1950, 
though the absolute number fell from 29,378 POWs in 1949 to 4,537 POWs in 1950.481 
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 Prisoners of war returning to West Germany through Friedland suffered from a variety of 
maladies. As with refugees and evacuees, the most immediate epidemiological worry was the 
possibility of spreading lice that might carry spotted fever and typhus. As a result, the camp 
mandated delousing with DDT powder for all returnees. Fear of disease led the administration to 
forbid returnees from bringing luggage with them to the registration area (the camp burned the 
trunks).482 Tuberculosis also posed a serious danger to the individual returnees and public health 
more generally. During a two-week reporting period in October 1946, the camp’s medical staff 
discovered that 10 percent of the 4,200 POWs suffered from tuberculosis. The public health 
authority for Göttingen therefore requested to keep on a permanent basis the x-ray machine given 
to the camp in September.483 Malaria was of further concern to state health officials, who 
transferred a doctor specializing in malaria cases from the Uelzen camp to Friedland in 1946.484 
According to a report from the malaria station at Friedland, there had been an increase in 
infections across Germany in 1946 and up to one-eighth of POWs returning from Eastern Europe 
in 1945/46 suffered from the disease.485 
 Harsh conditions and forced labor further contributed to the poor overall health of 
German POWs returning from Eastern Europe. For example, on August 13 and 16, 1946, the 
camp received transports of 808 and 316 POWs from the Soviet Union. According to a medical 
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report sent to state officials, the medical and nutritional condition of these POWs was 
“catastrophic.” Over 60 percent of the prisoners in each transport suffered from famine edema, 
and over 50 percent suffered from skin diseases resulting in abscesses, boils, and the like. Only 
the men who had recently been released from hospitals were well nourished. Serious contagious 
diseases were also present: 74 typhus cases, 113 malaria cases, and 23 spotted fever cases. The 
medical authorities argued that the men were “entirely incapable of work,” and only after months 
of recovery including supplemental provisions might they be reintegrated into the economy. The 
overall poor health of the men in the transports also resulted from a selection bias in the Soviet 
camps. The POWs reported to the doctors, “The only men who are released are those who, 
according to Russian doctors, would become incapable of work in the coming five months.”486 
 When so-called “Antifa-Männer” arrived at Friedland in 1949, their good health and 
provisioning played a central role in the controversy surrounding them. The men in question 
were POWs whom Soviet authorities had recruited and reeducated as German antifascists. The 
most famous of these anti-fascists were Generals Seydlitz and Paulus, who had surrendered at 
Stalingrad. Neither Seydlitz nor Paulus were among the first of the anti-fascists to arrive at the 
camp in 1949, though Seydlitz was one of the notable returnees during the Great Homecoming 
(Große Heimkehr) in 1955. In April 1949, a German wire service distributed an article about the 
status of POWs remaining in the Soviet Union under the sensationalist headline “Paulus—Villa 
Owner in Moscow.” Based on interviews with returnees from a prison camp in Krasnogorsk near 
Moscow, the article also reported that Paulus was ensconced in a villa while some 15,000 
German POWs supposedly sat in the Butyrka Prison in Moscow. According to the returnees, 
there was also a “central anti-fascist school” responsible for reeducating up to 300 POWs at a 
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time. Although the school was supposedly only in use for POWs with homes in the Soviet zone, 
teachers with origins in West Germany helped the Soviet instructors.487 
A transport of roughly 250 antifascists in February 1949 garnered the most outrage in the 
press. According to one article, the appearance of these returnees “stood in extreme contrast to 
the typical image,” not the least because they appeared to be well nourished, wore “first-class 
suits,” and showed no signs of labor exploitation (Arbeitsausnutzung). The article explained that 
although the months-long reeducation program was strenuous, the students at the 40 reeducation 
schools lived in heated barracks and were freed of compulsory work, unlike their fellow German 
prisoners.488 Referring to the returnees as the “avant-garde of the Kremlin,” a report in the 
Bielefeld newspaper Freie Presse likewise noted their “red and healthy” appearance. The article 
implicitly complained that the anti-fascists received the same half-liter of hot chocolate 
“welcome drink” given to normal returnees as well as the usual white rolls with marmalade and 
sausage.489 Both articles made special mention of the returnees’ reserved and arrogant manner. 
In addition to putting the camp at the center of press reports, the return of anti-fascists 
also created legal issues that camp authorities needed to address. In a memorandum from the 
camp administration to the state refugee ministry in October 1949, Krause reported that police 
had needed to detain a returnee, Arno R., on accusations that he had denounced two of his 
comrades to East German and Soviet authorities, who arrested the men in Heiligenstadt before 
their transport could cross into Lower Saxony. Members of the transport made the accusation 
about the denunciation to Friedland authorities immediately after crossing the border, and that 
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evening one of the denounced men arrived in the camp as an illegal border-crosser. Krause 
further explained that the other denounced man, Karl K., arrived at the camp in the evening of 
the following day and sought out the camp administrators to make a statement.490 
Records gathered by the police for charging Arno with crimes against humanity 
(Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit) provide further insight into the case. Karl had been a 
radio operator with a panzer regiment when he fell into Soviet captivity and was imprisoned at a 
camp in Karanganda, Kazakhstan. At the camp, he became acquainted with Arno, with whom he 
often had “differences of opinion” in political debates, particularly over Russia because Arno 
was “Soviet friendly.” Allegedly, the men had another political argument while the transport was 
passing through East Germany, which led to the denunciation and Karl being pulled out of the 
transport a mere 200 meters from the border. Karl claimed that the only reason for his release 
was that the East German interpreter had botched the translation of Arno’s denunciation that 
labeled Karl as a “criminal” who would “deliver propaganda fuel to the Bonn traitor politicians 
through his anti-Soviet agitation and his horror-story propaganda.” Arno further claimed that 
Karl was a “neo-fascist” who had admitted that he would immediately serve the Americans in 
case of a war against the Soviet Union.491 The Friedland police suspected that Arno had made the 
accusations in order to prevent Karl from reaching West Germany where he might report on 
Arno’s activities in the prison camps.492  
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 Despite the overall poor condition of the returning POWs, processing at Friedland was 
also supposed to be a first step toward reintegration into the economy and society. As such, a 
representative from the labor office in Göttingen began to meet with every transport of POWs 
from the Soviet Union in 1948. The camp reserved a barracks in which he could meet with the 
transports’ members to give them career counseling.493 Upon receipt of their D-2 Certificate of 
Discharge, returnees were also entitled to a release allowance (Entlassungsgeld) of 40 DM.494 In 
the 1950s, the allowance rose to 150 DM.495 Returnees also received a suit, shoes, and other 
clothing at no cost to them.496 
The Lower Saxon government directed city welfare agencies to set up returnee assistance 
offices in 1948. The government felt that such offices were necessary to ease the accommodation 
of the expected flood of returnees from the Soviet Union. These offices were to help returnees 
with finding work and housing, complete their registration with the city, hand out ration cards, 
search for lost family members, and provide guidance on medical care.497 In order to accelerate 
the POWs’ return to employment and “due position the community” (ordnungsmäßigen Platz in 
der Gemeinschaft), the Lower Saxon Minister for De-Nazification ordered that the local 
committees prioritize cases for returnees released after July 31, 1948, and not delay their 
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decisions.498 It is not clear how much of an obstacle de-Nazification actually was, but Lower 
Saxon authorities clearly wished to clear away potential hurdles for returnees. 
 Reintegration into home communities and employment still proved difficult for the 
returning POWs. The staff at Friedland certainly worked hard to make reception a positive 
experience for the returnees. Yet, that was also a relatively simple undertaking because arrival at 
Friedland was a generally happy, discrete first-step in a much longer and more complicated 
process. Housing shortages, bureaucratic hurdles, and the variable strength of the labor market 
all caused problems and disappointment for returnees. Worse, “returnees were often barred from 
taking up physically demanding labor” due to the ruination of their health in prison camps at a 
time when “hard manual labor remained the predominant form of occupation.”499 Gender norms 
played a significant role in those expectations and disappointments, as Frank Biess has argued: 
“Gainful employment, then, constituted the precondition for reestablishing men’s authorities as 
breadwinners and husbands within reconstituted families.”500 
Of course, complaints also functioned as claims on social aid. A letter from convalescent 
returnees to the Lower Saxon government in 1949 clearly expressed the connection between 
complaint and claim. The returnees at a Hannover hospital wrote, “What actually awaits each 
and every one of us? Not a reception-ready homeland, not a community of all beaten Germans 
steeped in deep ethical and social feelings.” They decried the poor living situations their families 
endured while the men were forced to do “reparations labor” to make good on the “guilt of 
German people.” As such, the returnees demanded “compensation for the reparations we paid.” 
                                                 
498 Rundschreiben Nr 4/48, 29 July 1948, Nds. 100 Acc 142/92 Nr. 4, NHStA. 
499 Biess, Homecomings, 118. 
500 Ibid., 116. 
 197 
They claimed to refuse all charity in favor of that compensation as well as their integration along 
with “expellees and the bombed-out into the people’s body [Volkskörper] of the constitutional 
state through prioritized work allocation and housing opportunities.”501 
A reaction to such demands throughout the Federal Republic, the enactment of the 
Returnee Law (Heimkehrergesetz) in June 1950 provided standard benefits for POWs based on 
several eligibility criteria.502 The law set the release allowance for returnees at 150 DM and 
provided for clothing and basic commodities up to 250 DM in value as a transitional supplement. 
Article 2 of the law mandated that housing offices give priority to returnees and their families. 
Article 3 provided employment protections in the forms of a right to return to prewar jobs and 
protection from dismissal for decreased productivity if the cause of that decrease could be traced 
back to imprisonment or internment. Additional articles required that returnees enjoy priority in 
filling new jobs, allowed for allotment of funds for vocational training, and clarified rules for 
unemployment and health insurance. 
Access to these benefits, however, depended on meeting criteria set forth in Article 1 for 
belonging to one of three eligible groups. The first group consisted of Germans imprisoned 
because of their membership in the military or in a paramilitary (militärähnlich) formation. The 
second group was former military or paramilitary prisoners who had been released from prison 
but were nonetheless forced to work in civil jobs in the detaining country. Third, civilians could 
gain returnee status if they had been interned in a foreign country due to their German citizenship 
or ethnicity (Volkszugehörigskeit), as long as that internment was not due to National Socialist 
activity (nationalsozialistische Betätigung) abroad. In all three cases, the individual faced the 
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further requirement of returning to the Federal Republic within two months of release, excepting 
any period of delay through no fault of one’s own.503 
The eligibility requirements led to disputes because of the nature of the POW groups 
passing through Friedland after 1949. For example, many of the so-called “late returnees” were 
members of the Waffen-SS and persons with war crimes convictions, including collective 
sentences for police and combat engineering units, district commandants, and roughly 20 
different infantry divisions.504 Indeed, it was standard practice that when Soviet soldiers gathered 
prisoners for release from camps, they searched out and removed SS soldiers from the transports. 
In particular, they checked for the blood-type tattoos that would mark soldiers as having been in 
the Waffen-SS.505 Determining these individuals’ eligibility for returnee status proved difficult 
because of not only the disqualifying “National Socialist activities,” but also the question of 
whether an individual was convicted of a specific crime and thus ineligible. Part of registration at 
Friedland included the decision over returnee status, so the camp became involved in a series of 
lawsuits filed by individuals who wished to take advantage of returnee benefits but whom the 
camp administration had ruled as ineligible. 
The lawsuit filed by Jens C. in 1959 illustrates a number of complications with the law’s 
eligibility requirements, especially in cases when returnees had incentive to lie about past crimes. 
According to court documents, Jens claimed that he had served in the Feldgendarmerie (an army 
policing formation) on the eastern front between 1942 and 1945. When his unit was retreating 
from the advancing Red Army in April 1945, according to Jens’s lawsuit, they received orders to 
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“liquidate” a group of Jewish forced laborers who had been sent from Theresienstadt to build 
trenches near the Moravian town of Mikulov/Nikolsburg. Jens claimed that after an argument 
over responsibility between German police, the commandant, and the gendarmerie (the 
Sicherheitsdienst unit responsible for the labor detachment had disappeared), he was ordered to 
carry out the executions. 506 
In his own defense, Jens argued that he had refused the order several times. He claimed 
that in addition to the argument over responsibility, he had tried to avoid taking part by 
suggesting that the “elimination” (Ausschaltung) of laborers building tank traps would be 
sabotage against the army. After his third and final refusal, Jens alleged that the adjutant to the 
district commandant had threatened to hold a summary court-martial and shoot him, at which 
point he sought out two other police officers to help carry out the shootings. After the war, Jens 
assumed a false identity but was caught and imprisoned in East Berlin in 1949. Initially 
sentenced to death by a Soviet military tribunal, his sentence was commuted to life in prison 
sometime later. In December 1955, East German authorities released Jens from a Brandenburg 
prison to Friedland, where Jens received returnee status and his release allowance.507 
Surviving documentation does not reveal the account that Jens told workers at Friedland 
during his registration. Eleanore Lappin-Eppel’s summary of the executions based on records 
from a 1949 trial in Austria and a 1967 trial in Czechoslovakia, however, presents a more 
damning interpretation of events. First, it seems that the commander of the town’s police 
(Schutzpolizei) had decided at the end of 1944 that the 21 Hungarian Jews working at an 
“Aryanized” brick factory should eventually be executed to prevent them from seeking 
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vengeance after liberation. The approach of the Red Army in April 1945 forced the issue, 
because a police officer became alarmed that the Jewish slave laborers could make denunciations 
to the Soviets. At that point, the SS-Feldgendarm Jens C. “took the initiative” and asked the 
county director (Kreisleiter) if the slave laborers should be evacuated or shot. The Kreisleiter 
ordered the executions, and on April 14, 1945, Jens informed the police commander and asked 
for four police officers to help with the executions. An exhumation of the mass grave in 
November 1945 revealed that in addition to shooting some of the victims, the executioners had 
also “knocked them into the grave, stunned them with the stocks of their rifles, and buried them 
so that they would die of suffocation.” A court in Vienna convicted three of the police officers in 
1949, though they only received sentences to hard labor ranging from 1.5 to 3.5 years.508  
 In 1956, the welfare office in Hamburg became aware of the further details regarding 
Jens’s imprisonment. Among the charges for living under a false identity, there was also a 
bigamy conviction for marrying under his assumed identity. The welfare office in Hamburg 
decided that Jens’s imprisonment had been for bigamy, which would not fit criteria for returnee 
status. The Friedland camp administration revoked the status per the office’s request. That 
decision in 1956 spawned years of litigation revolving around the reasons for his arrest. 
According to the Hamburg government, Jens had first received returnee status based on the claim 
that the Soviet military government, not the East German government, had arrested him for the 
“shooting of civilians in execution of a military order.” For Friedland’s part, camp director Franz 
Freßen argued that such an execution was a clear crime that did not fall under provisions of the 
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Returnee Law. Freßen wrote that if they had known in December 1955 that “the plaintiff had 
shot to death civilians (Jews), who had nothing to do with warfare, then it would never even have 
come to recognition in accordance with the Returnee Law.” Although Jens lost a lawsuit in 1957, 
the administrative court in Hildesheim decided for him in 1959, rejecting the Hamburg 
authorities’ argument that he had been imprisoned for bigamy. Instead, the court found that his 
imprisonment had been due to execution of a military order: 
The reason for the plaintiff’s imprisonment by the Soviet occupation authority [in 1949] 
was the shooting of Jews in Nikolsburg. This shooting was carried out by the plaintiff on 
9 April 1945 during the war and in his capacity as a sergeant in the field gendarmerie. 
The plaintiff was thus arrested and detained due to his activities as a soldier in the scope 
of his then formation. The plaintiff’s later offenses cannot change this conclusion. 
Therefore, there were and are the qualifications for plaintiff’s recognition as a returnee. 
The plaintiff’s [1955] recognition as a returnee therefore did not occur through a legal 
error [rechtsirrtümlich].509 
 
As a result, the court compelled the camp to reinstate Jens’s recognition as a returnee. 
Authorities recognized relatively early on that the understanding of wartime 
imprisonment needed be expanded to account for women who had not served in the military but 
had nevertheless been sent to forced labor camps. Karen Hagemann is correct to emphasize that 
more women served in the Wehrmacht and were Holocaust perpetrators than has previously been 
recognized. In addition to Red Cross nurses who occupy the public imagination, some 500,000 
women served in the Wehrmacht, including “160,000 who as flak helpers were directly involved 
in combat.”510 Yet, civilians such as Red Cross nurses, laborers from the Bund Deutscher Mädel, 
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and ethnic Germans residing in Eastern Europe were more problematic in terms of decisions 
about conferring returnee status. In July 1948, the first women’s transport from Siberia reached 
Friedland, and it consisted of a mixture of civilians and women’s auxiliary clerks, all of whom 
had done “men’s work” in mines.511 Subsequently in August, the German Red Cross engaged in 
discussions with Lower Saxon ministries over equal benefits for men and women released at 
Friedland.512 In November, the Prisoner of War Committee of the Zonal Advisory Council 
announced that Friedland would issue D-2 certificates to female civilian internees, meaning that 
these women would enjoy the same benefits as their male, military counterparts.513 The Returnee 
Law of 1950, of course, provided for benefits to civil internees regardless of gender. 
Women who had been civil internees nevertheless experienced difficulties in obtaining 
returnee status. Administrative lawsuits against the Friedland camp for wrongful rejection of 
returnee status demonstrate that women had difficulty proving that they had actually been 
interned and that their internment was connected to the war or their nationality. Such was the 
case for one woman who sued the camp in 1957, arguing that she had actually been imprisoned 
as a German rather than just forcibly committed to a medical asylum.514 
The recognition of now-grown children as returnees likewise challenged adult male-
centered notions of returnee status. In 1956, a woman sued the camp for recognition as a 
returnee. Court records reveal that the camp administrators denied her initial application, because 
they did not think confinement to a children’s home in postwar Yugoslavia constituted 
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internment. The court reaffirmed that a children’s home could not be considered a form of 
“internment,” but it concluded that the particular children’s home had been located within an 
internment camp, meaning she qualified as a returnee.515 
“Resettlers” from Poland 
 On March 3, 1950, a standoff developed along the Thuringian-Lower Saxon border 
between Russian authorities, British soldiers, and West German customs officials. At issue were 
hundreds of resettlers from Poland whose names did not appear on official resettlement lists for 
the population transfer codenamed Operation Link. About seven hundred resettlers waited in the 
cold for transfer to Friedland while border officials tried to determine their instructions and a 
British officer met with his Russian counterparts. Eventually Lower Saxon Minister for Refugees 
Heinrich Albertz declared to the press: “Gentlemen, the explanation I have to give is short. 
General Robertson has refused to accept the transport.”516 
Later in the afternoon, Albertz won tacit permission from the British customs inspector to 
deliver some supplies to the waiting transport. Eventually, Albertz secured permission to bring 
over all of the resettlers with the understanding that those with the proper permits would be 
processed normally and those without the permits would be processed as illegal border-crossers. 
Albertz concluded a memorandum defending his actions by noting that the entire event took on a 
tragic air in front of countless reporters when a refugee “climbing out of an omnibus at the 
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Russian gate, after weakening during the days-long transport and finally reaching his goal, and 
after waiting for hours without provisions, collapsed dead.”517 
 The events of March 3 raise a series of questions about British and German attitudes 
toward the possibility of further mass displacement. First, what were the origins of this particular 
resettlement program and how did it develop into conflict between German, British, and Polish 
authorities? Second, what were the demographic characteristics of the resettler transports? Third, 
how did differing interpretations of humanitarian imperatives affect British and German 
responses to the crisis at a policy level, and how did each side employ a language of 
humanitarianism in advocating its approach? 
 In contrast to assumptions that Potsdam-sanctioned expulsions had been comprehensive, 
the Polish government had not completed a clean sweep of German populations by 1949. Aside 
from the arbitrariness of a mass undertaking such as the expulsions, according to Carl Kordell, 
the Polish government forced three different groups of Germans to remain in Poland for years 
after the war. The first group consisted of German citizens from the interwar German territory 
(Reichsdeutsche) who fit criteria for expulsion but were kept due to their technical expertise. The 
second group was comprised of Reichsdeutsche whom the Polish government viewed as 
“Polonized.” Third were ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) subject to imprisonment and forced 
labor. A Polish census in 1950 revealed the presence of some 1.1 million persons who had held 
German citizenship in 1945.518 
 In 1948 and 1949, the International Red Cross helped to broker an agreement between the 
West German, British, and Polish authorities for the transfer of 25,000 of those remaining 
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Germans. According to a circular from the Red Cross Search Service in Hamburg, the Warsaw 
delegation of the International Red Cross had begun to advertise the possibility of resettlement in 
West Germany during the summer of 1949. Interested persons were to register with the Working 
Group of the Red Cross in Germany, which would make the necessary arrangements for permits 
and so forth in the British zone. At the start of August, the program had reached the point that 
transports of 1,000 persons each were ready to commence for the 25,000 people who fell under 
Category A (those with immediate family able to house them). Each transport had a distribution 
list for its members that gave their destinations from the state down to county and community 
levels. The British military government, however, delayed the transports with the argument that 
the new federal government needed to attend to the matter. On September 20, Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer declared the Federal Republic’s willingness to accept Germans still residing in Eastern 
Europe, and in early November he sought and received approval from the Allied High 
Commission for Germany to begin the transport of Category A members.519 
 Despite the creation of the Federal Republic and dissolution of the Allied Control 
Council, the western occupation powers still controlled key policy areas through the Occupation 
Statute and the Allied High Commission for Germany. In addition to matters of demilitarization, 
control of Ruhr industries, and foreign relations, the High Commission also reserved authority 
over “displaced persons [verschleppte Personen] and the reception of refugees.”520 Thus, the 
nascent federal government needed to secure permission from the High Commission for the 
reunification program. On November 28, the Federal Republic received approval for the 
acceptance of the 25,000 Germans from Poland as well as some 20,000 more Germans from 
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Czechoslovakia. Conditional for this approval was that the persons “exclusively belong to 
Category A and have relatives in West Germany.” The Allied High Commission agreed to the 
reception of these persons on an individual basis rather than as collective transports. Presumably, 
that was meant to ease the rejection of individuals without the necessary permits instead of 
accepting entire transports and needing to resolve the status of unpermitted resettlers.521 
 By accepting only resettlers belonging to Category A, the High Commission’s agreement 
was meant to prevent the arrival of individuals from two categories that would be more difficult 
to resettle. Because Category A consisted of persons with “closest family (spouses, relatives in 
ascending and descending line, and in exceptional cases siblings),” their families rather than the 
state would theoretically be responsible for housing and other immediate needs.522 Members of 
Categories B and C, however, might require more immediate state support. Category B consisted 
of persons with “second degree” or more distant family relations and who did not possess as 
residence permit. Members of Category C had neither relatives nor a residence permit. Lacking a 
residence permit or close family with whom they might live, B and C cases among the resettlers 
needed to be treated as any other refugees without immediate family to care for them. In 
recognition of that burden, the British and American zones, which had been hardest hit by the 
initial postwar displacement, were to receive only 20 percent each of the B and C cases when it 
became apparent that West Germany would accept them in spite of their initial exclusion from 
the operation. The French zone was responsible for the remaining 60 percent of those cases.523 
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 Sending most of the difficult cases to areas relatively unaffected by displaced Germans 
did not completely relieve the harder-hit regions. Indeed, the initial conditions for the program 
meant that areas already housing the largest proportion of expellees from Poland would 
necessarily receive the most people seeking reunification with family members. The 
disproportional impact was not lost on local communities. In an August 1949 memorandum to 
Lower Saxony’s refugee ministry, the director for Nienburg County expressed fears of once 
again being overrun with refugees. Having examined the list of 742 people arriving for family 
reunification, county officials concluded that they would receive over 500 more people than 
typical counties.524 The high number of assignments to Nienburg is consistent with census 
records for Lower Saxony showing that the population of expellees, refugees, and evacuees in 
Nienburg County (along with most counties in the eastern half of the state) was between 73 and 
100 percent of the size of the native population.525 
A further problem with the lists was that they underrepresented the number of people 
needing housing. The county director in Nienburg complained that upon closer examination of 
the lists, his administration had discovered that a single person on the list would create a 
residency entitlement for more family members not yet in the West. For example, the community 
of Seiden was officially supposed to receive three persons, “but there are, however, 22 persons to 
be expected,” something typical of migration chains. Based on their calculations, local officials 
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feared that the initial 742 refugees could quickly become 2,000 or 3,000 in total. The county 
director also explained that their search for usable mass quarters had failed, because one of the 
local refugee camps housed DPs while the other housed tuberculosis-infected DPs, and the 
former munitions depot was in poor shape after demilitarization work. In a sign of future 
problems with the lists at the arrival of the first transport in March 1950, discussions with the 
refugees living in Nienburg County revealed that some of their relatives had decided not to 
resettle after all. The country director suggested that the Red Cross and Polish authorities needed 
to reconfirm individuals’ desire to immigrate before the program began. The memorandum 
concluded by warning that the refugees from Poland “will have to be housed at the expense of 
the refugees already living here.”526 
 Rumors about the transports’ size as well as delays caused further confusion and concern 
for refugee authorities. In January 1950, officials with the state refugee ministry expected that 
the first transports would arrive on the fifteenth of the month. The Red Cross Search Service had 
also warned the refugee ministry that the number of Germans wishing to resettle in the area of 
the British zone had risen from 25,000 to over 42,000 people. It was an open question whether 
all of the incoming persons qualified as having “closest relatives,” but the Federal Ministry for 
Refugees declared that it was determined to accept those who did not meet that criterion.527 Then 
the transports did not arrive, and in early February the Lower Saxon Ministry for Refugees told 
the authorities for the state’s governing districts to expect transports in early March. In the 
meantime and in anticipation of problems with Categories B and C, the governing district 
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authorities were supposed to provide the Friedland camp with lists of Category A persons 
already approved for resettlement in order to quickly clear the camp of the easy cases.528 
 The British claimed to have been taken by surprise when the first transport arrived on 
March 3, 1950. In a protest sent to Polish authorities, the British ambassador explained that after 
approval of the program in December, the High Commission had delegated negotiations to its 
permit officer in Warsaw. Negotiations stalled in early February, and the British embassy in 
Warsaw enquired about the program. Polish authorities informed them that they “intended to 
discontinue discussions with the Allied High Commission Permit Officer and to include these 
25,000 Germans in a transfer of refugees to Eastern Germany.” The embassy informed the High 
Commission about the discontinuation, and neither received word about the transports until 
information “reached the Land Authorities in Hesse and Lower Saxony simultaneously that a 
first train bringing refugees from Poland would arrive on the border of the Federal Republic on 
3rd or 4th of March and that it was intended that a similar train should arrive at each of two border 
points every four days for the remainder of the year.” A calculation based on the number of 
registered and unregistered resettlers, the train’s capacity, and the supposed frequency of arriving 
transports led to British fears that as many as 180,000 resettlers might arrive over the course of 
the year.529 
 In their protests to Poland, the Western powers engaged a language of humanitarianism to 
strengthen their position. The British complained that any such mass transfer “would be both 
arbitrary and inhumane,” while emphasizing that their initial agreement to a transfer of 25,000 
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individuals had been a “humanitarian concession.”530 In addition to explicit claims that the 
British had fulfilled their obligations under the Potsdam Agreement, such language of arbitrary 
and inhumane transfers made an implicit case for the illegality of further transfers under the 
principles set forth at Potsdam. The American protest likewise noted that the acceptance of the 
original 25,000 resettlers only had been undertaken as an “exception on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds,” and the entry of individuals on that list could still occur “as an extra-
ordinary and humanitarian move.”531 Both documents made clear that the border would be shut 
for any additional resettlers. 
 Although the official protest did not make any accusations about Polish motivations, the 
British press reported that its government thought that Poles planned to destabilize West 
Germany. Articles particularly focused on the High Commission’s fear for German economic 
stability if masses of resettlers began to move through Friedland. The Times of London 
suggested that the transfer was part a larger Eastern Bloc effort to “embarrass the West German 
economy by adding to the number who have to be fed and supported.”532 The Manchester 
Guardian reported that the British government regarded the Polish government’s actions as “a 
deliberate attempt to undermine the economy of the Western zones.”533 
 The Polish government responded with a sharp protest of its own against the British. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that Polish authorities were “aiming at the reunion of 
German families based on an understanding concluded between the Polish Government and the 
Provisional Government of the German Democratic Republic, as the German authority 
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recognised by the Polish Government.” What the GDR did with the transports after receiving 
them was “not the matter for the Polish authorities.” The note continued with the accusation that 
the British alone had been responsible for “regrettable incident of the 3rd March.” The Polish 
government also engaged with a language of humanitarianism to defend itself and criticize the 
British. According to the note, the Polish government had acted out of “humanitarian 
considerations” in arranging the transports to reunite families in the GDR. The foreign ministry 
expressed that it was “astonished at the Embassy’s attempt to justify the inhuman orders” to 
refuse the first transport. With respect to the threatened closure of the border to any future 
transports, “The Ministry cannot qualify the action foreshadowed in the Note otherwise than as 
an anti-humanitarian action.”534 
 The composition of the first transport gave British authorities the basis for their belief 
that the Polish government was attempting to destabilize the West German economy. Only 20 
percent of the March 3 transport’s members appeared on the official resettlement lists.535 
Combined with the miscommunication before the transport’s arrival, that low percentage of 
registered persons gave the British reason to suspect that the Polish were attempting something 
underhanded. Given the concern from local German administrators about having the space 
necessary for only those persons listed on the official manifests, fears of being overwhelmed 
with unregistered resettlers required no great leap. 
Further adding to British fears, the first transport contained a large proportion of groups 
incapable of work and in need of extra state assistance, including children and the elderly. 
According to the medical report for the transport, “the proportion of men is too low” with 360 
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women and 115 children (under 14 years old) compared to only 198 men. The camp medical 
staff also found that “the work-capable age groups are particularly poorly represented,” while 
there were many elderly resettlers, who mostly were traveling alone. Although the work-capable 
men and women were generally well nourished, the children and elderly were in “mostly poor” 
condition.536 Children would require additional resources from communities for their education. 
According to a memorandum from the state refugee ministry, the area around Szczecin/Stettin 
under Soviet occupation was the only place with German-language schools, so children from the 
rest of Poland whose parents had not taught them speech and writing at home were often unable 
to communicate in German.537 
Figure 5: Changes in Refugee and Resettler Traffic, 1945-1960538 
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British fears about the overrepresentation of the elderly and those incapable of manual 
labor proved true for transports later in the 1950s as well. For example, the plurality of resettlers 
arriving in 1956 (38 percent) consisted of persons over 60 years old, slightly more than the total 
belonging to the working age groups of 22 to 40 years and 40 to 60 years (respectively 12 and 25 
percent).539 Older resettlers tended to arrive from Masuria, while many resettlers from the mining 
region of Silesia would likewise be incapable of work, as they suffered from “extreme silicosis.” 
Children from Silesia showed signs of “developmental disorders and malnutrition.”540 The 
camp’s medical staff, however, noted a general improvement in the resettlers’ health in 1957. 
The age divide based on region nevertheless continued that year. The elderly resettlers tended to 
come from the areas of East Prussia incorporated into the Polish state, while young resettlers, the 
number of which had increased, tended to come from Silesia. Cases of silicosis nevertheless 
remained “high” among the Silesian resettlers.541 
Though confronted with the possibility of being inundated with the elderly and persons 
otherwise incapable of work, German politicians and the press nevertheless argued for the 
accommodation of resettlers on humanitarian grounds. This inclusive reaction stemmed from a 
sense of obligation to care for co-nationals, no matter the potential difficulties. Indeed, the poor 
or infirm condition of resettlers that fueled British fears about economic dislocation instead 
functioned as a crucial point of sympathy in German criticism of the British decision to refuse 
the transport. Deprivation and suffering in Poland played a key role in arguments that a 
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humanitarian imperative required the Federal Republic to accept the resettlers. On the one hand, 
the British had argued that it was not humane to cast aside regulation, thereby encouraging 
further mass expulsion and forcing resettlers on communities unable to care for them. The West 
German position, on the other hand, was that strictly holding to regulations produced the more 
inhumane consequence of leaving suffering Germans standing outside at the door. 
Two articles published respectively by Hannover and Göttingen newspapers typify 
sympathetic portrayals of the refused resettlers. In a report published on March 4, the 
Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung described the situation on the border and the reasons for the 
British refusal despite their role in negotiating the population transfer in the first place. The 
report’s final paragraph discussed the hardships the group had faced during the intervening years. 
Most had come from a camp in Leszno near Poznań/Posen, where “they had been sent to work 
for farmers without reimbursement since 1947.” It went on to note, “an older resettler suffered a 
heart attack when the transport assembled behind the Soviet sentry gate.” Childhood innocence 
and deprivation under the Polish government also played prominent roles. The article explained 
that children had not been allowed to learn German, and it also recounted the common story of a 
journalist who gave oranges to the arriving children. After receiving the fruit, they thanked him 
“for the nice, colorful potatoes.”542 
 A few days later, the Göttinger Tageblatt published a profile of the Büttner family who 
had been fortunate to cross the border. The article explained that the family’s triumphant entry 
into West Germany largely resulted from their comparatively good financial situation in Poland. 
When they reached the border, the family had the appropriate entry visa from the High 
Commission, but procuring it had been difficult. The author wrote sardonically, “Any German 
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living in Poland could have this paper, if he had the money to repeatedly travel to Warsaw and to 
pay for the countless certificates and finally the fee of 800 zloty for the permit.”543 The article 
went on to celebrate Josef Büttner’s “sharpness” (Pfiffigkeit) in obtaining the necessary 
documents for his family, but it also lamented the slow process of sorting through the list of 
remaining persons. German bureaucrats were not at fault for the delay, as the author praised the 
sixteen customs officials who were working “feverishly” to produce an alphabetical list of 
authorized resettlers. Rather, fault lay with the Polish offices that had handed over an 
“arbitrarily” organized list.544 
 Lower Saxon Refugee Minister Heinrich Albertz became a fixture in the German press 
and de facto spokesperson for accepting all individuals from the incoming transports. In contrast 
to the British, Albertz favored a more inclusive humanitarianism that likely stemmed from his 
previous training as a pastor and which was defined by a German obligation to care for this new 
wave of their ethnic brethren.545 Articles often included statements from him that made clear his 
displeasure with Robertson’s interdiction and his opinion that West Germans had a duty to come 
to their ethnic counterparts’ aid. A report of the first day’s standoff in the Essener Tageblatt 
featured Albertz, who beseeched the English border officer to allow the waiting group through. 
The article let the officer’s response speak for itself: “‘No,’ said the intimidated guard, ‘that 
won’t do. I have my orders…’”546 That day Albertz also supposedly remarked, “Ask General 
                                                 
543 “Sie durchbrachen den Sicherheitsgürtel,” Göttinger Tageblatt, 9 March 1950. 
544 Ibid. 
545 On Albertz’s life experiences and their effects on his outlook as refugee minister, see Rainhard Rohde, "Heinrich 
Albertz und Erich Schellhaus: Zwei Flüchtlingspolitiker der ersten Stunde," in Zwischen Heimat und Zuhause: 
Deutsche Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in (West-) Deutschland 1945-2000, ed. by Rainer Schulze, Rainhard Rohde 
and Rainer Voss (Osnabrück: Secolo Verlag, 2001), 126-40. 
546 “Die ersten aus Polen,” Essener Tageblatt, 4 March 1950. 
 216 
Robertson if he wants to treat human beings in the same way as the Russians treat goods.”547 A 
week later, he wrote to Die Welt and again decried the instructions from the High Commission 
that weighed on the “backs of the weakest, and divest people coming from terrible suffering of 
their last dignity.”548 
At the end of March, Albertz resumed his attacks on the British. He claimed, “what is 
grotesque about the Allied attitude is that those who signed the Potsdam Agreement without 
batting an eyelash and tolerated the expulsion of millions now in the last phase raise their 
objections.” Albertz argued that the incoming transports had nothing to do with mass expulsions 
from Poland but rather consisted of German nationals who had worked for years to secure their 
transfer to West Germany. Finally, according to a report, “The Minister turned against the Allied 
argumentation that the Polish side intended to ‘burst the West German economy’ through this 
resettlement.”549 For Albertz, there was no question that the Federal Republic needed to accept 
resettlers irrespective of economic considerations. 
Albertz was not alone in linking resettlers’ suffering with a humanitarian obligation to 
accept them. In parliamentary debate on March 23, Doctor Fritz Wenzel, an expellee and SPD 
delegate to the Bundestag from Lower Saxony, inveighed against the British refusal to allow the 
entry of all Germans wishing to resettle from Poland and Czechoslovakia. He argued that the 
resettlers had lived under “particular suffering, difficulties, and need” and in so doing, had 
suffered “outwardly and inwardly, bodily and psychologically, longer and under more repressive 
circumstances” than earlier expellees. According to Wenzel, the resettlers had a “moral and 
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humanitarian demand” (moralischer und menschlicher Anspruch) for accommodation in the 
Federal Republic. He continued that aside from “ethical or religious sympathy,” there was no 
humanitarian reason to refuse their accommodation, so it was “impossible to leave these German 
brothers and sisters standing outside the door.”550 
Adenauer and the CDU also opposed the rejection of resettlers who did not appear on the 
officially sanctioned lists. During the March 23 debate, Federal Expellee Minister Hans 
Lukaschek reiterated Adenauer’s protest to the Allied High Commission that “due to 
humanitarian reasons [Gründen der Menschlichkeit], he was not in the position to rebuff those 
arriving from the border.” Lukaschek further explained that such persons were being sent to less-
occupied states based on his own authority to give directives (Weisungsrecht). Another CDU 
delegate, Doctor Hermann Götz from Hessen, labeled the British rejection as “indefensible from 
a humane standpoint.” Much like Albertz, Götz referenced the Potsdam-sanction expulsions in 
his criticism of the British who had contributed to the problem that “ultimately has its origins in 
the English-signed Potsdam Agreement.” Götz also noted that as long as the Federal Republic 
accepted foreign asylum-seekers from communist Eastern Europe without need for preapproved 
residence permits, Germans from Eastern Europe must be afforded the same right.551 
At the policy level, the acceptance of unregistered resettlers from Poland turned into a 
contest of wills between the Federal Republic and the British High Commissioner, General Sir 
Brian Robertson. In a memorandum sent to the Lower Saxon Minister President Hinrich Kopf 
chastising his SPD Minister Heinrich Albertz for mischaracterizing the official position of the 
Federal Republic, Chancellor Adenauer explained that the Allied High Commissioners had 
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petitioned the Cabinet of Germany (Bundesregierung) to refuse the transports from Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, German officials had “taken no measures in this direction.” 
Instead, Adenauer had informed the High Commissioners that the “Bundesregierung has no way 
to prevent them from crossing the border and that it considers such an action [refusal of 
transports] as incorrect.”552 
At the camp level, German civil authorities tried to win over British officers while also 
sidestepping Robertson’s order against accepting resettlers missing from Operation Link lists. A 
memorandum sent by camp director Richard Krause to Lukaschek indicates that German 
officials had impressed upon British army officers who oversaw the border that accepting the 
transports was necessary. These border officers were in turn working to convince Robertson to 
rescind his orders.553 In the meantime, it seems that Friedland received and distributed 
unregistered resettlers as “illegal border-crossers,” which led to arguments with the British 
border officers who nevertheless felt compelled try to enforce Robertson’s decree.554 
The dispute over unregistered resettlers came to a quiet resolution in April and May 
1950. A memorandum in the Lower Saxon State Chancellery regarding an April 21 meeting 
between Adenauer and Robertson reveals that Robertson unofficially committed to the reception 
of such persons. That unofficial agreement, however, was contingent upon the American and 
French High Commissioners agreeing to regulations concerning the distribution of unregistered 
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persons.555 A subsequent memorandum from May indicated the Allied High Commission’s 
agreement to accept that group.556 It is not clear the whether Robertson had individually driven 
the British side of the conflict, but later in the summer and after Robertson’s departure from the 
High Commission, the British attitudes toward the program warmed considerably. In August, the 
High Commissioner for Refugees, C. Pearman-Wilson, explicitly stated his “personal and 
complete understanding” that German authorities needed to do everything possible to 
accommodate Germans displaced from Poland.557 
West German reception of resettlers also depended on cooperation with East German 
authorities. According to Richard Krause’s explanation to a conference of Lower Saxony’s 
district refugee authorities, when a transport from Poland arrived in the GDR, East German 
officials sent a manifest to the camp. Resettlers on the Operation Link lists immediately received 
a residence permit for the Federal Republic and were transported to Heiligenstadt for handover at 
the German-German border. East German authorities held the rest of the transports’ members in 
five “quarantine camps.” Personnel at Friedland contacted the German Red Cross Search 
Services with which many resettlers had registered even though those resettlers did not appear on 
the Operation Link lists. Typically, the camp received an answer from the Red Cross within a 
few hours, and persons in their registration lists also received a residence permit.558 
Camp administrators and representatives from the federal states at Friedland were left to 
resolve the difficult cases of resettlers who had no registration whatsoever. These persons needed 
to wait for the camp administrators to contact the community directors where they wished to 
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resettle. The directors determined if family there could accommodate them. If so, then they too 
received a residence permit. If not, due to lack of space or family, they fell under the 
responsibility of the Federal Ministry for Expellees, which presumably determined resettlement 
in accordance with a refugee distribution key. This regulation for accepting unregistered 
resettlers proved important, because the percentage of resettlers on the official Operation Link 
lists remained low in subsequent transports. Between March and November 1950, the Friedland 
camp processed 27,584 Germans from Poland. Of them, only 16.7 percent appeared in the Polish 
Operation Link lists, while 52 percent appeared on the more inclusive German Red Cross Search 
Service lists.559 
In the end, the resumption of mass expulsions so feared by the British never occurred. 
Although the British concerns were not wholly unreasonable based upon the composition of the 
initial transport, it does not appear that the Polish government ever planned for Operation Link to 
be the starting point for mass expulsion. Friedland processed 34,162 resettlers in 1950, just shy 
of 10,000 more resettlers than in the initial agreement. Thereafter, the Polish government 
actually made emigration more difficult for Germans. In 1951, Friedland received 19,010 
resettlers, but the program came to a near standstill with only 8,200 resettlers total arriving over 
the next four years.560 
Rather than seeking a final sweep of its German population, the Polish government seems 
to have pursued a selective, self-interested transfer. The resettlers sent to the Federal Republic 
consisted of those who had registered for emigration from Poland and with the German Red 
Cross for family reunification and/or were viewed as a drag on the Polish economy. A press 
                                                 
559 Ibid. 
560 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, Anlage 3. 
 221 
release from refugee ministry in Lower Saxony, for example, noted that when larger transports 
resumed in 1955, a third of the resettlers were over 65 years old, but there were no young men in 
the transports.561 Accounts given by resettlers in 1956 suggest that the low resettler numbers 
from 1952 through 1955 were due to the Polish government having made emigration difficult. A 
doctor from Breslau claimed that there were still thousands of Germans in the city wishing to 
emigrate, but they waited on approval of their applications.562 Indeed, in 1956 the Polish Red 
Cross informed the German Red Cross that the Polish government had decided to ease 
emigration restrictions for Germans.563 Another man from Silesia said that he had been trying to 
arrange reunification with his family in West Germany since 1945. Money was another obstacle 
in his case. According to him, the Polish government did not allow Germans to leave with Polish 
currency, so he had needed to spend his savings on furniture, shoes, and other items at high 
prices in the border city of Szczecin/Stettin.564 Thus, for the Polish government, Operation Link 
and the ensuing crisis appear to have been a relatively limited program to allow family 
reunifications and simultaneously remove potential drains on the state. 
 During the crisis, all three sides used the language of humanitarianism to pursue their 
interests. For the Polish government, humanitarianism provided a justification for a program that 
would help its economy. Claims of humanitarianism further functioned as a rhetorical weapon to 
use against the British who tried to block the transports. Of course, reuniting individuals with 
their families did have humanitarian effects, such as psychological wellbeing and enabling 
families to care for relatives in need. British humanitarian protests were connected to regulation. 
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Their line of argumentation, which also paralleled concerns at the local level for German civil 
government, was that regulations protected both communities and resettlers from inhumane 
overcrowding and therefore needed to be respected. Absent a hard-line stance, in the British 
view, Polish authorities might undertake a unilateral program of mass expulsion with terrible 
consequences for displaced Germans and the receiving communities. 
Interestingly, West Germans did not protest the possibility of another mass expulsion. 
Politicians and the press made extensive reference to Potsdam-sanctioned expulsions, 
particularly the British agreement to them, but they did not object to the prospect of Germans 
again being forced to leave their homes. In part, that silence must have reflected an 
acknowledgment that the lost Heimat would not be returned (despite official language that 
continued to refer to “Poland and the Polish-administered German territories”) and that many 
Germans in Poland had already lost their homes in any event. The West German humanitarian 
response was to emphasize their fellow Germans’ urgent needs. Existing regulatory organs 
would mitigate social problems to the extent that it was possible. Aspects of the British concerns 
still appeared in arguments between federal states over quota obligations, but the need to accept 
rather than bar resettlers was not in dispute. British-German policy conflicts thus owed much to 
the differing humanitarian goals of either preventing or ameliorating displacement. 
Foreign Nationals 
 On March 22, 1951, the Gateway to Freedom became the scene of a violent crime. In a 
notice sent to the Lower Saxon Ministry for Refugees, Richard Krause explained that there had 
been a row between Italian and Polish refugees residing in the camp. Thaddäus B. (probably 
Germanized from Tadeusz), a Pole living in the camp with his wife and child while awaiting 
resettlement by the International Relief Organization, came into conflict with Egideo B. Egidio 
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was an Italian who had bounced around North Africa and Europe (his former home near Trieste 
had fallen under Yugoslav control) before being brought to Friedland as an “infiltree” who 
crossed into West Germany illegally. As far as the police could reconstruct the fight, Thaddäus 
had allegedly cursed Egidio as a “macaroni,” “gypsy,” and “shit,” so Egidio punched him in the 
jaw. In an effort to break up the fight, someone held Egidio from behind, whereupon Thaddäus 
struck him back. Egidio called for help from his Hungarian friend, Stefan K. Stefan punched 
Thaddäus, felling him and causing him to strike his head on the ground. Camp police arrested 
Egidio, but Stefan managed to flee on foot. According to the camp doctor’s statement, he arrived 
at 20:30 to find Thaddäus prone on the ground with a hematoma by the left eye, flat breathing, 
and pronounced blood-pressure fluctuation. The doctor transferred Thaddäus to the camp 
medical station, but he feared that transport to a Göttingen hospital would be too dangerous. The 
doctor thus stated that under this grave condition and “despite therapeutic measures,” Thaddäus 
died at 21:50. In agreement with Thaddäus’s “destitute” (mittellos) widow and the police, the 
camp administration arranged and paid for his burial in Göttingen.565 
 This fatal dispute raises a number of issues surrounding the foreign nationals housed at 
Friedland between 1949 and 1952. First are the questions of who these foreigners were and why 
they were residents in a transit camp years after of the war. Second, of course, is the question of 
criminality. The camp administration, charities, and local officials protested against housing the 
various foreign nationals. Accusations of violence and criminality played a central role in 
complaints to the IRO and other authorities, but what were sources of conflict and resentment 
between Germans and the foreigners? Third, how did policy conflicts over the accommodation of 
the foreigners play out and reach a resolution with respect to the camp at Friedland? 
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 The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration repatriated a remarkable 
number of Displaced Persons shortly after World War II. Estimates vary, but as many as 8 to 11 
million former forced and supposedly voluntary laborers, POWs, survivors of the concentration 
and death camp systems, and former Nazi allies were in occupied Germany in 1945. According 
to William Hitchcock, military authorities saw these DPs—officially, “civilians outside the 
national boundaries of their country by reason of war”—as primarily a problem of “security and 
order.”566 With some key exceptions, the Anglo-American military governments sought and 
succeeded in speedy repatriation for these DPs. The Soviet Union likewise demanded the quick 
return of its citizens regardless of those individuals’ wishes. By the end of 1945, UNRRA had 
returned between 6 and 7 million DPs to their home countries. The completion of those initial 
repatriations marked the beginning of what Gary Cohen calls the “second and longer phase of the 
DP episode,” when the International Refugee Organization (the UN successor agency to 
UNRRA) cared for the “last million” refugees from the war and postwar flight from their 
countries.567 
 Several groups constituted this “hardcore” remainder of foreign refugees in occupied 
Germany. Poles brought to Germany as slave and voluntary labor accounted for half of the DPs 
(400,000 Poles total) in March 1946. Between 150,000 and 200,000 persons from the Baltic 
states as well as 150,000 ethnic Ukrainians also proved difficult to resettle and remained in 
Germany in the spring of 1946.568 Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in Germany numbered 
between 60,000 and 70,000 shortly after the capitulation. Their numbers increased as three other 
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groups of Polish-Jewish survivors poured into occupied Germany in response to persecution in 
Poland: camp survivors who returned to their hometowns after liberation, Jews who survived the 
war in Poland as partisans or in hiding, and Jews who had fled from Poland to the Soviet Union 
only to be repatriated after the war.569 Replacing resettled DPs, anti-communist refugees arriving 
from Yugoslavia, Slovakia, and Hungary bolstered the “last million” into the late 1940s.570 For 
all of these groups, resettlement was often complicated by the displaced individuals’ objection to 
repatriation and other countries’ objection to accepting them. 
 Although the facility at Friedland operated as a border transit camp largely used by 
Germans, it also processed some of these displaced foreigners. In addition to DPs passing 
through Friedland as part of the chaotic cross-border traffic shortly after the war, the camp also 
housed two groups of foreign nationals totaling 1,894 individuals between 1949 and 1952.571 The 
first group consisted of refugees who came to Germany without the proper permits. In a 
memorandum to the Lower Saxon Minister President, a high-ranking official from the refugee 
ministry explained that the relief detachment with the British Regional Government Office 
directed the camp to accept “infiltrees” (Infiltrees as a loan-word in German) beginning in 
October 1949. The majority of these infiltrees consisted of former DPs whom the IRO had 
repatriated shortly after the war. In their home countries, these individuals became criminal 
offenders and fled back to Germany. The other two populations among the infiltrees were 
political refugees and immigrants who gave unverifiable reasons for coming to Germany.572  
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According to the refugee ministry official, the infiltrees posed particular bureaucratic 
difficulties. One problem was that the federal government was the only German civil authority 
empowered to make determinations about their status and resettlement. Furthermore, federal 
officials needed to make those determinations in consultation with the Allied High Commission, 
which reserved authority in DP and refugee matters through the Occupation Statute.573 In the 
absence of clear responsibilities or a distribution key for other German states, in March 1950 
Lower Saxon Refugee Minister Albertz refused to order their distribution and integration into the 
Lower Saxon economy until a “general regulation at the federal level can be reached.”574 In 
practice, that meant the transit camp needed to house some of the infiltrees indefinitely, 
particularly if the IRO could not resettle them abroad. In April 1950, the camp accommodated 
roughly 100 infiltrees, a mixture of new arrivals and persons who had been at the camp since 
September 1949.575 The slowing of infiltree traffic meant that the camp still held over 100 
infiltrees in August, despite the administration’s preference to send them away as quickly as 
possible. Lower Saxon officials meanwhile waited for the federal government to find an 
alternative camp in North Rhine-Westphalia.576 At that point, the first infiltrees sent to Friedland 
in September 1949 still accounted for over 20 percent of infiltrees housed in the residential sub-
camp.577 
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At some point in 1950, the outflow of infiltrees from the Friedland camp did increase 
despite continued debates over their classification and distribution as refugees. In part, their 
continuing arrival forced the issue, because as of January 1951 the camp was receiving 40 to 50 
infiltrees per month. While Lower Saxon authorities sought clarification of their responsibilities 
and waited on the establishment of both a distribution key and an alternative camp, the facility at 
Friedland had little choice but to distribute infiltrees according to slow-coming directions from 
the IRO and military government offices. For example, the camp took in 427 infiltrees during the 
reporting period lasting from September 1949 through December 1950. The IRO had managed to 
find oversees accommodation for 83 infiltrees, while Lower Saxon communities accepted 43 of 
them and American offices in Frankfurt employed 29 more infiltrees from the camp. The 
plurality of them (133 infiltrees) had simply left the camp of their own accord, either to escape 
criminal investigations or to join the French Foreign Legion. For example, 27 infiltrees 
implicated in a gang theft fled the camp in May 1950 before judicial procedures against them 
could begin.578 Aside from 6 infiltrees imprisoned for criminal activity, the camp was left 
housing the remaining 133 infiltrees.579 
Interrogation records sent from Friedland to ministry officials in Hannover provide 
further details about individuals’ backgrounds and reasons for entering West Germany. The case 
of Ferenc K. demonstrates the upheaval of the war and postwar years as well as the 
interconnection of political and personal motivations for travelling to Germany. Ferenc was born 
and lived in Nyiregyhaza, Hungary, until September 1943, when he registered for the Nazi labor 
administration Organization Todt and was assigned to an engineering firm in Dresden. That firm 
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sent him to Yugoslavia, Greece, and Hungary to do surveying work until he was released from 
his duties in Vienna in April 1945. He fled from the Red Army to Kufstein in Austrian Tyrol 
before returning to Hungary in July 1945. There he worked various odd jobs, but Ferenc ran into 
trouble because he had applied for membership in the Communist Party to improve his 
employment prospects. When the Party began to check its membership rolls, Ferenc fled to 
Austria in 1948. Ferenc told camp officials that he lacked acceptable “identification” for the war 
years. After a stint in a Viennese refugee camp, he crossed into the western zone of Germany on 
his way to Brussels. After a couple of years there, he abandoned his plan to emigrate to family in 
Canada, so the Brussels IRO cut him off and he crossed into West Germany illegally near 
Aachen. The Frankfurt IRO office where he registered himself sent him to a refugee camp, 
which then sent him to Friedland, where he told officials that he had decided to go to Canada 
after all.580 
The account that Sergei S. gave for his illegal entry into West Germany illustrates the 
complications presented by a political refugee who did not understand his flight as a political act. 
Sergei was born in Karachev, Russia, in January 1928 and lived there until German invasion and 
occupation in 1941, when his family moved to a nearby village. In April 1945 the Soviet 
government resettled him and his mother to Crimea. In 1948, Sergei was drafted into Red Army 
and after four months in artillery school, he was deployed to a garrison outside of Potsdam. 
Army life did not suit Sergei. According to him, he reached his breaking point in 1951 when he 
could not determine how much longer his tour would last. So, he deserted his tank unit on 
February 8 and fled to the Royal Air Force Station at Gatow just outside of Berlin. After 
interrogation there, the British brought Sergei to Minden and then Bielefeld for further 
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interrogation. Months later, the British military took him to the Hannover IRO, which referred 
him to the state refugee ministry.581 
Sergei finally received his assignment to Friedland from the refugee ministry in 
Hannover and was registered in the camp on August 16, 1951. In October, he was assigned to an 
IRO emigration camp near Lübeck, but Sergei returned to Friedland after his bid to emigrate to 
Canada failed in November. During his second stint at Friedland, Sergei expressed an interest in 
returning to Russia if the communist government fell. He also wished to move to Munich where 
a group of Russian anti-communists was active. Sergei did not, however, understand his 
defection as a political act, but rather he explicitly stated that he had never thought about 
communism and had never belonged to the Communist Party. He claimed that he deserted 
because he had not felt an “inner bond” (innere Verbindung) to the army. It is possible that 
Sergei was telling camp officials what he thought they would want to hear, but his case helps to 
show how infiltrees’ political motivations and cases for asylum could take different forms.582 
Former DPs composed the second group of foreign nationals housed at Friedland. Some 
of these ex-DPs, as German officials termed them, had lost their official status once they had 
completed work contracts in Western Europe. For countries facing labor shortfalls due to 
wartime casualties, DPs offered a potentially valuable pool of workers. According to Gary 
Cohen, the IRO’s “main task was to orchestrate migration movements to meet the manpower 
needs or humanitarian proclivities of host counties.”583 Postwar hardships meant that countries 
were more interested in meeting labor needs than taking on burdensome refugee groups. As such, 
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the IRO “advertised DPs as a reservoir of skillful and industrious workers,” and DP camps 
proved attractive to recruiters because they functioned as centralized labor markets. The French 
population minister Robert Prigent noted, “it will be easy to examine the refugees regrouped in 
the camps according to their professional ability, physical shape, social background, and 
behavior.”584 The Belgian program named “Operation Black Diamond” served as a model for 
Britain’s “Westward Ho!” and France’s “French Metropolitan Scheme,” and it entailed two-year 
labor contracts for the hardest mining tasks before participants could seek easier work. 
Unsurprisingly, these conditions proved undesirable for DP laborers, and 8,000 of the 32,000 
working in Belgium returned to Germany after their contracts’ expiration.585 Officials in the host 
countries also became dissatisfied with the DP guest-worker programs later in the 1940s when 
they began to see DPs as a “problem of ‘surplus population’ hampering the stability of the 
continent and the prospect of European integration.”586 
From the German perspective, the return of workers after contract expiration was a matter 
of neighboring countries using Germany as a dumping ground for unwanted, problem 
populations in a sometimes-illegal manner. Indeed, the manner by which some DP workers 
returned to Germany therefore blurred the lines between ex-DPs and infiltrees. In July 1950, for 
example, the “military government” (likely meaning a refugee office for the Allied High 
Commission) ordered the camp at Friedland to register and accommodate three Polish men. The 
men had worked under official migrant labor programs in Belgium and the Netherlands, but they 
had nowhere to go once their contracts expired and were not renewed, so they had crossed into 
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Germany illegally. The camp administration planned to send them as either to an unnamed DP 
camp as either infiltrees or DPs.587 
In another case, Belgian police literally shoved a problem case, a Romanian man named 
Emil C., over to Germany. He had fled to Belgium via Hungary, Austria, and West Germany 
because of past imprisonment for having taken driving jobs without Romanian authorities’ 
permission and persecution following his release. It is also possible that he was fleeing additional 
problems in connection to revenge against a competitor who had denounced him. Emil did not 
mention any additional charges, but during his questioning at Friedland he bragged that he 
“settled the score” (abgerechnet) with the denouncer before leaving Romania. In any event, 
according to him, he tried to register with the police after his arrival Belgium, but they arrested 
him and held him for 20 days. To release him, the Belgian police brought Emil to the German 
border and “shoved him off” (abgeschoben) in the direction of Aachen. The administration at 
Friedland initially refused to receive Emil, but it had to accept him when he returned three days 
later with an assignment from the Allied High Commission office in Hannover.588 
Other ex-DPs at Friedland had lost their official status through commission of a crime, 
though the line between actual crimes and criminalized non-compliance could be blurry. In 
comments on figures given to Lower Saxon officials in a yearly report, camp director Richard 
Krause complained, “The Friedland camp has received an extraordinarily high percentage of 
former DPs who lost their DP status for criminal reasons.”589 Krause did not elaborate on the 
exact percentage of the ex-DPs released from prison nor what a normal percentage of criminal 
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ex-DPs would have been. Registration statistics indicate that the camp registered 270 ex-DPs in 
1949, but they do not differentiate between former DPs returning from labor contracts and those 
who had completed prison sentences.590 
Extant records offer only snapshots of the size of the ex-DP convict population at 
Friedland. In late March 1950, the directors of the camp’s religious charities and German Red 
Cross unit claimed that half of the former DPs had either been released from prison or fled other 
countries with law at their heels.591 Yet, in the middle of April, the camp administration reported 
the presence of only 8 released prisoners from Hameln, Lower Saxony in comparison to 75 
infiltrees and 8 “unclear cases.”592 In August, communications between refugee and interior 
ministry officials indicated that the camp held 14 ex-DPs transferred from prisons in Hameln and 
Werl, North Rhine-Westphalia compared to 65 ex-DPs returning from labor in England.593 
Certainly, officials overseeing Friedland were also concerned that the already high percentage of 
ex-DP convicts would increase in the spring and summer of 1950, because the Hameln and Werl 
prisons were set to release roughly 700 former DPs as of late March.594 Despite those fears, 
nothing in camp documents or statistical records suggests that it came to a mass release. 
Given that Friedland was organized on the principle of speedy processing and release, 
German intransigence about resettling ex-DPs made them a particular challenge for the camp. 
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The Lower Saxon government came to an agreement with the British “DP Branch” in January 
1950 to the effect that ex-DPs entitled to resettlement in Lower Saxony would be sent directly to 
their assigned communities, thereby bypassing the Friedland camp.595 Because Lower Saxon 
Minister for Refugees Heinrich Albertz had “refused to assign ex-DP [convicts] from camps in 
other states to Lower Saxon communities,” it would seem that Friedland was stuck with the more 
difficult convict cases.596 Indefinite stays in the transit camp, however, were good for no one. 
The austere facilities did not lend themselves to pleasant long-term accommodation, and the 
camp administration and charities had not wanted to accept the ex-DPs at all, much less 
indefinitely. 
Fears of recidivism among the ex-DP convicts played a role in the decision to hold back 
the former convicts, regardless of the illogic it produced for the individuals and camp. An 
official with the Charity of Protestant Churches in Germany writing to the Federal Expellee 
Ministry succinctly expressed the fears and justifications for not attempting to integrate the ex-
DP convicts into local communities. He not only suggested that recidivism would be a problem 
for communities forced to house ex-DP convicts but he also claimed that distributing criminals 
would make life difficult for other DPs living in Germany: “Based on recent experiences […] 
one must fear that the criminals, upon winning back their freedom, will immediately proceed to 
new violent crimes [Gewalttaten]. This will cause all of our painstaking work to build empathy 
among our people for the DPs’ plight and hardships to be in vain.”597 
                                                 
595 The memorandum does not specify if the “DP Branch” was part of the IRO or the Allied High Commission. 
Vermerk by Regierungsrat Schütte, 31 January 1950, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 472, NHStA. 
596 Flüchtlingsminister Albertz to Bundesminister für Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen, 11 April 1950, Nds. 380 
Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 472, NHStA. 
597 Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen in Deutschland to Niedersächsischen Flüchtlingsminister, 28 March 1950, 
Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 472, NHStA. 
 234 
Problems with petty and violent criminality at Friedland gave additional weight to 
concerns about recidivist ex-DPs as well as infiltrees. In his discussion of annually reported 
statistics, Krause told his superiors: “Whereas before Sept. 1949 hardly any thefts occurred in the 
camp, a large portion of returnees have been stolen from since Sept. 1949. All evidence points to 
the thefts having been carried out by the DPs and foreigners [infiltrees].”598 In early November 
1949, the camp detained three ex-DPs in connection to stealing pigs from a neighboring 
village.599 A week later, an official in Hannover asked his refugee ministry superiors for 
directions in light of “the hold-up of an automobile by DPs from the camp and numerous thefts 
and burglaries.”600 In December, a Czech resident was expelled from the camp and arrested, 
because “evidence in many cases of baggage theft from returnees pointed to him.”601 In another 
case, a Hungarian man helped four German girls flee from the camp before they could be 
returned to the Soviet zone.602  
Violence or threats of violence against fellow residents and camp staffers were a more 
serious problem. The confines of the camp surely exacerbated interpersonal quarrels, and 
political disagreements along with resentments between the various nationalities also caused 
conflict. Simmering tensions in the camp and surrounding community boiled over in March 
1951. On March 10, a group of foreigners and members of the Sports Club Friedland brawled in 
front of an inn. Later in the evening, some of the foreigners ambushed and injured a camp 
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employee who belonged to the club but had not participated in the initial fight. During the night, 
they “disturbed” the camp’s employee housing area. On March 15, a Mongolian named Badma 
K. fought with an Operation Link resettler in a cantina run by the camp charities. That night, 
Badma broke into the closed cantina and threatened a night-shift employee with a knife. Having 
recounted these events in a memorandum to Hannover officials, assistant camp director Hans 
Thederan warned that the relationship between foreigners and Operation Link resettlers was 
“often tense.” He noted that the camp administration asked the local police station to always 
keep two officers on duty for such instances.603 
The case of Czesław S. illustrates just how much trouble a single volatile individual 
could cause. Born in 1925, Czesław was a Pole who had been deported to Siberia with his 
mother and father after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Poland in 1939. Czesław was sent with a 
military unit (presumably as part of the Armia Ludowa) to Lublin in 1944, and he was garrisoned 
at Rzeszów from 1945 until his desertion in 1948. After crossing into the British sector at 
Ratzeburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Czesław registered himself with British authorities. He bounced 
between DP camps and an American guard unit before arriving at Friedland in February 1951.604 
A fellow resident, Leopoto, alleged that Czesław ruled his barracks and threw out anyone 
opposed to communism. On May 13, Czesław and Leopoto were in a heated argument when 
Czesław struck him with a fist and then a chair. Allegedly, Czesław grabbed a knife and 
threatened to kill Leopoto, whereupon Leopoto grabbed a fire iron to defend himself. Czesław 
stabbed Leopoto, but he survived even though other residents barred his exit for about 5 minutes. 
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Later, Czesław’s threatened to “stab in the heart” anyone who accused him of spreading 
communist propaganda and spying for the Russians.605 
Despite the fight and stabbing, Czesław remained at Friedland or returned sometime 
during the summer. When the sub-camp director confronted him about removing a bed from the 
barracks in August, Czesław replied that it was no concern for administrators because, “We live 
here, not you. We will arrange the beds how we like.”606 In October, Czesław fought with 
another resident for reasons unknown to the camp administration, and both men sustained head 
injuries. Unfazed, Czesław brawled with three men the next day, which stemmed from one of the 
men’s desire to “create difficulties” for Badma K.607 Czesław finally received a prison sentence 
in connection with the last fight, though one of the parties complained that it was “too light.”608 
Thefts and violence at Friedland fit into what German and occupation officials saw as a 
problem of DP criminality. According to Christopher Knowles, British officers “found their 
sympathies lay increasingly with the local German population and came to share the Germans’ 
perception of DPs as lawless troublemakers.” At the August 1945 Corps Commanders 
Conference, Montgomery ordered that despite sympathy for victims of the Nazi regime, the 
“present looting and murder by Poles and Russian DPs must be stopped by ruthless means. 
Soldiers must shoot to kill.”609 American intelligence reports from April 1950 included the 
results from a study conducted by a Caritas publication for Germans expelled from Hungary. The 
journal, Unsere Post, found that the crime rate for foreigners was 316 cases per 100,000 persons, 
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while native Germans and expellees respectively accounted for 254 and 108 cases. Foreigners 
particularly outpaced Germans in petty thefts, black-marketeering, and other economic crimes. 
The report also noted that the return of former DPs after emigration to other countries had stoked 
German resentment toward them.610 
Although DPs and other foreign nationals clearly did commit crimes at Friedland and 
elsewhere in Germany, several factors contextualize the impression that DPs were exceptionally 
prone to criminal activity. First, as Atina Grossmann argues, German police harassed and 
arrested DPs for petty offenses and black market trade. Targeting by police would help to explain 
why the arrest rates for Germans and DPs were most disparate for petty larceny and economic 
crimes. Second was a sense of having nothing to lose, which Grossmann evokes in a DP leader’s 
description of facing “the bitter yesterday, the bad to-day, and the hopeless tomorrow.” DPs were 
confronted with an indefinite stay at Friedland, a camp with relatively primitive quarters and a 
camp administration that clearly did not want to house them. Those conditions surely led to 
frustration, resentment, and lashing out, particularly if they felt they had no future in German 
communities anyway. Finally, there was the issue of what types of people had survived to 
become DPs. According to Grossmann, “most observers concluded that the ‘uprooted were not 
fit now to take their places in a normal, law-abiding society.’” Outside observers thought that the 
“survival of the fittest” did not select for individuals compatible with normal society. DP leaders 
believed that the survivors were deeply marked: “worse than the visible scars and injuries they 
bear are the hurts which they carry on the inside.”611 
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It is also worth pointing out that German populations in the camp committed thefts and 
acts of violence as well. Refugees, returnees, and adolescents in Friedland’s youth sub-camp 
traded with and stole from each other and camp employees. Krause’s reformation of the camp 
staff had been in response to employees’ participation in those very crimes. The camp 
administration also needed to call for reinforcement from the town’s police force during a 
dispute with returnees. On July 5, 1948, the British commandant ordered the arrest of three 
women who had crossed over from the Soviet zone to trade currency. The women’s arrest 
angered returnees from England waiting to cross into the Soviet zone. A large group of returnees 
gathered in front of the camp police barracks, cursing them and demanding the women’s release. 
The camp administration called the town police force for help, and they resolved the situation by 
ordering the returnees back to their own barracks.612 
The camp administration also admitted to authorities in Hildesheim that it could not 
prevent returnees’ arguments from escalating into fights. The fights typically occurred shortly 
after crossing the border and involved returnees who had held leadership positions or received 
special treatment in prison camps. Although left unstated in the memorandum, these fights were 
clearly cases of revenge. One of these disputes developed into a “serious brawl” on September 5, 
1949. By the time the camp police could intervene, one of the pugilists was so badly injured that 
a camp doctor feared he had suffered skull fracture.613 
The primary argument for relieving Friedland of the obligation to house ex-DPs and 
infiltrees was their criminality, but German administrators made two more arguments to that 
effect. First was the issue of supplies. In 1950, the directors of the camp charities wrote to 
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ministerial officials in Hannover to demand the removal of the “asocial element.” In addition to 
noting that 60 percent of the foreigners had previous convictions, the signatories complained 
bitterly that the foreigners claimed items from the limited clothing donations available for 
German refugees and resettlers only to sell them and buy alcohol with the profits.614 
Summarizing the proceedings of a 1952 conference on the foreigner question, the directors of 
Caritas, Innere Mission, Arbeiterwohlfahrt (Workers’ Welfare Organization), and the German 
Red Cross explained that they had tried to help the foreigners “out of a self-explanatory demand 
of Christian charity.” Serious difficulties, however, emerged almost immediately. The charity 
directors grumbled that the foreigners “no longer approached solicitously [als Bittende] but 
instead made demands by claiming a right to support.“ According to the signatories, it was 
“pointless” to try to convince the foreigners that donations from charities abroad were 
insufficient to meet their demands. They again expressed frustration that the foreigners then 
exchanged the clothing and other donated goods for alcohol, only to return and demand more 
from the charities. Thus, aside from issues of over criminality, the charity directors protested that 
there were “sleazy” (heruntergekommen) individuals among the foreigners who “all too easily 
smother the good elements.”615 
The second argument for removing the foreigners was that it was wrong for the British to 
force the camp to care for foreign nationals while denying entry to German resettlers. The 
charities’ 1950 complaint letter written in the midst of the Operation Link crisis cast the issue in 
terms of national self-defense and sovereignty. For the charities, the removal of ex-DPs and 
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infiltrees from the camp was a necessary step toward an end goal of “the entirety leaving 
Germany as soon as possible.” They found it unacceptable that a “decree by the non-German 
ruling power” forced them to watch “our fellow German” (deutsche Mitmenschen) waiting at the 
border. Worse, in the signatories’ view, was the presence and proliferation of foreign “drones 
[Drohnen] and mostly asocial elements” in Germany. They suggested that the disputed entry of 
Germans into the fatherland could easily be resolved if the foreigners were to leave the 
“overpopulated German country.” The charity directors defended their exclusionary, nationalist 
views by claiming the right to self-defense: “This is simply an act of self-defense [Notwehr], 
which every human is permitted under natural and formal rights and which should be also be 
allowed for a people fighting for its life [einem um sein Leben ringendem Volk].”616 
The camp’s British commandant and his superiors in the British Army of the Rhine also 
tried to force relocation of the ex-DPs and infiltrees in early 1950. For the British military, the 
troublesome foreigners endangered what it considered to be the more important task of 
registering and demobilizing German POWs from Eastern Europe. On January 7, Major 
Middlemas ordered the German administration to clear the camp of all ex-DPs and infiltrees. He 
gave them until noon of January 9 to complete the task. Before the camp could act, the British 
authorities with the Control Commission for Germany (CCG) in Hannover forced Middlemas to 
rescind his order. From the perspective of the CCG, Middlemas had no right to order their 
removal, because the foreign populations were housed in the German administered portion of the 
camp that fell under the CCG’s remit. The CCG won its initial dispute with the military by 
allowing that the Rhine Army was welcome to restrict its part of the camp to returnees only, but 
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CCG officials insisted that the part under German administration was to continue housing the 
foreign populations.617 
Although Rhine Army agreed to such a division, it nevertheless sought a way to force the 
foreign populations out of Friedland entirely. Middlemas and his superiors knew that they could 
not compel German authorities to resolve the problem by settling the foreign populations in 
Lower Saxony. So, in late January 1950, the army began threatening to requisition the entire 
camp, which would enable it to expel the ex-DPs and infiltrees. As the refugee ministry official 
overseeing Friedland explained, such a requisition would close to the camp to the soon-arriving 
Operation Link resettlers. German officials could not simply shift the resettlement program 
elsewhere, because there was no other suitable camp available in Lower Saxony or other states. 
The German camp administration and its higher authorities wanted to remove the foreigners 
from Friedland, but that price was too steep. In a sign of frustration, the official closed his 
remarks by noting, “It would be a simple matter [ein Leichtes] for the military government to 
order the accommodation of infiltrees in the ample available space at their disposal in DP 
camps.”618 The army never followed through on its threat to requisition the camp, but it is not 
clear if the officers had been bluffing or if German or British officials convinced them not to take 
that step. In any event, the fact that the camp was caught in a dispute between British offices in a 
manner threatening the arrival of resettlers helps to contextualize the demands for autonomy in 
dealing with foreigners and resettlers. 
 Conflict between the Rhine Army, IRO, and German administrators played out at the 
camp level for years after the army stopped its attempts at removing the foreigners wholesale. As 
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he had done since the arrival of the first ex-DPs and infiltrees 1949, Middlemas expelled 
troublemakers on an individual basis. For example, when two Czech nationals were arrested for 
thefts of returnees’ luggage, Middlemas secured permission from IRO offices in Hannover for 
their expulsion from the camp. The IRO agreed to the measure because the two men had broken 
camp rules.619 
The problem was that the refugee ministry sometimes had nowhere else to put persons 
removed from the camp. In late May or early 1951, Middlemas expelled a Polish man named Jan 
S., who had committed unspecified offences against camp rules. The IRO sent Jan’s case back to 
the state refugee ministry, which lacked an alternative camp to Friedland and negotiated for a 
camp near Nürnberg to accommodate him. Jan had either lost or destroyed the letter containing 
that directive when he returned to Friedland to retrieve his belongings. Believing that the refugee 
ministry had meant to accommodate Jan at Friedland again, the camp reregistered him.620 
Middlemas was furious and wrote official complaints to the Land Commission Office (LCO) of 
the Rhine Army in Hannover and the German camp administration. According to the LCO, 
Middlemas saw Jan as “more than an annoyance and [thought] that he undermined the German 
camp director,” so he demanded Jan’s immediate removal.621 Middlemas’s strong reaction must 
have been fueled by feeling undercut by both British and German offices, as evidenced by 
Thederan’s explanation to refugee officials that the whole affair was a “question of prestige” for 
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the commandant.622 Having sorted out the misunderstanding, the camp administration sent Jan 
along to the Valka camp in Bavaria. Refugee ministry officials took the incident as an 
opportunity to complain to the Federal Expellee Ministry that the British POW discharge unit at 
Friedland was “superfluous” and should be dissolved.623 
The dispute over housing foreigners at Friedland finally came to an end in the summer of 
1952. At that point, there was enough private housing and space in residential camps that Lower 
Saxon officials could relieve Friedland of the responsibility.624 In August, administrators sent the 
last 36 foreigners to a residential camp in Seedorf, a community midway between Bremen and 
Hamburg.625 Friedland had become home to the roughly 2,000 foreign nationals between 1949 
and 1952 in large part because no one wanted to take responsibility for them. To be sure, some of 
the ex-DPs and infiltrees proved so troublesome that even the most patient, sympathetic person 
would find it difficult to help them. The presence of former convicts among the foreigners 
probably made the population more difficult than was typical for DPs, a group that Germans and 
other Western Europeans already viewed with wariness. British officers and German authorities 
at Friedland had little patience and sympathy for these foreigners. German officials in particular 
saw them as a burdensome imposition that made the task of accepting and aiding fellow 
Germans more difficult, which led to a feedback loop of mutual resentment.  
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Conclusions 
 The Friedland camp’s successes and difficulties in handling returning prisoners of war, 
German resettlers from Poland, and former DPs and infiltrees lead to several conclusions about 
what made Friedland an effective institution. The camp was extraordinarily successful at 
providing immediate aid, registering, and redistributing uprooted individuals. Particularly for 
POWs, whether returning to homes in West or East Germany, the camp was an efficient conduit 
between the estranged states. Hundreds of thousands of returnees spent less than 24 hours 
between arrival at Friedland and departure to their new homes following medical care, 
distribution of donated clothing, and their registration into special welfare class. Despite British 
fears, the camp also met the challenge presented by influx of resettlers from Poland by quickly 
processing and sending them to their families or other communities. These communities could 
thank the camp and its regulatory distribution schemes for taming displacement, thereby making 
the reception and accommodation easier. 
 Difficulties with the camp’s foreign populations in particular show that Friedland relied 
on cooperative receiving communities as much as the communities relied on the camp. Certainly 
there were difficult individuals among those foreigners, though returnees and resettlers had their 
share of difficult persons as well. Yet, Friedland had difficulty coping when communities refused 
or delayed acceptance of people from the camp. In the case of the ex-DPs and infiltrees, refugee 
officials for Lower Saxony acted on behalf of the state’s communities by refusing to accept the 
foreigners en masse as was the case for returnees and resettlers. Penning up the foreign 
populations exacerbated tensions by exposing them to austere conditions that were fine for a day 
or week at a time but were not meant for indefinite habitation. Resettlement and integration into 
communities was the key to resolving the problems associated from displacement. Keeping 
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displaced individuals in camps only served to prolong and worsen problems because they had no 
real investment the camp serving as their temporary/indefinite accommodation. 
 These successes and failures in the partnership between camp and communities also 
depended on the interplay of nationalist and humanitarian sentiments. Resettling Germans 
proved to be a relatively easy matter because the receiving communities had a sense of 
obligation to care for their co-nationals. There were, of course, some difficulties. Returnees used 
that language of nationalism and humanitarianism in their complaints about problems finding 
work and housing, though those were also partly issues of expectations and making claims on the 
state. Communities also feared that they would be unable to accommodate German resettlers 
flooding in from Eastern Europe. Despite those fears, the need for some German community to 
receive them was never in question; it was a matter of regulating how many individuals went to 
which places. Faced with British refusal to allow resettlers entry to West Germany, politicians 
explicitly linked nation and humanitarian obligation in their arguments to accepting co-nationals 
waiting at the border. 
 National standards excluded non-German infiltree and ex-DP populations from that 
humanitarian obligation. Of course, the camp charities did speak of altruism and needing to care 
for them, but it is telling that they used the language of Christian love for one’s neighbor as 
opposed to a nationally determined humanitarian obligation. German communities simply did 
not want to care for and integrate foreigners when other Germans were in need. To be fair, the 
British, French, Belgians, and other western countries did not want to take in DPs on a 
permanent basis either, and they used West Germany as a dumping ground for DPs. Thus, unlike 
in the case of the foreign nationals or various other refugee crises worldwide, what Friedland was 
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most successful in was the care of Germans who wanted to integrate into new communities and 
their distribution to communities willing to accommodate them. 
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CHAPTER 5 
“POOR GERMAN YOUTH”: EFFORTS TO RESTORE ORDER THROUGH THE 
FRIEDLAND YOUTH RECEPTION CAMP  
In the spring of 1946, camp authorities at Friedland already had begun to consider youths 
who illegally crossed the zonal border (jugendliche Schwarzgänger) as a significant problem. 
Surviving documents do not indicate when exactly in 1946 the German and British 
administrators at Friedland decided that the facility should address the problem of vagrant youths 
through the establishment of a dedicated sub-camp. In June 1946 the German camp staff drew up 
a planning document for the British authorities that outlined major repair and new construction 
projects that would be undertaken while the camp was temporarily closed during the summer. A 
youth camp did not appear among the construction projects, including work on running water, 
electricity, and a quarantine camp. Nevertheless, the document highlighted “the care and 
registration of youths passing through the camp, particularly men aged 15-19 years” as a 
“pressing problem.”626 
A combination of factors contributed to the breakdown of social control over youths in 
Germany beginning in late 1944 and lasting through the early postwar years. Foremost, the war 
had worked as a solvent on familial bonds. Files containing information on the individual youths 
at Friedland are replete with instances of fathers serving in the military who were absent at the 
front, in captivity as prisoners of war, missing, or dead.627 Mothers, often caring for multiple 
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children, navigated the demands of being a breadwinner and rebuilding the destroyed cities.628 
Especially for families living in the path of the advancing Red Army, the chaos of flight and later 
expulsions also separated children from parental authority. 
Various Nazi programs and organizations had further destabilized the cohesiveness of 
families. For boys, the Hitler Youth offered a form of social organization separate from 
traditional loci of the family and school, and, moreover, it also separated youths from their 
homes with camp programs.629 The wartime evacuation of children from areas in particular 
danger from air raids also affected children from ages 3 to 14. The National Socialist People’s 
Welfare (Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt) placed young children aged 3 to 10 years with 
host families, while the Hitler Youth took authority over male youths 10 to 14 years old.630 The 
League of German Girls (Bund Deutscher Mädel) likewise challenged parental authority and 
drafted young women into service as nurses or for service in rural areas. Furthermore, as the 
fighting capacity of Germany’s military diminished, the Volkssturm drew in more and more 
male youths. With the defeat of the Nazi regime and disbandment of military formations, these 
centers of authority likewise collapsed. 
As a result of dislocation and the dissolution of authority over youths, the period lasting 
from roughly 1944 to 1947 was one of unprecedented freedom for many adolescent Germans. It 
was also a time in which adult authorities (parents, social workers, police, politicians, and the 
like) worried about a perceived crisis of growing criminality and deprativity. Looking back on 
that period of independence from adults, many Berliners interviewed by Kimberly Redding 
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described 1944 to 1947 as “lovely childhood years” (schöne Kinderjahre). She found that their 
primary concerns had been “meeting their personal needs without getting caught.”631 Yet, what 
the adolescents understood as meeting personal needs too often was black-marketeering and theft 
in the eyes of authorities. From the perspective of adult authorities, adolescents freed of social 
control became “young lawbreakers [who were] both products and perpetuators of immorality 
and lawlessness.”632 
Establishment of the Youth Reception Camp 
The movement of vagrant or unaccompanied youths in the border area near Friedland 
therefore posed three problems for the camp. First, the border region had become increasingly 
violent in 1946 and 1947. In 1946, the regional police reports showed local disquiet over the 
murder of the Baron of Uslar-Gleichen between the border and Göttingen. The police reports 
likewise noted concern over roving criminal gangs. The gang problem and the arrival of 
supposedly uprooted, directionless young men surely fed off of each other in fueling locals’ 
fears.633 Second, once the police or other authorities apprehended vagrant youths, there remained 
the question of how such an individual should be classified (a refugee, an illegal border-crosser, 
or something else). Third, there was a question of who actually held legal guardianship for these 
youths. The camp was meant for the rapid redistribution of displaced populations according to a 
system of classification and quotas. But the issue of family reunification, which typically 
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simplified the question of where to send individuals, threatened to create confusion and delays in 
the cases of youths whose families were missing or remained resident in the Soviet zone. Thus, it 
was necessary for the camp to establish a dedicated facility that could house the youths for 
longer periods while it sorted out questions of guardianship and family reunification or work 
placements. 
The decision to intervene in the youth problem also stemmed from the combination of 
humanitarian and regulatory concerns. In a 1948 letter in which camp director Richard Krause 
discussed the founding of the youth camp within context of the camp’s early operations, he tied 
together the two issues, arguing, “Moreover, it became evident that young illegal border-crossers 
simply out of humanitarian reasons could not be rushed onto the street nor be driven into the 
army of the black market.”634 As Krause likewise noted in the letter to Hannover’sche Presse 
explaining the detention of vagrant youths at Friedland, intervention by the camp to settle 
vagrants in orderly families and professions was in the best interests of the individual while also 
curtailing the beginning of a “criminal career.”635 
The Hildesheim District Refugee Authority (Bezirksflüchtlingsamt) overseeing the 
Friedland camp, however, initially opposed the development of a youth camp. According to a 
memorandum written by the youth camp director Gerhard Rüpprich, the refugee authority felt 
that such a youth camp lay beyond the responsibilities of a camp meant for the quick acceptance, 
registration, and redistribution of people crossing the zonal boundaries.636 Presumably, the 
refugee authority would have preferred that the camp hand over the young male border-crossers 
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to the competent youth authority for the district rather than become bogged down in their longer-
term housing and care. This point of dispute seems to have continued throughout the youth 
camp’s existence. The sub-camp closed in 1951, because the Lower Saxon Ministry for Refugees 
felt that the youth camp had taken on the “character of a residential facility” such that “it no 
longer served the demands of a transit camp” and could be relieved of state support.637 
Despite the Hildesheim District Refugee Authority’s objections to the establishment of 
the dedicated youth sub-camp, Krause ultimately prevailed with the help of the British Salvation 
Army and the Innere Mission. In his memorandum to the Innere Mission, Rüpprich argued that it 
was Krause’s tenacity that had made possible the erection of the youth camp. He also noted the 
importance of the Salvation Army allowing the use of a barracks it owned and the commitment 
of 6,000 RM by the Innere Mission for the construction and running costs of the facility.638 
Krause likewise commented that construction of the youth camp had taken half a year because of 
“material difficulties and a scarcity of understanding on the part of German authorities.”639 As 
such, it seems that Krause was able to win approval for the construction and running of the youth 
camp as long as the material and financial costs would not be borne by the district or state 
governments. 
Supporters of the project within the Innere Mission justified the significant financial 
commitment for the establishment and staffing of the youth camp in terms of prestige and 
maintaining the organization’s reputation. In his memorandum, Rüpprich argued for the Innere 
Mission’s continued involvement, because he felt that another organization such as the German 
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Red Cross, YMCA, or Catholic Caritas would be eager to step in and take the Innere Mission’s 
place. Rüpprich warned that an abandonment of their commitment would be “shameful for us” 
and lead to a “lessening of our reputation in the eyes of the Catholic Church and the 
foreigners.”640 Concerns about being seen as contributing less than the Catholic Church and 
Caritas played an important role in justifying the local Innere Mission organization’s 
involvement in the Youth Camp. In a 1950 letter from the Göttingen Innere Mission leadership 
to Bishop Johannes Lilje in Hannover, the author lamented that the Catholic Church had been the 
first to conceive of building a refugee settlement in the town of Friedland and that such an 
undertaking was presently beyond the capacity of the Innere Mission. The author nevertheless 
defended the Innere Mission’s work with the example of the youth camp as particularly 
noteworthy.641 Thus, reputational concerns and inter-confessional rivalry at the Friedland camp 
played a role in the Innere Mission making available the funding and personnel necessary to run 
the youth camp from its inception through its final year of operation. 
Despite the financial commitments by the Innere Mission, it was Camp Director Krause 
who had final authority for operation of the youth camp when the sub-camp opened in January 
1947. Indeed, he seems to have taken a great interest in the youth camp, and he wrote all official 
correspondence between the camp and the youths’ families. Krause seems to have worked in 
such close concert with the Innere Mission that the lines of authority and, indeed, the ownership 
of the youth camp were blurred. It took until an April 1948 meeting between the District Refugee 
Authority, the camp leadership, the youth camp leadership, the British Salvation Army, and 
representatives of the Innere Mission to officially clarify that Krause, as a representative of 
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Lower Saxon refugee authorities, directed a youth camp staff whose paid members and 
volunteers were nevertheless employees of the Innere Mission and Protestant Church.642  
Under Krause stood the official director of the youth camp, Gerhard Rüpprich. Originally 
from Silesia, Rüpprich had been a Protestant pastor. He had joined the Nazi Party in May 1933, 
and had been active as a congregation leader for the pro-Nazi Deutsche Christen movement. In 
de-Nazification proceedings Rüpprich claimed that he joined the Nazi Party in order to remain 
active in various local social welfare programs. He further explained his membership in the 
Deutsche Christen as following from the desire to overcome divisions within German 
Protestantism and to use works by German writers and poets in sermons. According to him, he 
left the priesthood in 1940 and the Church in 1944 out of despair for overcoming confessional 
divisions and instead devoted himself vocationally to youth care. After release by the Russians 
from a brief internment as a POW, Rüpprich came to the Göttingen area in 1945 and began 
working as a laborer in the camp. It appears that his connections with the local organization of 
the Innere Mission helped to secure his directorship of the youth camp.643 As director of the 
youth camp, Rüpprich interviewed arrivals about their personal histories and future plans, 
worked with youth homes to find placements for the youths, and oversaw a small paid staff 
trained in youth pedagogy as well as occasional interns studying youth care. 
Operation of the Youth Camp and Daily Life 
The administration at the Friedland camp pursued two goals in their operation of the 
youth reception camp (Jugendauffanglager or JAL, as it was officially termed). First and most 
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immediately, the youth camp was supposed to resolve the question of what to do with 
unsupervised underage persons crossing into the British zone or who had been found in the 
surrounding region and who were suspected to have crossed over from the Soviet zone. As the 
border transit camp, the facility at Friedland was responsible for categorizing incoming 
populations so that they could be distributed to Lower Saxony and, later, the British zone and 
West German Länder according to rules set by higher British and German authorities. Youths 
crossing the border or traveling in the border region for myriad reasons (traveling to or searching 
for family, seeking work in the West, trade/smuggling, and adventure, among others) naturally 
fell within the camp’s remit as a population needing to be processed at a transit camp. 
Because there was no youth or adolescent category, staffers needed to assess the youths 
in order to determine their proper categorization and subsequent distribution. For example, 
whereas a refugee seeking his family residing in the Western zones would most likely be 
reunited with them, other individuals such as work-seekers or adventurers who had left home 
without their guardians’ permission needed to be returned across the border. As such, the camp 
needed dedicated facilities to house the youths while its staffers worked to resolve such details, 
from initial questioning through consultation with parents and youth offices to the final 
determination of where to send the youth in question. 
The second goal for the youth camp was to make an intervention in the youths’ lives and 
disrupt a cycle of escaping adult authority and wandering. The impetus for this sort of 
intervention stemmed from a combination of regulatory and humanitarian concerns. As 
previously noted, the camp administration not only feared that unsupervised adolescents might 
contribute to criminality, but they also felt that it was a humanitarian imperative to save youths 
from a way of life harmful to society and the youths themselves. Intervention at Friedland 
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involved much more than providing food, medical care, and shelter, though naturally those were 
priorities as well. The camp took youths into custody and through a variety of means it could 
once again place youths under competent authorities, whether those were family, non-family 
guardians, or work placements. Thus, the preexisting resources at the disposal of camp 
administrators, including communications, search services, and networks of charitable 
organizations, could be brought to bear on the youth problematic. 
The ultimate purpose of such intervention was for the camp to help restore social order 
by transforming vagrant youths into hardworking, productive members of society. To that end, 
the youth camp operated as a kind of pedagogical space for reforming bad behaviors and 
instilling traditional values, such as hard work, frugality, and comradeship. Although the JAL 
operated under the transit camp’s principle of settling individuals elsewhere as quickly as 
possible, when youths were in the camp the administrators worked hard to teach them to be good 
members of society. That meant fostering a sense of personal responsibility and respect for 
others, as well as contributing to their academic and vocational education. To accomplish those 
goals, not to mention helping to ease the burdens of running the sub-camp, the camp 
administrators put their charges under strict rules, found work for them in the camp and for local 
tradesmen and farmers, and closely observed how the individual youths interacted with each 
other. 
When an unaccompanied minor arrived at Friedland, the camp’s staff pulled him or her 
out of the general camp population and began resolving the question of the youth’s status. Once 
the youth had been separated, members of the JAL staff would question him or her ascertain his 
or her background. In most cases, the youths also wrote a brief summary of their lives up to that 
point (Lebenslauf). From there, the camp administration went about resolving the question of 
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guardianship, typically starting with letters to the adolescent’s parents, other kin, or sometimes 
the responsible youth office. In these communications, the camp authorities reported the youth’s 
explanation for his or her vagrancy and arrival at the camp. The letters also related the youth’s 
wishes for the immediate future, such as a work placement or family reunification. At the end of 
the letters, they inquired what the responsible person wished for the camp to do with the youth. 
Typically that meant asking whether there was a place for the youth at home and if he should be 
sent there or found a placement with an employer or other youth home.644 
While the camp staff communicated with families, youth offices, and prospective 
employers, adolescents resided in the youth camp where they faced a tightly regulated life under 
house rules (Hausordnung). Indeed, the Hausordnung underscores efforts to control the youths 
in the camp and how new lives for adolescent males would be based upon productivity and the 
order of gainful employment. To begin with, the youth camp administrators required residents to 
work within the camp or for farmers or artisans in the surrounding area. Residents were 
responsible for keeping their beds and the common living areas clean and orderly. Any trading, 
buying, or selling of items was prohibited in the attempt to prevent the development of a black 
market, and violations would be reported to the camp police. Smoking and disorderly behavior 
were also strictly forbidden. Finally, youth camp residents faced a curfew from nine at night to 
six in the morning, during which they had to remain in the dormitory area.645 
There was, of course, a gap between the rules’ prescriptions and actual behavior. Illicit 
trade amongst the JAL residents and also between JAL residents and members of the camp’s 
                                                 
644 See folders Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 49, NHStA, for interview summaries and various notes 
taken by staff, Lebensläufe written by residents after their arrival, and correspondence between camp authorities and 
parents, legal guardians and Jugendämter. 
645 Hausordnung für das Jugendheim, n.d., Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 30, NHStA. 
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general population was an ongoing problem. Incident reports and confessions from youths 
indicate that in addition to buying and selling items for currency, the most common barter 
materials were clothing, food, and cigarettes.646 Illicit trade in the camp was especially 
problematic because it encouraged pilfering of camp resources and theft from other residents.647 
Smoking was another common rule violation that frustrated the youth camp staffers, because 
they felt that cigarettes were a frivolous waste of the wages youths earned in addition to 
damaging the youths’ health. One instance that stands out from the records was Rüpprich’s 
annoyance with a resident who continued to smoke in spite of a tuberculosis infection and 
repeated warnings that smoking while suffering from such an infection was particularly 
damaging.648 In cases of serious or repeated violations of the house rules, the camp expelled 
residents back to the Soviet zone. 
An examination of the weekly planned schedules between 1947 and 1948 shows that, 
with the exception of Sundays, the youths typically awoke by 6:15 in the morning, worked in or 
near the camp, and cleaned. When youth camp residents attended classes, the lessons 
concentrated on religious instruction or practical knowledge, such as geography or reading and 
discussing newspapers. Physical health was also important, and the schedules devoted at least 
several hours per week to gymnastics, sports, and personal hygiene. As a result of these efforts to 
provide work experience, a practical education, and cultivate physical and spiritual health, 
                                                 
646 See for instance, “Bericht über Tauschgeschäfte im Jugendlager,” n.d., Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 40, NHStA. 
647 For example, see memo on “Besondere Vorkommnisse” 24 January 1948, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 47; several 
confessions from youths caught breaking into an administration building, 13 October 1947, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 
45, NHStA; and the interrogation transcript of a JAL resident who stole and sold clothing from his comrades, 
“Vernehmung,” 20 February 1947, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 40. NHStA. 
648 See for instance records of violations of the house rules in Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 40 and Nr. 42, NHStA. 
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residents had little unsupervised free time other than the occasional block mid-week or on 
Sundays.649 
One aspect of the youths’ education that proved important was fostering their 
development into good, democratic citizens. After all, the youth camp residents had mostly 
grown up under Nazi rule and participated in Nazi youth organizations only to have their world 
turned upside-down with Germany’s defeat in 1945. The time devoted to reading and discussing 
current event in newspapers, for instance, suggests an attempt to lay the groundwork for the 
adolescents’ eventual participation in an independent, critical public sphere.  
The issue of political education, however, could also prove contentious when it came to 
confronting Germany’s Nazi past and World War II. During April 1948, the youth camp 
administration became embroiled in dispute over the adolescents singing Nazi youth songs. The 
quarrel emerged when a volunteer in the camp named Staedtler sent a complaint about youth 
camp director Gerhard Rüpprich to his superior, Friedland camp director Richard Krause. 
According to Staedtler, a young deacon-in-training (Diakonpraktikant) named Ehrenreich was 
leading the adolescents in signing “old Nazi songs.” Staedtler did not specify the songs in 
question, so it is difficult to ascertain if they were folk songs adopted and tainted by the Nazi 
regime or if they were in fact overtly Nazi songs. In any case, when Staedtler challenged 
Ehrenreich about the songs and his utterances of “Long live the Führer!” and “Sieg Heil!” the 
young intern allegedly answered that democracy in Germany was absurd. Staedtler was likewise 
upset by Rüpprich’s response when he demanded the youth camp director address the situation: 
                                                 
649 For weekly plans running from February 1947 to April 1948, see Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 38, NHStA. 
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“But he did not do that! In contrast, he wanted to push the blame [on me], because I had taken 
the situation (please note: the spirit of democracy) too seriously.”650 
Rüpprich defended his approach to the youths in pedagogical terms. According to a 
written statement by Rüpprich, when Staedtler first raised the concerns about the youths and the 
young intern he had calmly explained to Staedtler, “in such instances we did not interact with the 
youths through bans or scolding, because this would only increase their penchant for opposition 
[Oppositionslust], but instead clearly teach that the […] false successes of National Socialism 
were bought through unscrupulous politics that are also to blame for the monstrous hardship of 
the individual youth and his parents and the homeland.” Staedtler had apparently been 
unimpressed with Rüpprich’s position, instead feeling that such patience created the danger that 
“reactionary elements could gain a foothold and bring the fall of democracy for a second 
time.”651 
Despite Staedtler’s protestations, the camp administration ultimately sided with 
Rüpprich. In a special meeting of the camp leadership and a representative of the district youth 
office, these authorities reaffirmed the decision of the Innere Mission to sack Staedtler.652 
Among their reasons, the committee agreed that Staedtler had technically been a volunteer of the 
Innere Mission rather than an employee of the camp, so the charity had the authority to dismiss 
him. Moreover, they argued that Staedtler had been out of line in his protests to the camp 
administration and, when those failed to produce the desired result, to the district de-Nazification 
commission. Finally, Major Mitchell of the British Salvation Army asserted that, as an adult 
                                                 
650 Letter from Staedtler to Krause, 9 April 1948, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 105, NHStA. 
651 Copy of a statement by Rüpprich, n.d., Nds 386 Acc 16/83 Nr 105, NHStA. 
652 Niederschrift über eine am 16.4.1948 stattgefundene Besprechung über das Jugend-Auffanglager im 
Flüchtlingslager Friedland/Leine, 16 April 1948, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 105, NHStA.  
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authority figure, Staedtler should have been able to come to an understanding with Ehrenreich 
and that a direct and strict forbidding of such songs would have simply raised resistance from the 
youths.653 Although the youth camp leadership was not always hesitant to treat their charges 
strictly, in this case they felt a lighter touch was necessary to avoid hardening any anti-
democratic feelings among the adolescents. Reading between the lines of the meeting’s notes, it 
further seems that Staedtler’s dismissal was most likely because he had proven himself to be too 
difficult of an employee. 
Vocational Training and Work Placements 
In addition to the political education of its residents, the Friedland youth camp also 
played an important role in the adolescents’ vocational training. As the Hausordnung stated, the 
youths were expected to contribute to their keep in the camp, but there was a further logic behind 
the compulsory labor than just paying for their expenses and avoiding disorder that might follow 
from idle hands. A portion of their earnings was withheld to pay for room and board, while 
further withholdings were placed in savings accounts to be accessed once residents moved out of 
the camp. The decision to allow the residents to keep the remainder as pocket money not only 
provided a reward for their labor, but it was presumably also meant to give them practice 
handling work responsibilities and money. Ideally, the youths’ labor would provide them further 
training and facilitate professional networks for their upcoming career. 
The camp thus became something of a clearinghouse for matching young laborers with 
the employers. This fact was recognized both by industry in the form of work solicitations and 
the local labor office (Arbeitsamt), which felt compelled to remind camp director Krause that 
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only it had the authority to parcel out laborers, no matter the age.654 Throughout 1948, the JAL 
was in a running dispute with local, regional, and state-level labor office administrators over the 
question of authority to give out work assignments. In a January letter sent from the Hildesheim 
District President (Regierungspräsident) to various local labor offices and the JAL, the refugee 
authority forbade the JAL from overstepping the Göttingen Labor Office in finding work for 
youths in Lower Saxony. The administration likewise informed the JAL leadership it was 
“inappropriate” (unzweckmäßig) for them to directly arrange jobs for youths with industry and 
labor offices in the Ruhr industrial region of North-Rhine Westphalia.655 
New rules regarding residence permits for all Soviet zone refugees in March 1948 further 
complicated the procurement of work and housing assignments for young refugees. On March 
15, 1948, the Lower Saxon State Commissioner for Refugee Affairs (Staatskommissar für 
Flüchtlingswesen) wrote that recent experiences had demonstrated that refugees from the Soviet 
zone could not find work or housing after temporary work assignments had ended. Nor did the 
commissioner think it was reasonable to expect them to return home to the Soviet zone. As such, 
the commissioner directed, “in order to avoid the temporarily accommodated persons becoming 
homeless at the end of their employment, in all future cases it must be determined if a residence 
permit is appropriate.”656 As such, the JAL became caught between competing demands. 
Needing to maintain available spaces for newcomers, the JAL administrators were under 
pressure to secure housing and work for residents as quickly as possible and in accordance with 
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labor office rules. Yet, in order to avoid simply shifting the problem of homelessness further 
down the road, the camp now needed to undertake the time-consuming measure of ensuring a 
residence permit for the youths. 
The JAL administration considered this push-and-pull between directives untenable. In 
his letter responding to the commissioner, Krause asked for a special exception from the new 
regulations for the JAL and the youths it was resettling. According to him, the new regulations 
had slowed youths’ resettlement to the point that the JAL could no longer fulfill its mission. In 
order to justify an exception to the rules requiring a residence permit, Krause pointed to the 
specter of lawlessness and disorder. He argued that the implementation of the law would do 
nothing to prevent the youths from crossing into Lower Saxony nor cause them to return to the 
Soviet zone. The youths would instead find unlawful ways to care for themselves. In Krause’s 
telling, the proper function of the camp offered a much better alternative: “if one steers the 
honest elements [sauberen Elemente] to orderly paths, one can much better identify the dishonest 
elements [unlauteren Elemente] and steer them to places of departure, or, in the case of refugees 
from the East, hand them over to reform institutions.”657 
There is no record of an official response from the state commissioner, but it seems that 
the JAL administration pursued jobs and housing placements while trying to balance the 
demands of work office consultations and residence permits with needs of the camp and its 
residents. Such a balance proved difficult, and the Göttingen Labor Office once again wrote to 
the camp in November, calling on it to cease placing youths with employers. The labor official 
warned the camp that facilitating such placements had “no legal basis and was even punishable.” 
While the labor office was “obviously prepared to use all possible means to remedy the vagrant 
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youths’ distress,” the official nevertheless demanded that all work placements be made solely 
through the labor office.658 
To address the dispute, the JAL administration met with the County Youth Welfare 
Officer for Göttingen (Kreisjugendpfleger des Landkreises Göttingen), and a representative of 
the Göttingen Labor Office. In a subsequent statement to the Göttingen Labor Office, the JAL 
administrators steadfastly defended their practice of matching youths with employers. Krause 
explained that the camp was doing everything in its power to cope with the increased inflow of 
youths following the currency reform. Krause disputed the claim that the camp had behaved 
illegally in pursuing placements outside of the Göttingen Labor Office’s regional jurisdiction. 
According to Krause, too many jobs did not meet the “educational requirements” (erzieherische 
Anforderungen) necessary for the youths to take root in their new homes and workplaces. The 
JAL administration was therefore compelled to search on its own for such possibilities and to 
make all necessary legal arrangements with the competent local labor and youth authorities 
rather than with the Göttingen office.659 
From the statement, it seems that despite the efforts of the youth welfare officer to find a 
middle ground, the camp and labor office could only reach an agreement in the week following 
the meeting. The statement sent from Friedland to the Göttingen Labor Office ended with four 
demands from the camp for continuing its cooperation with the agency. First, the labor office 
should send a caseworker to the camp who would handle all work placements for the City and 
County of Göttingen and who would provide for an equivalent placement in other regions if none 
was available within his jurisdiction. Second, Krause demanded recognition of the camp 
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administration’s right to assess the educational quality of the placement before agreeing to the 
transfer. Third, the JAL would then be responsible for contacting the competent youth welfare 
organizations and for applying on behalf of the youth for a residence permit. Finally, the camp 
would instruct all employers in the legally correct course and suggest to them that they make the 
labor office aware of the open positions.660 It seems that the camp and labor office had reached 
an accord based on those demands, because the labor office made no further complaints and 
subsequent communications about youths’ work placements noted agreements between the labor 
offices for Göttingen and the respective local labor offices. 
Much as the negotiations over procedures for finding work placements proved thorny, the 
example of an unsuccessful work placement in the summer of 1949 speaks to the difficulty of 
finding acceptable jobs and to the authorities’ impatience with problem youths. During August 
1949, a youth camp worker, Pastor von Girard, brought the JAL into contact with the Protestant 
Church’s youth home in Solingen. Youth camp director Rüpprich asked the Solingen 
administrators to check with their local employment office about the possibilities of employing a 
number of young apprentices and journeymen, because the camp could no longer house them 
and “everything must be tried from here to settle them elsewhere.” The home’s administrators 
and Rüpprich then organized the transfer of eleven adolescents for whom no further vocational 
training or work placement could be arranged near the camp.661 
What initially appeared to be a normal, orderly transfer of youths from Friedland to an 
area capable of absorbing them was quickly upset when several of the adolescents demanded to 
return from Solingen to Friedland. In a letter sent with five youths back to Friedland, the 
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Solingen home’s director explained that these five youths under the direction of the “ringleaders” 
named Arlt and Wauer purportedly refused to stay in Solingen because living in Friedland had 
been cheaper and that certain unspecified promises had not been kept at their new home. 
Dismissing the youths’ complaints about wages and costs of living out of hand, the home 
director argued, “the reason for Arlt and comrades lies in their character, which appears to be 
ungovernable [zügellos].” He went on to ask what such youths actually expected from life, and 
he asserted, “these are youths who have earned to be treated harshly for once.” In doing so, one 
might still save the “poor German youth” that still want an orderly, productive life, such as the 
remaining youths from Friedland who refused to go along with Arlt and Wauer.662 
The comments about these adolescents from the Solingen home director are striking for 
their characterizations of two types of German youth. One notes the implication that some 
adolescents had been pampered and were in need of harsh discipline. This statement seems ironic 
at first glance, because many youths had lost almost everything in either expulsion, separation 
from their families in war, or fleeing from poor living and/or working conditions in the Soviet 
zone.663 Yet, in its description of the offending adolescents and need to treat them harshly for 
once, the Solingen letter reproduced a language and fears of young never-do-wells who used the 
postwar disorder to slip away from parental authority and make easy money on the black market, 
all with the implicit danger of creating a more permanent criminal class. Moreover, the danger 
was particularly acute because the criminally minded youths exerted great influence over their 
otherwise honest comrades. Indeed, the Solingen home’s director felt that these particular youths 
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 266 
were “not capable of being inserted into a community,” whether at a home or in German society 
more broadly.664 
A handwritten note initialed by Rüpprich at the top of the Solingen letter suggests that he 
shared the concerns of the Solingen home’s administrators. Initially, Rüpprich ordered that Arlt 
and Wauer be separated and immediately reassigned to different work placements.665 Rüpprich 
further assured the Solingen administration in a later letter that the offending individuals’ pay 
would be docked to reimburse the home for their travel expenses.666 In the end, the camp took an 
even more punitive approach. Rather than finding further work placements for Arlt and Wauer, 
the camp expelled the two ringleaders back to the Soviet zone and scattered the rest of the 
returning youths among various other work placements in order to keep from the negatively 
influencing other JAL residents.667 
Problem Cases, Punishment, and Trauma 
Forcible return to the Soviet zone therefore functioned as a tool for youth camp 
administrators for rule violations in the camp. Such expulsions were also a means to ensure that 
supposedly irredeemable problem youths would not take up resources including jobs and home 
placements that could be given more deserving ones. Unfortunately, it is not clear how common 
that practice was, because it seems that the youth camp did not keep statistics on forcible returns. 
Of the 874 adolescents housed in the youth camp between January 1947 and March 1951, the 
camp sent 96 youths back to the Soviet zone, but the reasons for their return could have been 
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disciplinary, family reunification, or some combination of the two. By contrast, the camp 
recorded 513 work placements, which were presumably successful insofar as the youths involved 
did not return to the camp.668 
Figure 6: Distribution of Youths from the JAL669
 
 
While some youths were criminal, lazy, or adventurers, other youths may have suffered 
from psychological disorders. The case of one young man sent from Friedland to a youth home 
near Delmenhorst in 1949 illustrates that problem. Born in Hannover in 1930, Hans S. lost both 
of his parents during the war. His mother died in 1943, while his father had been missing since 
1944. After living for a short period with his grandparents, Hans was institutionalized in a youth 
home near Göttingen, which sent him to the Friedland camp in 1947 for unknown reasons.670 
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The JAL found Hans an apprenticeship with an automobile mechanic in Göttingen, but the 
mechanic fired him in 1948, citing his repeated failure to come to work and their fear that he 
could damage the reputation of the firm as well as be a poor influence over the other apprentices. 
The mechanic further complained that repeated warnings, lectures, and threats had been 
unsuccessful in changing Hans’s behavior.671  
Despite these problems, the camp authorities continued to work on Hans’s behalf, 
because they suspected that some kind of psychological disorder caused his poor behavior. In a 
letter to a youth home near Delmenhorst, the camp explained that the apprenticeship had fallen 
through and went on to note that Hans suffered from bedwetting and other uncleanliness. In 
camp, his laziness at work was worsening while he increasingly could not be trusted with money. 
Attempts to “free him of his illness” in the camp had come to naught, so the Friedland 
administrators hoped that intensive care at the youth facility might help him. The camp 
administrators’ remarkable patience with Hans in comparison to other poorly disciplined youths 
seems to have resulted from their belief, expressed in the letter, that his “considerable 
shortcomings in character can be attributed to physical illness.”672 Evidently the youth home 
refused to accept Hans, so the JAL continued to house him through the summer of 1949. The 
seemingly inexhaustible patience continued even after Hans took 10 DM in payment from an 
agent of the American intelligence services to question incoming refugees about events and 
conditions in the Soviet zone.673 Although the file does not include any indication of where the 
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camp ultimately sent him, Krause maintained that Hans would benefit from living with a strict 
family and therapy, because he remained capable of being influenced and taught (beeinflussbar 
and bildbar) so that “patience and care” were appropriate in his case.674 
Psychological problems likewise played a role in the failed placement of Otto D., which 
tragically ended in suicide by drowning in the Werra River.675 Otto had been born and raised in 
Königsberg/Kaliningrad. In the immediate aftermath of the war, according to his mother, Soviet 
authorities had imprisoned Otto and his mother for three and a half years.676 During that time, the 
Soviets forced him to labor on a farm, where he learned some Lithuanian.677 Thereafter, Otto 
lived with his mother in the Soviet zone. A work assignment to the Aue uranium mines in late 
1948 or early 1949 set in motion Otto’s migration to the British zone. As part of the program 
“Kinder in die Westzone,” Otto flew from Berlin to somewhere in the British zone and was then 
brought to Friedland to be processed on 19 January 1949. Although Otto had a grandmother and 
an aunt living in the British zone, neither could care for him. The grandmother’s health was too 
fragile, according to JAL administrators, while for unknown reasons his aunt refused to care for 
him. The JAL administrators then found a work placement for Otto with a farmer family near 
Hannoversch-Münden, where he began living and working on February 12.678 
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What seemed to be a normal work and living placement turned sour within the following 
month. In letters to his mother written March, Otto complained about the cold, food, and work on 
the farm. In a letter from March 22, Otto noted that the local mayor had told him that his mother 
would likely need to wait six months for a residence permit in the West, so he asked her to cross 
into the West illegally rather than waiting. Two days later, he wrote to her again to ask that she 
cross the border illegally.679 A statement from a local woman likewise testified to Otto’s 
problems in the community. She said that he had been particularly rude to the farmer’s wife and 
called the farmer’s family gypsies and filthy pigs (Dreckschweine).680 In a memorandum written 
by Rüpprich following Otto’s death, he noted that Otto had personally visited him in the camp on 
March 25 to ask for advice, at which time Rüpprich had advised that he try to manage until the 
mother could obtain the necessary paperwork to take up residence in the West. Finally, in early 
April, the farmer wrote to the JAL to ask that the work placement be ended and that Otto return 
to Friedland. 
Before Otto could be returned to Friedland, he took his own life. According to the last 
townsperson to see him alive, Frau K., Otto received notice on a Thursday that he was supposed 
to return to Friedland on the following Monday. On that Friday, Frau K. noted a radical change 
in Otto’s behavior (he was suddenly quiet and withdrawn), and he asked Frau K. to ferry him 
across the Werra in her boat. She assumed that he was wanted to travel to his grandmother, so 
she agreed. In a letter written to Otto’s mother, Frau K. described his death once they reached the 
middle of the river as well as her opinion of Otto’s reasons for committing suicide:  
“So, he said that he could not go to his grandmother and he did not want to go back to 
Friedland. Then there was a plop and I turned around immediately. I did not see Otto 
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anymore, and I immediately called for help. Otto surfaced 7 to 8 meters from my boat, so at 
an unreachable distance from me. He called, ‘[Frau K.], [Frau K.]’ and went right back 
under, because there was a strong current that day. Then I only saw his red jacket 
shimmering and then it was over. [The host farmer] as well as his son and an acquaintance 
came right away with a fishing boat, but it was already too late. They only found his hat […] 
We were all in shock. We could not believe the terrible thing that had just happened there. 
He could not have fallen in the water, because the boat is 85 centimeters tall. So, he can only 
have had the reason that he did not want to return to the camp. There is no other explanation 
for it.”681 
 
When the youth camp authorities learned of Otto’s death, they strenuously denied that 
return to the JAL could have motivated him to take his own life. The camp did not dispute that it 
was a case of suicide. Indeed, they confirmed to the youth welfare office in Hannoversch 
Münden that the local police had ruled the death “clearly a suicide.”682 The leadership at 
Friedland nevertheless asked the youth welfare office to investigate the death, contending that it 
was unreasonable for the townspeople and local government to assert that distress over returning 
to the camp had been the cause. Sometime after a conversation with the local mayor, Rüpprich 
wrote a memorandum explaining why the initial explanation of motivation for suicide was 
incorrect. He noted that Otto had come to seek his advice only a few weeks earlier. Rüpprich 
also explained they had not felt compelled to have Otto escorted to the camp, because he had 
been coming of his own free will. Moreover, Rüpprich pointed out that Otto had “confided in 
[another youth from the JAL], who was a fellow East Prussian compatriot [Landsmann], and had 
remarked that he wished to return to Friedland.” Rüpprich also found it unlikely that Otto feared 
a return to Friedland, because Otto was aware that a return would mean eventually reuniting with 
his mother. In fact, the camp leadership went so far as to ask Otto’s mother to provide them with 
                                                 
681 Ibid. 
682 Letter from JAL to Jugendamt Hannoversch Münden, 20 April 1949, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 51, NHStA. 
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transcriptions of her correspondence with Otto to vindicate their assertions to the youth welfare 
office.683 
The JAL leadership’s response to the suicide and subsequent allegations raises two 
further issues. First, it is worth noting that in this case like many others including unflattering 
press reports about general camp conditions or allegations about insufficient care for returning 
prisoners of war, the camp leadership jealously guarded the reputation of Friedland facility.684 
Although it seems that there were never explicit allegations of wrongdoing, much less criminal 
allegations, the camp leadership understandably wanted to refute the implication that a young 
man found death preferable to returning to the camp. After all, the youth camp relied upon 
networks of youth welfare offices, youth homes, and other authorities, not to mention the trust of 
those institutions and youths’ parents/guardians. However strict the discipline or difficult the 
surroundings in the camp may have been, the administrators of the JAL strove to create a safe 
environment and they needed others to believe that the camp was a safe place for youths. 
The second issue that stands out from this case is the role that trauma played in 
difficulties with work and living assignments for youths. The camp certainly housed and 
resettled difficult youths. In some cases, such as the failed settlement at the Solingen home, 
headstrong youths accustomed to having greater control in their lives due to the breakdown of 
familial and social authorities may well have been unreasonable in their expectations for 
housing, working conditions, and pay. It is nevertheless worth emphasizing that the destructive 
effects of war and population displacements, which caused that very breakdown of social 
control, must have also had profound effects on the psyches of these teenage men. In the case of 
                                                 
683 Although the memorandum is unsigned, the handwriting matches Gerhard Rüpprich’s script. “Vermerk,” n.d., 
Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 51, NHStA. 
684 These other examples are discussed in chapter 3 and in chapter 6, respectively. 
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Otto D, for example, it hardly seems speculative to link the trauma of forced agricultural labor as 
a child to extreme difficulties living and working on a farm, where he was separated from his 
mother and surrounded by strangers. 
Youth Camp Demographics 
A prosopographical examination of 157 adolescents housed at Friedland during the first 
year of the JAL’s operation demonstrates the ongoing social effects of displacement and the 
complexities of refugee categories.685 These adolescents came almost exclusively from the 
Soviet zone, though a division existed between longtime residents of those territories and 
recently arrived expellees. The 82 youth camp residents with expulsion backgrounds constituted 
a majority (52 percent) of the overall population in comparison to the 68 youths (43 percent) who 
had been previously resident in Soviet zone territories. The remaining six youths resided during 
and after the war in the areas comprising the Western zones. Given that expellees accounted for 
roughly 25 percent of the overall population in the Soviet zone, their majority presence amongst 
the youths speaks to a lasting transitory status after the expulsion.686 The overrepresentation of 
youths with expulsion backgrounds perhaps can be explained by their having been less rooted in 
local communities. They may also have had a level of comfort or confidence in traveling to find 
a new home that came from familiarity with displacement. The chaotic shifting of populations 
during the war and early postwar years likely functioned as a further solvent to familial bonds 
that might otherwise have kept the adolescents sedentary (or under supervision during travels). 
                                                 
685 The fragmentary and incomplete nature of the files as well as variable forms of record keeping within the camp 
regarding individuals in the Friedland JAL makes a systematic sampling of the years 1947 to 1951 unmanageable. 
The 157 files in this case are comprised of interview summaries and various notes taken by staff, Lebensläufe 
written by residents after their arrival, and correspondence between camp authorities and parents, legal guardians 
and Jugendämter. Data compiled from folders Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 49, NHStA. 
686 On the 4.5 million expellees in the Soviet zone and later German Democratic Republic, see Michael Schwartz, 
Vertriebene und "Umsiedlerpolitik." Integrationskonflikte in der Deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft und die 
Assimilationsstrategien in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1961 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004). 
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One JAL resident’s personal history encapsulates all three of those elements. This youth 
was born to a carpenter and his wife in the summer of 1931. The family lived in the county of 
Ebenrode, East Prussia, until 1945. In the spring, the father was drafted into the Volkssturm 
while the rest of the family fled from the Red Army. During the flight, the then 13-year-old 
adolescent became separated from his mother and brother, and he eventually arrived at a refugee 
camp in Mecklenburg. He lived there for two years without his family, because, according to 
him, acquaintances had told him that the mother and brother had returned to East Prussia. The 
youth stated that he had decided to leave the Soviet zone to pursue agricultural work in the west, 
crossing illegally at Salzwedel, Saxony-Anhalt. From there, he reported himself to the refugee 
camp at Uelzen (the other major border transit camp in Lower Saxony), which then led to his 
transfer to Friedland. Having no family and few social ties, not to mention possessing a great 
deal of experience living on his own, the youth presented his decision to leave to pursue work in 
the west as a matter of course. In the end, the JAL procured a job for him in Ballenhausen, a 
small community a few kilometers from Friedland, and sent a letter to the father in the 
hometown in Ebenrode County.687 
The camp also processed ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe who had been uprooted 
well before the final war years and expulsions. One such example was a JAL resident who 
arrived at Friedland shortly before his fifteenth birthday in 1947. This adolescent had been born 
in Volhynia, but he resettled with his family in Wartheland during the war, surely as part of the 
Heim ins Reich program. The boy and his mother then fled westward as the Red Army advanced. 
                                                 
687 Lebenslauf, 9 April 1947; and letter to Herr A in Schenkenhagen, Ebenrode, n.d., Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 41, 
NHStA. 
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According to the youth, he and his mother lived in county of Ostprignitz, Brandenburg in the 
Soviet zone until he left on his own to find agricultural work in the west.688 
The case of another youth processed in 1947 further exemplifies the influences of earlier 
displacement on his decision to travel into the British zone. He was born to an ethnic German 
baker in Bacau, Romania, where the family lived until they were brought to a resettlement camp 
in Baden in 1941. Eventually the family moved to Gliwice/Gleiwitz, Upper Silesia. In the course 
of flight from the Red Army, the boy became separated from his family, but he ultimately found 
housing with a farmer in the Soviet zone. Upon hearing in a letter from his aunt in Linz, Austria 
that the family planned to resettle in Romania, he crossed the border into the British zone, in an 
apparent journey to reach his family in Linz. Brought to the camp, he ultimately escaped through 
a bathroom window. Rüpprich suggested that the youth had feared being forcibly returned to the 
Soviet zone and had also wished to “illegally” travel to Austria more quickly.689 
Aside from cases of family reunification, youths themselves typically reported economic 
reasons for their flight to the west. The push-factor of lost or scarce work in the Soviet zone 
combined with a pull-factor in the perception of goods and work being more abundant in the 
West. The war and industrial dismantling significantly interrupted the JAL residents’ entry into 
professions. Notes from administrator’s interviews with youths as well as the youths’ own 
written accounts indicate that it was rare for an individual to have enjoyed an uninterrupted 
vocational education. Particularly in the cases of younger JAL residents and those from farther 
east, the war had prevented completion of the studies at a vocational school (Berufschule) and 
sometimes even primary schooling (Volksschule). 
                                                 
688 Lebenslauf, 19 August 1947, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 44, NHStA. 
689 Lebenslauf, 11 July 1947, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 49, NHStA 
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Indeed, the disruption to education or poor learning for other reasons is often plainly 
evident in the text of the short biography (Lebenslauf) that residents wrote as part of processing 
procedure at Friedland. This Lebenslauf followed a more-or-less set form that combined family, 
school, and work histories as well as an explanation of the circumstances and motivations that 
ultimately led to the individual’s arrival at the camp. Handwritten by each resident, the 
Lebenslauf as a document conveys the level of education beyond just the recounting of years in 
school. Older, better-educated residents wrote in standard script with few spelling or 
grammatical errors. Younger and less-educated residents, including some who had not even 
completed their elementary education, produced documents in poor script or block-writing 
replete with grammar and spelling errors. Such spelling errors were often the result of 
phonetically spelling a word to match their accent (for example, “-unk” for the “-ung” ending). 
Figure 7: Vocational Training of JAL Residents690 
 
If the level of schooling was uneven, the completion of apprenticeships was uniformly 
rare for JAL residents. Wartime destruction, flight, and the postwar dismantling of industry 
(Demontage) for sending in-kind reparations to the Soviet Union ended early work opportunities. 
                                                 
690 Statistics compiled from interval sample of Lebensläufe in the folders Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 
49, NHStA. 
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In terms of actual work experience prior to arriving at the camp, 25 percent had worked in 
agriculture (e.g. farming and forestry), 24 percent in industry (e.g. machine work, mechanics, 
smelting), and 22 percent in artisanal labor (e.g. baking, butchery, carpentry). Only 4 percent had 
training in a white-collar profession (typically sales), and 2 percent were on the university track 
in their education. Most of the remainder had no formal or informal vocational training. 
Youths arriving in Friedland often claimed work conscription in the uranium mines of the 
Wismut SAG in Aue as their reason for flight across the zonal border. The influx of youths with 
this motivation seems to have reached its high point in the summer of 1949, when nearly all of 
the arriving adolescents claimed work conscription as the cause for their flight.691 Indeed, the 
mines’ reputation for dangerous work, meager rations, and poor living conditions had spread 
widely enough amongst adolescent males in the Soviet zone that they often made the decision to 
flee upon receipt of the work assignment from their local employment authority. Still others 
reported that they had tried to work at the mines but fled due to the conditions. Work 
conscription, however, was also most likely over-reported as a reason for flight. Subsequent 
investigations with families and work offices by camp administrators did periodically reveal 
residents’ lies about assignment to Aue. It is unsurprising that youths willing to take the risk of 
leaving home and crossing the zonal border might also strategically lie about reasons for flight. 
After all, claims about work conscription constituted a more compelling case than the truth of 
familial and workplace disputes in the Soviet zone. 
Cases of flight due to explicitly political reasons seem to have been rare for the youth 
camp. That is not to say that the decision to flee from work conscription was a non-political act. 
Likewise, leaving for the West and its supposedly better economic opportunities was also a 
                                                 
691 See files in Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 54, NHStA. 
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political decision of sorts. Nevertheless, the youth records at Friedland reveal only one case of 
overt political persecution in the East. The young man in that instance was an 18-year-old 
originally from East Prussia whose family resettled in Sonderhausen, Thüringen after the 
expulsion. According to him, he became politically active on behalf of the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) in 1947, which made him so locally “unloved” that supporters of the Socialist 
Unity Party of Germany (SED) began to accost him in the street. He also alleged that a teacher 
associated with the socialist Free German Youth organization boxed his ear in front of the class, 
“because I was a CDU man.” Even then, the immediate cause for this young man’s flight was not 
the persecution but rather a work assignment from the local Russian commandant for him and his 
classmates in 1948. The youth camp’s efforts to find him work with a CDU politician ultimately 
came to nothing, and they could not place him in an agricultural job either. So, the camp 
administrators sent him back to his family in the Soviet zone some 2 months after his flight to the 
west.692 
Female Residents and Gender in the Youth Problematic 
 The youths’ backgrounds and JAL’s mission also raise the question of why the camp 
administration established the sub-camp for male but not female adolescents. Surviving 
administrative documents from the JAL and camp at large are conspicuously silent on this issue. 
The JAL did in fact house and resettle some vagrant female youths, particularly in 1947 and 
1948 before camp came to an agreement for sending them to a young women’s home in nearby 
Göttingen also run by the Innere Mission.693 One explanation for the focus on male youths is that 
they simply constituted the larger problem group, because only a handful of vagrant young 
                                                 
692 Lebenslauf (with marginal notes by youth camp administrators) and letters from camp to the father in Nds. 386 
Acc. 16/83 Nr. 49, NHStA. 
693 Mädchen Wohnheim Göttingen to JAL Friedland, 5 February 1949, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 39 NHStA. 
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women arrived at the camp. Young women may have tended to remain with families to care for 
parents or siblings, while young men were freer (or expected) to travel west to find gainful work. 
Given the furtive nature of many of the journeys, most of the male adolescents had travelled 
alone or in small groups, and the prospect of traveling through the seemingly dangerous border 
region might have also depressed the number of young women willing to attempt the crossing. 
Rape had been a problem along the border in 1945 and 1946, but instances were still reported 
into 1947, and individuals approaching the border on their own or in small groups, as the youth 
refugees did, were most vulnerable.694 
 Worries about possible sexual activity presumably led the camp administration to prefer a 
single-sex facility. Authorities at Friedland were circumspect about the possibility of youths’ 
sexual activities. Still, given the opportunity to socialize more freely before arrival in the camp 
as well as residents’ work and vocational training outside of the camp, JAL authorities could not 
completely close off the young men from the possibility of such relationships. Indeed, one 
particularly enamored young woman wrote from Göttingen to a JAL resident and included her 
mother’s suggestion that the two just marry already.695 In another instance, camp director Krause 
interceded to delay the marriage between a still under-aged JAL resident and a young woman 
living nearby. Krause sent the youth across Lower Saxony to a home near the Dutch border, 
writing, “the entire marriage plan makes no sense and cannot be realized if [the youth in 
question] has no possibility of feeding himself and his wife.” Krause went on to state that young 
man’s character was “not entirely in order,” that he “sometimes had difficulties with the truth.” It 
                                                 
694 Letter from Landrat Göttingen to COO 1002 Mil.Gov.Det. Göttingen, 18 September 1945, Stadtverwaltung und 
Militärregierung Nr. A 10, SAG. Memorandum written by Doctor Marggraf, 3 October 1945, MISC 170 Item 2616, 
IWMA. See also report dated January 1947 in Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 105, NHStA. 
695 Letter to JAL resident, 5 Novemeber 1947, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 45, NHStA. 
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would be for the best to separate him from his fiancée to see if the “love is great and honest, and 
if he takes his work seriously.”696 
 Adolescent women crossed into Lower Saxony for many of the same reasons that drove 
their male counterparts. Female youths cited work assignments in the Soviet zone, finding better 
work in the West, family conflicts, and some combination of thereof as the most common 
reasons for their journeys. For example, one 17-year-old woman had been born in Gliwice 
(Gleiwitz), lost her father to tuberculosis in 1941, and fled from the Red Army with her 
remaining family at the end of the war. The family took up residence in Thüringen, where she 
received a work assignment as a maid for a Russian officer. When the officer received transfer 
orders to a different region of the Soviet zone, she was supposed to accompany him. Instead she 
fled to the British zone, eventually arriving at the Friedland camp. Twelve days later, the camp 
sent her to work as a maid for a Göttingen family.697  
 At least one woman also reported work conscription at the Aue uranium mines as a 
reason for flight. A 19-year-old woman from Glauchau, Saxony, crossed into the West near 
Duderstadt in the spring of 1949. Local authorities there took her into custody and then sent her 
to the Friedland JAL. According to her, she had been working as a maid while her mother and 
sister lived on welfare. Separated from the family for unknown reasons, the father lived in a 
small town southwest of Hannover. In August 1948, the young woman received an assignment to 
the mines at Aue doing survey work underground. She found the work too difficult and also 
                                                 
696 Letter to Georgsheim in Rhederfeld, 7 Nov. 1949, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 56, NHStA. 
697 Lebenslauf included in a report from 29 September 1947, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 44, NHStA. 
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“colossally harmful to her health,” so she left her work post at the end of April 1949 and, without 
informing her mother, crossed the zonal boundary four days later.698 
 In other cases, the prospect of better work opportunities was sufficient to draw young 
women across the zonal boundary. In the spring of 1948, the small women’s home in the JAL 
housed two sisters who had come from Saxony-Anhalt to seek employment and further 
schooling. As in the preceding case, the parents were separated. The mother lived in Burg bei 
Magdeburg, Saxony-Anhalt, while the father took up residence in Göttingen following his POW 
release. The 19-year-old elder sister had completed her schooling in May and found work as an 
office maid for a lawyer in her hometown of Osterburg. She, however, decided to the leave that 
job because it had no “opportunity for advancement.” Somehow, presumably through some 
connection with her father, she had arranged work as a maid for a family in nearby Kassel. The 
younger sister, 17 years old at the time, had decided to leave the Soviet zone with her sibling 
because new school regulations had made it impossible to complete her Abitur exam. Hence, she 
felt that there was no possibility for a livelihood (Existenzmöglichkeit) there, and she wished to 
complete her schooling or find work as a maid in the British zone. JAL administrators sent both 
of the sisters to Göttingen when the JAL closed its young women’s home and a new young 
women’s home opened in Göttingen in June 1948.699 
 Until the young women’s home in Göttingen opened, the JAL administrators had been 
responsible for finding residential and vocational placements for their female charges. For 
example, the camp administrators arranged a successful placement for a 17-year-old woman with 
a hotel in Hannoversch Münden. The woman had been born in Halle, Saxony, where she 
                                                 
698 Oberkreisdirektor Duderstadt, Memorandum on “Wandernde Jugendliche,” 2 May 1949, Nds. 386 Acc 16/83 Nr. 
39, NHStA. 
699 Lebenslauf for each sister in Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 49, NHStA. 
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completed her schooling in 1944. She had worked on a farm to start her compulsory year with 
the Bund Deutscher Mädel, but due to health concerns had switched to household work for a 
family with two children. Following the end of the war, she worked as a maid, going from one 
job to the next until she decided to travel to Bremen for work with an acquaintance in July 1947. 
Upon crossing the border illegally, she was brought into the custody of the JAL. In the camp, she 
requested that the administrators find her a job as a maid, because she “would like to return to 
orderly employment as soon as possible.” Three days after her arrival at Friedland, the camp 
received a labor solicitation from the hotel owner, who complained of the local labor office’s 
inability to find a maid for his hotel and inquired if the camp had any young women who could 
fill the position. The hotel owner suggested that his wife could come to the camp when the next 
transport arrived so that she could arrange details with whichever young woman might be 
interested. In a letter to the father, Krause asked for his assent to the placement, though it is 
unclear if he ever responded. Some two weeks after her arrival at the JAL, the young woman left 
for Hannoversch Münden.700 
As is also the case with male youths, assessing the success of placements is difficult 
because only problem cases reentered the camp’s records after the female youths left the JAL. 
The reasons for failed placements mirror those of young men: personal conflicts with families or 
employers, willfulness, and criminal behavior. One such conflict arose between a young woman 
originally from Vitkov (Wigstadtl) in Moravian Silesia and her employer/host in Groß Schneen 
near Friedland. According to her Lebenslauf, she had never known her father and had lived in an 
orphanage since she was nine years old. She lost contact with her mother during the process of 
                                                 
700 Lebenslauf and correspondence in Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 42, NHStA. 
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expulsion at the end of war. She failed to find her mother when she returned to Vitkov later in 
1945, so she took up residence on a farm in Ostprignitz, Brandenburg. 
After her arrival at Friedland in 1947, the JAL administrators matched the young woman 
with a nearby family that had requested a maid from the camp. The relationship between the 
youth and her host/employer soured due to personal conflicts. The father complained that he had 
forbidden her from attending dances (Tanzvergnügen), but she went anyway and answered him 
rudely when confronted about it. He further noted that he did not receive support from the 
camp’s personnel but rather felt that they undercut his authority because her obstinacy increased 
after every visit from camp personnel. According to him, whenever he or his wife tried to 
discipline the youth, she threatened to make a complaint to the JAL, claiming, “I will be better 
believed than you.” The father further stated his belief that she would become a burden to the 
community, arguing she was from a bad family and that the apple does not fall far from the tree. 
As such, he fired her and sent her back to the JAL. The administrators sent her back across the 
zonal border to her mother in Ostprignitz, and the only subsequent record of her was the sending 
of 50DM back wages to her a year later.701 
 In one instance, a youth’s health and psychological problems made resettlement 
extremely difficult. Eva G. was born in Kreuzburg, Upper Silesia, in 1931.702 Eva’s mother and 
brother both died in 1945, and her father was missing despite the best efforts of the German Red 
Cross’s Search Service to determine his status. When Eva arrived at Friedland as a refugee from 
the east in August 1947, the JAL housed her and confirmed her background with a refugee 
                                                 
701 It is unclear if the youth had lied to the camp about her mother being missing and/or her living situation in 
Ostprignitz. It might also be the case that her mother took up residence in Ostprignitz after the youth left for the 
British zone. Lebenslauf and correspondence in Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 50, NHStA. 
702 Name changed in accordance with German privacy laws. 
 284 
family from Kreuzburg that had resettled to Geismar, a small town since incorporated into 
Göttingen. Eva had suffered from tuberculosis during the war, and as a result needed 
hospitalization for health problems after the camp sent her to a children’s home near Lübeck. 
Because she was unable to work, the home returned her to Friedland. After she spent two weeks 
back in the JAL, Rüpprich and his family took her in as live-in maid.703 
 During the subsequent period from November 1947 to August 1948, she proved difficult 
for Rüpprich. In his memorandum about Eva’s status, Rüpprich noted that while she was 
“willing and honest,” she required significant guidance because she still had not “learned to care 
for her hygiene and for the maintaining the cleanliness and good condition of her bedding and 
clothing.” Rüpprich stated that although the family provided her with ample free time, she spent 
hours daydreaming and doing nothing. Eva further spurned opportunities to integrate into the 
local community in favor of fellow “girls of vagrant backgrounds” with whom she could “revel 
in the vagrant life and the partially asocial high jinks and job changes.” Rüpprich lamented that 
he had failed to change her behaviors and to have her take root in the community. When 
Rüpprich had to release Eva due to financial difficulties resulting from the currency reform, she 
went from job-to-job and home-to-home because of poor health and the persistent psychological 
problems. In one instance, her demands for free time and pay further compounded the problems. 
Rüpprich considered life and work in a specialized youth community to be her only remaining 
option.704 
 Youth camp records also indicate one instance of young women committing theft and 
then fleeing back to the Soviet zone. The youth who had come to Friedland after fleeing from her 
                                                 
703 Documents pertaining to Eva G. in Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 46, NHStA. 
704 Ibid. 
 285 
work assignment as a Russian officer’s maid had been processed through the JAL and given an 
assignment as a maid for a family in Göttingen. In September 1947, after roughly a month 
working for the family, she suddenly disappeared along with valuables, clothes, and food 
belonging to the family. Subsequent investigation revealed that she had traveled to meet a 
compatriot from her hometown in Thuringia who had also been processed at the JAL and was 
working as a maid for a children’s home near Hannover. Both women then returned across the 
border to Thuringia. Evidently the police were able to recover what remained of the stolen 
property and return it. The first youth was arrested and brought to trial, but the other one could 
not be apprehended immediately because she was recovering a maternity ward shortly after 
giving birth to a child conceived with a Russian.705 
 The establishment of the girls’ home in Göttingen in the spring of 1948 seems to have 
concluded the youth camp’s involvement in care for female youths. The JAL closed its small 
home for young women at the same time, and records indicate that the administrators would send 
underage female border crossers to the Göttingen home as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, 
examination of the young women’s lives prior to, during, and subsequent to their time at the JAL 
suggests that they had much in common with their male counterparts. Many of these youths had 
previously experienced displacement through expulsion from Eastern European states, and the 
turmoil of war and defeat had contributed to the breakdown of parental control. Furthermore, like 
the young men at the JAL, these young women had mostly sought better living and employment 
prospects in the west, though personal conflicts and past trauma likewise posed difficulties in the 
process of resettlement. 
 
                                                 
705 Report and Lebenslauf in Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 44, NHStA. 
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Conclusions 
Despite the continuing flow of young refugees from the GDR into Lower Saxony, the 
Friedland camp closed its youth sub-camp in March 1951. Although extant documents reveal 
little about the reasons for the closure, it is apparent that by January 1951 the youth camp no 
longer enjoyed the support of Lower Saxony’s refugee ministry, which oversaw the Friedland 
facility. In the midst of discussions about closing the entire camp, a senior ministry official from 
the state defended the camp as a whole to the Federal Minister of Interior, but he also wrote that 
the JAL had taken on the “character of a residential facility” such that “it no longer served the 
demands of a transit camp” and could be relieved of state support.706 When the JAL subsequently 
closed in March, the refugee ministry instead used dedicated camps in Poggenhagen and 
Sandbostel to house and care for individuals who were part of the influx of young men and 
women from the GDR.707 The new camps did, however, take advantage of the institutional 
experience gained by personnel at Friedland. Richard Krause left the Friedland camp to take over 
the administration of the camp at Sandbostel in 1952. After the refugee ministry sacked Krause, 
Friedland’s assistant camp director, Hans Thederan, took over the position at Sandbostel. 
The administration at Friedland established and operated the JAL with the twin goals of 
helping uprooted youths and securing social order, but it is difficult to assess the extent to which 
they were successful in these goals. Aside from the question of how one could isolate the JAL’s 
effects on rates of youth vagrancy or crime, the loss of contact between the youths and camp 
administration after resettlement makes a longitudinal assessment difficult as well. It does seem 
that youths occasionally visited the JAL to see old friends and staffers after resettlement. There 
                                                 
706 Letter from Oberregierungsrat Lange to Bundesminister des Innern, 8 January 1951, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 
399, NHStA. 
707 “Die Entwicklung des Jugendlagers Poggenhagen,” 11 June 1952, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 530, NHStA. 
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likewise appears to have been come base-level networking or communication between former 
residents who were resettled near each other. Yet, with these few exceptions, only problem cases 
reemerged in JAL records following youths’ resettlement. As such, it is difficult to determine 
what happened to members of the silent majority, so to speak.  
Any conclusions about the youth camp’s effects on society in the immediate border 
region or the British zone and early FRG must also be limited, given the JAL’s size. During its 
four years of operation, the youth camp processed 874 adolescents. By comparison, the Friedland 
camp processed nearly 700,000 individuals in total during those four years. Nevertheless, the 
JAL administrators’ fears of losing social control over vagrant youths were real and worth taking 
seriously. The Nazi regime, the war, and the defeat had all corroded traditional social controls 
over youths, whether that was the family or community organizations. The period roughly lasting 
from 1944 to 1947 was one in which youths experienced unprecedented freedom from adult 
supervision, only for that authority to be reasserted as social and state institutions regained their 
footing in 1947-1948. The JAL represents one example of that effort. 
Moreover, it seems reasonable to conclude that the JAL had some effect on resocializing 
youths in the border and Göttingen regions. The process of being taken from a period of 
vagrancy, being cared for, and being reunited with family or found employment must have been 
a profound experience for the residents at that point in their lives. This process was characterized 
by a strict regulation-oriented form of humanitarianism built upon principles successfully applied 
to other populations at Friedland. It is instructive that the facility that proved itself vital to the 
process of resettling of a variety of uprooted populations also addressed specific challenges 
presented by displaced youths. In addition to having outlined the backgrounds of youth camp 
residents as well as their treatment at Friedland, this chapter suggests that the young refugees 
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from the Soviet zone and GDR belong in the much larger history of the uprooting and 
resettlement of mass populations during and after World War II, particularly given the 
overrepresentation of youths from expulsion backgrounds. 
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CHAPTER 6 
GATEWAY TO FREEDOM: REFUGEES, RETURNEES, AND MYTH-MAKING, 1952-
1960 
In January 1953, Friedland’s Catholic camp priest, Doctor Josef Krahe, wrote to the state 
refugee ministry to appeal on behalf of a woman and expressed his shock at her suffering under 
the “hard fate she experienced in the postwar confusion.” According to her statement, Marie J. 
lost contact with her husband in 1944 while he was serving on the eastern front. Marie and her 
two children fled their home in Zduńska Wola (Freihaus) near Łódź as the Red Army advanced, 
and she left the children with her mother-in-law before returning home in the spring of 1945. 
Believing that her husband was dead, Marie took up with (schloß mich an) Herr Stephan. Marie 
miscarried in 1945, and at the start of 1946 she retrieved her son Egon from the mother-in-law. 
In June, Marie left with her son and Stephan by expellee transport for Rodenburg, Lower Saxony 
and then settled in Hörsten, Schleswig-Holstein. During their journey, Stephan convinced Marie 
to present herself as his wife, to which she agreed in those “confusing days.” Marie lived as 
Stephan’s wife and gave birth to two daughters in the following years. Unfortunately for Marie 
and Egon, Stephan’s treatment of them worsened. Feeling trapped by the deception, Marie 
reported that she found herself “under his thumb” (in seiner Gewalt) until she could no longer 
bear “these abuses [Mißhandlungen] and emotional pressure.” In December 1952, Marie and 
Egon fled to the Uelzen refugee camp, where she claimed to have just arrived as a refugee from 
Poland. Officials there sent her to Friedland, where she admitted to the deception in a long 
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interrogation. Having sought freedom from her abusive partner, Marie now wanted to give an 
honest accounting of the events “in order to finally become a free person.”708 
 Marie’s case raises the question of what populations still needed resettlement seven years 
after the end of World War II and the camp’s establishment. Despite the time that had passed 
since the war and the largest postwar displacements, the Friedland administration began planning 
in January 1953 for the construction of additional barracks to increase the camp’s capacity to 800 
persons at the cost of 30,000 DM.709 At that time, much of the camp was occupied by refugees 
uprooted by the East German efforts to create a “security belt” along the border with West 
Germany as well as overflow from North Rhine-Westphalian refugee camps. Camp officials 
nevertheless expected arrivals at Friedland to increase rather than tail off in the coming years. 
According to investigations by the German Red Cross Search Service, hundreds of thousands of 
Germans in Eastern Europe still waited to be released to West Germany. Camp director Franz 
Freßen summarized those findings in a report about populations to expect at Friedland as of July 
1954: 9,375 prisoners of war; over 7,000 civilian internees; 2,600 forced laborers; over 100,000 
Germans taken from the “Eastern Territories;” 2,646 resettlers from the Baltic and East Prussian 
areas incorporated into the Soviet Union, and 175,926 resettlers from Poland.710 
                                                 
708 Lagerpfarrer Josef Krahe to Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Vertriebene, 30 January 1953, Nds. 380 Acc. 
62a/65 Nr. 527, NHStA. Krahe asked refugee officials to intercede with the Göttingen prosecutor to drop charges for 
obtaining free train tickets, lodging, and meals under false pretenses, but they refused because they had no 
jurisdictional authority. Marie had left her daughters in Hörsten, and to the best of her knowledge, her other son was 
still in Poland. 
709 Lagerleitung Friedland to Regierungspräsidenten Hildesheim, 8 January 1953, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 98, 
NHStA. 
710 Lagerleitung Friedland to Regierungspräsidenten Hildesheim, 24 July 1954, Nds. 120 Hildesheim Acc. 111/77 
Nr. 20/2, NHStA. According to past experience, the camp expected 20% each of the POWs, internees, and forced 
laborers to resettle in the GDR. Of the 100,000 Germans taken from the Eastern Territories (East Prussia, 
Pomerania, the Warthegau, and Silesia), the Red Cross estimated that 29,000 had been forcibly resettled but could 
apply for transit permits through GDR to West Germany. Although the Red Cross had received 175,926 applications 
for resettlement from Poland, it estimated that over 200,000 Germans wished to resettle. 
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 The second issue raised by Marie’s account is the association between Friedland and 
freedom. When Marie stated her desire to finally become a “free person,” she was referring to 
the lifting of the constraints created by her deceptions, such as her dependence on Stephan and 
the need to maintain her fictional personal history, as well as leaving behind the psychological 
toll of lying to others. Nevertheless, her story of escaping an abusive home environment through 
refugee camps offers an allegory to the political refugees and returnees seeking freedom after 
their release from prisons and from repression in the Eastern Bloc. 
During the 1950s, Friedland cemented itself in West German public consciousness as the 
“Gateway to Freedom” for people arriving from the unfree east. This place in public 
consciousness was due to the composition of populations processed there as well as the 
administration’s careful cultivation and defense of the camp’s public image. Repression in the 
East and the Cold War also functioned as foils to the promise of freedom at Friedland. In turn, 
the reputation played a role in the decision to maintain Friedland as a transit camp for the Lower 
Saxon and federal governments when West German authorities undertook programs to close the 
last refugee camps in the late 1950s. 
This chapter examines displaced groups in the mid-to-late 1950s in connection with the 
development of the freedom mythos by focusing on three different camp populations. The first 
group consisted of East Germany refugees who fled from their homes near the inner-German 
border. During the summer of 1952, the East German government undertook a program to create 
a secure, restricted area along the border, which involved the arrest or displacement of ostensibly 
unreliable individuals through Operation Vermin (Aktion Ungeziefer). Second, Friedland played 
host to the last POWs returning from the Soviet Union, including the large transport and 
accompanying celebrations in the fall of 1955. Despite the eventual emergence of exonerative 
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consensus narratives about POWs as representatives of German victimhood, the POWs’ returns 
occasioned contests over the memory of the war and a proper reception, in which East Germany 
played an important role. Finally, the roughly 3,500 Hungarian refugees fleeing unrest and 
persecution during and after their revolution of 1956 contributed to the camp’s reputation. In 
contrast to the earlier acrimony over ex-DPs and infiltrees, officials and the press greeted 
Hungarian refugees with sympathy and welcomed them to western freedom. 
Refugees in Residence and Operation Vermin 
 In June 1952, the Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung published accounts of refugees’ 
flight from East Germany, headlined by the claim “Germans are being expelled by Germans.” 
The article explained that on the basis of the “highest orders,” the East German police were 
“cleaning the ‘restricted area’ along the zonal border of ‘unreliable persons.’” Over the course of 
the preceding weeks, the East German government had removed 4,000 border dwellers, while 
some 800 persons had managed to flee into Lower Saxony. The article decried the police’s brutal 
methods. Refugees were fleeing west to “escape their underserved fate, abandoning their 
possessions, often chased by the bullets of the People’s Police.” The author recounted meeting 
refugees who took any means of flight available to them. Refugees near Lübeck had crossed the 
border with horse and cart under the cover of darkness, while others arrived in Ratzeburg after 
rowing across the Schalsee separating Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. 
Where the Werra River ran along the inner-German border south of Friedland, refugees had 
crossed in self-made emergency rafts. All along the border, the refugees “smuggled themselves 
across the border even though the police [VoPos] make use of their machine pistols without 
warning.” The article included the heart-rending case of a boy who reported, “Our father was 
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shot. He’s lying over there in the forest.” Having lost his father and home, the boy and his 
sobbing mother were left with only a shopping bag containing their worldly possessions.711 
 Although camps in Uelzen, Gießen, and Berlin had been responsible for accommodating 
East German refugees, Friedland was tasked with housing hundreds of refugees from the border 
region in 1952 and 1953. This shift in responsibilities raises a number of questions. What were 
origins of this particular displacement and whom did it affect? Why did authorities for Lower 
Saxony decide to break from earlier practice of reserving Friedland for German refugees from 
abroad and house the East German refugees at the camp? What was life at the transit camp like 
for the refugees? What specific challenges did this residential population pose for the camp 
administration, and how did officials handle them? 
  The permeability of the so-called Green Frontier running between the Western and 
Soviet zones had long been a source of frustration for the military governments, and the problem 
continued after the founding of the two German states in 1949. Although guards and criminals 
made border-crossings dangerous, traffic between the German states allowed for employment in 
the other zone, family visits, illicit trade, and escape for refugees. As Edith Sheffer argues, when 
the western allies rejected Stalin’s suggestion for a unified, neutral German state in March 1952, 
Stalin urged East Germany’s communist government to rapidly implement a program to create a 
separate, sustainable, socialist German state.712 Securing the border was a key element of that 
program, so the East German Council of Ministers enacted the “Regulation Concerning 
Measures on the Demarcation Line between the German Democratic Republic and the Western 
                                                 
711 Siegfried Pistorius, “Deutschen werden von Deutschen vertrieben,” Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 June 
1952. Press clipping in ZGS 2/1 Nr. 163, NHStA. 
712 Edith Alice Repogle Sheffer, “Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain” (PhD diss., 
University of California at Berkeley, 2008), 219-220. 
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Occupation Zones of Germany” on May 26, 1952. Hidden behind the obfuscatory title and desire 
to protect from “enemy agents the economic and cultural construction of East Germany,” the law 
directed the Ministry for State Security to “immediately implement strict measures for the 
surveillance of the demarcation line,” in order to prevent the further entry of “saboteurs, spies, 
terrorists, and vermin [Schädlingen].”713 Of course, these dictates followed a strategy of blaming 
the West for the GDR’s own repressive measures. 
 The Ministry for State Security thus began to create a restricted zone and a control strip 
along the border in late May. The control strip extending 10 meters from the border fence was to 
be completely cleared of vegetation, structures, and inhabitants, while residents of the restricted 
zone extending 5 kilometers from the border were subject to intense surveillance, a pass system, 
and other restrictions. According to Sheffer’s study of the border town of Sonnenberg, locals 
reacted with a mixture of annoyance and fear. Some fled the region after the announcement, 
while others refused to help clear the control strip or crossed over to “sample Bavarian beer one 
more time.”714 Rumors of impending deportations were followed by an official announcement of 
Operation Vermin (Aktion Ungeziefer) to remove “asocial” elements from the region. Political 
opponents, criminals, foreigners and stateless persons, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, among others, 
fell under that category. Officials, however, also used the program as an opportunity to rid 
themselves of “social vagrants: ‘the work-shy,’ ‘notorious boozers,’ or the ‘un-teachable.’” 
Sheffer further argues that in practice the deportations were “capricious” and “relied heavily on 
well-honed traditions of local recrimination” as residents denounced each other to settle scores. 
                                                 
713 “Verordnung über Maßnahmen an der Demarkationslinie zwischen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und 
den westlichen Besatzungszonen Deutschlands,” Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 26 May 
1952, 405-406. 
714 Sheffer, “Burned Bridge,” 225. 
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Although the propaganda labeled deportees as “vermin,” many of them were in fact decent, 
responsible citizens, some of whom may have been opponents of the regime or specific policies 
and some of whom were caught up in a program that needed targets. In sum, the East German 
government had planned to deport 10,300 residents, but it managed only 8,300 deportations 
while 5,585 persons fled to West Germany (1,888 of whom had been slated for deportation).715  
 The paucity of available housing and space in residential refugee camps in 1952 meant 
that refugees from Operation Vermin needed indefinite accommodation. In mid-June, Federal 
Minister for Expellees Hans Lukaschek committed 10,000 DM to the Gießen refugee camp for 
“first aid” for these refugees. The emergency reception camp at Uelzen was also under strain, 
having seen an increase from 80 to 170 individuals in its daily refugee arrivals. Friedland, which 
was in the process of clearing its residential camp of the last ex-DPs and infiltrees, therefore 
received 200 refugees from the region near Heiligenstadt, even though the camp had not 
previously been responsible for East German refugees aside from the vagrant youths who had 
resided in the also closed Friedland Youth Reception Camp.716 In late summer, the number of 
refugees had risen slightly to 260 individuals, despite efforts to resettle them in less provisional 
housing. In addition to these refugees, the camp also accommodated over 300 refugees assigned 
to North Rhine-Westphalia but for whom that state had no available space in refugee camps. 
Lower Saxon officials hoped to complete the resettlement for the former group by the end of 
October, but they were unsure how long their commitment to the latter group would last.717 
                                                 
715 Ibid., 227-229. 
716 Statistics from Pistorius, “Deutschen werden von Deutschen vertrieben.” 
717 Vermerk by Regierungsrat Schütte, 29 August 1952, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 401, NHStA. 
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 The decision to make camp space available to the two refugee groups was beneficial to 
the camp and served longer-term interests for refugee authorities. The refugees occupied the 
space just vacated by Friedland’s foreign populations, but their reception was at a moment when 
overall traffic was weak. Soviet, Polish, and Yugoslav reluctance to release POWs and German 
resettlers had depressed the inflow of populations to a total of 10,024 persons in 1952, including 
the GDR refugees.718 The drop-off in the camp’s workload led officials in the state refugee 
ministry to suggest to the Federal Ministry for Expellees that the camp had taken on the character 
of a residential camp contrary to earlier operations and that its personnel should be reduced.719 
Yet, closure of the camp never came into question. Within several months, the state ministry was 
making plans for expensive new barracks construction.720 These barracks would help to replace 
the Nissen huts, which had never been pleasant (hot in the summer, cold in winter, and nearly 
always wet inside) and had been in use far too long. The camp’s administration likewise 
provisionally planned for relocating the refugees in the event that the Soviet Union resumed its 
POW releases in 1953.721 In effect, Lower Saxon officials expected to need the facilities at 
Friedland when Eastern European states resumed POW and resettler releases, so housing the 
border region refugees and overflow from North Rhine-Westphalia was a means to avoid 
temporarily mothballing the camp. 
                                                 
718 By contrast, the camp had processed 19,010 resettlers alone the year before. See 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, 
Anlage 3. 
719 Ministerialrat von Grolman to Bundesminister für Vertriebene, 18 October 1952, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 527, 
NHStA. 
720 Lagerleitung Friedland to Regierungspräsidenten Hildesheim, 8 January 1953, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 98, 
NHStA. 
721 Vermerk by Oberregierungsrat Schütte, 31 August 1953, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 527, NHStA. 
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Accommodating refugees from the border region at Friedland was also affected by 
questions of employment. In fact, some of the refugees had previously taken advantage of the 
porous border by working in West Germany while living in East Germany, though it is difficult 
to determine what percentage of the refugees lived in such an arrangement. One man who had 
fled with his wife and children in June 1952 claimed that the reason for his persecution in the 
GDR was that he had been working for the rail service in Göttingen since before World War II, 
and that made him politically suspect in the eyes of East German officials.722 For refugees 
without employment in West Germany, financial support depended on their expected length of 
stay. In an agreement reached between the camp administration and the Göttingen employment 
agency, the refugees were to register themselves with the agency’s camp office on the day of 
their arrival. If the refugee had reason to expect release within two weeks, the accompanying 
application for financial support would be dated but not processed. If, however, the refugee had 
no immediate prospects for housing and employment elsewhere, then the agency would process 
the application immediately and pay out the support twice per month.723 
Because the camp could not resettle the refugees until housing in Lower Saxon 
communities became available, officials at Friedland and in Hannover suddenly faced the 
complication of arranging compulsory schooling for the children. In late July, a senior official in 
Lower Saxon Ministry for Refugees wrote to the Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs 
(Bundestministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, BMG) to ask for financial assistance with 
refugee children’s education. According to him, there were 87 children at Friedland who had 
reached the age of compulsory schooling and an additional 17 children who had not yet reached 
                                                 
722 Johannes A. to Bundesminister Kaiser, 28 July 1953, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 401, NHStA. 
723 Aktenvermerk über eine Besprechung zwischen der Lagerleitung des Grenzdurchgangslagers Friedland und dem 
Arbeitsamt Göttingen, 5 May 1953, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 98, NHStA. 
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that age in the GDR but who, according to Lower Saxon regulations, should have already started 
school during the spring. Aside from legal requirements, “because the children had already not 
been in class for several weeks and their idle residence [unbeschäftigter Aufenthalt] was 
disruptive to camp operations, a way needed to be found to bring them to classroom instruction.” 
The elementary school in the town was already overcrowded with 133 pupils in just two grades, 
and the other local schools were likewise overcrowded and too far for the children to travel. A 
further objection to integrating the children into local schools lay in the “entirely different 
teaching methods” the refugee children had experienced. From the standpoint of refugee and 
education officials, the only solution was the establishment of a camp school with two teachers: 
one teacher for grades one through four and another for grades five through eight. According to 
the memorandum, Lower Saxony could not bear the monthly cost of 1,300 DM, so they hoped 
that the BMG would make available 6,500 DM for that purpose.724 
To the disappointment of Lower Saxon officials, the federal officials refused to help, and 
other difficulties also emerged. In a response from the Federal Ministry for the Interior, the 
author explained that federal funds could be used only in cases of “aid for the consequences of 
war” (Kriegsfolgenhilfe), for which teacher salaries and classroom materials (Lehrmittel) did not 
qualify. The official helpfully added that the ministry could in principle pay for learning 
materials (Lernmittel, e.g. schoolbooks) if they fell under the standards for aid for the 
consequences of war.725 Needing funding from other sources, the Lower Saxon government 
compelled North Rhine-Westphalia to cover the educational costs for the children of refugees 
                                                 
724 Ministerialrat von Grolman to Bundesminister für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 25 July 1952, Nds. 380 Acc. 30/96 Nr. 
72, NHStA. 
725 Bundesministerium der Innern to Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Vertriebene, 16 August 1952, Nds. 380 Acc. 
30/96 Nr. 72, NHStA. 
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assigned to the Rhineland but still housed at Friedland, though the dispute required mediation at 
the federal level.726 Finding teachers also proved difficult. One of the hires, Frau R., 
unexpectedly left her job at end of September 1952, so the superintendant (Schulrat) in 
Göttingen had been forced to hire another teacher, Frau F., on an emergency basis for the next 
morning.727 Unfortunately, Frau F. suddenly took a teaching job in Westphalia within a month, 
leaving the position unfilled for an indeterminate period. Finally sometime in the spring of 1953, 
the superintendent rehired Frau R.728 
The camp administration and officials in Hannover also sought a solution for defraying 
the costs of housing and feeding the East German refugees on a long-term basis. In early August 
1952, camp director Franz Freßen suggested to his superiors that on September 1 the camp 
should stop paying out allowances for room and board to refugees with employment. The effect 
would be that refugees with local employment or who received other welfare would need to pay 
0.45 DM per person, per day for their various expenses.729 Shortly before the allowances could 
be revoked, a legal specialist (Amtsrat) for the refugee ministry ordered the camp to delay the 
charges because the measure also required approval from the social ministry. Having received no 
direction, Freßen pressed his superiors for an answer in late October. A decision was necessary 
                                                 
726 Vermerk, Niedersächsisches Kultusministerium, 25 June 1953, Hann. 180 Hildesheim Nr. 08395, NHStA. A 
memorandum from the Federal Ministry for Expellees indicated that North Rhine-Westphalia refused to make the 
payments after the initial agreement, so federal officials had needed to resolve the conflict. Ministerialdirektor Dr. 
Nahm to Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Vertriebene, 4 August 1953, Nds. 380 Acc. 30/96 Nr. 72, NHStA. 
727 Schulrat Göttingen to Regierungspräsidenten Hildesheim, 30 September 1952, Hann. 180 Hildesheim Nr. 08395, 
NHStA. 
728 See various communications between Schulrat Göttingen and Regierungspräsident Hildesheim in Hann. 180 
Hildesheim Nr. 08395, NHStA. 
729 Lagerleitung Friedland to Regierungspräsidenten Hildesheim, 8 August 1952, Nds. 120 Hildesheim Acc. 111/77 
Nr. 8/2, NHStA. 
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because the Hessian Ministry of the Interior had refused to pay for accommodation in the cases 
of refugees housed at Friedland who were working in the nearby Hessian town of Eichenberg.730 
At some point in November, Lower Saxon officials finally authorized the camp to charge 
employed refugees for room and board, which began on December 1. The local paper Göttinger 
Presse sensationally headlined its article on the refugees’ reaction as a “Revolution in the 
Friedland Camp.” According to the article, the refugees protested the fees and their surprising 
introduction. The article’s sub-heading suggested that the charges were an “unfriendly surprise 
Christmas gift,” and one of the refugees complained that they were being charged “at Christmas 
of all times.” The refugees had considered the free room and board as a form of burdens-
equalization (Lastenausgleich). In apparent agreement, the article suggested that their fate was 
no different from that which met millions of Germans in 1945 and 1946, implying that the “rent” 
was an unfair departure from earlier practice. Apparently, Freßen and other administrators were 
only able calm the protests with “patience and understanding,” such as acknowledging the 
“inopportune” (ungünstig) timing and the refugees’ frustrations. The article’s author did also 
allow that the camp administration had tried to be reasonable in setting the prices in accordance 
with individuals’ income and by giving a price break to families with many children.731 
In a press release from December 5, the refugee ministry defended its decision. The 
ministry argued that the comparison of treatment to earlier refugees was specious. Whereas 
expellees and resettlers had been in “need of help in the sense of welfare directives” and were as 
a rule accommodated for only three or four days at Friedland, the restricted area refugees “have 
                                                 
730 Lagerleitung Friedland to Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Vertriebene, 31 October 1952, Nds. 120 Hildesheim 
Acc. 111/77 Nr. 8/2, NHStA. 
731 “Revolution im Lager Friedland,” Göttinger Presse, 3 December 1952; press clipping in Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 
Nr. 527, NHStA. 
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long had their workplace in the Federal Republic (Bundesgebiet) and earn their bread further 
without change.” According to the press release, the payments had been set in accordance with 
“social concerns” (nach sozialen Gesichtspunkten) and on a sliding scale in reference to 
individual income so that refugees would pay between 0.15 DM and 1.45 DM per person. Those 
charges covered housing, meals, and administrative costs, but the press release emphasized that 
the refugees were still exempt from the “substantially higher sundry camp maintenance costs.” 
The camp administration had supposedly warned the residents of these upcoming charges in 
September and justified the change on basis of not unfairly privileging a specific class of a few 
hundred refugees through indefinite free housing and meals.732 
 Aside from the principle of paying to live in a refugee camp, residents complained that 
they were paying too much for low-quality housing. Johannes A., the railway worker who had 
fled with his wife and two daughters in June of 1952, penned a complaint to the BMG signed by 
other families in July 1953. Johannes claimed that the camp was charging 1.45 DM per person 
for inadequate meals and 24 square-meter living spaces shared by up to six families (30 people). 
He noted that while he paid 60 DM in fees for living at Friedland, his new accommodation in a 
recently constructed three-room apartment cost only 44 DM. He further complained that 
although light and heating were included in the rent, the electricity was shut off during the 
daytime hours and there was hardly ever any coal to use. As an employed resident, he was also 
excluded from all charitable donations and benefits. For these reasons and, ostensibly, a lack of 
funds, Johannes refused to pay for his last several months in the camp, which the state’s revenue 
services were trying to recoup from him.733 Refugee officials disputed Johannes’s claims. They 
                                                 
732 Presseinformation Nr. 55/52, 5 December 1952, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 401, NHStA. 
733 Johannes A. to Bundesminister Kaiser, 28 July 1953, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 401, NHStA. 
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argued that Johannes had overestimated his costs in the complaint and that he had in fact 
received all benefits aside from donations for the neediest residents. The report on the situation 
further noted that the governmental pricing agency had set the rates, and it was disingenuous to 
compare the 44 DM for rent alone with the more inclusive rates in the camp.734 
Some refugees living at Friedland also banded together with local residents to complain 
about what they saw as misuses of funds and other resources at the camp. In an anonymous letter 
from the “refugees and taxpayers in Friedland/Leine,” the authors made three criticisms of the 
camp. First, they complained about the amount of food waste collected as slop for pigs owned by 
the kitchen personnel. The authors questioned, “Is cooking not done rationally? […] Or must 
there always be so much left that the kitchen personnel’s pigs eat their fill [satt werden]?” 
Second, they claimed that the motor pool director was picked up in a large retrofitted military 
truck making a round trip of 20 kilometers, while other workers had to commute the same 
distance by bicycle. Third, the complainants criticized the camp for constructing administration 
barracks, “each prettier than the other,” and other expensive beautification projects. The letter 
asked if donations given to the SOS—Hilfe für Ostzonen Flüchtlinge (Help for Eastern Zone 
Refugees) solicited by radio were being used for these projects. The complaints noted, “100,000 
refugees are waiting in Berlin,” and asked, “if it would not be better to produce housing for our 
poor comrades [Volksgenossen].”735 
In a report to ministry officials in Hannover, an administrator in Hildesheim overseeing 
the camp largely rejected the complaints. He admitted that a truck was used for picking up 
                                                 
734 Regierungspräsident Hildesheim to Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Vertriebene, 4 September 1953, Nds. 380 
Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 401, NHStA; and internal memorandum to Flüchtlingsminister Albertz, 22 September 1953, Nds. 
380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 401, NHStA. 
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employees who lived some distance from the facility, but that was due to difficult transport 
connections. The motor pool director did not use this service, instead taking a public bus to the 
village of Klein Schneen where he and a few other camp employees could hitch a ride with a 
daily supply transport from Göttingen. The administrator further reported that the construction 
and beautification projects were in an approved budget using funds set aside for that purpose. 
Refugees assisted by planting gardens without using camp funds. With respect to the food waste, 
the administrator indicated that there was relatively little of it (just “one to two bins daily”), and 
it consisted solely of leftovers collected from the residential barracks where the East German 
refugees were living. According to him, the root of that complaint was the fact that the camp’s 
kitchen had actually cut back on food waste and as such locals and families of employees 
transferred to Sandbostel had been cut out of the division of waste for slop.736 In response to the 
complaint, the workers’ council planned to create an organization that would contract with the 
camp for buying slop and apparently use profits from selling pigs to support charitable efforts at 
the camp. Fearing that such an arrangement would appear as graft to annoyed locals, ministry 
officials ordered that the leftovers be made available for public purchase.737 
As other housing became available in 1953, both privately and in other refugee camps, 
administrators were able to reduce the number of East German refugees residing at Friedland. 
The expected arrival of 5,000 returnees released by the Soviet Union in late August also gave 
particular urgency to the resettlement or at least transfer of the refugees. At that time, the camp 
housed 406 refugees on behalf of Baden-Württemberg, 206 refugees for North Rhine-
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Westphalia, and 78 refugees from the restricted zone. Whereas Baden-Württemberg made two 
camps available for accommodation of its refugees, Lower Saxon officials were forced to search 
out other options for the refugees in the latter categories. These officials also secured a guarantee 
from the Rhenish social ministry in Düsseldorf that it would no longer send its refugees to 
Friedland. The camp administration began clearing the facility of refugees by sending 80 to a 
facility in Loccum, and if the returnees from the Soviet Union did begin to arrive, the camp 
would distribute the remaining refugees between four other refugee camps.738 
Faced with a sudden, unexpected influx of East German refugees in 1952, state officials 
had turned to the Friedland camp as a robust, well-functioning institution. Indeed, housing the 
refugees at Friedland solved the problems of accommodating new refugees and making the 
continued operation of the then-underused camp more efficient. The decision also had the effect 
of making the Friedland camp even more durable as an institution. Investments in physical 
improvements created permanent structures where provisional ones had once stood. The camp 
also became more resilient in a bureaucratic sense. The camp benefitted from inertia in the 
direction of continued operation, and the arrival of refugees seeking freedom from East Germany 
demonstrated an ongoing need for adaptable institutions available for mass accommodation on 
short notice.  
The Last Homecomings 
 On October 17, 1955, Friedland was overrun with politicians, dignitaries, reporters, and 
onlookers. These outsiders came for the arrival of the first transport of 599 prisoners of war 
following negotiations to secure the release of the last 10,000 German POWs still in the Soviet 
Union. Federal President Theodor Heuss greeted the POWs and offered his “heartfelt welcome” 
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on behalf of the German people. After other speakers had their turns, Wilhelm Wolff a 60-year-
old colonel from Hannover spoke on behalf of his fellow returnees and assured his audience in 
the camp that “these men standing here are just as innocent as those men who returned home up 
to 1948.”739 Two months later another group of POWs offered a similar message, though much 
more stridently and with much subsequent protest. This second group claimed to have been held 
in the Soviet Union despite their innocence, and they swore an oath “before the German people 
and on the dead of the German and Soviet militaries that we have not murdered, raped 
[geschändet], or plundered.”740  
The provocative oath speaks to the fact that during the last “homecomings” of POWs and 
internees, Friedland became a site of contestation over memory of the war. The arrival of these 
last returnees was of course a cause for celebration for waiting families and society at large. Yet, 
recognition of the homecoming meant acknowledging the war in which members of SS and 
police formations as well as the regular army had in fact murdered, raped, and plundered in what 
Germans conceived of as a “war of annihilation” (Vernichtungskrieg) on the eastern front. For 
returnees proclaiming their innocence, the delayed release seemed to imply that they were 
particularly guilty. Indeed, many returnees had experienced long imprisonment due to arbitrary 
factors, including having been healthy enough to provide labor longer than their comrades or 
otherwise having poor luck during selections for prisoner releases. Other late returnees, however, 
had been imprisoned for wartime crimes, such as the prisoners excluded from the general 
amnesty. Among these non-amnestied prisoners were notorious figures: extermination camp 
guards, an Auschwitz doctor who performed medical experiments, and personal adjutants to 
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Himmler and Hitler. Debates at Friedland also revolved around what constituted a proper 
reception for the returnees, including the atmosphere of the receptions and whether the camp’s 
facilities and supplies were sufficient for task. 
Although Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s diplomatic visit to Moscow and the returnee 
arrivals during the fall of 1955 dominate narratives about POW homecomings, releases had 
depended on changes in Soviet policies. Frank Biess has indentified three major factors leading 
to the release of the last Soviet-held prisoners, all of which had to do with domestic and foreign 
policy shifts in response to changes in international relations. First, following Stalin’s death, 
Lavrenti Beria began to scale back the massive Gulag system in the Soviet Union, and he 
included German prisoners in the large-scale amnesty program. Second, the East German 
uprising in June 1953 motivated the Soviets to release some remaining 10,000 POWs and 2,000 
civilian internees in order to “bolster the SED’s questionable legitimacy.” Third, the Soviet 
leadership had shifted from the desire to reunify Germany and remove it from the Western orbit 
to formalizing the division of Germany as part of maintaining the status quo in Europe. 
According to Biess, Soviet officials “informed SED leaders Walter Ulbricht and Otto Grotewohl 
of its intention to release the last POWs in exchange for the achievement of this diplomatic goal” 
months before Adenauer’s visit to Moscow. Thus, the releases resulting from Adenauer’s visit 
“yielded the desire quid pro quo.”741 
Of course, Friedland processed returnees from the Soviet Union for years before and after 
the height of attention in 1955/56. Homecomings to the Federal Republic reached a temporary 
nadir in 1952, when the camp processed only 772 westward-bound returnees. That year was also 
the last year during which the camp processed returnees from the west to the GDR, a total of 12 
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persons. In 1954 and 1955, respectively, the camp processed 5,954 and 4,262 returnees from the 
Soviet Union and other communist states (e.g. a few hundred each from Yugoslavia and Poland). 
True, the year 1955 was the highpoint of returns with 8,771 POWs and civilian internees passing 
through the camp, but a further 3,849 returnees arrived at Friedland in 1956. Despite the waning 
attention paid by contemporaries and historians, the camp continued to process a little over 1,100 
returnees per year through the end of the 1950s. The camp recorded hundreds of homecomings 
each year from 1960 through 1965, again with most of the individuals coming from the Soviet 
Union followed by a handful of returnees from Yugoslavia and Poland. Particularly for these 
later cases, it is not clear if the individuals had been imprisoned for the full 15 to 20 years after 
the war or if they had been released earlier but won returnee status through recognition of a “no-
fault delay” in their departure for the Federal Republic.742 
Adenauer’s efforts to secure the prisoners’ release as well as their arrivals at Friedland 
were loaded with symbolic meaning for the resurgent West German state. In September 1955, 
Adenauer had traveled to Moscow on a diplomatic mission with the goal of formalizing relations 
between the Federal Republic and Soviet Union ostensibly so that the Soviets might eventually 
acquiesce to German reunification. The return of POWs and civilian internees still in Soviet 
prisons was a key point of negotiation. According to Robert Moeller, press reports depicted 
Adenauer “not only as a geopolitical strategist but also as a compassionate, if forceful, father 
insisting on the release of the nation’s sons.”743 
Meetings between Adenauer and the Soviet leadership proved contentious, particularly 
with respect to German crimes during the war. As such, the first two days of negotiations 
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produced no progress. In response, Adenauer phoned his delegation’s plane to order preparations 
for departure, expecting the Soviets to have tapped his telephone line. Negotiations proceeded 
smoothly after Adenauer’s ploy, and he secured the prisoners’ release by the end of the day. 
Although the Soviet leadership expected to concede prisoner releases as part of negotiations, 
Adenauer’s resolute insistence on POW returns and gamesmanship provided the Federal 
Republic with a putative victory. This symbolic success was all the more meaningful because it 
demonstrated West Germany’s return to being an important, independent actor on the 
international stage in tandem with the country’s entry into NATO, rearmament, and the end of 
the occupation statute.744 
 As Robert Moeller has convincingly argued, the returnees functioned as a victim group 
along with expellees and other “war-damaged” allowing for a selective memory of the war. 
During his mission to Moscow, Adenauer had “insisted that he and Bulganin should avoid 
playing the role of ‘heralds of antiquity, who shout mutual recriminations at one another,’” but 
he also obliquely referenced Red Army atrocities on the other side of the moral ledger by noting, 
“in Germany as well, many bad things happened during the war.”745 The public discourse about 
the returnees, however, was much more explicit in emphasizing German victimhood while 
eliding crimes. In their own narratives and press accounts, returnees were “soldiers and prisoners 
of war, not war criminals,” so that “the presumed innocence of all but a few POWs was the 
presumed innocence of all but a few Germans.”746 Narratives about the Soviet victimization of 
POWs not only functioned as a counterbalance to accusations of German war crimes, but also as 
                                                 
744 Ibid., 90, 102-103. 
745 Ibid., 99-100. 
746 Ibid., 112-113. 
 309 
a warning about the threat posed by communism. According to Moeller, “[the returnees] had 
fought on for ten more years, and this time they were victors in the struggle against ‘Soviet 
inhumanity and Bolshevik propaganda,’ reminders that constant vigilance against the 
Communist threat was essential.”747  
 The prisoners’ returns also offered a symbolic solution to gendered perceptions of social 
ills in West Germany. World War II had left Germany with a demographic imbalance that 
politicians, policymakers, and sociologists variously referred to as the problems of the “surplus 
of women,” “scarcity of men,” and “women on their own” (alleinstehende Frauen). The return 
of male POWs offered a solution for women looking for a husband; indeed, single women wrote 
to the Friedland camp administration to ask about potential husbands among the returnees.748 
Despite the returnees’ poor physical condition and the servility that could be associated with 
imprisonment, the representations of returnees “presented examples of masculine assertion.”749 
For critics of American cultural influence, the returnees’ absence from developments in West 
Germany likewise became a feature rather then problem to overcome. Men who had survived the 
hardships of prison camps could supposedly correct German society from its drift toward 
American consumerism and “material excesses.”750 Thus, Friedland became the setting for 
debates over wartime memory as well as Cold War and gender politics because of the meanings 
imbued upon the returnees passing through the camp.  
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 The returnees who arrived during the homecomings in 1955 and 1956, like their 
compatriots before, consisted of soldiers and civilian internees. The first transports from the 
Soviet Union began in the fall of 1955, and over the course of the following year, the transports 
brought 7,326 former POWs, 2,622 internees, and 5,588 Germans who had been forcibly 
relocated (verschleppt).751 The POWs had served in regular Wehrmacht and SS formations, 
though it seems that the camp did not compile statistics on the soldiers’ postings. Of the 300 
registration cards selected in an interval sample from the returnee card catalog at Friedland, 15 
entries were for individuals processed in 1955 or 1956. Members of the regular Wehrmacht 
accounted for seven of those 15 returnees. There were two members of the Waffen-SS. Oddly, 
the first case was a German from Wolfenbüttel who served in the 23rd SS Volunteer Panzer 
Grenadier Division Niederlande for Dutch volunteers, while the other case was a Dutchman from 
Eger, Zeeland, who instead served in the 18th SS Panzer Grenadier Division. Civil internees 
accounted for a further three cases: a reporter taken from Berlin in 1949, a mechanic taken from 
Klingenthal along the Saxon-Czechoslovak border in 1951, and an unskilled worker taken from 
Höflein near Vienna. The final three cards either did not include a final field post number or 
other information on the place and date of capture. Other scholarship on late returnees has 
revealed that of 1,011 higher-ranking returnees in 1953, former SS and police officers accounted 
for 537 individuals, including members of the Totenkopf Division and Leibstandarte Adolf 
Hitler.752 
 Although there were no women from 1955/56 represented in the sample group, female 
late-returnees consisted of both POWs and civilian prisoners. Because as the camp did not keep 
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statistical records distinguishing between reasons for internment, it did not maintain records 
distinguishing between types of women among the returnees. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable 
to believe that women from military formations were less common than female civil internees. In 
June 1953, for example, the camp received a closed transport of 29 returnees from Poland. All of 
the returnees had belonged to Waffen-SS formations, and the American and British occupation 
troops had handed them over to Poland after the war. Of the 29 returnees, only one was a 
woman: a 27 year-old SS signals auxiliary (SS-Nachrichtenhelferin).753 In addition to 
stereotypical cases of Red Cross nurses, civilian women imprisoned and then released as late-
returnees included Germans and ethnic Germans who had been forcibly relocated during or after 
the war. 
 Two issues of femininity in particular stand out from the cases of female returnees in the 
mid-1950s. The first issue was the belief that after years of imprisonment and hard labor, the 
returning women needed to be refeminized through participation in consumer society. This 
message stood in stark contrast to the male returnees whose fundamental masculinity never came 
into question, despite their ruinous physical condition, and whose masculine virtue was supposed 
to save German culture from Americanization. Press reports about women’s return via Friedland 
suggested that their reintegration depended on beautification and consumption. One widely 
circulated account first published in the Göttinger Tageblatt noted that a fashionable leather 
purse purchased in the camp cantina was the “most important female attribute.” Thereafter, the 
woman featured in the article was left to the “treatment” of a salon, so that the within a few hours 
a perm, eye-liner, and a manicure made her into the article’s titular “new person.”754  
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 The second issue of feminine norms raised by homecomings in the 1950s was that of 
West Germans waiting or, more scandalously, failing to wait for their spouses’ returns from 
imprisonment. As documented by Robert Moeller, the normative expectation was that West 
Germany was a nation of Penelopes waiting for their husbands and spurning all other suitors. 
Women who seemingly abandoned their suffering husbands provided much grist for the tabloid 
mill focusing on “tragedies […] that are part of the norm in Friedland, the encounter of the 
returning soldier and his wife, who has a small child in her arms.”755 Of course, information 
about the status of missing persons could be fragmentary or incorrect despite postcards sent as 
signs of life and the best efforts of the German Red Cross Search Service to determine the 
whereabouts of prisoners. Accounts of infidelity in the press were certainly exceptional cases. 
Reporters seized upon sensational stories that played on fears stemming from limited information 
from POW camps and insecurities about reintegrating returnees into the family after years of 
separation. 
 The press also reported on instances of men who married in prison camps. Again, these 
sorts of marriages seem to have received press attention because their rarity made for interesting 
reading. For example, in 1951 the men’s magazine published by the Protestant Church, Kirche 
und Mann, reported on men who returned from imprisonment with new wives and, sometimes, 
new children. One such returnee purportedly asked, “What should I do? If I do not go to my 
wife, then I am a scoundrel [Lump]; but if I leave this woman whom I am bringing with me and 
who saved me, then I am also a scoundrel!”756 In a happier surprise reported by the Westfälische 
Allgemeine, a man who went to meet his son at Friedland in 1956, having lost all contact while 
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the son fought on the Lithuanian border in 1944. In addition to the son, he found three grandsons 
and a “beaming daughter-in-law” whom the son first met while both worked on construction of a 
factory at a prison camp along the Mongolian border.757 
Sometimes men living in West Germany did not wait for their wives either. The Kirche 
und Mann article also included a woman who discovered that her husband’s pending remarriage: 
“Where should I go? I have become old and sick, he will have found a young one; I would like 
for him to stay with her, she will have cared for him.”758 The expellee ministry in Bonn likewise 
received a letter from Käthe H., who had been the assistant to dentist who treated Hitler and 
“other people of the former government.” According to Käthe, the Soviets had held her in a 
Moscow prison for six-and-a-half years and another camp for an additional three years. During 
that time she lost contact with her husband who had her declared dead before remarrying and 
fathering two children. Käthe first discovered those developments when she reached her sister in 
Hannover via Friedland. In asking for assistance, she complained that state support barely paid 
for food while she awaited a decision on restitution from the government, and her former 
husband denied all financial responsibility for her.759 Despite their sympathy, federal officials 
stated that they could not intervene with respect to the marriage and finances other than to refer 
Käthe to a ministry advisor (Referentin) in Hannover and to suggest that she try to “move” 
(bewegen) her husband to support her on a temporary basis.760 
                                                 
757 “Statt eines Heimkehrers kam eine ganze familie,” Westfälische Allgemeine, 2 February 1956; press clipping in 
Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 89, NHStA. 
758 “Das ist Friedland 1951,” Kirche und Mann. 
759 Käthe H. to Bundesminister für Vertriebene, 12 July 1955, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 374, NHStA. 
760 Dr. Vogl, BMfV, to Käthe H., 22 August 1955, Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 374, NHStA. 
 314 
German scientists returning from the Soviet Union comprised a second group of civilians 
processed at Friedland, though it is unclear how many individuals were in question. After the 
war, Americans and Soviets scrambled to obtain technology and technical expertise in atomic 
sciences, rocketry, optics, and other military-related fields. In addition to bolstering their own 
research and weapons production, the rivals hoped to deny each other potentially useful 
resources. According to Norman Naimark, Soviet authorities had been successful in recruiting 
nuclear scientists to live and work in the Soviet Union with promises of good living and working 
conditions. They attracted around one hundred scientists in the first six weeks of occupation. The 
Soviets were initially less hurried in removing non-nuclear scientists and production materials 
from their occupation zone, but on the night of October 21-22, 1946 the NKVD and Red Army 
conducted a sweep of scientists, engineers, and technicians for deportation to the Soviet Union 
along with laboratory and factory materials. Soviet agents also rounded up families to send with 
the scientists. Naimark notes, “The Soviets were not particular about which women went with 
which men; as a result, NKVD officers sometimes seized maids thinking they were wives or 
packed up protesting girlfriends or sisters.”761 
Despite relatively good treatment with respect to housing and materials, the scientists 
sometimes worked under duress. For example, although the nuclear scientists “lacked nothing in 
the way of food and comforts,” they did fear for their wellbeing and “had to endure severe 
scrutiny and implied threats of punishment.”762 The wife of a scientist working in Sokhumi, 
Abkhazia, reported, “We lived in our own homes. It went better for us than the Russians.” Yet, 
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as she explained, the scientists and their families suffered from isolation and a “mad longing for 
Germany.”763 Soviet authorities did not release all of the German scientists in 1955/56 either. For 
instance, some of the Germans in Sokhumi were not released until February 1958.764 
Presumably, officials waited to release some scientists out of a fear that they might reveal 
security-sensitive information. Soviet officials also held them until they were certain the 
scientists had nothing left to offer, though the scientists claimed, “what we knew has long since 
been overtaken.”765 In any event and despite the relatively good conditions experienced by the 
scientists, West German authorities considered the long-term confinement sufficient cause for 
recognition as returnees. The only real obstacle to recognition was that an unknown number of 
scientists had resided in the Soviet zone for more than two months before their deportation, 
which potentially constituted a disqualifying delay in return to West Germany.766 
“Non-amnestied” returnees comprised the final group at Friedland that attracted 
particular media attention and raised legal questions for German authorities in 1955/56. 
Although the Soviet government had granted amnesty to most of the prisoners it released, 746 
individuals were excluded. West Germany received 471 of these returnees, while 275 of them 
returned to East Germany. Roughly 20 percent of them had served in SS or policing units. As 
part of the release without amnesty, Soviet authorities expected both German governments to 
further prosecute these returnees based on documentation sent subsequently to their releases.767 
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The Soviet demands for arrest and prosecution caused concern for Lower Saxon officials 
overseeing Friedland. According to a confidential memorandum among chancellery officials, the 
camp was to receive 24 and 36 non-amnestied generals on October 6 and 7, respectively. 
Representatives from Lower Saxony had been in contact with the various state justice 
departments, which agreed not to carry out any arrests in the camp. Instead, the camp would 
process and send the returnees to their hometowns where criminal proceedings could begin.768 
The strength of that agreement must have come into doubt, because a later memorandum 
suggested that Lower Saxon Refugee Minister Erich Schellhaus asked the Federal Minister of 
Justice to recommend the various states set aside arrest warrants for as long as the returnees were 
in the camp.769 A memorandum about Schellhaus’s travel plans further indicates the wish to 
avoid too direct of association between non-amnestied returnees and the refugee ministry. 
Schellhaus did not agree to greet returnees at Friedland on October 7 until it became clear that 
the transport also included amnestied returnees, at which point he immediately left Hannover for 
the camp.770 
When another transport of non-amnestied returnees arrived in January 1956, Schellhaus 
directed that their reception take place entirely outside Friedland. According to him, he “was 
warned by the Federal Foreign Ministry that the reception of the non-amnestied at Friedland 
could endanger further transports.”771 Presumably, they feared that East German and Soviet 
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authorities would be angry if the facility at the center of celebratory receptions also welcomed 
persons facing charges for crimes during the war. The border guard garrison in nearby 
Hannoversch Münden offered a solution for keeping these returnees out of the camp.772 
Administrators essentially set up a field office at the garrison, so that the “entire transport was 
processed without the usual ceremonies and large number of visitors.” In addition to the typical 
procedures (registration, examination, and so on), attorneys from Office of Legal Protection 
(Rechtsschutzstelle) associated with the German Red Cross Search Service questioned the 
returnees about their convictions and sentencing. After staffers had finished processing the 
transport, they sent lists of returnees to the responsible state ministries, such as the Returnee 
Office of the Lower Saxon Social Ministry.773 It is not clear how many of the non-amnestied 
returnees faced prosecution rather than return to normal life, but Frank Biess has suggested that 
courts were largely uninterested in prosecuting “administrators of genocide,” and because of 
expiring statues of limitations, “many highly compromised returnees never faced charges in 
West Germany.”774 
Notorious Holocaust perpetrators among the non-amnestied processed at Friedland and 
Hannoversch Münden attracted much press attention. One notable case was Carl Clauberg, who 
had conducted sterilization experiments on women in his capacity an Auschwitz doctor and 
returned from imprisonment via Friedland in October 1955. A report from the Westdeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung characterized him as unrepentant: “with a scientist’s pride he told how he 
worked out a new method with a simple injection.” Clauberg explained that he had used the 
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injection on only 150 women. He noted, “Himmler allotted me 400 women, I saved the other 
250,” to which the author commented, “with that, he reckoned, he had put everything right [alles 
gutgemacht].”775 Indeed, the media focus on Clauberg, along with his provocative statements, 
likely contributed to the decision to distance the camp, figuratively and physically, from non-
amnestied returnees in January 1956. Two SS guards at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, 
Wilhelm Schubert and Gustav Sorge, were among the returnees received at the camp’s 
temporary field office in Hannoversch Münden that month. Although there were other 
concentration camp guards in that transport, these two attracted particular attention for their 
infamous brutality, reflected in their monikers Pistol-Schubert and Iron Gustav.776 Both men 
were rearrested and tried for crimes, including the murder of Soviet POWs at Sachsenhausen.777 
Yet, the press and camp officials mostly downplayed questions of collective guilt and 
focused on the most notorious cases. An opinion piece in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(FAZ) called for distancing most of the non-amnestied returnees from the worst offenders and 
suggested that as little as 2 percent of them were guilty.778 The article in the Westdeutsche 
Allgemeine quoted the camp’s protestant pastor, “naturally the percentage of SS people and SS 
leaders is particularly high among these last returnees.” Of course, longer sentences for SS 
members account for that high percentage, but the report also suggested that Lippert believed “at 
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most 10 percent” of the non-amnestied returnees “had really committed crimes.”779 In testimony 
before the Lower Saxon Parliament in 1959, camp director Freßen echoed that belief: “the single 
largest portion of these ‘non-amnestied and criminals,’ whose trial documents still have not 
arrived up to today, consisted of only the small fry [kleines Würstchen].”780 Although critical 
commentary about the POWs came from the West German left and victim states, Friedland was 
largely left out of the focus of such critiques.781 
The arrivals of POW transports were also moments of debate over the past in which 
present-day politics and East Germany played a significant role. For instance, the oath claiming 
that the returnees had not murdered, raped, or plundered provoked reactions in West and East 
Germany. It did not help that the man who led the oath was Ernst Günter Schenk, “a high-level 
doctor in the Wehrmacht and SS.” In response, however, the FAZ asked if returnees should be 
denied the right to state their innocence, even if it allowed that the oath was regrettable and 
warned against forgetting the past.782 The editors for Kirche und Mann noted that their article on 
the oath had generated hundreds of letters. One writer was Bishop Heckel, who was present at 
the time and who tried to distance himself and the camp from the oath by emphasizing that it was 
“surprising” and an act done “entirely alone by the group of men.”783 For its part, the East 
German press seized upon the oath as an example of fascism in West Germany. An article in the 
Leipziger Zeitung referred to the oath as the “murderers’ perjury” and claimed that Friedland was 
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the location where “criminals of the fascist era are made into heroes of the Second World War.” 
The author was also sure to note the members of the “Adenauer-clique” present for the oath, 
including Federal Expellee Minister Theodor Oberländer, a former Nazi, and the Archbishop of 
Paderborn, who “gave his blessing to it [the oath].”784 
Another point of public controversy stemmed from allegations that the camp 
administration tolerated or even supported a network of former SS-men recruiting comrades at 
Friedland. In October 1955, the Socialist Student Federation protested to Bundestag President 
Gerstenmaier during his visit to the camp. At issue was the distribution of the “SS-periodical” 
Wiking-Ruf among returnees, which an embarrassed Gerstenmaier assured was not known to the 
camp administration and would be prevented in the future.785 One newspaper decried the “hero 
factory,” where “as greeting one presses a copy of Wiking-Ruf and a free HIAG application into 
the hands of returning SS-men.”786 HIAG, of course, was a postwar SS mutual aid organization. 
Indeed, it is clear that SS veterans used the homecomings as an opportunity to contact 
and recruit returnees to sympathetic organizations. The December 1955 issue of Wiking-Ruf 
included a letter from an SS returnee praising the camp and HIAG. Complaining of the 
Americanization of Germany, the letter-writer told of first feeling at home when the camp 
administration “took us by the hand” and first feeling comradeship in conversation with a HIAG 
member from Göttingen. The returnee also declared, “If the homeland once again falls into 
danger from the subhumanity from the East, this community will fight and again pay a blood-toll 
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[Blutzoll], despite all defamations and just as resolutely defend the homeland as before.”787 
These issues resurfaced during the trials of Sorge and Schubert in 1959, when the Frankfurter 
Rundschau alleged that members of the camp staff were involved in a ring of SS veterans 
helping SS returnees.788 Freßen denied the charges and asked ministerial officials for permission 
to issue a statement.789 Yet, fallout from the trial revealed that the director of the Search Service 
at Friedland, Hugo Richard Gawinski, was a SS veteran who had lived and worked under the 
assumed name Baron Hugo von Rosen between 1949 and 1959.790 
East German press reactions to events at Friedland may have been predictable, but the 
GDR’s disposition toward the West and returnees mattered greatly to refugee officials and some 
families waiting for loved-ones to return. Because the Soviet transports first stopped in the GDR, 
it loomed as a possible hindrance to returnees’ arrival at Friedland if East German officials 
decided to delay or entirely halt them. There were worries that boisterous receptions at Friedland 
would exacerbate strained relations between the German states, in part because perceptions that 
East German authorities hoped soldiers would choose to stay there, though such concerns were 
naïve given that East German authorities were more likely to punish offenders.791 The delayed 
arrival of the second transport in October 1955 thus led to speculation that the East Germans had 
forced it to travel during the night so that it would arrive in the early morning hours, thereby 
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preventing further celebration.792 The camp administration also received letters from concerned 
families, who suggested that West Germans were at fault for delays because of what had been 
said about the Soviets at previous receptions. A woman in Cologne waiting for her husband’s 
return complained about a particularly angry speaker and asked for greater care and thought in 
the future about those still left behind.793 Based on the experiences in October, the Foreign 
Office communicated to the Lower Saxon legation in Bonn that it was “proper to suggest that in 
the future at transports’ arrival […] the reception festivities be scaled back in comparison to 
earlier practice.”794 
Debates also concerned what kind of atmosphere and reception was appropriate or 
worthy of the returnees. Already in 1953, the camp dealt with complaints about unscrupulous 
people profiting from returnees. For instance, a doctor who had assisted with care for members 
of an October 1953 transport decried what he felt was the exploitation of returnees. In addition to 
watches sold at inflated prices, he had been concerned about the “Veronikas” trying to take 
advantage of the men and who posed a particular health hazard. He had proposed that returnees 
be allotted 50 DM, with the remainder of their 300 DM allowance to be paid upon arrival home, 
in part because their waiting families might be counting on those funds.795 An official for the 
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Hildesheim governing district responded to the complaint by explaining that the camp 
administration was working to resolve the merchant problem. He further characterized the 
doctor’s account as “exaggerated.” As for the notion of withholding part of the release 
allowance, the official found the suggestion of restrictions for “mature returnees to be 
objectionable,” and he feared that returnees would consider it a form of “paternalism” 
(Bevormundung).796 
Complaints in surrounding commercialization of homecomings in 1955 mirrored those 
from two years earlier. Members of the press and public criticized the spectacle awaiting each 
transport, which cheapened the solemnity of reunions with returnees and made it expensive for 
everyone involved. A report from the Neue Illustrierte typified many of these complaints. One 
interviewee commented that ministers were already copying speeches, suggesting that the 
proceedings were a hollow routine. Outside the camp, the reporter found crass commercialization 
of the homecoming. A merchant offered “a colorful Friedland poster” for 30 Pfennig and boasted 
of having sold half of the 3,000 copies he had ordered. Photographers “hunted the clueless,” and 
one photographer explained his business model: “Scenes of embrace are very in demand […] 
The first picture is free, the supplemental orders are my business.” A painter nearby sold “search 
posters” for between five and ten marks. The reporter concluded, “I eat an expensive little 
sausage at a booth and drive to my expensive village inn.”797 The press service Deutsche Presse 
Agentur likewise reported that “unauthorized merchants” took “shameless advantage of the 
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inexperienced returnees” by selling them cheap wares at too high prices, and it called on the 
criminal police to intervene to protect the returnees.798 
In responding to the complaints in 1955, the camp administration followed a similar tack 
to that taken by the Hildesheim officials in 1953. The administration rejected some complaints 
and promised to address others. Freßen explained to Minister Schellhaus that the camp had 
specifically requested the erection of a “sausage and beer tent” for the benefit of families and 
spectators, and inspectors regularly checked the prices of these and other goods and services. 
Little more could be done other than to fine or arrest violators.799 
The final set of public criticisms in the fall of 1955 revolved around the notion that the 
camp had been inadequate in its reception of the returnees. Most seriously, the Bundestag 
Committee on War-Victims and Returnee Matters began an investigation over conditions in the 
camp. The chairman of the committee identified eight failings in a notice to Lower Saxon 
Minister President Heinrich Hellwege: insufficient clothing for returnees, lack of storage for 
donations, poor price controls for accommodation, the “flying [fliegende] merchants,” 
insufficient supply of forms, delayed structural improvements, inadequate and administration of 
medical services, and the treatment of Bundestag representatives.800 Newspapers seized upon 
small problems to paint a picture of a facility unable to deliver the treatment that refugees 
deserved. Some of the issues were trivial. Articles complained of rattling busses used to transport 
the returnees from the border and tea that was “hot, weak, and thin.” The Abendzeitung in 
Munich declared, “the state of the camp is a scandal,” while other papers complained of 
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“shortcomings in Friedland” or “a clear failure.”801 More than anything, the outsized complaints 
about minor issues speak to the vastly improved material situation in camp since the first 
transports a decade earlier. They also indicate extraordinarily high expectations for the treatment 
of men and women who had ostensibly paid on behalf of Germany for misdeeds during the war. 
At the time, however, officials in Friedland and Hannover felt the need to defend the 
camp’s public image rather than let the accusations pass. The response was multifold. First, 
camp administrators and ministry officials defended themselves through official channels, firmly 
rejecting the Bundestag committee’s list of criticisms, claiming that “complaints did not emerge” 
in the camp. In the case of medical personnel, the administration argued, “nothing definitive can 
be said, as long as precise complaints are not presented.” As for the tea: “It was strong if not too 
strong with respect with the average condition of the returnees. Every returnee received, upon 
request, rum mixed into it.”802 Second, the camp administration and directors of the camp 
charities wrote directly to the press to address the concerns.803 Third, through the backchannel of 
the Returnee Aid (Heimkehrerhilfe) organization, the directors of Caritas, Evangelisches 
Hilfswerk, the German Red Cross, and Arbeiterwohlfahrt at Friedland implored returnees to 
write to the Bundestag committee and give their “impressions of the work at Friedland.” The 
charity directors appealed to the returnees’ care for “comrades unfortunately left behind and their 
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relatives in the homeland,” because the camp needed the public to restore trust and the “Soviet-
zone press eagerly took up these reports” to criticize the Federal Republic.804 
A trickle of POWs and civil internees continued to arrive at Friedland throughout the rest 
of the decade, but they never received the attention given to the homecomings in 1955/56. The 
so-called Great Homecoming had nevertheless established Friedland’s place in West German 
national consciousness. The camp’s reputation did periodically need defending, a task that the 
camp administration and charities energetically undertook. Memory-makers at the homecomings, 
such as politicians, dignitaries, soldiers, and camp officials were ultimately successful in creating 
a consensus memory of joyous homecomings through ceremonies and cultivation of a positive 
image in the press. Still, that memory was contingent; hence, the hard work defending the 
reputations of the camp and its receptions. That memory also elided competing understandings of 
and attitudes toward the homecomings, such as sadness of those whose loved-ones would not 
return and anxiety for those still awaiting a loved-one’s return. The predominantly masculine 
image of returnees certainly stemmed from the fact that men accounted overwhelming majority 
of returnees. Yet, women also participated as returnees rather than having been limited to the 
roles of mothers, wives, and children. Finally, the homecomings functioned as a site for 
arguments over points political and social anxiety, including: collective guilt for atrocities during 
World War II, how the last returnees should be viewed and treated, and East German 
involvement in domestic West German affairs. Criticisms about arriving war criminals were 
certainly justified, though over-concern with ensuring the absolute best for returnees led to 
specious criticisms of the well-functioning camp. 
Hungarian Refugees 
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 Early in the morning on November 26, 1956, a transport of Hungarian refugees arrived at 
the Friedland under the watchful eyes of camp personnel and reporters. In contrast to the first 
transport three days earlier, many of these Hungarians spoke German and even claimed to be 
ethnic Germans. Aside from speaking a common tongue, the stories they told suggested 
experiences familiar to many German refugees who arrived at Friedland over the previous 11 
years. One young man, still wearing the cap from his Gymnasium, explained that he had fled 
from Budapest without telling his parents, because “they would not have let me go.” He hoped to 
track down relatives who had supposedly lived in Munich since 1943. Another refugee, a 
technician by trade, told a reporter, “I am a Hungarian, but not a Communist. I needed to go, 
because I took part in the uprising. For me, there is no more opportunity to study and work.” A 
Hungarian miner turned to a police officer in the camp and asked if he knew about work in 
German mines. At the end of the article, one difference in particular stood out. A Hungarian 
asked the gathered reporters about the history of the camp. Having heard that history, he then 
asked why the bell at the camp had rung for their arrival: “For us, this is no homecoming.”805 
 The reason for the Hungarian refugees’ flight was, of course, the abortive revolution in 
October and November 1956. The uprising in Hungary stemmed from longer-term dissatisfaction 
with Communist rule that boiled over during a succession crisis following Matyas Rakosi’s 
resignation as first secretary in July of that year. The selection of Erno Gero satisfied neither 
reformists nor hard-liners, while Władysław Gomułka’s return to power in Poland emboldened 
student protestors. A particularly large student demonstration in Budapest on October 24 led to 
Soviet intervention after Gero’s request for support. Solidarity between students and workers led 
the Soviets to halt the intervention by October 28 and install Imre Nagy as premier. Nagy proved 
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more radical than expected, “repudiating Gero’s request for military intervention, reconstituting 
the multiparty government coalition of 1945, withdrawing Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, and 
proclaiming its international neutrality.” The Soviet leadership reacted by using troops to quash 
the revolution on November 4, with the last of fighting concluding on November 11.806 
 As a result of the revolution, Austria was soon flooded with Hungarian refugees. During 
the initial clashes in October, roughly 3,000 to 4,000 refugees entered Austria. According to 
Andreas Gemes, Austrian authorities expected the revolutionaries to prevail and therefore did not 
anticipate that the situation would worsen. The confident Austrian Minister of the Interior 
declared on October 26 that the country was prepared to grant asylum to all Hungarian refugees. 
The refugee crisis along the border began in earnest on November 4, as between 3,000 and 5,000 
refugees poured into Austria every day. Initially, women and children accounted for most of 
those fleeing Hungary for safety, but after the fighting had ceased, more young men fled as well. 
All told, Austria suddenly became host to some 4 percent of the Hungarian population. As a 
result of students’ role in the revolution, half of the refugees were under 25 years old and two-
thirds of them were male. The Austrian press labeled the situation “catastrophic.”807 
 In order to relieve the pressure on Austria, the West German government offered to 
accept asylum seekers in November. As such, a commission from the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior traveled to the Austrian refugee camps to begin registering up to 3,000 Hungarians who 
wished to take up residence in Germany.808 Concerns about the “catastrophic development of the 
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refugee situation (epidemic danger),” meant that the refugee ministry in Bonn agreed to exceed 
its initial commitment before some of the German press even had an opportunity to report on the 
agreement.809 After refugees registered in Austria, German officials brought them to the transit 
camps at Piding, Bavaria, and Friedland. Because Friedland distributed refugees to all of the 
federal states, it seems most likely that practical concerns such as available space in the camps 
and transports determined the assignment to Friedland or Piding.810 
The processing of Hungarian refugees at Friedland mostly followed procedures used for 
other camp populations. As the transport arrived, loudspeakers at the camp greeted the refugees 
in Hungarian and informed them that Friedland was a transit camp with single-day stays, so 
particular wishes for work would be addressed subsequently in the next camp. The director of 
accommodation at the camp then assigned the refugees to their quarters, after which they 
underwent the registration process. Registration consisted of filling out forms, receiving 
certifications, and assignment to state camps labor office representatives. Staffers also confirmed 
possibilities for family reunification, which was a priority for assignments. After registration, the 
refugees received an allowance of 10 DM for those over 14 years old and 5 DM for younger 
persons. The remainder of their stay at Friedland consisted of x-ray checks for tuberculosis, 
clothing handouts from camp charities, and waiting for departure.811 
The mixture of ethnic Germans and Magyars among the Hungarian refugees created a 
further complication for the registration process. As of mid-November, German authorities 
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estimated that one-third of the refugees asking for acceptance in Germany were ethnic Germans 
and two-thirds were Magyars.812 This relatively high percentage of ethnic Germans suggests that 
they and Hungarians able to switch between ethnic identities may have used the crisis as a means 
to leave for the more prosperous west. In terms of the registration process, the issues were the 
legal categories to which the refugees belonged and where to book the expenses they incurred. 
Members of the Federal Cabinet thus decided to treat the ethnic Germans as “late resettlers” 
(Spätaussiedler) while the Magyars would be recognized as asylum-seekers with costs partially 
paid by the federal government under “Aid for the Consequences of War” (Kriegsfolgenhilfe).813 
A communication from the Lower Saxon Ministry for Expellees suggested that the ethnic groups 
were to be redistributed according to different guidelines. Officials were to recognize the 
Magyars as “foreign refugees,” meaning that they would be distributed according to asylum 
quotas rather than resettler quotas and receive travel documents from the police offices 
responsible for foreigners. Despite the different categorization, the refugee ministry emphasized 
that the Magyars should be “assigned work as soon as possible and appropriately [angemessen] 
housed.” A camp run by the Innere Mission in Ahlem near Hannover housed nearly all of the 
Magyar refugees in Lower Saxony, though single women were sent to a home run by a Swedish 
charity in Hannover.814 
Statistical information collected by Lower Saxon authorities offers further insight into the 
demographics of the refugees processed at Friedland. All told, the camp processed 3,555 of the 
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10,986 refugees who arrived in West Germany in 1956.815 During the period lasting from 
November 23 to December 6, 404 individuals transported to Friedland remained in Lower 
Saxony. The vast majority of the refugees (77 percent) were then housed at the Ahlem camp, 
while the remainder found accommodation with family or at the Swedish home, youth homes, 
and various institutions of higher education.816 By January 15, 1957, Lower Saxony was 
responsible for housing 598 of the Hungarian refugees (exclusive of ethnic Germans). A total of 
455 were sent to the Ahlem camp, which reported the following distributions: 62 persons 
returned to Austria for the purposes of emigration to America or Canada (it is unclear how many 
later emigrated from Germany with the same purpose); 14 persons to North Rhine-Westphalia 
for work in mines; 17 students for Lower Saxon universities; 305 persons sent to jobs in Lower 
Saxony; and 57 persons belonging to families still at Ahlem. Most of the workers were men in 
the field of metal work, while the 21 women entered domestic services or miscellaneous 
economic sectors.817 
Owing to prevailing anti-Communism, government officials acted sympathetically 
toward the Hungarian refugees because they seemed to be victims of Soviet repression. A 
memorandum in the state refugee ministry summed up the reasons for this goodwill. Having met 
with refugees, the official noted that the youths “behaved with discipline, showed themselves as 
ready to help, were willing to work, and were thankful for the aid.” Nevertheless, some problems 
in the workplace did develop with respect to language and the refugees’ “confidence” reaching 
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the point of being demanding. The officials suggested that they should be treated similarly to 
youths from the GDR and that part of the solution would be the creation of supervisory 
organization and instruction in the German language. Politically, the youths were also relatively 
reliable: they were “anti-Bolsheviks” who would land on their feet in democratic Germany.818 
Thus, the refugees’ apparent orderliness and eagerness to find employment or continue their 
studies made them easy to like. In the context of the Cold War, their courageous opposition to 
the communist government in Hungary established their political bona fides as well. 
Caring for the refugees also allowed politicians to demonstrate West German generosity 
to victims of communist oppression. To be certain, private citizens reacted with generosity in 
donations, and the government was making significant commitments to the refugees. Yet, the 
emphasis on generosity in public statements suggests a certain performative element. For 
example, in statements to Norddeutscher Rundfunk (Northern German Radio), Minister 
Schellhaus noted, “The free world started unanimously and spontaneously a generous 
[großzügige] aid action to alleviate the refugees’ distress and relieve Austria.” He continued, “I 
may conclude with satisfaction that Lower Saxony, despite the heavy strain [Belastung] to which 
its own expellee and refugee problems contribute, immediately declared itself prepared to 
accommodate Hungarian refugees.”819 In a press release, refugee officials also praised the 
“exemplary willingness to make donations [Spendenfreudigkeit] of the Lower Saxon 
population.”820 At the federal level, the expectation was to “proceed generously with the 
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accommodation of Hungarian refugees in both financial and juridical respects.”821 This giving 
mindset and the public emphasis on it suggest an attempt to associate West Germany with the 
prosperous and openhanded free world—necessarily in contrast to the repressive east—thereby 
improving its reputation internationally. Interpreting the Hungarians as “freedom fighters” rather 
than nationalists made Friedland along with other camps function as the gateway to western 
freedom, generosity, and well-being for the foreign refugees. 
In contrast to the acrimonious period during which the Friedland camp housed infiltrees 
and former DPs, the processing of Hungarians went smoothly and seemed to produce positive 
feelings all around. Several key differences account for the different experiences. First, the 
Hungarian refugees, as victims of communism, seemed more sympathetic than the earlier foreign 
populations associated with DP criminality, prisons, and illegal border-crossers. Second, the 
Hungarian refugees were more orderly and seemed more thankful than the infiltrees and former 
DPs. To the extent that the Hungarians were associated with security concerns, the worry was 
that communist agents from Hungary infiltrated Austrian refugee camps in order to spy on them 
and/or the West.822 Finally and crucially, the increased availability of housing and officials’ 
commitment to settling the Hungarians kept their time in camps to a relative minimum. Long-
term accommodation at Friedland or any other refugee camp ultimately produced discomfort, 
boredom, and frustration, all of which led to conflict and mutual resentments between residents 
and administrators. Such had also been the case with the border region refugees in 1952/53 and 
                                                 
821 “Kurzprotokoll der 34. Sitzung des [Bundestag] Ausschusses für Heimatvertriebene…” 
822 In particular, the press expressed concerns that informants would cause difficulty for families left behind in 
Hungary. See for example, “Agenten im Flüchtlingslager,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 December 1956; 
press clipping in Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 90, NHStA. 
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with Hungarians whose protest at a Hessian refugee camp required police intervention in 
1956.823 
Conclusions 
 The arrivals of two different populations kept the Friedland busy through the end of the 
1950s. Both groups also contributed to the image of Friedland as the location where victims of 
communism took their first steps into Western freedom. First, resettlers from Poland accounted 
for much of the traffic. Masses of Germans—mostly from the former German provinces of 
Silesia, East Prussia, and East Pomerania—took advantage of the relaxation of emigration 
restrictions in 1956 to start new lives in West Germany.824 Indeed, the roughly 250,000 resettlers 
between 1956 and 1960 accounted for the highest inflow to Friedland between the late 1940s and 
the late 1980s, when travel restrictions were once again relaxed throughout Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union.825 Second, adolescent male refugees from East Germany composed the other 
significant population, which also recalled the camp’s earlier operations. Between 1960 and 
1963, Friedland was home to 22,436 of these refugees, though that program was an extension of 
responsibilities from the Uelzen refugee camp unlike the youth camp taken of the Friedland 
administration’s initiative in the late 1940s.826 
 The beginning of the 1960s marked the end of era for the camp’s administration. Running 
the refugee camp had become increasingly mechanical in that there was less decision-making 
                                                 
823 “Ungarn-Flüchtlinge protestierten gegen den Aufenthalt im Lager,” Kasseler Stadtausgabe, 10 February 1952; 
press clipping in Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 473, NHStA. 
824 Taking 1957 as an example, Friedland processed 49,912 resettlers from Silesia, 18,175 from former East 
Pomerania, and 16,954 from former East Prussia. No other region of Poland accounted for more than 2,500 
resettlers. Lagerleitung Friedland, “Zusammenstellung der im Jahre 1957 registrierten Personen,” 4 January 1958, 
Nds. 380 Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 514, NHStA. 
825 Statistics from 20 Jahre Lager Friedland, Anlage 3. 
826 Ibid., 45. 
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done by the camp administration. Routines were already in place, and as German government 
had become more robust over the preceding decade and a half, the level of oversight increased as 
well. Evidence for this shift in administration styles can be seen in the decreased number and 
scope of camp directives over the course of the 1950s and particularly in the 1960s. For instance, 
the last general camp directive, Number 156, was issued on March 13, 1953.827 After that point, 
instructions from the camp administration were task-specific (e.g. instructions for a particular 
type of transport, as opposed to the need to include those instructions with other general 
directives and points of information). To some extent, that may also speak to differing 
administrative styles between the two pairs of camp directors and assistant camp directors 
Krause/Thederan and Freßen/Gottschalk. Yet, even when the number of resttlers from Poland 
spiked in the late 1950s, it was clear that the period of improvisation was past. The final markers 
of the changed camp administration were the retirements of Freßen and Gottschalk in 1959 and 
1963, respectively. 
The extraordinary flexibility of the camp in processing different populations also helped 
the development of its reputation as the “Gateway to Freedom.” The term had many 
connotations, depending on the population in question. Initially the camp was strongly associated 
with victims of flight and expulsion. Later, refugees escaping repression in East Germany and 
military and civilian returnees arriving after release from prison camps burnished the reputation 
as a sanctuary from communist repression. In the context of the Cold War, the camp also 
functioned as a conduit for foreign “freedom fighters” seeking asylum after the Soviets crushed 
the revolution in Hungary. 
                                                 
827 Lageranordnung Nr 153, 13 March 1953, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 84, NHStA. 
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 Population displacements and immigration created the ongoing need for a border transit 
camp in the 1950s, but the fame as a “Gateway to Freedom” also helped to keep the camp open. 
In October 1959, the Committee for Expellees, Refugees, and the War-Damaged Affairs from 
the Lower Saxon State Parliament met in Göttingen and Friedland to discuss the camp and its 
future. During the Göttingen meeting before visiting the camp, Minister Schellhaus spoke of how 
world events had caused Friedland to become a special term. He noted that when there was a 
pause in the arrival of returnees early in the decade, questions emerged about whether it was 
necessary to keep the camp or if it might be used for some other purpose. Schellhaus declared 
that he “was always dismissive of these suggestions, because it seemed inopportune to him to 
close such a camp—one of the few gateways from the East to freedom—as long as tens of 
thousands of Germans [deutscher Menschen] worked towards their emigration from eastern 
countries.” He added that he considered it proper to maintain the exemplary “care facility” 
(Betreuungsapparat) because further transports always arrived. Later, in discussions with the 
Red Cross Search Services at the camp, it became clear that more transports would arrive. Based 
on applications for resettlement through the Red Cross, the organization estimated that between 
700,000 and 800,000 Germans still lived in the “Polish administered eastern territories,” and 
another 250,000 lived in the Soviet Union.828 
                                                 
828 “Niederschrift über die 3. Sitzung des Ausschusses…,” Nds. 50 Acc. 96/88 Nr. 1433, NHStA. 
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CONCLUSION 
 During the late summer of 1945, Germany was inundated with people displaced by the 
war. Millions of victims of the Nazi regime—forced laborers, POWs, and concentration camp 
survivors—moved about in search of family, a way home, or the chance to make a new life. 
Millions more Germans had been uprooted as well. Evacuees from bombed out cities tried to 
return to what remained of their homes or find family who could house them. Joining them were 
millions of Germans fleeing or expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia, including former 
German territories ceded to those states and the Soviet Union. De-mobilized soldiers and 
prisoners of war released by the occupying powers likewise needed to make their ways home or 
find some other accommodation. Of course, obtaining shelter was no easy task with so much of 
the country’s housing stock destroyed through bombing campaigns and urban combat. 
 Using the transit camp at Friedland as a case study, this dissertation has examined the 
efforts by occupational and German civil authorities to resolve that mass displacement. Friedland 
functioned as the lynchpin for a system designed to collect, aid, register, and resettle displaced 
populations as quickly as possible. This study therefore has described the response to 
unsettlement exemplified by the Friedland camp as a regulating form of humanitarianism. Under 
that framework, the camp turned unmanageable masses into settled individuals belonging to 
special categories for state assistance. The success in ameliorating suffering and restoring social 
order through Friedland therefore depended on the efforts of German ministries, the British 
military government, and German, British, and international charities. 
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 Following the war, the occupying powers and German civil authorities viewed the 
unsettled masses with wary concern. Military officials still finding their footing in occupation 
governance worried that the free movement of these masses posed a security risk. As concerns 
about resistance to the military government faded, other worries persisted. Military and civil 
German officials alike considered refugees an epidemiological threat. During their treks, 
refugees slept in fields or barns, had limited access to sanitary facilities, and faced overcrowding 
when they could find better accommodation. These factors combined to create the fear that in 
addition to carrying their worldly possessions, refugees brought with them tuberculosis, lice, and 
deadly lice-borne diseases, such as typhus and spotted fever. In response, the military 
government tried to prohibit refugees from entering large urban areas, such as Berlin or 
Hamburg. At the community level, local civil officials and townspeople tended toward a 
defensive insularity and closed off their resources and housing. The effect of that was to extend 
the displacement as refugees went from place to place, exacerbating the hardships and the 
problems associated with them. Unsettlement created a new form of social polarization in which 
dividing lines depended less on class or religion. 
 The first major contribution of this study has been to demonstrate that the resolution to 
the displacement problematic depended on a comprehensive system of regulation in which the 
transit camp at Friedland played a crucial role. Founded in September 1945, the camp began as 
an improvisational step for addressing the movement of displaced individuals along the zonal 
boundaries near Göttingen. The fact that refugees initially slept under the stars or in converted 
livestock stalls at the Göttingen University’s experimental farm testifies to that improvisation. 
Despite the primitive conditions, the camp had much to offer civil and military authorities in 
taming the unruliness of mass population movements. Collecting refugees in the camp made it 
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possible to determine who they were, their intended destinations, and to reroute them away from 
areas incapable of accommodating them. Registration of refugees also had the administrative 
benefit of reintegrating them into the prevailing ration regime and establishing documentation 
that would prove necessary for providing welfare benefits in the future. Regulating 
humanitarianism was predicated on the welfare state, and because food, housing, and other goods 
were rationed, the act of classification at Friedland was crucial. The camp further made possible 
an efficient use of quotas in order to ensure a rational distribution of refugees and overcome the 
potential free-rider problem of communities refusing to accommodate refugees thereby shifting 
the burden more heavily upon others. Medical services at Friedland enabled public health 
authorities to screen the refugees for contagious diseases and remove infected persons for 
treatment, while the delousing facilities helped to remove a vector for transmitting disease. 
Finally, once the camp was running as an administrative and transit hub, it made possible the 
planning of large transfers with dedicated transports. These transfers were beneficial in that the 
programs allowed for better planning for receiving communities, and the camp could operate 
more efficiently in an economy of scale. 
 Of course, the camp at Friedland operated with a humanitarian purpose. The involvement 
of so many volunteers and charities, ranging from the British Salvation Army and the 
International Voluntary Service for Peace to the camp’s religious charities and the German Red 
Cross, testifies to that fact. Camp administrators and refugee officials were also concerned with 
the amelioration of suffering as well, which is apparent from communications that referenced 
humanitarian (menschlich) concerns. The meaning of humanitarianism at Friedland was 
contextual, but most often it meant providing basic forms of aid, such as feeding refugees, 
housing them, and reuniting them with family. Medical examinations and delousing were 
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invasive procedures undertaken with public health in mind, but it is also important not to 
overlook their benefits to individual refugees as well. Humanitarian effects were interlinked with 
registration and resettlement regulations. Reuniting refugees with their families was 
compassionate priority that also served the state’s interests in placing refugees within support 
networks. Although arbitrariness played a role in resettlement assignments and led to refugees’ 
frustration, the quotas were also meant to protect the interests of refugees and communities, 
because both would suffer in the event that no accommodation or supplies were available for 
refugees. Given the masses needing processing, the delivery of humanitarian aid at Friedland 
was dependent on coercion and a disciplining environment necessary for smooth operation of a 
transit facility. As a result, the camp environment could also become quite unpleasant at times. 
The complaints from and conflicts with former Displaced Persons, “infiltrees,” and East German 
refugees in long-term housing testified to that fact. 
 The second major argument of this dissertation is that scholars need to think about 
postwar displacement broadly and as relatively long-lasting phenomenon. Because of Friedland’s 
role as a border transit camp and its flexibility in handling different populations, the camp offers 
insight into the wide-ranging nature of displacement after World War II. Camp administrators 
and officials overseeing the facility proved innovative in identifying and meeting the needs of 
new streams of refugees, which kept the camp in operation. In addition to the groups that have 
received the most scholarly attention, such as expellees and DPs, this study examined numerous 
other groups subject to wartime and postwar unsettlement. For example, the exchange of 
wartime evacuees between the British and Soviet zones under Operation Honeybee was a major 
point of concern for British officials and a source of tension between the two powers in the 
winter and spring of 1946. 
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Released prisoners of war should likewise be considered as a part of the postwar 
displacement, given the need to return them to homes and families as well as to reintegrate them 
into society. The so-called “returnees without a homeland” particularly warrant consideration as 
a new type of refugee. Their homecomings were to regions where they had never previously 
lived, and the camp consequently distributed them according to refugee quotas. The fact that 
prisoner returns lasted well over a decade after war’s end (though most had been completed by 
1949) speaks to the long duration of the postwar displacements. Taken together, the military and 
civil returnees along with Honeybee participants also provide an important historical counter-
narrative to the emphasis on flight into western zones and the Federal Republic. Although a 
majority of the returnees and evacuees indeed moved westward, nearly 400,000 persons returned 
through the camp to homes in East Germany. 
Discussion of German resettlers from Poland further demonstrates weaknesses of 
focusing exclusively on the displacement of Germans through expulsion. One problem with such 
a focus is that it gives the false impression of Polish authorities having conducted a clean sweep 
of the German population between 1945 and 1949. In fact, there were sizable remnant 
populations of Germans and “amphibians,” to borrow a term from Chad Bryant’s study of 
Prague, in the formerly German provinces of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia. Examination 
of the demographics and common vocations among German resettlers suggests that the 
remaining populations were largely composed of individuals whom authorities had viewed as 
economically valuable (miners, technicians, engineers and so on). Indeed, the history of resettlers 
from Poland indicates that after the first waves of expulsion to create clear Polish majorities in 
some regions, authorities had not only been reluctant to expel all Germans during the period 
lasting until 1949, but they also made it difficult for Germans to emigrate during the early to 
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mid-1950s. Instead, the ages and health of resettlers during the early 1950s suggested that aside 
from cases of bureaucratic arbitrariness, the Germans arriving from Poland were mostly 
unsuitable for physical labor. The determination of camp and refugee officials to accept these 
populations further underlines the humanitarian aspects of reception at Friedland. 
The history of the Friedland Youth Reception Camp for teenaged male youths also 
demonstrates the profound disruptions that war and displacement had on society and which 
lasted for years. Records on individual residents indicate that the war had badly strained family 
bonds. Fathers were often in captivity, missing, or dead, while mothers navigated the dual roles 
of caretaker and breadwinner. In other instances, the chaos of flight and expulsions had torn 
apart families. Those factors along with other disruptions to traditional authorities, such as 
school and the church, meant that children experienced unprecedented freedom during the years 
1944 to 1947. As a result, the camp administration tried to capture vagrant or otherwise 
unsupervised youths in the effort to reunite them with family or otherwise return them to an 
orderly way of life. Administrators’ stern treatment of the youths exemplifies how coercion and 
humanitarian goals went hand-in-hand at Friedland. Furthermore, the overrepresentation of 
youths with displacement backgrounds at the youth camp between 1947 and 1951 is suggestive 
of the enduring effects of flight and expulsion on youths coming to West Germany from the east. 
Between 1949 and 1952, Friedland was also tasked with housing foreign individuals who 
had been uprooted during and after the war. During the first year of operation, the camp 
processed several thousand non-Germans, mostly classified as Jews and “stateless persons,” 
when they tried to cross the zonal boundaries. These refugees lay beyond the camp’s 
responsibilities, and administrators had orders to transfer them quickly to DP camps. Indeed, the 
greatest impact of foreign populations on the early camp came from Ukrainian DPs housed in 
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Göttingen who provided labor for improvement projects in 1946. The 1949 assignment for 
Friedland to accommodate ex-DPs (persons who lost DP status through commission of a crime 
or the end of a foreign work contract) and infiltrees (foreigners who crossed into West Germany 
illegally) ultimately demonstrated the limits of German and British humanitarianism. When 
housing and caring for these populations proved difficult, both sets of camp authorities along 
with the charity directors worked assiduously to have them removed, finally succeeding in 1952. 
By contrast, camp authorities and the German press were sympathetic to the several thousand 
Hungarian refugees processed in late 1956, a response clearly influenced by the Cold War. Seen 
as brave freedom fighters, these Hungarians were received with open arms, partly because of 
goodwill toward them and partly because of an eagerness to demonstrate West German 
generosity to victims of communism. 
The third major contribution of this study is the examination of the interplay of 
regulation, camp populations, and public perception, which is important for deconstructing the 
mythology of the camp as the “Gateway to Freedom.” Aspects of that reputation were certainly 
credible. Returning prisoners of war, particularly those involved in the much-celebrated 1955/56 
homecomings, were most associated with development of that reputation. Other camp 
populations that fed into the freedom narrative included young refugees from East Germany, 
resettlers from Poland and other eastern European countries, and the Hungarian refugees. For 
those groups, acceptance and resettlement from Friedland were steps toward lives free of 
repression under communist government. 
Yet, one must also recognize that the mythology was instrumental for more than anti-
communist rhetoric. The camp administration carefully guarded the reputation of Friedland in 
order to protect the continued operation of the facility and increase social acceptance of the 
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refugees processed there. The labeling of Friedland as the “Gateway to Freedom” also obscured 
the facts that the camp returned hundreds of thousands of people who chose to return to homes in 
East Germany and administrators expelled troublesome youths back across the border. 
Moreover, administrators tried to close the gateway to ex-DPs and infiltrees, whom the camp 
authorities did not want to house and German communities were likewise unwilling to 
accommodate. The Gateway to Freedom mythology, based on some realistic elements, won out 
in the end, but it is important to point out the complications in the camp’s actual history. 
Although study of Friedland in this dissertation was limited to the years 1945 to 1960, the 
camp continued to operate long past that period. New instances of displacement created an 
ongoing need for the facility that had proven itself flexible and effective in receiving different 
types of refugees. In 1960 and 1961, the camp processed roughly 25,000 refugees from East 
Germany, primarily young men housed in a youth camp operated as an extension of the Uelzen 
refugee camp. The construction of the Berlin Wall and tighter sealing of the inner-German 
border meant that the camp processed a mere 731 East German refugees in 1962. For the most 
part during the 1960s, the Friedland camp was responsible for the registration and distribution of 
resettlers from Eastern Europe. Between 10,000 and 20,000 of the resettlers arrived at Friedland 
every year throughout that decade. During the 1970s, the inflow of resettlers increased. Whereas 
the camp processed 135,036 resettlers from 1960 to 1969, it processed 270,198 resettlers from 
1970 to 1979.829 A major reason for the increased flow of traffic during the 1970s was the 
signing of treaties with Soviet Union and Poland under Willy Brandt’s program of Ostpolitik, 
                                                 
829 Statistics from Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Inneres und Sport, “Grenzdurchgangslager Friedland, 1945-
2005,” Anhang. 
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which in the Polish case specifically provided for an easing of emigration restrictions on ethnic 
Germans.830 
Friedland expanded its reach to become the reception station for refugees from all over 
the globe during the 1970s. Beginning in 1973, Friedland began accepting asylum-seekers 
fleeing from the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile. In 1978, Friedland processed Vietnamese 
refugees, so-called “boat-people,” whom the West German government had committed to 
helping.831 These refugees had been taken from the Hai Hong, a rusting boat carrying nearly 
3,000 refugees with insufficient drinking water, food, and other supplies and which came to 
international attention as Southeast Asian countries refused to allow it to dock and disembark the 
refugees. Germany agreed to accept 657 people from the Hai Hong and an additional 363 
Vietnamese refugees from Thailand, all of whom were flown to Hannover and brought to 
Friedland for processing and distribution to the various German states.832 
The crumbling of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union led to further 
ethnic German emigration in the 1980s and 1990s. The first wave of resettlers peaked at 50,267 
people in 1981 and receded to a low point of 17,997 in 1984, when the camp also processed 
Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka.833 Beginning in 1987, East German refugees added to the inflow 
at Friedland. According to Jürgen Gückel’s history of the camp, “from March 1988 many Poles 
came, most of them with false papers.”834 The arrival of 134,102 people in 1988 and 171,813 
                                                 
830 Jürgen Gückel, 60 Jahre Lager Friedland: Zeitzeugen berichten (Göttingen: Göttinger Tageblatt GmbH & Co. 
KG, 2005), 66. 
831 Ibid. 
832 Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, “30 Jahre danach: Boat People in Deutschland” (Berlin: Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 2009), 
21. 
833 Gückel, 60 Jahre Lager Friedland, 66; and “Grenzdurchgangslager Friedland, 1945-2005,” Anhang. 
834 Gückel, 60 Jahre Lager Friedland, 66. 
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people in 1989 proved too much for the camp to handle, and authorities were forced to construct 
an annex in Osnabrück, Lower Saxony as well as to begin sending refugee directly to the 
German states. The inflow of “late-resettlers” after 1989 remained high until the German 
government tightened the standards for qualifying as a resettler. During the early part of the 
2000s, some 4,220 Jewish emigrants from the former Soviet Union also found reception at 
Friedland before being dispersed across Germany. In December 2004, the camp noted that it 
have processed 4 million people since its founding in 1945.835 Indeed, Friedland might have 
processed more people during its existence than any other refugee camp in the world. 
During visits to the camp in 2011 and 2012, it was clear that the present rhymed with the 
past at Friedland. The Nissen huts were gone, save for one maintained as an exhibition of the 
camp’s early history. The camp still housed individuals with German roots resettling in Germany 
from the former Soviet Union, though the connection to German heritage was so far in the past 
that Friedland had to implement cultural integration courses for the resettlers, including lessons 
in the German language. Indeed, signs all around the camp offered messages in German and 
Russian. The camp likewise housed refugees from civil conflict and repressive regimes, though 
in recent years they have come from Iraq, Libya, and Syria. In a parallel to past practice, 
however, intelligence services, including those from the United States, still questioned the 
refugees about conditions in the areas from which they fled. During the Cold War, intelligence 
agents had hoped to determine troop strengths and deployments, industrial capacity, and nuclear 
sites.836 Information gathered from recently arriving refugees fed into a “target-acquisition 
system” (Zielerfassungssystem) in which statements help to “confirm a target, and possibly 
                                                 
835 Gückel, 60 Jahre Lager Friedland, 66; and “Grenzdurchgangslager Friedland, 1945-2005,” Anhang. 
836 Paul Maddrell, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-1961 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), Chapter 4. 
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trigger an order to kill,” typically with a drone strike.837 Enemies and technology have changed, 
but the weapons, methods, and effects of war on refugees remain much the same. 
Finally, study of the Friedland camp as a form of regulating humanitarianism raises a 
series of questions about the concept and what lessons can be learned from the camp. First are 
the related questions of whether the camp became more humanitarian over time and if one could 
not reverse the concept to that of humanitarian regulation. To some extent, it does seem that the 
operation of the camp became more humanitarian over time. For the period lasting from 1945 to 
1960, improvements in material conditions in the camp and society more broadly made it less 
necessary to focus on strict regulation. Moreover, the gradual decrease in the number of people 
arriving at Friedland likewise made it possible to better care for them in a less coercive manner. 
For example, mandatory delousing with DDT seems to have fallen out of camp directives and 
possibly out of use after 1949.838 To be sure, there were sometimes different understandings of 
what was most humane and effective in helping refugees, such as the Anglo-German dispute 
over acceptance of resettlers or the treatment of recalcitrant youths. Yet, the camp was ultimately 
meant to ameliorate suffering, and regulation was not an end in itself. Aside from all of the 
problems in the camp’s administration, it does seem that Krause had clearly expressed the 
overall approach at Friedland: “The refugees are not there for us, but rather we are there for 
them.”839 
                                                 
837 John Goetz and Hans Leyendecker, “Deutsche Behörde horcht Asylbewerber aus,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20 
November 2013. 
838 Camp directives 123 and 126 from 1949 mentioned mandatory delousing of illegal border-crossers and living 
quarters; see Nds 386 Acc 16/83 Nr. 84. On the other hand, medical reports from the 1950s suggest that eventually 
the camp only used delousing procedures on individuals with actual infestations; see, for example, “Beaufsichtigung 
der Hygiene,” 5 April 1957, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 16, NHStA.  
839 Lagerordnung Nr. 1, 18 April 1946, Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 84, NHStA. 
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Whenever a mass displacement comes to the world’s attention, refugee camps stand at 
the center. In such cases, a natural question to ask is what the Friedland example teaches about 
resolving present-day crises. It is most instructive to think in terms of what worked well at 
Friedland and in the broader system of resettlement associated with the camp. The facility was 
extraordinarily effective in registering and redistributing individuals as quickly as possible. 
Registration was necessary for reestablishing identities and documenting claims for social aid, 
and the crucial element of redistribution was to settle individuals outside of refugee camps. Of 
course, that was not always possible; many refugees ended up in residential camps or other 
institutions when they could not be sent to families in private housing. Rapid resettlement in 
communities also depended on the fact that there was never any real question of needing to 
accept the refugees and integrate them into society, despite all of the complications of specific 
categorizations. In that respect, Friedland and the refugee system in West Germany differed from 
many other crises in which refugees, the host state, or both have no desire for integration but 
instead wish to return them to their former homes. Thus, the relative successes of the Friedland 
system were dependent upon special circumstances in which the camp did not need to confine 
refugees. 
In fact, a key lesson to learn from Friedland is that long-term accommodation in refugee 
camps is socially corrosive and the need to confine refugees in them leads to problems. Instead 
of integrating into local society, the refugees remain a sort of foreign element (the proverbial 
“other”) as long as they are kept in camps, exacerbating the difficulties of being accepted. The 
problems that consistently emerged in Friedland’s residential camp are suggestive of the 
harmfulness of extended camp life. Residents of the youth camp, the ex-DPs and infiltrees, and 
East German refugees all experienced problems with frustrations and mutual recriminations 
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among themselves and with camp personnel, making the camp an environment prone to conflict. 
Indeed, their experiences matched those in other camps, such as the problems experienced with 
Hungarian refugees in Hessen or the problems well documented for DP camps. Penning 
displaced individuals in refugee camps only prolonged and worsened problems because they had 
no real investment in the camp serving as their temporary-yet-indefinite accommodation nor in 
the society that was either unable or unwilling to accommodate them. For the successful 
resolution to displacement crises, much depends on the willingness of both parties (the refugees 
and the host society) to accept each other and work toward integration.  
  
APPENDIX A 
Overview of Persons Registered Between 1945 and 1960840 
Year 
Refugees, 
Expellees, 
and 
Evacuees 
(East to 
West)* 
Refugees, 
Expellees, 
and 
Evacuees 
(West to 
East) Resettlers 
Returnees 
to West 
Germany 
Returnees 
to East 
Germany 
Returnees 
Registered 
in Berlin 
Child 
Transports 
Foreign 
nationals 
(Hungarians 
in 1956) Others Total 
1945 344,493 198,474 0 8,104 0 0 0 2,024 0 553,095 
1946 493,090 41,189 0 40,375 4,259 0 0 4,186 0 583,099 
1947 58,555 17,438 0 65,245 64,664 0 0 19 0 205,921 
1948 22,248 3,402 0 129,281 50,019 0 765 0 0 205,715 
1949 11,027 2,530 0 149,688 374 0 2,365 403 0 166,387 
1950 6,207 1,464 34,162 20,966 148 0 1,608 743 0 65,298 
1951 1,416 563 19,010 991 84 0 770 706 1,186 24,726 
1952 3,981 214 3,258 772 12 0 99 42 1,646 10,024 
1953 2,972 166 1,778 5,954 0 29 173 0 684 11,756 
1954 148 56 1,583 4,626 0 131 198 0 675 7,417 
1955 432 10 1,581 8,771 0 1,279 102 0 675 12,850 
1956 402 0 17,107 3,849 0 0 39 3,555 663 25,615 
1957 323 0 100,076 1,140 0 0 0 0 1,612 103,151 
1958 217 0 122,539 1,368 0 0 0 0 2,926 127,050 
1959 277 0 22,481 1,191 0 0 0 0 434 24,383 
1960 10,739 0 11,667 733 0 0 0 0 182 23,321 
 Total 956,527 265,506 335,242 443,054 119,560 1,439 6,119 11,678 10,683 2,149,808 
 
                                                 
840 Reproduced from 20 Jahre Lager Friedland (Heidelberg: Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, und Kriegsgeschädigte, 1965), Anlage 3. 
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